Summary
claiming that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the rear driver
Summary of this case from Smith v. GrahamOpinion
04-21-2016
Errol MORGAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Scott BROWNER, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
The Sullivan Law Firm, New York (James A. Domini of counsel), for appellant. Hurwitz & Fine, P.C., Melville (Elizabeth A. Fitzpatrick of counsel), for respondents.
The Sullivan Law Firm, New York (James A. Domini of counsel), for appellant.
Hurwitz & Fine, P.C., Melville (Elizabeth A. Fitzpatrick of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Fernando Tapia, J.), entered December 29, 2014, which denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.
It is well settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle to "come forward with an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident" (Cabrera v. Rodriguez,
72 A.D.3d 553, 553, 900 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept.2010] ; see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 [2008] ; Joplin v. City of New York, 116 A.D.3d 443, 982 N.Y.S.2d 762 [1st Dept.2014] ).
Defendant asserts that the lead vehicle driven by plaintiff signaled to go left, but then continued driving through the intersection, and "abruptly stopped in the middle of the intersection." However, a claim that "the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence" on the part of the rear driver (see Cabrera, 72 A.D.3d at 553, 900 N.Y.S.2d 29 ; Joplin, 116 A.D.3d at 443, 982 N.Y.S.2d 762 ). We have repeatedly so held, particularly when the defendant driver fails to explain why he or she did not maintain a safe following distance (see Corrigan v. Porter Cab Corp., 101 A.D.3d 471, 472, 955 N.Y.S.2d 336 [1st Dept.2012] ; Santos v. Booth, 126 A.D.3d 506, 6 N.Y.S.3d 26 [1st Dept.2015] ; Santana v. Tic–Tak Limo Corp., 106 A.D.3d 572, 966 N.Y.S.2d 30 [1st Dept.2013] ; see e.g. Chowdhury v. Matos, 118 A.D.3d 488, 987 N.Y.S.2d 132 [1st Dept.2014] [allegation that the plaintiff stopped suddenly in intersection insufficient to rebut presumption] ). Plaintiff did not change lanes, but rather continued straight through the intersection after initially signaling left, distinguishing this case from others where the lead vehicle suddenly changes lanes and decelerates (see Tutrani, 10 N.Y.3d at 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 [jury properly allocated 50% fault to front-most driver, a police officer who suddenly changed lanes and decelerated on a highway, causing the plaintiff's vehicle to brake suddenly, after which it was struck in the rear by the co-defendant's vehicle] ). Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability.
SWEENY, J.P., RICHTER, MANZANET–DANIELS, GISCHE, JJ., concur.