Opinion
No. CIV-S-01-0725 DFL DAD.
August 19, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises from the January 2001 demolition of a building owned by plaintiff Mario Moreno ("Moreno"). In June 2005, the case was tried to a jury on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. During the trial, defendants made several Rule 50 motions based on their arguments that: (1) the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (2) there is insufficient evidence against defendant Max Fernandez ("Fernandez") to justify a verdict against him; (3) both the individual defendants and the City of Sacramento (the "City") are entitled to state law immunity; and (4) there is insufficient evidence to justify an award of punitive damages. (Mot. at 1-2.) The court took these motions under consideration to be decided, if necessary, after the verdict.
On June 10, 2005, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Moreno and against defendants Joshua Pino ("Pino"), John Vanella ("Vanella"), Fernandez, and the City on all claims. The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $330,000 for the Fourteenth Amendment violation and $37,000 for the Fourth Amendment violation. Additionally, the jury awarded $200,000 in punitive damages based on Pino's conduct and $150,000 based on Vanella's conduct. Judgment was entered in favor of Moreno on June 13, 2005.
Defendants filed this motion on June 29, 2005, renewing their request for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") under Rule 50 on the grounds raised during trial. They also bring this motion under Rule 60, arguing that the court erroneously entered judgment before hearing additional evidence relating to the qualified immunity defense. Finally, to support their qualified immunity argument, defendants seek to introduce additional testimony from the individual defendants as to their knowledge of the relevant law.
I.
A. Timeliness of the Motion
____ As an initial matter, Moreno argues that defendants' renewed Rule 50 motion is untimely because it was not made within ten days of the entry of judgment, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). (Opp'n at 1-3.) In the absence of a timely renewal of a motion for JMOL, the trial judge lacks the power to grant such relief.Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1998). This holds true even if the court takes the pre-verdict JMOL motion under advisement. Johnson v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 51-53, 73 S.Ct. 125 (1952) (rejecting argument that trial judge's express reservation of a decision on a Rule 50 motion relieves a party from duty under 50(b) to make a motion for judgment after verdict); Warkentien v. Vondracek, 633 F.2d 1, 2 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[E]xpress reservation of a directed verdict motion does not authorize a district court to direct a verdict contrary to the jury's decision in the absence of a motion for a judgment n.o.v."); 9 Moore's Fed. Practice § 50.41 (3d Ed. 2004).
Here, defendants filed their renewed Rule 50 motion on June 29, 2005, two days after the expiration of the ten-day period. While admitting that the motion was filed beyond the ten-day period, defendants contend that this motion is more appropriately viewed as a Rule 60 motion seeking relief from a judgment or order and, as such, is not untimely. (Reply at 2.) Specifically, defendants contend that the court entered judgment prematurely because they were denied the opportunity to present additional evidence following trial relating to the qualified immunity defense. (Id.)
Given defendants' confusion over the possibility of introducing new evidence following trial, the court has discretion under Rule 60 to vacate the entry of judgment and consider defendants' motion. See Leichihman v. Pickwick Int'l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding it within the court's equitable power to vacate the entry of judgment arising from mistake, and consider a motion for a new trial, where court had ruled during trial that it would receive evidence on certain issues after verdict was returned). However, before a court does so, a moving party must convince the court that "vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise." Local 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992). For the reasons given below, the court finds that defendants' Rule 50 motion lacks merit and that the additional evidence they seek to present is not relevant to the qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly, the court declines to vacate the judgment under Rule 60 and consider defendants' untimely Rule 50 motion.
B. Rule 50 Motion
A jury verdict cannot be disturbed on a motion for JMOL if each necessary element of the verdict is supported by "substantial evidence." Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as reasonable minds may accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence." Landes Contr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987). In short, JMOL should only be granted when "the evidence . . . permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury." Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002).
The court "should review all of the evidence in the record" to determine if substantial evidence supports each element necessary to the jury's verdict. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). When examining the full record, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Id. 1. Qualified Immunity
In reversing the court's earlier grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of qualified immunity. Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 2004 WL 1166530, at *1-3 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit found that, on the facts then before the court, Moreno raised a triable issue as to whether his "clearly established" constitutional rights had been violated. Id. The court deemed the law clearly established on both plaintiff's Fourth Amendment seizure and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims. When defendants renewed their request for qualified immunity following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the court refused to revisit the issue because of the Ninth Circuit's ruling. (03/01/2005 Order at 2.)
Defendants now renew their request for qualified immunity, relying upon nearly identical arguments to those raised in their earlier motions. (Mot. at 2-7.) However, defendants have identified no evidence presented at trial that calls into question either the jury's finding of constitutional violations or the Ninth Circuit's qualified immunity ruling. Indeed, to the extent that there were facts in dispute that might alter the qualified immunity analysis, those facts have been determined against the defendants. Accordingly, there is no basis for the court to revisit the qualified immunity issue.
Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit's ruling does not foreclose the court from reconsidering the qualified immunity issue. (Mot. at 2.) They assert that, even where a constitutional violation is clearly established, the court must still inquire as to whether a reasonable officer would understand that to be the case on the particular facts of the case. (Id. at 3.) Accordingly, defendants argue that even though the Ninth Circuit found violations of clearly established constitutional law, that does not foreclose a finding by the court that a reasonable officer would not understand that his conduct violated the law on the specific facts presented in this case. (Id.)
Additionally, they assert that the individual defendants' personal knowledge of the relevant law is pertinent to this qualified immunity inquiry. (Reply at 2.) They seek to introduce additional testimony from Pino, Vanella, and Fernandez on the following topics: (1) their general reliance on the city attorney for their knowledge of the law; (2) their efforts to keep up with developments in the law; and (3) their understanding and reading of the relevant case law.
Defendants' arguments are premised on a misunderstanding of the qualified immunity inquiry. The qualified immunity analysis contains only two steps: (1) was there a constitutional violation? and (2) if so, was the violation clearly established?Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). Although defendants correctly note that a court must analyze whether a reasonable officer would understand that his actions were unconstitutional on the facts of the present case, that inquiry is subsumed within the "clearly established" analysis. As the Supreme Court has held, "the relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id.
Therefore, when the Ninth Circuit held that the constitutional violations were clearly established, it found that a reasonable officer, confronted with the alleged facts of this particular case, would be on notice that his actions were unconstitutional. Accordingly, defendants' assertion that a reasonable officer would not have understood that his actions were unconstitutional on the specific facts is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's ruling.
Defendants' request for additional testimony is equally misplaced. The qualified immunity analysis is objective, not subjective. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). The inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates the constitution, and it incorporates "a presumptive knowledge of and respect for `basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.'" Id. at 815. Thus, the individual defendants' personal knowledge of the law and their efforts to stay abreast of changes in the law is irrelevant to this constitutional inquiry. In fact, the Supreme Court rejected a subjective component of the qualified immunity inquiry for the very purpose of preventing the need for testimony from individual officers as to their state of mind, subjective motivation, and knowledge of the law. Id. at 816-17. Accordingly, the court finds it unnecessary to hear additional testimony from the individual defendants.
For the above reasons, defendants' qualified immunity arguments lack merit.
2. Defendant Fernandez
Defendants also argue that Fernandez cannot be liable for either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violations because: (1) he was not personally involved in the actions leading to the demolition or the destruction of Moreno's personal possessions; and (2) no reasonable jury could find Fernandez liable for his supervision of Pino and Vanella or for his role in creating the City's demolition policies. (Mot. at 8.) The court disagrees. While, as Moreno concedes, there was no evidence presented that Fernandez personally participated in the events leading to the demolition and seizure, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Fernandez personally liable for his actions as a supervisor.
A supervisor may be held personally liable under § 1983 if there exists either: (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). A causal connection can be established by showing that the supervisor set "in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Id., quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, supervisory liability can be imposed against an official for "his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates," or "for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others." Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
Here, evidence at trial showed that Fernandez did not formally review the performance of Pino and Vanella, insure that they received any training, or check their work on a regular basis. (Opp'n at 17-18.) Furthermore, there was evidence that Fernandez helped create and implement the form repair agreement at issue in this case, but did not ensure that the agreement was used consistently with due process requirements. (Id. at 18.) There was also evidence that Fernandez, Pino, and Vanella were confused by their own procedures and that these procedures were applied inconsistently. In short, based on the evidence presented at trial, a jury could find that: (1) Fernandez created the policy that, in part, led to the violation of Moreno's constitutional rights; (2) the officials under his control lacked clear direction on the City's procedures for ensuring against due process and Fourth Amendment violations; and (3) Fernandez failed to provide adequate training and supervision to Pino and Vanella. Such evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of liability against Fernandez. Accordingly, defendants' argument with regard to Fernandez is without merit.
3. State Law Immunities
In addition to moving for qualified immunity, defendants also renew their request for state law immunity based on: (1) discretionary immunity under Cal. Gov't Code § 820.2; (2) law enforcement immunity under Cal. Gov't Code § 820.4; and (3) public entity immunity under Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2. (Mot. at 9-10.) Defendants simply reiterate arguments the court rejected in its March 1, 2005 summary judgment ruling. (03/01/2005 Order at 4-8.) Defendants provide no basis for revisiting the court's earlier ruling on these issues, as they do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court finds there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Pino and Vanella acted improperly, and without due care, in the manner in which they carried out the demolition and destroyed Moreno's personal possessions. Accordingly, defendants' renewed request for state law immunity lacks merit.
4. Punitive Damages
Finally, defendants challenge the jury's award of punitive damages, arguing that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support the award. (Mot. at 10-12.) However, the court finds the award is supported by substantial evidence and is not unconstitutionally excessive.
Defendants state that they are challenging the punitive damages award based upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. (Mot. at 10.) However, they base their argument entirely upon an analysis of the factors identified in BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996), which are used only to determine whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive. The court will assume that defendants are challenging the award on both the "insufficient evidence" and "unconstitutionally excessive" grounds.
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury was instructed that, to award punitive damages, they must find that "the conduct of the defendant under consideration was malicious, or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights." Defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding because Pino and Vanella were simply enforcing the city's statutes, not acting with deliberate indifference or intentional malice. (Id. at 11.) Moreover, they note that they warned Moreno on several occasions of their intent to demolish his building if certain repairs were not made. (Id.)
The court finds the evidence sufficient to support the punitive damages award. Based on the evidence presented at trial, a jury could reasonably have found that Pino: (1) took steps to demolish the building although he had never seen it and had not inspected it; (2) demolished the building even though Vanella, the inspector, did not recommend demolishing it and had continued to approve repairs in the weeks prior to demolition; (3) intentionally misled the City Attorney's Office to gain approval for demolishing the building by incorrectly representing that an inspection had been done three days earlier and by including no photographs of the building taken after 1999; (4) told the jury that he had performed the final investigation himself when that was not true; and (5) intentionally misled Deputy City Attorney Wang on the day of the demolition by denying any knowledge of the status of the demolition. (Opp'n at 12-16.) Likewise, a jury could reasonably have found that Vanella: (1) destroyed Moreno's personal property with knowledge that it remained in the building; and (2) participated in the demolition of the building, and thus the personal property, despite his own belief that the building was not "dangerous." Such facts are sufficient to support a finding of intentional malice or deliberate indifference against Pino and Vanella.
For similar reasons, the punitive damages award is not unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court has articulated three guideposts for determining whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendants' conduct; (2) the disparity between harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and his punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996). The most important of these factors is reprehensibility. Id. at 575.
Defendants base their entire argument on the reprehensibility factor. (Mot. at 11-12.) In determining the reprehensibility of the conduct, a court must consider whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health and safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003). Based on these factors, defendants contend that Pino's and Vanella's conduct was not reprehensible. (Mot. at 11-12.)
However, as discussed above, sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could find that Pino and Vanella acted with intentional malice. Moreover, the ratio of the punitive damages award to the compensatory damages award weighs heavily in favor of finding the award not excessive. For both Pino and Vanella, the ratio is less than 1:1. While refusing to establish a solid line, the Supreme Court has held that single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process than higher multipliers. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Defendants have a heavy burden, therefore, of showing that a less than 1:1 ratio is excessive. Defendants fail to meet this burden.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Rule 50 motion and their request to present additional evidence is without merit. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise its discretion to vacate the entry of judgment under Rule 60 and consider defendants' untimely Rule 50 motion. Therefore, defendants' Rule 50 and Rule 60 motions are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.