Opinion
No. CV 02-0174267 S
February 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter is before the court on the defendant, West's Sales and Service, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, dated January 24, 2005. The defendant claims that since it possessed no right, title, or interest in the subject vehicle at the time of the alleged accident, it is not liable for plaintiff's injuries and is entitled to summary judgment.
On October 2, 2002, the plaintiff, Thomas F. Moran, IV, filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Mathew R. Ross and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), alleging injuries caused from an automobile accident occurring on November 29, 2001. Mathew R. Ross is alleged to be the operator of the vehicle, and GMAC is alleged to be responsible for the injuries pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-154a, as it "leased and owned the vehicle involved in said accident and are liable for any damage to any person caused by the operation of such motor vehicle leased to the same extent as the defendant operator."
On November 17, 2003, the court, Agati, J., granted plaintiff's motion to cite in West's Sales and Service, Inc. (West), as the plaintiff claimed in his motion that West was the actual lessor of the subject vehicle. In count four of his amended complaint dated November 20, 2003, the plaintiff alleges that West is responsible for plaintiff's injuries pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-154a, "in that the defendant, GMAC, leased and owned the vehicle involved in said accident and are liable for any damage to any person caused by the operation of such motor vehicle leased to the same extent as the defendant operator." In its answer filed on January 16, 2004, the defendant, West, denied the allegation.
The defendant, Gary Ross, was also cited in at that time. Gary Ross is the father of the defendant, Matthew Ross, and was allegedly the lessee of the lease with West.
The court assumes that the amended complaint contains a scrivener's error, and that counsel intended to allege West, rather than GMAC.
Now before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment (#123) which was filed on February 2, 2005, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-44. The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because it did not have any right, title, or interest in the vehicle at the time of the accident in question and that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to that point. The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion for summary judgment. This was accompanied by several exhibits: an affidavit from Paul West, president of West Chevrolet, dba West's Sales and Service, Inc.; a power of attorney from GMAC, appointing West as its true and lawful attorney in fact; an application for registration and a copy of the registration from the state of Connecticut, department of motor vehicles; a copy of the certificate of title; a copy of the lease between West and Gary R. Ross; a credit application from Gary R. Ross and notice of approval of the lease from GMAC; a certificate of origin and a sales receipt.
On February 4, 2005, the plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
I.
Practice Book § 17-49 "provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombardo's Ravioli Kitchen, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Conn. 222, 237, 842 A.2d 1089 (2004). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way . . . To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, [t]he movant must show that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). "A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).
II.
The facts necessary to assess West's potential liability in this case are not in dispute. It is not disputed that the alleged accident occurred on November 29, 2001, in Woodbury, Connecticut. At the time of the incident, the defendant Matthew R. Ross was the operator of a 2000 Chevrolet S-10 pickup, and GMAC was the owner of the vehicle.
The vehicle was initially leased by Gary Ross on October 26, 1999. On or before that date, agents or employees of West prepared the necessary application, lease and registration documents, which were executed by Gary Ross and representatives from West. The lease itself provided that the Lessor (Retailer) will assign this lease and sell the vehicle to General Motors Acceptance Corporation ('GMAC')." The lease was assigned to GMAC, and the vehicle was purchased by GMAC on October 26, 1999. As of October 26, 1999, the title of the vehicle was in the name of GMAC.
The plaintiff argues that West is liable for any injuries to him pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-154a. That statute provides:
Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.
The plaintiff claims that since West leased the vehicle, and owned it at the time of the lease's execution, they are liable under this statute for injuries to the plaintiff.
This motion involves a matter of statutory interpretation. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes §§ 1-2z (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gomes v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 87 Conn.App. 416, 422.
It is clear from the text of the statute itself that in order for a lessor to be liable under the statute, it must be the owner of the vehicle. At the time of the accident, West was clearly not the owner, and had not been the owner or lessor for over two years. To hold a party liable under these circumstances would lead to absurd and unworkable results. Given the fact that another party to the lawsuit is allegedly the owner and assignee of the lease, the legislature could not have intended to hold a prior owner liable under this statute.
In Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 284, our supreme court outlined the purposes of C.G.S. § 14-154a. "It cannot be regarded otherwise than as an expression of legislative judgment as to the extent — beyond the limitations of the general principles of respondeat superior and the `family-car doctrine' — to which the owner of a motor vehicle which he entrusts to another should be liable for the acts of the latter . . . We have consistently construed the statute as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental . . . By virtue of the express terms of the statute the owner lessor is made the alter ego of the operator so that the latter's acts with respect to the operation of the car . . . are in law the acts of the owner-lessor." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The supreme court has interpreted the statute to impose liability at the time of the accident to the owner-lessor. Since West did not own the vehicle at the time of the accident, they should not be held liable for the operator's negligence under § 14-154a. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
Matasavage, J.