Opinion
No. 05-07-00984-CR
Opinion issued January 24, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-56026-WH.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christopher Colin Moore appeals his conviction for possession of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence which the trial judge denied. Appellant then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that provided appellant could appeal the ruling on his motion to suppress. The trial judge deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on community supervision for four years, and assessed a $2000 fine. In a single issue, appellant claims the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In his sole issue, appellant claims the trial judge abused his discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress because Officer Anya Eissele's testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress was not credible. Appellant argues that, because Officer Eissele provided no credible articulable facts to support her decision to stop him, the stop was not valid. Appellant further argues the subsequent search of his car, which revealed four grams or more but less than two hundred grams of cocaine, was unlawful and that the cocaine evidence should have been suppressed. We disagree. We review a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We do not engage in our own factual review; rather, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We give trial judges "almost complete deference in determining historical facts." St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We review the record to determine whether the trial judge's ruling is supported by the record and correct under some theory of law applicable to the case. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In this case, the trial judge found Officer Eissele stopped appellant because of "outstanding traffic warrants." The judge further stated he had examined the State's warrant exhibits and that the warrants "appear to be good warrants in which probable cause is stated in the affidavits." Appellant does not challenge the validity of the traffic warrants. After appellant was arrested, a search of his car revealed cocaine. If an officer discovers a valid warrant for an individual's arrest and arrests the individual under the authority of that warrant, any evidence found during a subsequent search incident to the arrest is admissible regardless of whether any illegality occurred in the initial detention. Brooks v. State, 830 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (citing Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973)); see Lewis v. State, 915 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.) (holding that discovery of outstanding warrant during illegal detention breaks connection between primary taint and subsequently discovered evidence); Welcome v. State, 865 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd) (when officer detected outstanding warrant, he had probable cause to arrest appellant; police officer with probable cause to make legal arrest has right to search arrestee for objects immediately associated with arrestee's person); Fletcher v. State, 90 S.W.3d 419, 421 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (trial judge did not err in denying motion to suppress because contraband found on appellant and in car was fruit of two searches conducted once appellant was arrested via outstanding warrant, not initial stop); Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (trial judge did not err in denying motion to suppress because appellant's arrest, subsequent to discovery of outstanding warrant, was legal and marijuana discovered thereafter was not obtained in violation of law). Because appellant was arrested on outstanding traffic warrants, any evidence found during a subsequent search incident to the arrest was admissible. The trial judge did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the cocaine evidence discovered in appellant's car following his arrest. We overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.