Opinion
C. A. 1:23-6110-JFA-SVH
03-05-2024
Richard Kareem Moore, Plaintiff, v. Harpfear; Christopher Emeneker; Inv. Sean Morrow; and W.Van Cala, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Richard Kareem Moore (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is detained in the Aiken County Detention Center. He filed this amended complaint alleging a violation of his constitutional rights by Harpfear, Christopher Emeneker, Inv. Sean Morrow, and W.Van Cala (“collectively Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff generally alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by conducting an illegal search and seizure without a warrant or evidence. [ECF No. 7 at 4]. He further maintains Defendants tampered with evidence and had “[n]o bodycams for video footage.” Id. He states Defendants pursued frivolous or malicious claims without documented facts and made false charges and slanderous accusations against him. Id.
More specifically, Plaintiff claims that on January 8, 2023, between 9:00 PM and 11:00 PM, he was awakened and arrested at Sleep Inn Hotel. Id. at 5. He indicates he was not informed of the reason for his arrest, read his Miranda rights, or shown a warrant at the time of his arrest. Id. He asserts Defendants conducted an illegal search, seized money and property from the hotel room, and falsely imprisoned him. Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff alleges his injuries include posttraumatic stress disorder, physical and mental stress, pain, and suffering, and aches and pains from overeating and nonaerobic activities. Id. at 6. He requests the court find video footage from Sleep Inn Hotel and bodycam footage Id. He further “[d]esire[s] financial compensation for everything involved with this case.” Id.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Younger Abstention Bars Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff's complaint relates to state criminal charges currently pending against him. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Plaintiff states he is facing criminal charges, which satisfies the first part of the test. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Fourth Circuit has addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Plaintiff can pursue his claims related to the legality of his detention during the disposition of his criminal charges. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks interference in his state criminal case, the complaint is subject to summary dismissal. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
2. Monetary Damages
Plaintiff also states he “desire[s] financial compensation for everything involved with this case.” [ECF No. 7 at 6]. Plaintiff generally alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by conducting an illegal search and seizure without a warrant or evidence. [ECF No. 7 at 4]. However, subsequent to filing his amended complaint, Plaintiff submitted a supplement to his complaint that includes the underlying incident report. [ECF No. 18-1]. The incident report states “Cpl. Emeneker spoke with Ashley, who was identified as the one primarily in charge of the room. Ashley provided written consent to search the room.” [ECF No. 18-1 at 12]. Also included in the supplement Plaintiff provided is the signed written consent in which Ashley Wilson authorized Emeneker to search the hotel room. Id. at 10. Plaintiff's claim of an illegal search is barred because consent makes a search reasonable, functioning as an exception to both the warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974). Further, “consent from any person with ‘common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the . . . effects sought to be inspected' suffices.” United States v. Perry, 92 F.4th 500, 512 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Matlock at 171). In his original complaint, Plaintiff states that he admitted the drugs were his when he was awoken by Emeneker and questioned about the drugs. [ECF No. 1 at 2]. Therefore, assuming the truth in Plaintiff's own pleadings, his amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Federal courts typically stay rather than dismiss claims for money damages during the pendency of the state court proceedings. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). However, dismissal, as opposed to stay, is appropriate when the plaintiff's damages claims are “plainly barred” for other reasons. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2006).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed without leave for further amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).