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Moore v. Baylor Health Care System

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Sep 3, 2004
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2354-B (N.D. Tex. Sep. 3, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2354-B.

September 3, 2004


MEMORANDUM ORDER


Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 30, 2004 ("Defendant's Motion"). After review of the pleadings and evidence filed with the Court, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for the following reasons.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff Lois Moore ("Plaintiff") was employed by Defendant Baylor Health Care System ("Defendant") as a Learning Specialist who helped develop and deliver training programs for Defendant. (Pl.'s Dep. p. 21:3-12) Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment in August 2002 after receiving complaints about Plaintiff's job performance. (Wright Aff. ¶¶ 6, 13, 20)

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant, asserting claims of employment discrimination (race and age), retaliation, various types of negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant removed this suit to federal court on October 9, 2003, after Plaintiff amended her state court petition to include claims under federal law, specifically the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant moved for summary judgment on June 30, 2004. Plaintiff then requested and was granted an extra seven (7) days in which to respond to Defendant's Motion. To date, Plaintiff has filed no pleadings or evidence in response to Defendant's Motion, and the Motion is now ripe for decision.

II. Analysis

Plaintiff's lack of response to Defendant's Motion means that Plaintiff has not designated specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and is, therefore, relegated to her unsworn pleadings, which are not summary judgment evidence. Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)). Thus, while Plaintiff's failure to respond does not permit the Court to enter a "default" summary judgment, the Court is allowed to accept the evidence presented by Defendant as undisputed. Eversley v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding a party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports her claim). As such, this Court accepts Defendant's evidentiary assertions as undisputed. See Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458 (noting the court does not have the duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16n. 17 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). The Court now addresses the merits of Defendant's Motion.

Employment Discrimination Under ADEA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 — Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of age and race in making its decision to terminate her employment. (Pl.'s First Am. Pet. Jury Demand ¶ 7) Defendant asserts that its decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment was based on Plaintiff's documented performance problems and an unprofessional confrontation Plaintiff had with one of the attendees of her training sessions. (Wright Aff. ¶¶ 3-20; Eubank Aff. ¶¶ 3-14) The Court finds that Defendant has presented evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment actions about which Plaintiff complains. By failing to produce any evidence to dispute Defendant's reason, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's reason is a pretext for discrimination. Therefore, Defendant's Motion on Plaintiff's discrimination claims under the ADEA, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is GRANTED.

While not necessary to this Court's decision, the Court notes that Plaintiff has also failed to present evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of age or race discrimination.

Retaliation — Plaintiff claims that Defendant's decision to terminate her employment was in retaliation for Plaintiff's complaint to Human Resources regarding her supervisor. (Pl.'s First Am. Pet. Jury Demand ¶¶ 5, 7) Defendant asserts that its decision was based on Plaintiff's documented performance problems and an unprofessional confrontation Plaintiff had with one of the attendees of her training sessions. (Wright Aff. ¶¶ 3-20; Eubank Aff. ¶¶ 3-14) The Court finds that Defendant has presented evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment actions about which Plaintiff complains. By failing to produce any evidence to dispute Defendant's reason, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's reason is a pretext for retaliation. Therefore, Defendant's Motion on Plaintiff's retaliation claims is GRANTED.

Similar to her discrimination claims, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of retaliation.

Negligence ( including Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention, and Supervision) — Plaintiff claims that Defendant was negligent in failing to insure that discrimination did not occur at the workplace and in failing to properly train Plaintiff's supervisors. (Pl.'s First Am. Pet. Jury Demand ¶ 7) Defendant denies Plaintiff's claims and asserts that the record lacks any evidence of negligence on the part of Defendant. (Def.'s Motion pp. 9-10; Pl.'s Dep. pp. 55:11-56:6) The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of negligence of any sort by Defendant. Therefore, Defendant's Motion on Plaintiff's negligence claims is GRANTED.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress — Plaintiff claims that Defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her by discriminating against her, requiring her to perform menial tasks, and asking that Plaintiff send all e-mails through her supervisor. (Pl.'s First Am. Pet. Jury Demand ¶¶ 6, 7) Defendant denies Plaintiff's claims and asserts that the record lacks any evidence to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Def.'s Motion p. 10; Wright Aff. ¶ 5) The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented no evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct, intentional or reckless acts by Defendant, or severe emotional distress by Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant's Motion on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is GRANTED.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claims of discrimination, retaliation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Moore v. Baylor Health Care System

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Sep 3, 2004
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2354-B (N.D. Tex. Sep. 3, 2004)
Case details for

Moore v. Baylor Health Care System

Case Details

Full title:LOIS H. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. BAYLOR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Sep 3, 2004

Citations

Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2354-B (N.D. Tex. Sep. 3, 2004)