Opinion
No. 3-CV-03-2354-P
April 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Baylor Health Care System's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, filed October 21, 2003. Plaintiff filed a Response on November 10, 2003, and Defendant filed its Reply on November 21, 2003. After reviewing the pleadings, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
I. Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff originally filed this action in state court, asserting state law claims of negligent supervision, negligent retention and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Pl.'s Pet. at 1-2.) Plaintiff subsequently amended her original petition to include claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. (Pl.'s Am. Pet. at 2.) Thereafter, Defendant, a Texas corporation, sought removal to this Court, based on federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal at 2-3.)
29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
This controversy arose out of Defendant's allegedly discriminatory conduct between April and August 2002, which culminated in Plaintiff's termination on August 30, 2002. (Pl.'s Am. Pet. at 2-3.) Plaintiff, a sixty-nine year old, Caucasian female, worked for the Defendant for approximately thirteen years. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her age and race. Id. Plaintiff asserts that, on two occasions, she attempted to inform upper management of the alleged discrimination. However, upon reporting the discrimination, Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to retaliation. Id. at 3-4. On August 9, 2002, according to Plaintiff's Discrimination Statement to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Plaintiff was given the choice to either resign and sign a liability release or be terminated. Upon refusing to sign the release, Plaintiff was terminated on August 30, 2002. Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In support of their motions, the parties have attached exhibits which they offer for the Court's consideration. The Court at its discretion may, sua sponte, convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. However, the Court has chosen to disregard the offered evidence and render judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the pleadings of the parties.
II. Legal Standard — Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint when a defendant shows that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted. See Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). Under the rule of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), a claim should not be dismissed unless it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. The Court must render its decision taking the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and taking its allegations as true. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Court limits its inquiry to whether plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support claims and does not address whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Johnson v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1994). However, dismissal is proper when "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1986).
III. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot obtain relief because the applicable statute of limitations has expired on Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to (1) file a Charge with the appropriate agency within three hundred days of the occurrence of the alleged discrimination, and (2) bring her suit within ninety days of receiving her right to sue. In response, Plaintiff contends that her claim is not barred by either the three-hundred-day filing period or the ninety-day limitations period. Plaintiff argues that, in addition to her official Charge, filed on June 11, 2003, she satisfied the filing requirements by submitting a Discrimination Statement to the EEOC, on February 14, 2003, and a Charge Questionnaire to the EEOC, on April 9, 2003. Furthermore, Plaintiff relies on the initial filing in state court to satisfy the ninety-day limitations period which began when she received her right to sue letter from the EEOC. The Court will address each of Defendant's arguments in turn.
A. Three-Hundred-Day Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations defense may be raised on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate when it can be determined from the face of a complaint that the limitations period has expired. However, where the alleged failure to comply with the statute of limitations does not appear on the face of the complaint, a motion for summary judgment is the proper procedure. See Marshall v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 625 F.2d 1300, 1302 (5th Cir. 1980) ( citing Higgenbotham v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 607 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1979)). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a plaintiff need not set forth all the facts upon which the claim is based in her complaint. Rather, a short and plain statement of the claim is sufficient if it gives the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
Under both the ADEA and Title VII, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within three hundred days from the occurrence of the discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). "[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). For purposes of analyzing the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims of discrimination, the requirements of the ADEA and Title VII are similarly applied. See Galvan v. Bexar County, Tex., 785 F.2d 1289, 1305 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff filed her official Charge of Discrimination with the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR") on June 11, 2003. Defendant asserts that the period began to run on August 9, 2002, when Plaintiff was given notice of termination; however, Plaintiff contends that the claim did not accrue until August 30, 2002, the actual date of Plaintiff's termination.
The cases that the Defendant cites in support of specifying August 9, 2002 as the date of the discriminatory act are not definitive on the issue. In McNeill v. Atchinson, Topeka Santa Fe Railway Company, the district court determined that the statute of limitations for the claim of discrimination began to run upon notice that McNeill would not receive a promotion. 878 F. Supp. 986, 989-90 (S.D. Tex. 1995); see also, Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Elec. Workers v. Robbins Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1976). In that case, the denial of the promotion was the discriminatory act and not the employee's subsequent discharge. In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the discriminatory act was her actual termination, which did not occur until August 30, 2002. The difference is that, in McNeill, the notice denying the promotion was the final act taken by the employer and no subsequent action had to be taken in order to effectuate a discriminatory act. While Plaintiff was given notice of her impending termination, Defendant was still required to terminate Plaintiff in order for the discrimination to come about. Thus, for purposes of this motion, in construing the facts and inferences as favorable to the Plaintiff, the statute of limitations began to run on August 30, 2002, when the discriminatory act occurred. Because the effective date of the discriminatory act is determined to be August 30, 2002, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the Discrimination Statement of Plaintiff submitted on February 14, 2003 or the Charge Questionnaire submitted April 9, 2003 satisfy the requirements of a Charge in determining if Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendant also asserts that, even if the entire claim is not barred by the statue of limitations, to the extent any claims of alleged discrimination occurred more than three hundred days before Plaintiff filed the Charge of Discrimination, such claims are barred. "Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for purposes of determining liability." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). Accordingly, whether such acts are barred depends on if the claim is based on a hostile work environment or on a discrete act of discrimination. Id. at 115. In determining whether a claim of discrimination qualifies as a hostile work environment, the court should look at "all the circumstances,' including 'the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" Id. at 116. Whether a hostile work environment exists is a question of fact and therefore not appropriately resolved in a motion to dismiss unless it appears that there are no facts favorable to the non-movant which tend to show a hostile work environment. Here, the facts as plead, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, suggest that the claim of discrimination is based upon multiple discriminatory acts which occurred over a period of several months. Accordingly, Plaintiff has properly raised a factual issue regarding a hostile work environment and a continuing violation. Thus, Defendant's Motion regarding claims of discrimination which occurred outside of the limitations period does succeed.
B. Ninety-day Statute of Limitations
Defendant's final contention is that, even if Plaintiff satisfied the three-hundred-day statute of limitations for filing a Charge, Plaintiff failed to file a lawsuit within ninety days of receiving a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. The EEOC enforcement provisions stipulate that, upon notice, the complainant may bring a civil action within ninety days of such notice being given. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1). Plaintiff was issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on June 11, 2003. Plaintiff filed her original petition in state court on August 28, 2003; however, Plaintiff failed to allege any claims arising under the ADEA, Title VII, or the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Thus, the issue presented on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is whether the claims added in Plaintiff's amended petition relate back to the filing date of Plaintiff's original petition for purposes of the ninety-day statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's Amended Petition, filed Octocber 1, 2003, added claims of age discrimination and race discrimination arising under the ADEA and Title VII, respectively.
"An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2).
"[I]f a plaintiff seeks to correct a technical difficulty, state a new legal theory of relief, or amplify the facts alleged in the prior compliant, then relation back is allowed." F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1386 (5th Cir. 1994). In Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of relation back in assessing the timeliness of a Title VII claim in an amended complaint. In Sessions, the court held that the amendment would relate back to the date of the original filing "[s]o long as the Title VII claim is based on the discrimination originally charged in the complaint" since the "claim works no hardship on the defendant for the original complaint furnished adequate notice of the nature of the suit." Id. The Fifth Circuit has also liberally applied the relation back doctrine in situations where a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint to include an ADEA claim. Galvan v. Bexar County, Tex., 785 F.2d 1298, 1305-1307 (5th Cir. 1986); see also, Catoire v. Caprock Telecomm. Corp., 2002 WL 927780 (E.D. La., May 7, 2002) (applying relation back doctrine to Title VII and ADEA claims).
Although Plaintiff asserted only state law claims in the original Petition, the claims were based on the same set of facts that gave rise to Plaintiff's federal claims in the amended Petition. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Plaintiff's intent in pleading state law claims in the original Petition is irrelevant. In order to allow a claim to relate back to a previous pleading, the only inquiry is whether the operative facts necessary to support the amended claims are the same, both claims rely on the same evidence, and the defendant has notice of the particular facts upon which the claim is based. Catoire, 2002 WL 927780 at *2; see also, Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 1989) (allowing relation back of Title VII claim); Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing relation back of ADEA claim). Therefore, because the Title VII claim and the ADEA claim arise out of the same set of facts as the original petition filed in state court, the amended claims relate back to the original filing date and Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the 90-day filing period.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).