Opinion
CV 01-03552 FMC (Rcx)
September 28, 2001
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed on August 20, 2001, by defendants Michael Antonovich, Yvonne Burke, Donald Knabe, Gloria Molina, and Zev Yaroslavsky. These defendants are all current or former Los Angeles County supervisors and are therefore referred to collectively as "the supervisor defendants." The Court deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Local Rule 7.11. Accordingly, the hearing set for October 1, 2001, is removed from the Court's calendar. For the reasons set forth below, the Court HEREBY DENIES the motion for summary judgment.
I. Introduction
A. Nature of the Action
This action arises out of race riots at the Los Angeles County Jail that occurred April 24-25, 2000. Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and allege that their Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and equal protection rights were violated. Plaintiffs also allege that they were the victims of a racial conspiracy, and assert causes of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and § 1986.
Plaintiffs' claims against the supervisor defendants are based on an alleged policy of the supervisors to indemnify deputy sheriffs when punitive damages are awarded against those deputy sheriffs for their unconstitutional actions.
In the present motion, the supervisor defendants seek summary judgment as to all claims asserted against them on the basis of absolute and/or qualified community. Plaintiffs oppose the present motion, and argue that, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), they are entitled to additional discovery before resolution of the community issue at the summary judgment stage.
B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiffs allege that the riot was foreseeable because defendants knew of the jail's overcrowded conditions, knew the racial disparity of the jail, and knew of the ongoing racial hostilities among the jail's inmates. In spite of this knowledge, defendants did not racially segregate the inmates.
C. Evidence Offered by the Supervisor Defendants
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the supervisor defendants have offered the declaration of Violet Varona-Lukens, the Clerk for the Board of Supervisors for the County of Los Angeles. Varona-Lukens states that her staff's search of the computerized records of proceedings of the Board of Supervisors from November 1, 1996, to April 24, 2000, revealed that no resolutions were adopted by the Board of Supervisors to indemnify or hold harmless deputy sheriffs against whom awards of punitive damages were made.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A. Rule 56(c)
Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 56(c); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Whether a fact is material is determined by looking to the governing substantive law; if the fact may affect the outcome, it is material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the "adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Mere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists does not preclude the use of summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Court construes all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1995).
B. Rule 56(f)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that if a party opposing summary judgment demonstrates a need for further discovery in order to obtain facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the trial court may deny the motion for summary judgment or continue the hearing to allow for such discovery. In makingaa Rule 56(f) motion, a party opposing summary judgment "must make clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment." Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998).
III. Absolute Immunity
Defendants argue that the supervisor defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions because those actions are legislative in nature. This argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit.
In Trevino v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) ( Trevino I), the Ninth Circuit held that city council members who voted to indemnify police officers for punitive damages awards were not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions because the members' actions were executive rather than legislative in nature.
After Trevino I, however, the Supreme Court decided Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 118 S.Ct. 966 (1998), in which the Court held that local legislators who doted to eliminate a department of local government were absolutely immune for their actions, notwithstanding that their votes were allegedly due to their racially discriminatory animus and desire to retaliate against the department head for her exercise of First Amendment rights. The Court noted that the legislators' actions were legislative in nature, and rejected the lower courts' reasoning that the measure passed by the city council was an individually targeted administrative act, rather than a legislative elimination of a position. The Court concluded that whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than the motive of the actor.
Bogan, is neither dispositive nor instructive regarding what constitutes a legislative act; as the Court reads Bogan, the Supreme Court neither expanded nor contracted the scope of what is properly considered a legislative act in deciding Bogan,. Accordingly, the holding of Trevino I has survived the Supreme Court's decision in Bogan,. Because Trevino I controls, this Court holds that the County
Supervisors are not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in voting to indemnify awards of punitive damages against police officers.
IV. Qualified Immunity
The Ninth Circuit revisited the Trevino case, this time in the context of determining whether county supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996) ( Trevino II). In Trevino II, the Ninth Circuit held that the county supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that voting to indemnify police officers' punitive damages awards violated any law or constitutional provision.
Subsequently, however, the Ninth Circuit has held that Trevino I clearly established that voting to indemnify police officers punitive damages awards could violate the law or a constitutional provision if such decisions were made in bad faith. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1293 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court distinguished the holding of Trevino II as being required by chronological necessity because the events at issue occurred before the decision in Trevino I. Cunningham held that although the votes that occurred prior to the decision in Trevino II (i.e., prior to November 1, 1996) could not support a § 1983 claim, the votes that occurred after Trevino II could support a § 1983 claim if those votes were made in bad faith.
The supervisor defendants have offered evidence that no resolutions were adopted by the Board of Supervisors to indemnify or hold harmless deputy sheriffs against whom awards of punitive damages were made after November 1, 1996.
Plaintiffs argue that they should be permitted to engage in additional discovery regarding this issue. Plaintiffs contend that, despite defendants' evidence, they can show that the supervisor defendants have, in fact, indemnified punitive damages awards after November 1, 1996. Additionally, plaintiffs argue that they can establish that the supervisor defendants have settled, or have bonded on appeal, punitive damages awards after November 1, 1996.
The Court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden under Rule 56(f) to establish what information is sought in discovery and how that information would preclude summary judgment. In addition to requesting the opportunity to verify the information contained in the clerk's declaration, Plaintiffs request discovery regarding settlements and bonds issued as to punitive damages awards. Although Trevino II and Cunningham dealt only with votes to indemnify police officers, the Court sees no meaningful distinction to be made between a vote to indemnify and a vote to settle punitive damages awards. Indemnification of punitive damages awards may support a cause of action under § 1983 because, it is alleged, police officers understand that they may engage in unconstitutional acts without fear of personal financial consequences. The freedom from fear of personal financial consequences is unchanged regardless of whether the action by the county supervisors is to vote to indemnify or to vote to settle a punitive damages award. The vote to bond on appeal implicates, at least on a temporary basis, the same freedom from fear of personal financial consequences. Accordingly, plaintiffs must be permitted to conduct discovery into the actions taken by the county supervisors, after November 1, 1996, with respect to awards of punitive damages against police officers.
As has been noted previously by the Court, the causal nexus between the supervisors' actions and the alleged unconstitutional actions by individual police officers is tenuous. See Moss v. Gates, No. CV-00-07164 GAF (AJWx), 2001 WL 739806 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (Feess, J.) (noting that the alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights by police officers cannot be presumed naturally to flow from city council members' decisions regarding indemnification of punitive damages awards). Nevertheless, the allegations of bad faith votes to indemnify have been held by the Ninth Circuit to sufficiently allege a § 1983 claim. The Court holds that the causal connection between the acts of settling punitive damages awards or bonding those awards on appeal is no less tenuous than the act of indemnifying these awards.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs or their counsel conducted discovery into this issue in another case. Plaintiffs are still entitled to discovery in this case. To the extent that plaintiffs' discovery efforts are alleged to be abusive, the proper procedure is for defendants to seek a protective order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), not to seek summary judgment of plaintiffs' claims.
V. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court HEREBY DENIES the supervisor defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice.