Opinion
5:23-CV-00041-FL
06-02-2023
Carrie Montgomery, Plaintiff, v. Johnston County Department of Social Services, et al., Defendants.
ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
Robert T. Numbers, II United States Magistrate Judge
Carrie Montgomery, representing herself, has sued the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Johnston County, the Johnston County Department of Social Services, several JCDSS social workers, and Allan DeLaine (her former attorney) for wrongs that allegedly stem from losing custody over her grandchildren. Compl., D.E. 1.
Montgomery claims that the Defendants violated both state and federal law by entering her home without permission to speak with the children, removing them from her care, and refusing to notify her about state-court child custody proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 33-48. She also contends that DeLaine failed to communicate with her before the child custody proceedings, which led the state District Court to rule that the children should remain in JCDSS's custody. See id. ¶¶ 30, 48. Montgomery has appealed that order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Id. ¶ 30.
Before the court are five motions:
• Montgomery's motion for court-appointed counsel (D.E. 19);
• DeLaine's motion to dismiss and for attorney's fees (D.E. 6);
• A motion to dismiss filed by JCDSS and the three social workers (D.E. 16);
• NCDHHS's motion to dismiss (D.E. 26); and
• Johnston County's motion to dismiss (D.E. 33).
For the reasons discussed below, the court denies Montgomery's request for an attorney. The undersigned further recommends that the court refrain from hearing her equitable claims for relief under Younger abstention. The court should then dismiss Montgomery's federal claims for damages and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims. In sum, the court should dismiss Montgomery's complaint in its entirety.
The facts in this section are based on the allegations in Montgomery's complaint.
Before the events underlying this lawsuit took place, Montgomery maintained legal guardianship over her nine grandchildren for roughly 13 years. Compl. ¶ 9. In March 2021, however, things changed. Toward the end of that month, two JCDSS employees arrived at Montgomery's house while she was away, entered the residence, and spoke to her grandchildren. Id. ¶ 11. When Montgomery arrived home a few minutes later, the employees informed her that JCDSS had received reports that the children were being abused. Id. ¶ 12. The employees removed five of the children from Montgomery's home and filed juvenile petitions that same day, alleging that the minors were either abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. ¶ 13. Montgomery contends that these reports contained false information. Id.
Despite Montgomery's alleged cooperation in the months that followed, JCDSS refused to develop a strategy to return the children to her care. Id. ¶ 14. That May, Montgomery petitioned the juvenile court for visitation, and JCDSS opposed her request. Id. ¶ 16. The state court eventually appointed DeLaine to represent Montgomery, but she claims that neither he nor JCDSS informed her about upcoming court dates. Id. ¶ 24. She also contends that he refused to discuss her case with her. Id. This caused her to miss an adjudication hearing in November 2021 and a disposition hearing a month later. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. At the disposition hearing, the court determined that the children should remain in JCDSS's custody. Id. ¶ 30. Montgomery appealed this decision in February 2022. Id.
Although her challenge to the custody order remains pending, Montgomery sued in federal court in January 2023. Construing her complaint liberally, the undersigned finds that she brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, three North Carolina statutes, the North Carolina Constitution, and North Carolina tort law. Montgomery alleges that:
• JCDSS and its employees violated the Fourth Amendment by entering Montgomery's home without consent, speaking with her grandchildren, and removing them from her care. Id. ¶ 34.
• JCDSS and its employees violated Montgomery's fundamental right to have a family under the Fourteenth Amendment by removing the children from her custody. Id. ¶ 33, 35.
• JCDSS and its employees violated Montgomery's procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by falsely claiming that the children were abused, neglected, or dependent in its juvenile petitions. Id. ¶ 36.
• All Defendants violated Montgomery's procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because she was never notified about upcoming court dates and was therefore unable to present evidence during the hearings. Id. ¶ 38.
• JCDSS and its employees were negligent because the Department removed the children from Montgomery's care, refused to work toward reunification or visitation, did not try to
keep the children together when placing them in foster care, and failed to adequately train its employees. Id. ¶¶ 41-46.
• JCDSS violated N.C. G.S. §§ 7B-100(4), 7B-602, and 7B-506(b) as well as the North Carolina Constitution by disregarding Montgomery's parental rights and denying her the opportunity to present evidence on her own behalf in the child custody proceedings. Id. ¶ 47.
• DeLaine committed legal malpractice by refusing to communicate with Montgomery before appearing to represent her at the child custody proceedings. Id. ¶ 48.
Although Montgomery claims that her state constitutional rights were violated, she does not reference any section of the North Carolina Constitution.
All told, Montgomery seeks $30 million in damages, reunification with her grandchildren, and a court order requiring JCDSS to change its policies.
A month after filing her complaint, Montgomery moved for court-appointed counsel to assist her with her lawsuit. Mot. for Counsel, D.E. 19. She claims that appointed counsel is necessary because she has been unsuccessful in her attempts to find an attorney, and the important civil rights at stake in her case demand the help of a lawyer. Id. at 1-2.
All Defendants have moved to dismiss, contending that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Montgomery's claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that-even if the court has subject-matter jurisdiction-Montgomery has failed to state a claim. See DeLaine Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 6; CJDSS Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 16; NCDHHS Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 26; Johnston County Mot. Dismiss, D.E. 33.
II. Motion for Court-Appointed Counsel
Montgomery asks that the court appoint an attorney to help her with her lawsuit. Mot. for Counsel at 1. But there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil suits, and courts should exercise their discretion to appoint counsel for pro se civil litigants “only in exceptional cases.” Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975). The existence of exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of counsel depends on “the type and complexity of the case, and the abilities of the individuals bringing it.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982)), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
Montgomery's previous filings indicate that she can handle this litigation herself, and this case is not one in which exceptional circumstances merit the appointment of counsel. Thus, her motion to appoint an attorney (D.E. 19) is denied.
III. Motions to Dismiss
Each Defendant contends that Montgomery's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and otherwise fail to state a claim. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Rooker-Feldman does not apply here-the state court judgment placing Montgomery's children in the custody of JCDSS is pending appeal. But Younger abstention counsels against asserting jurisdiction over Montgomery's claims for equitable relief. After dispensing with the claims barred by Younger, the court should dismiss Montgomery's remaining federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Each Defendant claims that the court should dismiss Montgomery's complaint under Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine gets its name from the two cases that created it: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Both cases involved the jurisdiction of lower federal courts to adjudicate disputes involving state court judgments.
Broadly understood, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a party who has lost in state court from filing an action in a federal district court to overturn the state court's judgment. See, e.g., Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006). But the doctrine does not apply unless the state court has reached a final decision. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (“This Court has repeatedly held that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.”).
Although the Fourth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, seven circuit courts have held that Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when a state-court appeal is pending. See Hansen v. Miller, 52 F.4th 96, 103 (Menashi, J., concurring) (collecting cases). District courts within the Fourth Circuit have followed suit. See, e.g., Williams v. 21st Mortg. Corp., No. PX 16-1210, 2017 WL 1122706, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2017) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Plaintiff's state case is currently on appeal.”) (citing Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cnty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016)).
Montgomery's challenge to the state court's child custody order is pending appeal before a higher state court. See Compl. ¶ 30. In other words, the judgment granting JCDSS custody over her grandchildren is not yet final. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not strip this court of its jurisdiction over Montgomery's claims.
B. Younger Abstention and Claims for Equitable Relief
But the court should decline to assert jurisdiction over Montgomery's requests for equitable relief for a different reason-federal courts generally cannot interfere with ongoing state court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). This rule, known as the Younger abstention doctrine, comes into play if three elements are met. First, there must be “an ongoing state judicial proceeding” that was filed before there was “substantial progress in the federal proceeding[.]” Id. Second, the state proceeding must involve “important, substantial, or vital state interests[.]” And third, the state proceeding must provide an “adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.” See id.
Although Defendants did not mention Younger abstention in their motions to dismiss, the court may consider the doctrine sua sponte. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (“[I]t would appear that abstention may be raised by the court sua sponte.”) (citation omitted).
Although the doctrine has its roots in criminal law, the Supreme Court has explained that Younger abstention applies in certain civil contexts as well. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). In Middlesex, for instance, the Court held that “[t]he policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” 457 U.S. at 432 (citations omitted).
One such important state interest arises when state-level civil proceedings bear a close relationship to criminal proceedings. Id. And because the “temporary removal of a child in a childabuse context is . . . in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes[,]” Younger abstention applies to child custody proceedings. Moore, 442 U.S. at 423 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and generally abstain from hearing child custody matters.”) (citation omitted); Morkel v. Davis, 513 Fed.Appx. 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases in which circuit courts have applied Younger to cases involving child custody disputes).
But Younger does not require federal courts to dismiss all claims arising out of pending state court litigation. The Fourth Circuit has held that claims for monetary damages should be stayed rather than dismissed under Younger. See Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274, 279-80 (4th Cir. 1986) (determining that, while equitable requests for relief should be dismissed under Younger, claims arising out of § 1983 should be stayed until the state litigation concludes); see also Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (“[T]he District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state proceeding.”).
So Younger abstention bars this court from adjudicating Montgomery's requests to be reunited with her grandchildren and change internal JCDSS policies. These equitable requests for relief stem from the North Carolina state court's child custody proceedings that Montgomery is challenging on appeal. And as discussed above, federal courts routinely conclude that individual child custody proceedings implicate important state interests and warrant abstention. Finally, Montgomery will be able to raise her constitutional and statutory arguments for equitable relief on appeal.
The Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to Younger in extraordinary circumstances. As is relevant here, the doctrine does not apply if the plaintiff establishes “bad faith or harassment by state officials[.]” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But the Fourth Circuit has explained that “the path to extraordinary circumstances is exceedingly narrow.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. McVey, 37 F.4th 89, 100 (4th Cir. 2022). To pierce through Younger, “there must be actual impediments to the state's ability to address the federal issues” in a case. Id.
Montgomery objects to the way JCDSS and its social workers handled her case, but she provides no evidence suggesting that the social workers acted in bad faith. And even if she had, there is no reason that she can't present her arguments to the North Carolina Court of Appeals to regain custody over her grandchildren. Thus, Younger still applies.
Given the important state interests at stake in Montgomery's pending child custody litigation, the district court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over her claims requesting equitable relief. Thus, the court should dismiss her claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments insofar as they request that she be reunited with her grandchildren or that the court compel JCDSS to change its policies.
C. Claims for Monetary Relief
Having determined that Younger bars the court from entertaining Montgomery's requests for equitable relief, the undersigned now turns to her damages claims.
Each Defendant contends that Montgomery's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court has explained that, to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Thus, while a court must accept all the factual allegations in a complaint as true, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
After Iqbal, a court considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must subject a complaint to a two-part test. First, the court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are conclusory or mere formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim. Id. at 679. Then, taking the remaining factual allegations as true, the court must determine whether the complaint “plausibly give[s] rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. If, after conducting this two-part analysis, “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]- that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). If a party fails to show that they are entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the deficient claims.
Montgomery's status as a pro se party relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that her complaint contain facially plausible claims. Although a court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011); see Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 304 n. 5. “The special judicial solicitude with which a district court should view . . . pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate. Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed.” Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). Every party-pro se or otherwise-must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam).
1. Section 1983 Claims
Montgomery brings a litany of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute creates civil liability for any person acting under the color of state law who deprives a plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Therefore, to state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
Montgomery contends that all Defendants have violated her substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because she was not notified about upcoming court dates. Compl. ¶ 38. She also claims that JCDSS and its employees violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying her right to have a family and falsifying reports that claimed her grandchildren were abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35, 36. And finally, she claims that JCDSS and its employees violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without permission, speaking with her grandchildren, and removing them from her care. Id. ¶ 34. The undersigned will analyze her claims against each Defendant in turn.
a) Allan DeLaine
Montgomery claims that DeLaine, her former attorney, violated her substantive and procedural due process rights because he “kept [her] in the dark” before the adjudication and disposition hearings. Id. ¶ 38. But court-appointed attorneys are not state actors and cannot be sued under § 1983. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 115556 & nn.2-3 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the court should dismiss Montgomery's § 1983 claims against DeLaine.
b) North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
In a similar vein, Montgomery accuses NCDHHS of violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights because she did not receive notice about the child custody hearings. Compl. ¶ 38. Other than the caption naming Defendants, this is the only time that NCDHHS is even obliquely referenced in Montgomery's complaint. In another filing, she contends that NCDHHS can be held vicariously liable for JCDSS's actions. Resp. Opp'n Mots. Dismiss at 12, D.E. 35.
This claim should be dismissed for two reasons. First, NCDHHS is immune from liability under § 1983. The Fourth Circuit has held that “state sovereign immunity bars all claims by private citizens against state governments and their agencies” unless the state waives its immunity or Congress abrogates it. Passaro v. Virginia, 935 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity in actions arising out of § 1983, Biggs v. N.C. Dep't Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 2020), and Montgomery's complaint does not allege that North Carolina (or NCDHHS) has waived its immunity. See also Gregory v. Currituck Cnty., No. 21-1363, 2022 WL 1598961, at *2 (4th Cir. May 20, 2022) (holding that the district court did not err in determining that sovereign immunity barred a plaintiff's § 1983 claims against NCDHHS). Nor may Montgomery pursue a theory of vicarious liability against NCDHHS under § 1983. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
But even if Montgomery could sue NCDHHS under § 1983, her claim is facially implausible-she provides no specific factual allegations about how the Department violated her rights. Instead, she merely provides a conclusory and formulaic statement claiming that the Department is liable for her alleged injuries. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 579. Thus, the court should dismiss her § 1983 claim against NCDHHS as well.
c) JCDSS and the Official Capacity Claims Against Its Employees
Montgomery claims that JCDSS and three of its social workers-Elizabeth Wilson, Chandler Watson, and Tabitha Hardin-violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. ¶¶ 34-38. She wishes to sue the social workers in both their official and individual capacities. JCDSS contends that it lacks the legal capacity to be sued and that its officers are immune from suit. See Mem. Supp. JCDSS Mot. Dismiss at 10-11, 15-19. The undersigned agrees.
In general, a government entity's capacity to be sued depends on “the law of the state where the court is located[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(3). In North Carolina, only persons in being may be sued unless a statute provides otherwise. McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat'l Bank, 81 S.E.2d 386, 397, 240 N.C. 1 (N.C. 1954). A state statute provides that county governments are legal entities that may sue and be sued. N.C. G.S. § 153A-11. But no state law expressly authorizes suit against county departments.
More than 40 years ago, the Fourth Circuit held that North Carolina county-level boards of health and social services cannot be sued. Avery v. Burke City, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981). Multiple federal district courts, invoking Avery, have concluded that North Carolina county departments of social services similarly lack legal capacity to be sued. See, e.g., Hogan v. Cherokee Cnty., No. 1:18 CV 96, 2019 WL 2591089, at *6 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 28, 2019) (collecting cases).
Some North Carolina state courts have, however, suggested that departments of social services are amenable to suit in certain contexts. In Taylor v. Wake County, 811 S.E.2d 648, 657, 258 N.C.App. 178 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018), the North Carolina Court of Appeals noted that its holding “[did] not preclude Plaintiff from maintaining a negligence action against Wake County DSS in superior court[.]” 811 S.E.2d 648, 657. But this statement is dicta-it played no part in the court's resolution of the case before it. Elsewhere, the North Carolina Supreme Court has explained that “an action against a county agency which directly affects the rights of the county is in fact an action against the county.” Meyer v. Walls, 489 S.E.2d 880, 884, 347 N.C. 97 (N.C. 1997) (finding that a county department of social security could be sued because the county purchased liability insurance).
Ultimately, this court is bound by federal precedent. That precedent suggests that JCDSS is not “a legal entity separate and apart from the county.” Avery, 660 F.2d at 114. And even if JCDSS could be sued, the party in interest would be Johnston County itself. See id. (“[I]f Avery is entitled to recover damages under § 1983 because of the boards' conduct, the county would be liable.”). Thus, any suit alleging a violation of § 1983 should be directed at Johnston County, not the Department. Because federal case law has determined that JCDSS may not be sued, the district court should dismiss all § 1983 claims against it.
The same goes for official capacity suits against Wilson, Watson, and Hardin. Courts treat official capacity suits “as a suit against the entity[,] . . . not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (citations omitted). As a result, when a governmental body is named as a defendant, suits against employees of that entity should be “dismissed as duplicative.” Loughlin v. Vance Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 5:14-CV-219-FL, 2015 WL 11117120, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 31, 2015), appeal dismissed, 615 Fed.Appx. 809 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004)). Johnston County is a named Defendant, so the undersigned recommends that the district court also dismiss all official capacity claims against the DSS social workers.
d) Individual Capacity Claims Against JCDSS Employees
This leaves the individual capacity claims against the three social workers. Montgomery claims that Watson entered her home without permission to speak with her grandchildren and removed them from her care in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 34. It's less clear where Wilson and Hardin fit into the picture-Montgomery's only specific allegation against the two is that she spoke to them over the phone, and they told her that the children would remain in JCDSS's care. Id. ¶ 15. Elsewhere, she claims that DSS employees refused to notify her about court dates, falsified information in reports that led to the children being removed from her care, and refused to let Montgomery or her husband have contact with the children. See, e.g., id. at 13, 16, 33, 38. But Montgomery does not explain which DSS social worker took any of these actions.
To state an individual capacity claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that “each Government-official defendant, through the official's own actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added). Except for Watson, Montgomery does not explain how the actions of the specific social workers named in her complaint violated her federal rights. Instead, the bulk of her allegations refer to JCDSS as a whole, leaving the court with no ability to discern which individual officers committed which constitutional violations. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 33, 36, 39-41, 43-47. Thus, the court should disregard the generalized allegations against JCDSS when construing individual capacity claims against the social workers. See, e.g., Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the end, Montgomery's specific factual allegations boil down to two claims: Watson entered her home and removed five children without consent, and Wilson and Hardin told her over the phone that her grandchildren will remain in JCDSS's care. See id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Montgomery's allegations against Wilson and Hardin fail to get off the ground-she draws no connection between their unpleasant phone call and the deprivation of her federal rights.
Montgomery's claims against Watson are more complicated. She alleges that Watson violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in two ways: she entered Montgomery's home without consent, and she removed the children without a court order authorizing her to do so. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, and the Fourteenth Amendment provides that states may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[,]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. While Montgomery's individual capacity claims against Watson trace a sufficient connection between Watson's conduct and the deprivation of Montgomery's rights, Watson alleges that she is entitled to absolute-or, at least, qualified-immunity. See Mem. Supp. JCDSS Mot. Dismiss at 15-19.
When a plaintiff brings a damages claim against certain government officers acting within the scope of their core duties, “absolute immunity defeats [the] suit at the outset.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). Social workers only enjoy absolute immunity when undertaking quasi-prosecutorial actions. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 1989). Non-prosecutorial actions, such as “investigating the possibility that a removal petition should be filed[,]” only enjoy qualified immunity. See id. Entering Montgomery's home to speak with her grandchildren about alleged abuse without authorization sounds in investigative, rather than prosecutorial, conduct. Thus, Watson is not entitled to absolute immunity.
Qualified immunity is more limited. It “shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S.Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To qualify as clearly established, a right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). And although plaintiffs need not find a doctrinal twin to prove that a right is clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Qualified immunity bars Montgomery's claim that Watson entered her home without consent. The Fourth Circuit has explained that, while the Fourth Amendment applies to civil investigations, “home visits by social workers are not subject to the same scrutiny as searches in the criminal context.” Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Thus, social workers' visits to a plaintiff's home to determine whether children are being neglected or abused do not violate the plaintiff's clearly established rights. Id.; see also Ross v. Klesius, 715 Fed.Appx. 224, 226 (“Even assuming, without deciding, that Defendants violated Ross' Fourth Amendment rights, their conduct in entering or directing others' entry into Ross' home to retrieve her foster children, under the circumstances presented, did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). By entering Montgomery's home to investigate whether her grandchildren were suffering from abuse or neglect, Watson did not violate a clearly established right.
Watson is also immune from suit for removing the children from Montgomery's home. Because neither the Fourth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has “articulated the legal standard that applies to . . . unlawful seizure claims in the child removal context[,] . . . a reasonable social worker would not have known” that seizing children from a potentially dangerous home without a court order violated the Constitution. Parker v. Henry & William Evans Home for Child., Inc., 762 Fed.Appx. 147, 154-55. This right was not clearly established when Montgomery's grandchildren were seized-Watson is entitled to qualified immunity.
In sum, Montgomery has failed to state a claim against Wilson and Hardin, and Watson's conduct is protected by qualified immunity. Thus, the district court should dismiss all her individual-capacity § 1983 claims against the social workers.
e) Johnston County
The text of Montgomery's complaint alleges only one claim against Johnston County: it violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights because she was never given notice about the late-2021 child custody hearings. Compl. ¶ 38. But as discussed above, federal courts have held that county governments bear ultimate responsibility for the official actions of their departments of social services (and, by extension, their social workers). But even assuming that Montgomery's allegations against JCDSS and its employees in their official capacities may be imputed to Johnston County, she has failed to state a claim against it.
To hold a county government liable for its employees' constitutional violations, a complaint must contain sufficient allegations to show that the alleged constitutional injury is attributable to an official policy, procedure, or custom of the county. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiffs may meet this burden by showing that the unconstitutional custom flows from an express policy, the decisions of a policymaking official, a failure to train officers that “manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens[,]” or through a practice so widespread as to become a “custom or usage with the force of law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Montgomery contends that she did not receive notice of court dates, leaving her unable to attend or present evidence at the late-2021 hearings. Compl. ¶ 38. Elsewhere, she maintains that “Johnston County's system allows attorneys to represent a party without communicating with a client[.]” Resp. Opp'n Mots. Dismiss at 4. But North Carolina-not Johnston County-runs the Johnston County District Court. See N.C. Const. art. IV, § 10. Thus, none of Montgomery's grievances centered around the judicial process are fairly traceable to the County.
The rest of Montgomery's complaint identifies no Johnston County policy, custom, policymaker's decision, or widespread practice that caused the violation of her Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. She does allege that JCDSS failed to train its employees, which led Watson to enter her home and remove her grandchildren without consent. See Compl. ¶ 42. But failure to train claims must contain details about the training program itself-they cannot simply infer that an alleged constitutional violation traces back to poor training. See, e.g., McDowell v. Grimes, No. GLR-17-3200, 2018 WL 3756727, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018) (“Absent any factual detail about the training program, [the plaintiff] fails to state a claim.”). Nor may plaintiffs base their failure to train claims on individual incidents-there must be “a history of widespread abuse.” Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983).
One conclusory allegation claiming that JCDSS failed to train its employees doesn't cut it. Montgomery has failed to plead that Johnston County adopted a policy, procedure, or custom that caused her constitutional rights to be violated. Thus, the court should dismiss her claims against it.
2. State Law Claims
Montgomery also brings several state-law causes of action. First, she alleges that JCDSS and its employees handled her case negligently. Compl. ¶¶ 41-46. Next, she maintains that JCDSS violated the North Carolina Constitution and N.C. G.S. §§ 7B-100(4), 7B-602, and 7B-506(b) by separating her from her grandchildren, denying her right to counsel, and preventing her from presenting evidence in court. Id. ¶ 47. Finally, she contends that DeLaine committed legal malpractice by failing to consult her before her late-2021 child custody hearings. Id. ¶ 48. The court should not exercise jurisdiction over these claims.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction to hear state-law claims. But so long as a district court has original jurisdiction over a dispute, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law tort claims that are “part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a case once it has dispensed with all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
The undersigned has recommended that the district court dismiss all the claims that created this court's original jurisdiction. After considering the interests of judicial economy, fairness, federalism, and comity, the undersigned recommends that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Montgomery's state claims. Thus, the claims should be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the court denies Montgomery's motion for court-appointed counsel (D.E. 19). The undersigned further recommends that the court abstain from hearing her equitable claims under Younger, dismiss her remaining federal claims for failure to state a claim, and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state claims. In sum, the court should grant Defendants' motions to dismiss (D.E. 6, 16, 26 & 33) and dismiss Montgomery's complaint (D.E. 1) in its entirety.
DeLaine also asks that the court award him attorney's fees. See DeLaine Mot. Dismiss at 1. The undersigned recommends that the court deny this request.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared here. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.