Opinion
No. 4-783 / 04-0554
Filed December 22, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Marsha M. Beckelman, Judge.
An employer and its workers' compensation insurer appeal from a district court judicial review ruling reversing the workers' compensation commissioner's finding that claimant's petition for benefits was untimely. AFFIRMED.
Ryan M. Clark and Jeffrey Baker of Patterson, Lorentzen, Duffield, Timmons, Irish, Becker Ordway, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas Wertz of Wertz Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan, Miller, Vaitheswaran, and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Monsanto and Pacific Employers Insurance Company (Pacific) appeal from a district court judicial review ruling reversing the workers' compensation commissioner's finding that Michael Smith's petition for benefits was untimely. Monsanto and Pacific argue the district court erred when it concluded the statute of limitations on Smith's claims did not begin to run until January 26, 2000. We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings.
Monsanto employed Smith from 1986 to 2000. During the majority of that time, Smith was employed as a welder. He performed his duties in a small shop that was entirely enclosed and lacked ventilation. Smith primarily worked with galvanized steel, which produces a toxic gas when heated or welded. Although Smith and his coworkers complained about the lack of ventilation, Monsanto did nothing to correct the problem until 1999 when it began phasing out equipment that contained galvanized steel.
On January 16, 1997, Smith was admitted to the hospital. At that point, Smith smoked a pack of cigarettes a day and had been doing so for approximately twenty years. He was primarily diagnosed with pneumonia, with secondary diagnoses of pleurisy, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bullous emphysema, and bronchospasm. Smith was discharged from the hospital on January 19, 1997, and remained off work for three weeks. After that time, Smith returned to work and did not incur any further absences from work due to health reasons. In 1999 Monsanto transferred Smith from the welding shop to a processing position, which exposed him to more dust and chemicals from seed corn. Smith voluntarily terminated his employment with Monsanto in 2000.
On March 29, 2000, Smith filed workers' compensation petitions. Following an arbitration hearing, Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner Steven Beasley concluded Smith's respiratory problems were work-related injuries. In the arbitration decision, Deputy Beasley determined Smith's injuries were cumulative and that the date of injury was January 16, 1997, the date Smith was hospitalized for his respiratory condition. Deputy Beasley further concluded Smith should have been aware of the seriousness and compensable character of his injuries at that time. As a result, Deputy Beasley determined Smith's workers' compensation petitions were untimely because they had not been filed within two years from the date he knew of the seriousness and compensable nature of his injury as required by Iowa Code section 85.23 (1999).
Smith appealed from the deputy's decision. On appeal, Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner Larry Walshire concluded the proper date of injury was January 16, 1997. However, in contravention to the arbitration decision, Deputy Walshire concluded Smith was not aware of the seriousness of his work-related injury at that time. Rather, Deputy Walshire concluded Smith remained unaware his injury would adversely impact his future employment until January 26, 2000, when he announced to Dr. Donald Paynter, M.D., his treating pulmonologist, he was going to change jobs to avoid exposure to the dust and fumes because they were aggravating his condition. However, even utilizing the latter date of January 26, 2000, Deputy Walshire concluded Smith's petitions were untimely because Monsanto did not receive notice within ninety days of when Smith discovered his injury as required by Iowa Code section 85.23.
In several places throughout the appeal decision, the deputy commissioner indicates the date Smith was aware his work-related injury would adversely impact his employment was January 26, 1999. However, both parties agree these references reflect a scrivener's error and were intended to refer to the year 2000.
Smith appealed to the district court. He asserted Deputy Walshire committed a mathematical error in calculating the amount of time that elapsed between January 26, 2000, when Smith was aware his injury would adversely impact his employment, and March 29, 2000, when Smith filed his petition and provided notice to Monsanto. The district court concluded substantial evidence supported the determination Smith was not aware of the seriousness and probable compensable character of his injury until January 26, 2000. Utilizing this date, the court determined Deputy Walshire made a scrivener's error because only sixty-two days, not over ninety days as the opinion indicated, elapsed between that time and March 29, 2000, when notice was first provided to Monsanto. As a result, the district court remanded the case to Deputy Walshire so he could review and correct the mathematical error and determine the amount of benefits Smith was entitled to receive. Monsanto and Pacific appeal from the district court's ruling.
This miscalculation may have been the result of the previous scrivener's error, which in several instances throughout the opinion incorrectly reflected the year Smith was aware of the seriousness of his injury as being in 1999, instead of 2000.
II. Standard of Review.
Our review under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2001) is for the correction of errors at law, not de novo. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2003). The district court, as well as this court, is bound by the commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). We consider all of the evidence in the record. Dawson v. Iowa Bd. Med. Exam'rs, 654 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2002). Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the commissioner's decision. Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1997). Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d at 499. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether it supports the finding the commissioner actually made. Murillo, 571 N.W.2d at 17. Findings of the commissioner have the effect of a jury verdict, and the commissioner, not the court, weighs the evidence. Kiesecker v. Webster City Custom Meats, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Iowa 1995). The court should broadly and liberally apply those findings in order to uphold, rather than defeat, the commissioner's decision. Id. The mere fact that we could draw inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence does not mean the commissioner's conclusions were unsupported by substantial evidence. Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Monsanto and Pacific aver the evidence is sufficient to show Smith was aware of the adverse impact his condition would have on his employment prior to January 26, 2000. They argue Smith's claims should have been dismissed because he was aware of the seriousness of his injury well before January 26, 2000, and therefore failed to provide timely notice to the employer as required under Iowa Code section 85.23. This section provides that in order to receive compensation, an employer must receive notice of an injury within ninety days from the occurrence of the injury. However, under Iowa law, the notice requirement of section 85.23 is tempered by virtue of the discovery rule. See Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa 2001). Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the employee is aware the injury is "serious enough to have a permanent adverse impact on the claimant's employment or employability, i.e., the claimant knows or should know the `nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character' of his injury or condition." Id. (quoting Orr v. Lewis Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Iowa 1980)). A claimant must have knowledge, either actual or implied, of all three characteristics of the injury before the statute begins to run. Swartzendruber v. Schimmel, 613 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2000).
At issue in this case is when Smith became aware of the seriousness of his condition. The seriousness component of the discovery rule exists so that "every minor ache, pain, or symptom" does not begin the statute of limitations. 2B Arthur Larson, Workers' Compensation § 78.41(e), at 15-279 (1994). Thus, the failure to file a claim within two years of the occurrence of the injury may be excused if the claimant had no reason to believe the condition was serious. See id. at 15-281. If the injury is trivial or minor, or the symptoms indicate no serious trouble, the seriousness component is not met. See id.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Smith did not know his injury would have a permanent, adverse impact on his employment until January 26, 2000. Smith had smoked cigarettes for more than twenty years as of the date he was first hospitalized for his pulmonary condition on January 16, 1997. The record reflects Smith believed his lung condition would improve if he quit smoking. The record further reflects Smith was not absent from work for health reasons following his 1997 hospitalization. Smith testified his condition did not get any better or any worse following his 1997 hospitalization. Furthermore, despite flare-ups in 1998 and 1999, Smith unusually returned to what Dr. Paynter referred to as "baseline" relatively soon after treatment. Dr. Paynter testified Smith's condition gradually worsened during his last several years of employment at Monsanto. As a result, Smith did not have a reason to believe his condition would adversely affect his employment until sometime after he was transferred to processing because the symptoms he exhibited did not reveal the severity of his condition. See Dillinger v. City of Sioux City, 368 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Iowa 1985) (indicating claimant's ability to continue working, coupled with no significant change in symptoms demonstrated claimant was unaware of the nature, seriousness, and compensability of the injury). As a result, we conclude substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Smith was not aware his injury would adversely impact his future employment until he informed Dr. Paynter of his intentions to change jobs on January 26, 2000. Utilizing this date, Smith provided notice to Monsanto well within the ninety-day notice period required by section 85.23.