Opinion
May 5, 1942.
July 23, 1942.
Negligence — Street railways — Sudden start — Evidence — Injuries to plaintiff.
1. In an action for injuries, in which there was testimony that while the wife-plaintiff was standing still in defendant's car reaching for an upright pole, the car started with a "sudden jolt", causing plaintiff to be thrown on the floor, and in which there was no evidence of the effect of the action of the car on other passengers except that they became "excited" and two or three of them "bent over", it was held on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that defendant was negligent.
2. The opinion of a physician that the injury must have been caused by a "most terrific force" is no evidence of the suddenness or speed of the start of the car.
Appeals, Nos. 296 and 297, April T., 1942, from judgments of C.P. Allegheny Co., Jan. T., 1938, No. 2063, in case of Mary L. Monahan et vir. v. Pittsburgh Railways Company.
Before KELLER, P.J., CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE, RHODES, HIRT and KENWORTHEY, JJ. Judgments reversed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before McKENRICK, J., specially presiding.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Verdicts for wife plaintiff in sum of $2,000, and for husband plaintiff in sum of $732, and judgments thereon. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was refusal of judgment n.o.v.
Arthur W. Henderson, with him J.R. McNary, for appellant.
Robert H. Braun, Jr., with him Daniel S. Newman, for appellees.
Argued May 5, 1942.
Wife-plaintiff entered one of defendant's street cars which started with a "sudden jolt" while she was standing still reaching for an upright pole. She was thrown on the floor, striking her back at the base of her spine, as a result of which she sustained a compression fracture of two vertebrae. There was no evidence of the effect of the action of the car on other passengers except that they became "excited" and two or three of them "bent over." On the facts thus far stated, plaintiffs were not entitled to go to the jury. (See Coyle v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 149 Pa. Super. 281, 27 A.2d 533.
They contend the testimony of the attending physician that the injury "must have been [caused by] a most terrific force" was evidence that the accident was "inherently unusual," and therefore sufficient to enable the jury to find negligence on the part of the motorman. A similar contention was made in Hawkins et al. v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 146 Pa. Super. 185, 188, 22 A.2d 73. What we there said is controlling here: "The physician's statement about the amount of force necessary to cause a displaced knee cap, in our opinion, is of no help in determining the suddenness or speed of the start of the car. There are so many other factors involved that it is of no probative value whatever."
Judgments are reversed and entered for defendant.