Opinion
No. 3:22-cv-00013-SHL-HCA
2022-08-24
Katie MOELLER, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
Cara Lauren Roberts, Matthew L. Preston, Brady, Preston, Gronlund, PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Jase Jensen, Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, IA, Kevin Christian Rigdon, Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff. Paul David Burns, Bradley & Riley PC, Iowa City, IA, David Michael Caves, Jeremiah Dwayne Junker, Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Michael J. Mueller, Pro Hac Vice, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Washington, DC, Thomas R. Waskom, Pro Hac Vice, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Richmond, VA, for Defendant.
Cara Lauren Roberts, Matthew L. Preston, Brady, Preston, Gronlund, PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Jase Jensen, Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, IA, Kevin Christian Rigdon, Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff. Paul David Burns, Bradley & Riley PC, Iowa City, IA, David Michael Caves, Jeremiah Dwayne Junker, Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Michael J. Mueller, Pro Hac Vice, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Washington, DC, Thomas R. Waskom, Pro Hac Vice, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Richmond, VA, for Defendant. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS Stephen H. Locher, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff alleges the dishwasher she purchased from Defendant started leaking, but Defendant would not honor its contractual obligation to repair it, replace it, or provide a refund. She brings claims for breach of contract and under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act with respect to the dishwasher and several other appliances she purchased from Defendant that, unlike the dishwasher, have not exhibited any defects. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court concludes Plaintiff has stated plausible claims for breach of contract and under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act related to the dishwasher but lacks standing to bring claims with respect to other appliances. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Consistent with governing standards on a motion to dismiss, this Factual Background section accepts as true all well-pled allegations of fact and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 774 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff Katie Moeller ("Moeller") is an Iowa citizen and resident who bought appliances sold and distributed by Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ("Samsung"), in the summer of 2019. (Petition, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 15.) The appliances, which she purchased at Home Depot, included a dishwasher, stove, refrigerator, and microwave. (Id., ¶ 14.) They were "delivered in their new, original cartons in the summer of 2019." (Id., ¶ 15.) The dishwasher came with a warranty stating, in part, as follows:
All references to the "Petition" are to the document found on the docket at ECF 1-1.
Image materials not available for display. (Petition, p. 17 (Ex. 1).) The warranty further states that Samsung "will provide in-home service within the contiguous United States during the warranty period at no charge, subject to availability of SAMSUNG authorized servicers within the customer's geographic area." (Id.) "If in-home service is not available, SAMSUNG may elect, at its option, to provide transportation of the product to and from an authorized service center." (Id.) The warranty states that the customer might be "responsible for a trip charge or required to bring the product to a SAMSUNG authorized service center for service." (Id.) "During the applicable warranty period, a product will be repaired, replaced, or the purchase price refunded, at the sole option of SAMSUNG." (Id.)
Moeller's dishwasher started leaking in Fall 2020. (Id., ¶ 19.) A local appliance repair person diagnosed the problem as a "broken tub weld." (Id.) On or about March 24, 2021, Moeller reported the issue to Samsung via telephone and was told Samsung would repair the problem as part of the "Lifetime Stainless Door Liner & Tub for leakage" warranty. (Id., ¶ 20.) The Samsung representative opened a ticket and told her a repair technician would follow up to make an appointment. (Id., ¶ 21.) Later the same day, however, Samsung sent Moeller an email canceling the service ticket and advising her to contact Samsung if she still needed service. (Id., ¶ 23.) When she did so, she was informed that Samsung did not have a repair person in her area. (Id., ¶ 24.) Samsung informed her that she "would not be provided any Warranty services." (Id.) "Samsung did not offer Moeller any alternative repair, refund or return options for her broken Dishwasher and otherwise refused to honor the Warranty." (Id., ¶ 26.) Moeller alleges, upon information and belief, that Samsung "has, or at material times hereto had, only one repair technician available to provide Warranty services in the entire state of Iowa." (Id., ¶ 25.)
Samsung provides a similar warranty for other appliances as it does for dishwashers. (Id., ¶¶ 28-30.) This includes an offer of "in-home service within the contiguous United States during the warranty period at no charge, subject to availability of SAMSUNG authorized servicers within the customer's geographic area." (Id., ¶ 30.) Moeller alleges, upon information and belief, that Samsung "has no authorized servicers within Moeller's geographic area to provide in-home Warranty services." (Id., ¶ 32.) According to Moeller, "Samsung has an insufficient number of authorized servicers to meet the in-home Warranty service needs of its customers within the geographic area of Iowa." (Id., ¶ 33.) Samsung has no repair centers in any major metropolitan area in Iowa except possibly Des Moines, although even in Des Moines no address or contact information is provided on Samsung's website. (Id., ¶ 35.) Samsung has "no authorized service centers available to provide Moeller's warranty services" and "an insufficient number of authorized service centers to meet the Warranty service needs of its customers located in Iowa." (Id., ¶¶ 36-37.)
Moeller alleges that, in addition to refusing to provide repair services, Samsung "has refused to honor the Warranty for Home Appliances" by failing to replace the appliance or refund the purchase price. (Id., ¶¶ 39, 40.) She alleges Samsung "fraudulently and deceptively markets, sells, and distributes Home Appliances, which purport to have a lifetime or limited Warranty for the repair, replacement, or refund of any product, to Moeller and other Iowans when it knows it has no intention of honoring the Warranty." (Id., ¶ 41.) She further alleges:
Samsung fraudulently agreed to provide Warranty services knowing Samsung could not honor the Warranty given the insufficient number of authorized servicers and authorized service centers in Iowa and failed to honor, and continues to fail to honor, its Warranty for the Home Appliances, all of which constitutes repeated and ongoing violations of: (1) Iowa's Consumer Fraud Act, Iowa Code Chapter 714H, through uniformly fraudulent statements and deceptive practices directed at Moeller and other owners of Samsung Home Appliances located in Iowa; and (2) breach of contract.(Id., ¶ 42.) She brings her breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated. (Id., ¶ 43.)
Moeller filed her action in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County. (Id., p. 1.) Samsung removed the case to this Court. (ECF 1.) Samsung now moves to dismiss both claims. (ECF 4.)
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must "accept the well-pled allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Meardon v. Register, 994 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2021). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Schriener, 774 F.3d at 444 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The Court may draw on its "judicial experience and common sense" in evaluating plausibility. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. However, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
B. Moeller Has Stated a Claim for Breach of Contract.
To prevail on a breach of contract claim under Iowa law, a plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the contract; (3) the plaintiff's performance of all terms and conditions required under the contract; (4) the defendant's breach of the contract; and (5) damages resulting from the breach. Royal Indem. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 786 N.W.2d 839, 846 (Iowa 2010). Samsung argues that Moeller's Petition fails as a matter of law on the fourth element because, under the warranty, Samsung has the option at its sole discretion to replace a faulty appliance or provide a refund rather than repairing it. (ECF 4-1, p. 9.) Samsung therefore argues that Moeller's allegation that it refused to repair the dishwasher is insufficient to state a claim. (Id.) According to Samsung, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, clearly allege that she requested a replacement of her dishwasher or a refund of the purchase price." (ECF 4-1, p. 3.)
The Court has little difficulty rejecting Samsung's position. Moeller's Petition alleges that she notified Samsung that her dishwasher was defective, but Samsung refused to repair it and informed her she "would not be provided any Warranty services." (Petition, ¶ 24.) The Petition further alleges, inter alia: "Samsung did not offer Moeller any alternative repair, refund or return options for her broken Dishwasher and otherwise refused to honor the Warranty" (id., ¶ 26); "Despite requests made by Moeller, and other Iowa residents, Samsung has refused to honor the Warranty for Home Appliances" (id., ¶ 40); "Samsung . . . failed to honor, and continues to fail to honor, its Warranty for the Home Appliances" (id., ¶ 42); and, "Samsung has intentionally and improperly breached Moeller and each Class Member's contractual rights under the written Warranty by failing to repair, replace or refund the purchase price for Home Appliances during the Warranty period" (id., ¶ 71). These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract.
Samsung identifies nothing in the warranty language that would obligate Moeller to "request[ ] a replacement of her dishwasher or a refund of the purchase price" before Samsung could be deemed to have breached the warranty. To the contrary, the plain language of the warranty seems to obligate Samsung to do something when a customer provides notice of a defective dishwasher falling within the warranty—either replace it, repair it, or provide a refund. Here, Moeller alleges that Samsung did none of those things upon learning that her dishwasher leaked. This is enough to state a claim for breach of contract.
Samsung cites no persuasive legal authority supporting its position to the contrary. The only case it cites in which a court dismissed a breach of contract claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is Williams v. Security National Bank of Sioux City, Iowa, 293 F. Supp. 2d 958, 970 (N.D. Iowa 2003). Williams, however, granted the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff alleged the breach of a contract provision that did not exist. Id. at 970-71 (explaining the "impossibility of breaching non-existent terms of the contracts"). Here, there are at least two different contract provisions that obligate Samsung to repair or replace a defective dishwasher or provide a refund. First, the lifetime warranty for leakage says, "[i]f the unit cannot be repaired, Samsung will replace your unit with same or current model . . . ." (Petition, p. 17 (Ex. 1).) Second, and similarly, the warranty says "[d]uring the applicable warranty period, a product will be repaired, replaced, or the purchase price refunded, at the sole option of SAMSUNG." (Id.) Moeller's Petition therefore does not suffer from the same infirmity as the pleading in Williams, and dismissal is not appropriate.
C. Moeller Has Stated a Plausible Claim Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.
Samsung also moves to dismiss Moeller's claim under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. Samsung argues it cannot have misled consumers or otherwise violated the Consumer Fraud Act by failing to provide in-home repair services when the warranty specifically warns consumers that such services are "subject to the availability of SAMSUNG authorized servicers within the customer's geographic area." (Petition, p. 17 (Ex. 1).) If the case were solely about Samsung's failure to provide in-home repair services, the Court might agree. But Moeller's Petition—read in the light most favorable to her—is broad enough to include other allegations that are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.
1. Background Regarding the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.
The Consumer Fraud Act states, in relevant part:
A person shall not engage in a practice or act the person knows or reasonably should know is an unfair practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, or false promise, or the misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, or omission of a material fact, with the intent that others rely upon the unfair practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, or omission in connection with the advertisement, sale, or lease of consumer merchandise . . . .Iowa Code § 714H.3(1). "[A] claimant alleging an unfair practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation must prove that the prohibited practice related to a material fact or facts." Id. " 'Deception' means an act or practice that is likely to mislead a substantial number of consumers as to a material fact or facts." Iowa Code § 714H.2(5).
The Iowa Consumer Fraud Act "is not a codification of common law fraud principles." State ex rel. Miller v. Pace, 677 N.W.2d 761, 770 (Iowa 2004). "It permits relief upon a lesser showing that the defendant made a misrepresentation or omitted a material fact 'with the intent that others rely upon the . . . omission.' " Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 714.16(2)(a)). "A course of conduct contrary to what an ordinary consumer would anticipate contributes to a finding of an unfair practice." State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., 834 N.W.2d 12, 37 (Iowa 2013). "To ascertain whether a practice is likely to mislead in the consumer protection context, courts typically evaluate the overall or 'net impression' created by the representation." Id. at 34.
Iowa Code Chapter 714H was enacted by the Iowa Legislature in 2009 to give Iowa consumers a private cause of action under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. Prior to 2009, Iowa was one of a small number of states whose Consumer Fraud Act only could be enforced by the Attorney General. See Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Iowa 1998). The interpretation of the relatively new Chapter 714H is informed by pre-2009 cases applying Iowa Code Chapter 714, which governs actions initiated by the Attorney General. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 714H.2(9) (" 'Unfair practice' means the same as defined in section 714.16.").
Samsung's motion to dismiss relies primarily on Iowa cases evaluating claims of common law fraud. (ECF 4-1, pp. 14-16.) These cases are of limited persuasive value given the Iowa Supreme Court's repeated recognition that the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act covers a broader range of conduct than common law fraud. See Pace, 677 N.W.2d at 770.
2. Iowa Consumer Fraud Act Claims Are Subject to the Heightened Pleading Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
The parties disagree about the governing pleading standard for claims under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. Samsung argues the heightened standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) apply because Moeller's claims sound in fraud, whereas Moeller relies on Iowa cases interpreting the Consumer Fraud Act more broadly than common law fraud to argue the case is governed by the more liberal standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
The Court agrees with Samsung. The Eighth Circuit has held that "Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement applies to statutory fraud claims." E-Shops Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 678 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2012). When—as Moeller argues is the case here—a statute also provides redress for non-fraudulent conduct, the Court must analyze whether the specific claim is "grounded in fraud such that Rule 9(b) applies." Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, 910 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2018). "A claim may sound in fraud even though it is brought under a statute that also prohibits non-fraudulent conduct." Id. Here, Moeller's Petition is grounded in fraud because, inter alia, she alleges that Samsung "fraudulently and deceptively markets, sells, and distributes Home Appliances . . . when it knows it has no intention of honoring the Warranty." (Petition, ¶ 41; accord id., ¶¶ 42, 62.). This is enough to trigger the heightened requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See Olin, 910 F.3d at 1075 (concluding that allegations about "misrepresentations" and "deception" sound in fraud).
3. Moeller's Petition Sufficiently Alleges a Deceptive or Unfair Practice Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.
On the merits, the crux of the dispute is whether language warning consumers that in-home repair services are "subject to the availability of SAMSUNG authorized servicers within the customer's geographic area" is enough to protect Samsung, as a matter of law at the pleading stage, from potential liability under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. The Court concludes that Moeller's Petition, read in the light most favorable to her, alleges conduct broad enough to state a Consumer Fraud Act claim notwithstanding the warning about availability of in-home repair services.
There are no Iowa Supreme Court cases addressing the exact issue presented here, although three recent cases provide guidance. In McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., 864 N.W.2d 518, 532-33 (Iowa 2015), the Court held that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a consumer fraud claim if her relationship with the defendant is governed by a contract under which she has no right to recovery. Similarly, in Bass v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 880 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 2016), the Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant in a consumer fraud claim because there were no material misrepresentations in the defendant's documents. The Court explained that "[a]ny person examining the disclosures of J.C. Penney knew exactly what was being charged and how that charge was calculated. J.C. Penney's disclosures were not complicated or confusing, and did not involve tricky or clever stratagems or fine print designed to mislead less attentive customers." Id. By contrast, in Vertrue, the Court concluded the defendant engaged in an unfair practice by obscuring information about the enrollment and cancellation process for memberships for credit score monitoring services. 834 N.W.2d at 42. The Court rejected the defendant's position that it provided adequate disclosures regarding the memberships, holding that the "presence of a disclosure or request for consent does not alone cure a misleading solicitation if the net impression remains deceptive because material elements of the transaction remain obscured." Id. at 37.
Moeller's Petition is nestled somewhere between McKee and Bass, on the one hand, and Vertrue, on the other. Like the disclosures in Bass, the language of Samsung's warranty is clear enough to put reasonable consumers on notice that free in-home repairs are not guaranteed, but rather are "subject to availability of SAMSUNG authorized servicers within the customer's geographic area." See Bass, 880 N.W.2d at 764. However, if, as Moeller alleges, Samsung never intended to provide in-home repair services or refund or replace defective appliances (see Petition, ¶ 41), the case begins to resemble Vertrue in that the warranty plausibly may have given consumers the misleading and deceptive "net impression" that the warranty would be honored. See 834 N.W.2d at 37. Or, stated differently, Samsung allegedly "obscured" material elements of the transaction by failing to disclose that it did not intend to honor the warranty. See id.; see also Iowa Code § 714H.3(1) (providing cause of action when seller makes a "false promise" or conceals material facts).
At this early stage of the case, the Court must read the Petition in the light most favorable to Moeller. It therefore concludes Moeller has stated a viable theory under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act in the sense that her allegations are similar enough to the ones giving rise to liability in Vertrue to allow the case to reach the discovery stage. In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that Samsung has not cited a single case—state or federal—in which a court dismissed an Iowa Consumer Fraud Act or Iowa common law fraud case at the pleading stage. Instead, courts in the cases cited by Samsung either denied a motion to dismiss, see Asbury Square, L.L.C. v. Amoco Oil Co., 221 F.R.D. 497, 509 (S.D. Iowa 2004), Miller v. Elliott Aviation Aircraft Sales, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-00161-JAJ, 2014 WL 12601040, at *13-14 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 31, 2014), or adjudicated the claim at the summary judgment or post-trial stage, see Brown v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 820 F.3d 339, 348-49 (8th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment), Robinson v. Perpetual Services Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 1987) (post-trial), City of McGregor v. Janett, 546 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1996) (post-trial). Like the courts in these cases, this Court will be in a better position to evaluate Samsung's arguments on a more complete record following discovery.
The Court further rejects Samsung's position that Moeller's Petition fails to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In relevant part, Moeller alleges that Samsung committed an unfair or fraudulent practice by selling her a dishwasher with a warranty that it had no intention of honoring. By alleging the date of the sale, language of the warranty, date and substance of her interactions with Samsung after a defect developed in the dishwasher, and substance of the information that was not disclosed, Moeller has sufficiently alleged the "who, what, when, where and how" of her Iowa Consumer Fraud Act claim. See Cagin v. McFarland Clinic, 317 F. Supp. 2d 964, 971 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (denying motion to dismiss where, inter alia, the plaintiff identified the information the defendant failed to disclose).
Finally, the Court rejects Samsung's position that Moeller failed to allege an "ascertainable loss" of money or property. (ECF 4-1, pp. 16-17) (quoting Iowa Code § 714H.5(1).) Samsung argues the "alleged loss here is not the loss of use of her dishwasher after it malfunctioned" and insists Plaintiff "does not allege that Samsung refused her a refund or a replacement." (Id., p. 17.) The Court disagrees. Moeller's Petition alleges, inter alia, that "Samsung did not offer Moeller any alternative repair, refund or return options for her broken Dishwasher and otherwise refused to honor the Warranty." (Petition, ¶ 26.) This is sufficient to allege "ascertainable loss" in the form of the value of a functioning dishwasher. See, e.g., Schooley v. Orkin Extermination, Co., Inc., 502 F.3d 759, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming damages award based on loss of value of property and repair costs).
D. Moeller Lacks Standing to Bring Claims Related to Appliances Other Than Her Dishwasher.
Although the Court concludes Moeller has stated a plausible claim for relief for both breach of contract and under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act as to her dishwasher, the question remains whether she has standing to bring claims with respect to other Samsung appliances she purchased that have not exhibited any defects. Samsung argues that Moeller has standing only with respect to the dishwasher. The Court agrees.
To establish standing, "a plaintiff must present a 'case' or 'controversy' within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009). "This 'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing' requires a showing of 'injury in fact' to the plaintiff that is 'fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,' and 'likely [to] be redressed by a favorable decision.' " Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). "Whether a plaintiff has shown such an injury 'often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.' " Braden, 588 F.3d at 591 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). "[T]he question whether he has a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing is closely bound up with the question of whether and how the law will grant him relief." Braden, 588 F.3d at 591.
The Eighth Circuit has held that "purchasers of an allegedly defective product have no legally recognizable claim where the alleged defect has not manifested itself in the product they own." Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); accord In re Polaris Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liability Litig., 9 F.4th 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2021); O'Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir. 2009). "It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that a product line contains a defect or that a product is at risk for manifesting this defect; rather, the plaintiffs must allege that their product actually exhibited the alleged defect." Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1030 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 616 (8th Cir. 2011)) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).
These cases compel the conclusion that Moeller lacks standing with respect to any appliances other than the dishwasher. Unlike the dishwasher, Moeller does not allege that there have been defects in her stove, refrigerator, or microwave—much less that she disclosed these defects to Samsung or Samsung refused to honor the warranty. Her position is therefore akin to the "no-injury" plaintiffs in Polaris, O'Neil, and Briehl, all of whom were held not to have valid breach of warranty or consumer fraud claims. See Polaris, 9 F.4th at 797 (affirming dismissal of claims regarding allegedly defective vehicles that had not exhibited an actual defect); O'Neil, 574 F.3d at 504-05 (same holding with respect to allegedly defective cribs); Briehl, 172 F.3d at 628-29 (same holding with respect to allegedly defective brakes).
Moeller argues these cases are not governing, and the Court instead should follow Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2017), and Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2016), both of which found standing to exist when consumers alleged violations of contractual privacy provisions. The Eighth Circuit found standing even though the consumers did not allege misuse of their private data, reasoning that the breaches prevented the consumers from getting the data privacy they paid for. See Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 714-16; Carlsen, 833 F.3d at 909-10.
There is an outcome-determinative difference between Moeller's Petition and Kuhns and Carlsen: Moeller has not alleged that Samsung refused to honor the warranty with respect to any appliance other than the dishwasher. In other words, there has been no alleged breach of contract with respect to those other appliances. In Carlsen, by contrast, standing existed because the plaintiff alleged a breach that was "both concrete and particularized, as the breach allegedly already has occurred, and any consequences of the breach have occurred specifically to [plaintiff]." 833 F.3d at 909-10. Similarly, in Kuhns, the plaintiff alleged breach and actual injury. 868 F.3d at 716.
The Court recognizes that Moeller alleged breach of contract with respect to the other appliances. (See Petition at ¶¶ 68-72.) However, the Court is "not bound to accept as true '[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . .' " McDonough v. Anoka Cnty., 799 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Instead, the Court must analyze the underlying alleged facts to determine whether Moeller has alleged a true breach. See id. She has not. Moeller only alleges a defect and failure to honor the warranty with respect to her dishwasher. The alleged "breach" with respect to the other appliances is Samsung's failure to have enough authorized servicers in the State of Iowa and alleged intent not to honor the warranty. Standing alone, however, these are not breaches of any provision of the warranty. Rather, the breach would occur only if Moeller's appliances became defective and if Samsung thereafter refused to repair or replace the appliance or provide a refund. Until and unless those things happen, Moeller has not suffered an injury in fact and lacks standing. See Wallace, 747 F.3d at 1031 (rejecting similar attempt to characterize a product-related injury as a contractual injury; "Article III cannot be so easily fooled.").
As the Eighth Circuit's most recent decision on standing, Polaris is particularly important to the Court's analysis. In Polaris, like here, the plaintiffs argued they suffered injury in the form of the difference between what they thought they were buying (a vehicle with no risk of defects) and what they actually bought (a vehicle with risk of defects). Id. at 797. (Compare ECF 6, p. 18 (identifying "diminished value of [Moeller's] bargain" as the injury-in-fact).) The Court in Polaris found this allegation insufficient to establish standing because "[n]o purchaser alleges that his vehicle has exhibited any damage or degradation, that replacement parts or additional servicing have been required, or that the vehicles failed to perform as intended." Id. The same is true here with respect to all appliances purchased by Moeller other than the dishwasher. Polaris therefore compels dismissal of Moeller's claims for those other appliances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Moeller's Petition alleges plausible claims for breach of contract and under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act in connection with the dishwasher she purchased from Samsung. She has not, however, established standing with respect to the other Samsung appliances she purchased. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Samsung's Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.