Opinion
C/A No. 6:18-cv-2718-BHH-JDA
10-16-2018
Glenn Michael Moccia, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Laurens County Detention Center, Solicitor Jim Todd, Judge Frank Addy, Jr., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Glenn Michael Moccia, Jr., ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at the Laurens County Detention Center in Laurens, South Carolina, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
As noted, Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at the Laurens County Detention Center and asserts claims against Defendants for due process violations and malicious prosecution. [Doc. 1 at 2.] The Court takes judicial notice, see Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting "the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records"), that Plaintiff has been charged with various drug-related crimes in the Laurens County Court of General Sessions, including charges for manufacturing, distributing, and trafficking drugs at case nos. 2017A3020400512, 2017A3020400513, 2017A3020400520, and 2017A3020400521, which remain pending against him. See Laurens County Eighth Judicial Circuit Public Index https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Laurens/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search Plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). True bill indictments were issued on October 13, 2017, as to each of the charges, respectively, at indictment numbers 2017GS3001653, 2017GS3001654, 2017GS3001655, and 2017GS3001656. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, upon his incarceration at the Laurens County Detention Center on July 19, 2017, he was denied a preliminary hearing in violation of his due process rights. [Doc. 1 at 3.] Plaintiff's repeated requests for a preliminary hearing were denied. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, when he finally had a bond hearing on August 31, 2017, bond was denied. [Id.] At the hearing, Solicitor Jim Todd read Plaintiff's arrest record, which was incorrect. [Id.] Plaintiff contends Solicitor Todd and Judge Addy had previously discussed his case. [Id.] Judge Addy took the matter of bond under advisement and, on September 7, 2017, denied bond based on the significant penalty for the charges and Plaintiff's criminal history. [Id. at 3-4.] Plaintiff contends Judge Addy granted a lower bond for Plaintiff's co-conspirators. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff claims Judge Addy's ruling concerning bond is excessive, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and was maliciously made in concert with Solicitor Todd. [Id.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks to have his state criminal case transferred to a different circuit, to have a different solicitor and judge assigned to the case, to have his bond reviewed, and to be awarded damages for his unlawful incarceration. [Id. at 6.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liberally construed, the Complaint asserts claims for due process violations and malicious prosecution. However, for the reasons below, the claims in this § 1983 action are subject to summary dismissal.
While Plaintiff appears to seek only money damages and certain injunctive relief in this action, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from custody, his claim should be brought, if at all, as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.").
Defendants are Entitled to Dismissal
Plaintiff has named three Defendants in this action: the Laurens County Detention Center, Solicitor Jim Todd, and Judge Frank Addy, Jr. [Doc. 1 at 1.] All of the named Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Laurens County Detention Center
It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Laurens County Detention Center is a group of officers in a building and, as such, is not subject to suit under § 1983, or is a facility or building, which cannot be sued as a "defendant" in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."), aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds by 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."); Williams v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., 987 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696 (D.S.C. 2013); Morrison v. Greenville Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Likewise, as noted, buildings and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 F. App'x at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building—the detention center—is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a "person" under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions).
Further, the Laurens County Detention Center is subject to summary dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Laurens County Detention Center is administered by, and under the control of, the Laurens County Sheriff's Office. See, e.g., Williams, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 695-98 (finding that Dorchester County Detention Center is controlled by the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, and thus a state agency). As such, Plaintiff's claim is actually against the Laurens County Sheriff's Office, which is considered a state agency for purposes of Plaintiff's claim. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C.1988) (explaining that a Sheriff's Office is considered a state agency in South Carolina). Because the County Sheriffs are state officers, not county employees, a suit against the "Laurens County Detention Center" is a suit against the state of South Carolina for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (noting Sheriff's office is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit); see also Cash v. Thomas, No. 6:12-cv-1278-MGL, 2013 WL 3804375, at *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2013) ("It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court") (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996)).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989). The law is clear that a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). However, the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court. See S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e) (1976) (South Carolina statute expressly providing that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State); see also McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"), superseded by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 633 S.E. 2d 143 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). Since the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against the Laurens County Detention Center, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant. Accordingly, Laurens County Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Defendant Solicitor Jim Todd
Plaintiff makes various allegations against Solicitor Todd related to his prosecution of Plaintiff's state criminal case and, specifically, with regard to Solicitor Todd's conduct at Plaintiff's bond hearings. [Doc. 1 at 3-4.] However, Solicitor Todd is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial "motions" hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470-71 (4th Cir. 2000). Any actions taken by a solicitor in preparing a criminal charge and prosecuting the case against Plaintiff are part of the judicial process; therefore, the solicitor has absolute immunity from suit. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (explaining absolute immunity is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340-43 (2009).
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310. As noted by the cases cited above, such prosecutors are protected by immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. This absolute immunity from suit applies when prosecutors exercise their prosecutorial discretion, such as making the determination to go forward with indictment. See Springmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1997).
Here, it appears that Solicitor Todd's alleged wrongful conduct relates to his actions in pursuing a criminal case against Plaintiff. This alleged conduct is intricately related to the judicial process and to the prosecution of the State's case against Plaintiff. Therefore, this Defendant has absolute immunity from this suit. Dowdle v. Skinner, No. 6:12-cv-3253-DCN, 2013 WL 5771199, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2013); Rodgers v. Riddle, No. 6:09-cv-1446-PMD, 2009 WL 1953188, at *3 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009); Brooks v. Johnson, No. 2:15-cv-1074-PMD-BM, 2016 WL 551958, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2016), adopted sub nom., Brooks v. Williamsburg Cty. Sheriff's Office, 2016 WL 1427316 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2016). Because such claims are barred under § 1983 by prosecutorial immunity, Solicitor Todd is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Judge Frank Addy , Jr.
Judge Addy has absolute judicial immunity from this civil action and should be dismissed from this case. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that even if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Immunity presents a threshold question. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Here, Plaintiff makes numerous allegations against Judge Addy concerning his rulings on Plaintiff's bond, but these allegations all relate to judicial actions. Thus, because all of the alleged misconduct of Judge Addy arose out of his judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against him. Accordingly, Defendant Judge Addy is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to name any defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal on this basis. Abstention under Younger
Further, this Court is constrained from granting Plaintiff's requested relief by the Younger abstention doctrine. Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to injunctive relief and money damages because Defendants violated his constitutional rights. However, granting Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. As such, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to name a proper Defendant, this Court would nevertheless be required to stay this action pending conclusion of the state court criminal proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, as explained above. See Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm. on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged due process violations and malicious prosecution, thus the first element is satisfied. [Doc. 1 at 6.] The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "'that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
Plaintiff's Complaint essentially challenges the validity of his pending criminal charges, claiming that he has been denied due process of law by the state judge presiding over his criminal case and the solicitor assigned to prosecute his case. A ruling in Plaintiff's favor would call into question the validity of the criminal charges pending against him and would significantly interfere with Plaintiff's ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, even if Plaintiff had named a Defendant amenable to suit under § 1983, this Court should abstain from hearing this action.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge October 16, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).