Opinion
1:19-cv-0754
01-06-2020
MMG INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. GUIRO, INC. and Leonardo D. Lopez, Defendants.
Kevin C. McNamara, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff. Thomas Edward Brenner, Caldwell & Kearns, PC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
Kevin C. McNamara, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.
Thomas Edward Brenner, Caldwell & Kearns, PC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
John E. Jones III, United States District Judge
Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff MMG Insurance Company's Motion for Reconsideration re Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("the Motion"). (Doc. 20). The Motion has been briefed, (Docs. 21, 23), and the time for filing a Reply has since passed. Accordingly, the matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Motion shall be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The pertinent factual background of this case has been fully outlined in this Court's Memorandum and Order of November 5, 2019. (Doc. 19). Relevant herein, we reiterate that the instant motion is an outgrowth of a declaratory judgment action filed by Plaintiff MMG Insurance Company ("MMG"). MMG seeks a declaration that it is not required to defend or indemnify Defendant Guiro, Inc. ("Guiro") for damages alleged by a victim-plaintiff in Pennsylvania state court. In the state-court action, the victim-plaintiff seeks damages that allegedly resulted from a car accident caused by Guiro's delivery driver, Defendant Leonardo Lopez ("Lopez"). In its Answer to MMG's federal declaratory judgment complaint, (Doc. 7), Guiro admitted that Lopez was not driving a vehicle covered by its commercial automobile insurance policy at the time of the accident and that the state-court victim-plaintiff's averment in the underlying state-court complaint that Lopez was driving a personal vehicle as a substitute for a vehicle covered by Guiro's insurance policy "has no factual basis and is false." (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 24, 26; Doc. 7 at ¶¶ 24, 26). According to MMG, Guiro's admission in this concurrent federal action relieved MMG of its obligation to defend or indemnify Guiro under the terms of Guiro's insurance policy.
Notwithstanding the fact that Counsel for Guiro recently entered an appearance on behalf of Lopez, (Doc. 27), we have no reason to believe that Counsel for Guiro also represented Lopez at the time Guiro filed its Answer or that Guiro's Answer was filed on Lopez's behalf.
In our Memorandum and Order denying MMG's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings premised thereon, we held that, under Pennsylvania's "four-corners rule" recently reiterated in, among other cases, Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. , 939 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2019), "MMG's reliance upon Guiro's admissions in the present suit to defeat its duty to defend [is] misguided." (Doc. 19 at 8). Specifically, we noted that Pennsylvania precedent is clear that "when a policyholder is sued, ‘an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual averments contained in [the underlying state court] complaint,’ " Sapa Extrusions , 939 F.3d at 249 (quoting Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. , 589 Pa. 317, 908 A.2d 888, 896 (2006) ), and that, " ‘if the allegations of the underlying complaint potentially could support recovery under the policy, there will be coverage at least to the extent that the insurer has a duty to defend its insured in the case.’ " Id. (quoting Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co. , 814 F.3d 660, 673 (3d Cir. 2016) ) (emphasis in original)). Thus, we found, as did the Third Circuit in Sapa Extrusions , that it would be "misplaced" for an insured to rely upon facts outside of the complaint to trigger an insurer's duty to defend. Id. Accordingly, we found the inverse to also be true: An insurer also may not rely upon facts outside of the underlying complaint to defeat its duty to defend. Id. ; see also Kvaerner , 908 A.2d at 896 ("The Superior Court ... [erred by] depart[ing] from the well-established precedent of this Court requiring that an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify be determined solely from the language of the complaint against the insured. We find no reason to expand upon the well-reasoned and long-standing rule that an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual averments contained in the complaint itself.") (citations omitted); Kiely ex rel. Feinstein v. Phila. Contributionship Ins. Co. , 206 A.3d 1140, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) ("The question of whether a claim against an insured is potentially covered is answered by comparing the four corners of the insurance contract to the four corners of the complaint. We do not consider extrinsic evidence.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, we held that, because MMG's motion for judgment on the pleadings relied upon facts admitted in Guiro's Answer before this Court—a pleading which was clearly not within the four corners of the complaint filed in state court by the injured plaintiff in the action underlying the instant insurance dispute—MMG could not rely upon those facts to relieve itself of its duty to defend or indemnify Guiro and MMG was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The instant motion for reconsideration challenges that ruling.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly as federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments. Burger King Corp. v. New England Hood & Duct Cleaning Co. , 2000 WL 133756, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence, Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki , 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), and, as such, "motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly." Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc. , 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Generally, a motion for reconsideration will only be granted on one of the following three grounds: (1) if there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) if new evidence, which was not previously available, has become available; or (3) if it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Café by Lou Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros , 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration may not be used to present a new legal theory for the first time, to raise new arguments that could have been made in support of the original motion, see Vaidya v. Xerox Corp. , No. CIV.A.97-547, 1997 WL 732464, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997), and should not ask the court to rethink a decision that it has already made. Tobin v. GE , No. Civ. A. 95-4003, 1998 WL 31875, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Mere dissatisfaction with the Court's ruling is not a proper basis for reconsideration. Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon , 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION
In its motion and accompanying brief, MMG argues that this Court erred in concluding that an insurer may not rely upon facts outside of the underlying complaint to defeat its duty to defend. According to MMG, an insurer's obligation to defend "continues only until the insurer can ‘confine the possibility of recovery to claims outside the coverage of the policy.’ " (Doc. 21 at 2 (quoting American Contract Bridge League v. Nationwide , 752 F.2d 71, 75 (3rd Cir. 1985) ). Thus, because "[a]n insurer is not bound to defend where it cannot be bound to indemnify," and because "an insurer may rely upon evidence outside the underlying complaint to prove that it has no duty to indemnify," an insurer may also rely upon evidence outside of the complaint to prove that it has no duty to defend. (Id. at 3 (citing State Farm v. Cooper , 2001 WL 1287574, *3-4, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17050, *11 (E.D. Pa.) ). We disagree.
We note that MMG did not attach a copy of this unreported case as required by Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 7.8. Because MMG did not include a date in the citation, the Court cannot conclusively identify the case to which MMG refers. Further review of the quotations from the case cited in MMG's brief suggests that the case to which MMG intended to cite was State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cooper , No. 00-cv-5538, 2001 WL 1287574 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2001). We caution the parties to comply with all local rules moving forward.
As an initial matter, we note that motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly as federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments. Burger King Corp. v. New England Hood & Duct Cleaning Co. , 2000 WL 133756, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki , 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). In this case, MMG has presented no binding authority suggesting that the Court's understanding of Pennsylvania law or the Third Circuit precedent interpreting Pennsylvania law upon which it relied was manifestly erroneous. Likewise, a motion for reconsideration may not be used to present a new legal theory for the first time, to raise new arguments that could have been made in support of the original motion, see Vaidya v. Xerox Corp. , No. CIV.A.97-547, 1997 WL 732464, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997), and should not ask the court to rethink a decision that it has already made. Tobin v. GE , No. Civ. A. 95-4003, 1998 WL 31875, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Mere dissatisfaction with the Court's ruling is not a proper basis for reconsideration. Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon , 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993). All of the arguments that MMG raises in its motion for reconsideration were implicit in its initial motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court simply disagreed. Thus, MMG has failed to carry its burden in support of its motion for reconsideration and we shall deny MMG the relief it requests.
Even were we disinclined to deny MMG's motion on procedural grounds, we see MMG's reliance upon Cooper and other similarly reasoned cases as unpersuasive in light of intervening decisions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, particularly Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. , 589 Pa. 317, 908 A.2d 888 (2006) and Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. , 939 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2019). Both Pennsylvania courts and the Third Circuit have been abundantly clear that, under Pennsylvania law, "[w]e do not consider extrinsic evidence" when determining whether "a claim against an insured is potentially covered" for purposes of determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend. Kiely on Behalf of Feinstein v. Philadelphia Contributionship Ins. Co. , 206 A.3d 1140, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2019) ; see also Kvaerner , 908 A.2d at 896 ("The Superior Court ... [erred by] depart[ing] from the well-established precedent of this Court requiring that an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify be determined solely from the language of the complaint against the insured. We find no reason to expand upon the well-reasoned and long-standing rule that an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual averments contained in the complaint itself."); Sapa Extrusions , 939 F.3d at 252 ("[W]hen a policyholder is sued, ‘an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual averments contained in [the underlying] complaint ... if the allegations of the underlying complaint potentially could support recovery under the policy, there will be coverage at least to the extent that the insurer has a duty to defend its insured in the case.’ ") (emphasis in original)). In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has even go so far as to note that:
In making this determination, the factual allegations of the underlying complaint against the insured are to be taken as true and liberally construed in favor of the insured. Indeed, the duty to defend is not limited to meritorious actions; it even extends to actions that are "groundless, false, or fraudulent" as long as there exists the possibility that the allegations implicate coverage.
Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry's Sport Ctr., Inc. , 606 Pa. 584, 2 A.3d 526, 541 (2010). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the reasoning in Cooper which suggests that district courts are permitted to look beyond the four-corners of the complaint by simply considering the external evidence in the context of an insurer's duty to indemnify and then circuitously applying the absence of a duty to indemnify to negate the insurer's duty to defend. In our view, this would except Pennsylvania's four-corners rule out of existence.
In Cooper , insurer State Farm sought a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify Stephen Loehrs ("Loehrs") under the terms of Loehrs' homeowner's insurance policy for injuries he caused to a third party. In short, Loehrs and others had brutally beaten victim Keith Cooper ("Cooper") resulting in Cooper's death; Loehrs pleaded guilty to the same in state court. When Cooper's widow sought civil damages against Loehrs, Loehrs engaged State Farm who sought to defeat its duty to defend and indemnify because Loehrs' homeowner's insurance policy explicitly denied coverage for intentional conduct. In granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment, the district court found that, because Loehrs had pleaded guilty in state court to intentional conduct which necessarily defeated State Farm's duty to indemnify him, State Farm was necessarily relieved of its duty to defend him under the terms of his insurance contract. The district court considered Loehrs' state court guilty plea when determining whether State Farm had a duty to defend him even though that guilty plea fell outside the four corners of the underlying state-court complaint. According to the district court:
The determination of the duty to indemnify is not limited to the facial allegations of the underlying complaint. "Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify cannot be determined merely on the basis of whether the factual allegations of the complaint potentially state a claim against the insured. Rather, there must be a determination that the insurer's policy actually covers a claimed incident." State Farm may rely upon evidence outside the underlying complaint to prove that it has no duty to indemnify the underlying claim. Once State Farm can confine the claim in the [underlying state court action] to be outside the coverage of the insurance policy, it no longer has a duty to defend the underlying action. Consequently, this Court may look outside the four corners of the [underlying state court action] complaint to determine both State Farm's obligation to indemnify and its ongoing duty to defend.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cooper , No. CIV.A. 00-5538, 2001 WL 1287574, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2001) (internal citations omitted).
Oddly, the district court in Cooper cited a single case from the Pennsylvania Superior Court, American States Insurance Co. v. State Auto Insurance Co. , 721 A.2d 56, 63 (Pa. Super. 1998), in support of its view that an insurer "may rely upon evidence outside the underlying complaint to prove that it has no duty to indemnify the underlying claim." However, in our view, American States ' holding does not appear as broad as the proposition for which it is cited in Cooper . In American States , the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a trial court ruling that relieved an insurer of its duty to indemnify its insured after the insured settled the case prior to a court ruling as to the insurer's duty to indemnify. In short, the trial court held that the vehicle involved in the accident at issue in the case was not a covered vehicle under the policy terms by relying upon an uncontested affidavit filed by the insurer—an affidavit that was necessarily outside the four corners of the complaint. However, neither the Superior Court nor the trial court in American States explicitly acknowledged it as such. Rather, the Superior Court and the trial court grappled with whether the case's settlement implicitly resolved the factual question of whether the vehicle involved in the accident was not covered by the policy terms and whether there is "a blanket rule that a breach of the duty to defend automatically requires the insurer to indemnify if the underlying action was settled." Id. at 64. Notwithstanding the awkward and seemingly inapplicable procedural posture of American States to the facts in Cooper , the district court in Cooper proposed that American States stood for the proposition that, as a matter of course, an insurer "may rely upon evidence outside the underlying complaint to prove that it has no duty to indemnify the underlying claim." Cooper , 2001 WL 1287574, at *4. Consequently, because the insurance contract at issue in Cooper relived the insurer of the duty to defend where there was no duty to indemnify, the Cooper Court concluded, a district court may look outside the four corners of the state-court complaint to determine State Farm's ongoing duty to defend when viewed through the lens of the duty to indemnify.
Just five years after Cooper , however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated "the well-established precedent of this Court requiring that an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify be determined solely from the language of the complaint against the insured." Kvaerner , 908 A.2d at 896 (emphasis added). Seemingly, notwithstanding the asserted-soundness of Cooper's reasoning, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed.
In light of Kvaerner , and what appears to be an over-extension of a minor procedural issue in American States by Cooper , we are not persuaded by MMG's insistence that Cooper 's understanding of the interplay between the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify, and Pennsylvania's four-corners rule is persuasive and/or binding because it has been adopted by other district courts which have cited to it, and adopted its logic. (Doc. 19 at 6 (citing Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. Welsh , No. CV 14-1581, 2016 WL 5468121 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2016) ; Utica First Ins. Co. v. Maclean , No. CIV.A. 08-1138, 2009 WL 415988 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2009) ; State Farm v. Bellina , 264 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ). Rather, we are constrained to conclude that Cooper 's proposition that an insurer may rely upon evidence outside the underlying complaint to prove that it has no duty to indemnify the underlying claim and, therefore, that the district court is permitted to look beyond the four-corners of the complaint in determining an ongoing duty to defend is a conflation and/or misapplication of disparate areas of Pennsylvania law. Indeed, the cases upon which MMG relies to bolster Cooper's authority all tautologically cite to each other. That is, Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. Welsh cites to Utica First Ins. Co. v. Maclean . Utica First Ins. Co. v. Maclean cites to Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn , 590 F. Supp. 643, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1984), (a case which, interestingly, American States rejected as inapplicable to the facts of that case). In turn, Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn cites to C. H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co. , 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1981) —a case which appears inapposite to the original proposition in Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. Welsh which looks to Heist for support.
In Heist , the Third Circuit noted that the "obligation to indemnify ... cannot be determined merely on the basis of whether the factual allegations of [a] complaint potentially state a claim against the insured. Actual indemnification depends upon the existence or nonexistence of facts not yet established." Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded, "a decision on [the insurer's] obligation to indemnify [the insured] is premature at this stage of the proceedings," i.e. , before the necessary factual predicates have been established before the operative fact-finder. Id. Thus, Heist did not find that a district court may look outside of the four-corners of the complaint to determine an insurer's duty to defend or indemnify and, after Kvaerner , to infer such a broad conclusion from Heist 's narrow holding is specious at worst and a prime example of precedent creep at best.
In fact, in Heist , our Court of Appeals expressly bifurcated the duty to defend from the duty to indemnify, finding that:
In determining whether [a specific contractual exclusion] excludes from coverage the injuries suffered by [the victim-complainant], it is important to separate [the insurer's] duty to defend [the insured] from its duty to indemnify [the insured]. [The insurer] must defend the third-party action if the allegations of the complaint "state on their face a claim against the insured to which the policy potentially applies." In making this determination, the factual allegations of [the victim-complainant's] complaint against [the insured] are controlling. That complaint alleges that [the victim-complainant] was injured while cleaning a tank containing highly toxic lead substances. The allegations do not indicate that there was a discharge or release of toxic fumes or chemicals "into or upon land, the atmosphere or any ... body of water." In addition, even if such a discharge or release from the tank could be implied, there is no basis in the complaint for finding that it was non-accidental. Therefore, the allegations of [the victim-complainant's] complaint "state on their face a claim against the insured to which the policy potentially applies," and [the insurer] must defend the third-party action .... Nevertheless ... [the insurer's] obligation to indemnify [the insured] ... cannot be determined merely on the basis of whether the factual allegations of [the victim-complainant's] complaint potentially state a claim against the insured. Actual indemnification depends upon the existence or nonexistence of facts not yet established. For example, during trial of [the victim-complainant's] complaint it may develop that [a specific contractual exclusion] or another exclusion applies to some or all of the injuries in question. Similarly, factual findings in that action may demonstrate that [the victim-complainant's] injuries are not within the
scope of the ... indemnity agreement. Thus, a decision on [the insurer's] obligation to indemnify [the insured] is premature at this stage of the proceedings.
Id. at 483. Here too, in the instant case, where the factual predicates related to various exclusions in the insurance contract have not yet been proven in the underlying litigation , we are constrained to conclude that ruling upon the merits of MMG's duty to indemnify, and by extension its ongoing duty to defend, is premature. That is, at this stage of the litigation, we are constrained by the verbiage of the state-court victim-complainant's averments and cannot find—absent further fact-finding before the proper fact-finder—that MMG has no duty to indemnify Guiro and, therefore, no ongoing duty to defend.
We are also unpersuaded by MMG's insistence that Sapa Extrustions supports its position that this Court's interpretation of Pennsylvania law is "simply not correct." (Id. at 7). In Sapa Extrusions , our Court of Appeals clarified that, "in the context of a declaratory judgment action to determine an insurer's obligations, Pennsylvania courts consistently apply what is known as the ‘four-corners rule.’ " Sapa Extrusions , 939 F.3d at 249. "That is, when a policyholder is sued, ‘an insurer's duty to defend is triggered, if at all, by the factual averments contained in [the underlying state court] complaint[.]’ " Id. (quoting Kvaerner , 908 A.2d at 896 ). " ‘[I]f the allegations of the underlying complaint potentially could support recovery under the policy, there will be coverage at least to the extent that the insurer has a duty to defend its insured in the case.’ " Id. (quoting Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co. , 814 F.3d 660, 673 (3d Cir. 2016) ) (emphasis in original)). Thus, the Third Circuit reasoned, it is "misplaced" for an insured to rely upon facts outside of the complaint to trigger an insurer's duty to defend. Id. Based upon Sapa Extrusions , we concluded that, if an insured is not permitted to look outside of the four-corners of the complaint to create a duty to defend, "the inverse must also be true: An insurer may not rely upon facts outside of the underlying complaint to defeat its duty to defend." (Doc. 19 at 8).
MMG, however, picks up on dicta in Sapa Extrusions in which the Third Circuit continued: "Pennsylvania law thus creates a ratchet of sorts between the two duties. The initial allegations in the underlying complaint that may trigger the insurer's duty to defend must eventually mature into provable facts to spark a duty to indemnify." Id. (emphasis in original). Further, the Court cryptically cautioned, "this ratchet works in only one direction." Id. According to MMG, the single-direction in which this ratchet operates is in favor of the insurer and this Court erred in finding otherwise. (Doc. 21 at 8 ("[W]hile an insurer may rely upon [extrinsic] evidence to defeat coverage, an insured may not do so to invoke coverage.")).
In our view, however, neither precedent from the Third Circuit nor from the Pennsylvania courts bears out MMG's understanding of Sapa Extrusions . Our reading of the ratchet dictum in Sapa Extrusions suggest that an insured may plead facts in his or her complaint which trigger a duty to defend, but that duty to defend may never "spark" into a duty to indemnify. That is, if there is no spark, then the insurer may at some point be relieved of its duty to indemnify. This is not to say, as MMG suggests, that this ratchet works only in favor of the insurer or that an insurer may plainly violate the four-corners rule to defeat its duty to defend.
We reiterate, Pennsylvania courts and the Third Circuit have been abundantly clear that "[w]e do not consider extrinsic evidence" when determining whether "a claim against an insured is potentially covered." Kiely , 206 A.3d at 1146 ; Kvaerner , 908 A.2d at 896 ; Sapa Extrusions , 939 F.3d at 252. In fact, "the duty to defend ... even extends to actions that are ‘groundless, false, or fraudulent’ as long as there exists the possibility that the allegations implicate coverage." Am. & Foreign , 2 A.3d at 541. Thus, in our view, the unpublished district court cases that MMG cites are not only non-binding and unpersuasive but appear to gut the four-corners rule by exception. Were we to consider evidence extrinsic to an underlying state court complaint in the context of an insurer's duty to defend by first considering that evidence in the context of the insurer's duty to indemnify and then applying the absence of a duty to indemnify to negate the insurer's duty to defend, the four-corners rule as it relates to the duty to defend would be rendered nugatory. We are not prepared to take such a leap.
In our view, Sapa Extrusions ' ratchet dictum articulates that an insured may plead facts in his or her complaint which trigger a duty to defend which never "spark" into a duty to indemnify during the pendency of litigation because the insurer points to evidence in the underlying litigation to demonstrate that it is relieved of its duty to indemnify. However, this does not and cannot speak to whether an insurer can point to evidence outside of the complaint to defeat its duty to defend without upending Pennsylvania's clearly articulated four-corners rule. Indeed, the Pennsylvania jurisprudence upon which MMG relies to demonstrate that the duty to defend "continues only until the insurer can ‘confine the possibility of recovery to claims outside the coverage of the policy,’ " (Doc. 21 at 2 (quoting American Contract Bridge League v. Nationwide , 752 F.2d 71, 75 (3rd Cir. 1985) ), appears to be triggered when the insurer can "confine the possibility of recovery to claims outside the coverage of the policy" in the underlying state court litigation —not in a concurrent federal declaratory judgment action. Were we to look outside of the facts established in the underlying state court litigation we could deprive the underlying state court victim-claimant that which it is owed should Guiro's admission before this Court prove incorrect. To affirmatively find, at this juncture, in a concurrent federal action, that MMG has no duty to defend or indemnify Guiro based upon Guiro's admission before this Court also could deprive the state-court victim-claimant that which he or she is owed should Guiro and/or Lopez prove judgment proof. If Guiro's admission before this Court is in fact true, then MMG may be relieved of its duty to indemnify Guiro at a later date. At that time, MMG may petition this Court or the Pennsylvania courts to rule upon its duty to indemnify Guiro and the concurrent impact the existence or nonexistence of that duty could have on MMG's ongoing duty to defend. At this point in the federal proceedings, however, we are constrained to the facts in the victim-complainant's state court pleading and cannot engage in the mental gymnastics necessary to consider extrinsic evidence simply because MMG so requests.
We reiterate that Guiro admitted these facts before this Court, not Lopez.
Our reading of Sapa Extrusions ' interpretation of Pennsylvania law suggests that the one-directional ratchet discussed therein works the same way for the insurer as the insured. In conformity with Pennsylvania law, neither may rely upon evidence extrinsic to the underlying complaint when determining whether a claim is potentially covered. As such, we shall deny MMG's motion for reconsideration premised thereon.
From a practical perspective we are of course sympathetic to MMG's arguments. In the instant case, a state-court victim-claimant raised allegations that plainly trigger MMG's duty to defend Guiro under Pennsylvania's clearly articulated and strictly enforced four-corners rule. Before this Court, however, Guiro has admitted facts which, if true, would seemingly bring the claims outside the scope of the policy and would remove MMG's duty to indemnify Guiro. As a consequence, this may also relieve MMG's duty to defend Guiro under its policy terms. Thus, we are tasked with either enforcing Pennsylvania's four-corners rule as we understand it or carving out an exception which would, in effect, gut the rule entirely. Absent further guidance, we refuse to do the latter. Such an exception, while perhaps logical and more equitable as applied to the case at bar, would also fly in the fact of the aforecited precedent. It is thus not for this Court to make that leap.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration re Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 20), shall be denied. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration re Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 20), is DENIED .