Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-30066-MAP.
December 19, 2002
MEMORANDUM REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket Nos. 37, 39)
I. Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Thomas Mitchell ("plaintiff" or "Mitchell"), a former inmate at North Central Correctional Institution ("NCCI") at Gardner, Massachusetts, has brought suit in three counts — under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(2); section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and various departmental officials (together, "defendants"). Mitchell contends that, during his incarceration at NCCI, he suffered discrimination when, because of his medical condition, he was repeatedly denied the chance to participate in various programs and thereby lost an opportunity for early release.
Both the plaintiff and the defendants have filed motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion will be allowed in full, and the plaintiff's motion denied.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue is one that reasonably could be resolved in favor of either party, and a "material fact is one that affects the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000).
Once the moving party has asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is on the opposing party to point to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue. National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995). Not every genuine factual conflict, of course, necessitates a trial. "It is only when a disputed fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant that the materiality hurdle is cleared." Parrilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 108 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). At bottom, matters of law are for the court to decide at summary judgment. Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir. 1996).
III. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts below are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor.
On March 27, 1996, Mitchell was convicted of five counts of larceny and sentenced to a prison term of seven to ten years. Mitchell began his term of incarceration at the correctional facility at MCI-Concord. On August 9, 1996, he was transferred to NCCI. At the time he was sixty-six years old and suffered from heart disease and diabetes.
Within a few days of his arrival at NCCI, Mitchell became aware of the possibility that he could participate in certain programs and thereby possibly receive a reduction in his time of incarceration. Thereafter, Mitchell unsuccessfully applied for various programs he believed he might be eligible for.
During August of 1996, for example, he approached a work assignment officer, Officer Lundquist, at various times to request an assignment to "the grounds crew, the kitchen, the optical shop, carpentry shop or any other job available." (Docket 40, Ex. 3, at ¶ 2). Each time, within a couple of days of making the application, Mitchell would be denied permission to work purportedly because he lacked medical clearance or was simply too old for the job.
In September 1996, Mitchell attempted to sign up for the "Barber Shop, . . . Culinary Arts, Tractor Training and Welding Programs but was told a few days after signing up for each program that [he] was not medically cleared for the program." (Docket 40, Ex. 3, at ¶ 3). Mitchell was also rejected from the Power Tech program. Id. All or most of these rejections were communicated verbally following the refusal of Correctional Medical Services ("CMS") to grant medical clearance.
Throughout his incarceration at NCCI, Mitchell regularly consulted with medical professionals at CMS regarding his inability to procure medical clearance. Sometime in 1997, one of the facility's medical staff, Dr. Mohammed, intimated that, because of Mitchell's heart disease and diabetes, he would clear Mitchell only for light work — work that never materialized. On other occasions, Mitchell could elicit no more than a "we'll see" response from CMS doctors. (Docket 40, Ex. 1, at 50).
According to Mitchell, this pattern of unresponsiveness continued throughout his stay at NCCI; his grievances regarding his rejections fell on deaf ears. Two meetings with the Director of Treatment at NCCI, Peter Chalapatis, produced no response.
Mitchell's incarceration at NCCI concluded on August 12, 1999, when he was transferred to the Southeastern Correctional Center. In total, the plaintiff calculates that he was denied 255 days of good-time credits that he might have received if he had been permitted to participate in some sort of program.
Mitchell filed this complaint on April 19, 2001. On March 8, 2002, the court adopted the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Neiman, allowing the defendants' motion to dismiss except as to claims brought under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, to the extent Mitchell sought monetary damages. Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on these remaining claims.
IV. Discussion
The defendants have offered essentially two reasons for granting summary judgment in their favor: (1) that the plaintiff fails to state a valid factual claim under either Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act; and (2) that the plaintiff's ADA claim is precluded by the statute of limitations.
To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities or otherwise was discriminated by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion or denial of benefits was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. See Parker v. Universidad di Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). Under the language of the ADA, a disability is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The analysis of the ADA applies coextensively to the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA's precursor.
With respect to the defendants' first argument, the record is indeed very sketchy and offers evidence that at best barely supports, as a factual matter, a substantive claim under Title II of the ADA. That said, it is not necessary to resolve this factual issue, because the defendants' statute of limitations argument is overwhelming as a matter of law.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are treated as personal injury actions, and the pertinent statute of limitations is three years. See Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Author., 13 F. Supp.2d 130, 136 (D.Mass. 1998); see also Sigros v. Walt Disney World Co., 190 F. Supp.2d 165, 168 (D.Mass. 2002). In this case, the plaintiff's injury occurred in 1996; he filed suit in April 2001, far too late.
In Massachusetts, a "continuing violation" theory allows a plaintiff to recover for earlier incidents, otherwise time-barred, where, at the time, the plaintiff had no reason to know of his injury. Keeler v. Putnam Fiduciary Tr. Co., 238 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2001). The First Circuit has recognized the propriety of extending the filing period, where an initial injury may be almost indiscernible and "where pinpricks may only slowly add up to a wound." Keeler v. Putnam Fiduciary Trust Co., 238 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2001).
In this case, however, Mitchell conceded at oral argument that programs which result in reduction of sentences come to the attention of prisoners within a few days of their incarceration. Indeed, as in Keeler, Mitchell suspected "long before he filed his complaint . . . that . . . discrimination was at work." Keeler, 238 F.3d at 11. In fact, the undisputed record demonstrates that Mitchell was aware of his injury as early as mid-September 1996, roughly four and one-half years before he filed suit on April 19, 2001. In his deposition, the plaintiff commented:
I knew there was a violation of my rights because another person there . . . . [H]e brought up the fact — well I was only there a couple of months — he brought up the fact that they can't deny you these jobs because of ADA. He showed me the rules . . . and I studied it for about a year.
(Docket 40, Ex. 1, at 72-73). At the latest, by the end of 1997 — after roughly fifteen months of incarceration at NCCI and more than three years before he filed suit — Mitchell would have been well aware of the defendants' alleged determination to prevent him from participating in sentence-reducing programs.
Under these circumstances, Mitchell's claims under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are untimely and must be hereby dismissed.
Because the defendants are entitled to summary judgment, the plaintiff's corresponding motion must be denied.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby ALLOWED and the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
A separate Order will issue.
ORDER
PONSOR, D.J.
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby ALLOWED and the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. The clerk will enter judgment for the defendants.
It is So Ordered.