Opinion
C/A 8:23-cv-04771-JFA-JDA
11-13-2023
Venable Mitchell, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Boykin, Dentist; Mrs. Garcia, formerly Ms. Broach/Dental Asst.; Elane Miller, Inmate Grievance Coordinator; Tonya James, Warden; Cathrine Amos, Mail Clerk; Cheri Frost; Jennifer McDuffie, Associate Warden; Ms. Logan, Inmate Financial; M. Lawrance, General Counsel; Dr. Burnham, Dr.; Tyrone Commander, Associate Warden, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Venable Mitchell (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action against the above-named Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is presently confined at the Ridgeland Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1 at 2, 7.]
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02, D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants Miller, James, Amos, Frost, McDuffie, Logan, Lawrance, Burnham, and Commander be dismissed from this action. If the undersigned's recommendation is adopted, this action will remain pending against Defendants Boykin and Garcia, and an order authorizing service of process as to those Defendants is entered contemporaneously with this Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
The crux of this action is Plaintiff's claim that he was denied appropriate medical care for a tooth that had to be extracted. Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends Defendants have violated his rights under the First, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends that “each Defendant was being deliberately indifferent” to his right to receive adequate medical treatment. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on September 14, 2020, at the Kershaw Correctional Dental Lab. [Id. at 7.] For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he suffered pain, discomfort, and facial numbness. [Id. at 8.] Plaintiff alleges he now drools while talking, he has a “pause” in his face/mouth movement, his face aches and is swollen most mornings, and there is a slow lag in the right side of his face. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he was never checked out by the appropriate doctor and has suffered temporary paralysis. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff contends he is seeking actual damages in the amount of $1 million and $10 million in punitive damages. [Id.] Plaintiff also seeks “dental improvement.” [Id.]
Plaintiff makes the following additional allegations in a hand-written document attached to his Complaint. [Doc. 1-1.] On June 18, 2020, Warden James approved Plaintiff to be transported for an outside elective healthcare request to have a dental procedure performed at his own expense. [Id. at 1.] Dental assistant Garcia contacted the approved dental office, Aspen Dental, to inquire about whether Plaintiff had insurance, his financial situation, and who was paying for the services. [Id.] The dentist office contacted Plaintiff's family “relieving themselves of conducting the [p]rocedure [and] stating, ‘it's too much to deal with.'” [Id.] Garcia stated the best solution would be to let the prison deal with it. [Id.] However, Plaintiff was experiencing excruciating pain from his degenerating tooth. [Id.] Plaintiff agreed to let Garcia and a dentist extract the tooth. [Id.]
On September 14, 2020, Plaintiff was taken to dental. [Id.] While sitting in the dentist chair, Garcia shot Novocain into Plaintiff's mouth and rubbed the roof of his mouth with her gloved finger. [Id.] Moments later, Dr. Boykin, the dentist, walked in and immediately started to extract Plaintiff's tooth. [Id.] Plaintiff asked Dr. Boykin to stop because he could feel the work being done and it was painful. [Id. at 1-2.] Dr. Boykin refused to stop and continued to attempt to extract Plaintiff's tooth. [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff was “humming stop from [his] throat,” and Garcia grabbed Plaintiff's arms, placed them across his chest, and placed her weight on him. [Id.] Dr. Boykin crushed Plaintiff's tooth and split the gum, causing blood to spurt everywhere. [Id.] Garcia yelled, “Dr. Boykin,” who then aggressively started pulling and yanking on the tooth, causing Plaintiff's head and neck to jerk. [Id.] Garcia then yelled at Dr. Boykin to stop. [Id.] Dr. Boykin then “snatche[d] one last aggressive time, pulling the stud of the tooth out, with a long attached strip of skin, hanging from it, which came from [Plaintiff's] upper gum and inner cheek skin.” [Id.] Plaintiff then went unconscious. [Id.] Garcia screamed at Dr. Boykin to “GET OUT! GET OUT! Clean yourself up, trash your scrubs, and go to your office.” [Id.]
Plaintiff woke up to Garcia slapping his face, spraying the waterpick in his face, and calling his name. [Id.] She was crying and said, “I don't know what[']s gotten into the dentist.” [Id.] Garcia then checked Plaintiff's vitals and rubbed his arms and legs, at which time Plaintiff noticed he had no feeling in his arms and legs. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff and Garcia both started crying, and Garcia said the feeling in his arms and legs should return shortly. [Id.] She then gave Plaintiff two Aspirin. [Id.] Dr. Boykin returned to apologize and explained he was not intentionally trying to hurt Plaintiff and that the procedure typically called for sedation but it is not allowed at the institution. [Id.]
Dr. Boykin then stitched Plaintiff up while Garcia held his neck and chin steady because his feeling had not yet returned. [Id.] Dr. Boykin attempted to stitch the wound with “thick yellow thread,” which failed and caused more bleeding. [Id.] Dr. Boykin packed the hole with gauze and then stitched it up. [Id.] Plaintiff then sat for several hours until the feeling returned. [Id.] He was then released to report back to his unit, where he was left alone for three days. [Id.] Garcia visited Plaintiff multiple times, mainly to excuse herself of the situation. [ Id. at 3-4.] Plaintiff was also seen by Lt. Bogerstras. [ Id. at 4.]
Warden James subsequently approved Plaintiff for another outside visit to a dentist. [Id.] Plaintiff was taken to Smile Columbia Dentistry on September 20, 2021, and money was taken from his trust fund account. [Id.] Plaintiff was escorted by Sgt. Nesbit and Lt. Mickens to the dentist. [Id.] The dentist, Adam Hahn, took multiple x-rays and then stated he could not perform the procedure because they waited too long to bring Plaintiff to him. [Id.] Dr. Hahn noted that Plaintiff had a “swollen bacterial infection” and “gross decay” and that it could be detrimental for Hahn to cut it. [Id.] Hahn prescribed Plaintiff Penicillin and referred him to Prisma Health to see an oral surgeon. [Id.] However, Plaintiff never received his pain medications or Penicillin. [Id.] Plaintiff was placed in special housing unit while his situation got worse. [Id. at 5.]
Plaintiff was then approved by Warden James for a visit to the oral surgeon, but Plaintiff was never taken. [Id.] Instead, Plaintiff was transferred to Lee County Correctional Institution. [Id.] Plaintiff had conversations with Associate Warden Commander, who was aware of Plaintiff's situation, and said he would arrange for him to see medical. [Id.] Nurse Kennedy, who passes out medications, told Plaintiff they had him written down as refusing to go. [Id.] On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff was transported to another dental office but was told he needed work done that they did not do. [Id.] At this time, Plaintiff has still not had the work done on his teeth that he needs. [ Id. at 5-6.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under the less stringent standard applicable to pro se pleadings, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”). Thus, although a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendants Miller, James, Amos, Frost, McDuffie, Logan, Lawrance, Burnham, and Commander are entitled to dismissal from this action because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against them to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Plaintiff makes the following allegations with regard to these Defendants. As to Defendant James, Plaintiff alleges that, as the Warden, he approved Plaintiff's request to see an outside dentist on three occasions. [Doc. 1-1 at 1, 4, 5.] As to Defendant Commander, Plaintiff alleges that, as Associate Warden, he was aware of Plaintiff's situation and said he would arrange for him to see medical. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever against the other Defendants.
As an initial matter, these allegations fail to state a claim because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that these Defendants acted personally in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); Faltas v. South Carolina, No. 3:11-cv-3077-TLW-SVH, 2012 WL 988105, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988083 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012), aff'd, 489 Fed.Appx. 720 (4th Cir. 2012). When a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See, e.g., Reaves v. Richardson, No. 4:09-cv-820-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 2119318, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2011) (“without such personal involvement, there can be no liability under section 1983”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2112100 (D.S.C. May 27, 2011); Fox v. Drew, No. 8:12-cv-421-MGL, 2013 WL 4776706, at *11 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2013) (explaining that a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing), aff'd, 563 Fed.Appx. 279 (4th Cir. 2014). In the absence of substantive allegations of personal wrongdoing against these Defendants, the Court is unable to liberally construe any plausible cause of action arising from the Complaint against them.
Additionally, these Defendants are entitled to dismissal to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against them on the basis of supervisory liability. This is so because the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against any Defendant to make such a showing.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants Miller, James, Amos, Frost, McDuffie, Logan, Lawrance, Burnham, and Commander be dismissed from this action. The action remains pending against Defendants Boykin and Garcia.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).