Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. JVSQ-10-6034
Kline, P.J.
Misty R., the mother of the child Z.R., seeks extraordinary writ review pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, to vacate the order of respondent juvenile court made at the conclusion of the six-month review hearing. Before setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for adoption of a permanent placement plan, the court ordered termination of reunification services to petitioner from real party in interest Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services (Department). The court found that the reunification services offered to petitioner were adequate, that the extent of petitioner’s progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement was insufficient, and that there was not a substantial probability of return of the child by the 12-month review hearing.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
Petitioner contends on review that adequate services were not provided to her and that her progress was sufficient to require continuation of services. We shall conclude that the record has more than ample evidence to sustain the court’s determinations, and we deny the petition on its merits.
BACKGROUND
On March 15, 2010, the Department filed an original petition under section 300 for the child, who was then less than two years old. The court sustained allegations under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), upon findings that petitioner had refused to allow hospital staff to treat the child for an umbilical hernia and diaper rash; petitioner had a chronic substance abuse problem that impaired her ability to provide proper care and supervision of the child; and she recently had been evicted from her apartment as she was not abiding by the rules of her transitional housing placement program. It was further alleged that the child had tested positive for methamphetamine on October 15, 2009; that petitioner had tested positive for methamphetamine on numerous occasions, including days before the petition was filed; and that petitioner had used methamphetamine in the home with the child present. The petition also stated that preplacement preventative services had been offered to petitioner and she refused to abide by the case plan provided at that time. The petition also alleged under section 300, subdivision (g) (no provision for support), that petitioner had left the child at the hospital, stating to staff, “ ‘I’m done, I’m walking away’ ”; her whereabouts were unknown for a period of time; and the identity of the child’s father and his whereabouts were also unknown at the time. A detention hearing was held on March 16, 2010, at which time the court detained the child and set the matter for a jurisdiction hearing. At the detention hearing, petitioner named an alleged father and informed the court she would go to an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. At the jurisdiction hearing held March 26, 2010, petitioner submitted on the petition. She had returned from the rehab program, having stayed there five hours. She stated she had worked out a recovery plan with the Alcohol and Other Drugs (AOD) program. She had been terminated from the MEND/WEND Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Program (an anger management program) and needed a $50 reinstatement fee. The Department agreed to pay the fee and to provide a new referral for the program. The Department offered visitation and the court ordered her to test for drugs.
A dispositional report was filed on April 7, 2010, recommending the child be declared a dependent of the court and that reunification services be offered petitioner. A case plan was developed and attached to the report. The disposition hearing was continued two weeks at the request of the Department for Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notice purposes. On April 23, 2010, the disposition hearing was continued again due to petitioner’s absence. The disposition hearing was held June11, 2010, at which time the court found ICWA did not apply, ordered compliance with the case plan, and set an interim review for July 9, 2010. At this point, petitioner was in inpatient drug treatment at Skyway House treatment center.
The interim report, filed on July 7, 1010, stated that petitioner was making progress in inpatient treatment. She was due to graduate from the Skyway House treatment program and had been approved by the AOD program to live at the Clean and Sober home for women. The Department also submitted an amended case plan including father. At the interim review hearing on July 16, 2010, both parents submitted to the amended case plan and the matter was continued for a six-month review.
The status review report for the six-month review hearing was filed October 14, 2010, at which time the Department recommended termination of services to both parents and the setting of a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. The report related that after three attempts to send her to treatment, beginning in March 2010, petitioner finally entered treatment in May 2010. Petitioner had successfully completed the Skyway House program and was participating in AOD. However, “[d]uring her entire stay at the facility, the staff had to deal with [her] refusal to participate in groups and counseling and threats of leaving. Following a deal struck with [petitioner] by AOD..., [petitioner] agreed to stay for 60 [d]ays rather than complete the entire 90-[d]ay program. After her return to Del Norte and placement in the... Clean and Sober housing facility[, petitioner] walked away on two occasions to go out and use.” The first was shortly after returning from treatment. She was gone for approximately four days. After she claimed she almost died as a result of using and that she was finished with drugs, the facility allowed her to return. After staying clean for little more than 30 days, she again left to use on September 7 through 9. She was allowed back and left again on September13, 2010, returning a couple of days later. In addition, petitioner had three positive tests since returning from inpatient treatment and she admitted to using in August 2010. Her most recent test on September 21 was positive for alcohol, which she denied using. However, the Department verified with petitioner’s family that she had consumed alcohol around the time of her test. The social worker testified at the six-month review hearing that since this September test, the Department had been unable to make contact with petitioner to conduct random drug testing. She previously had refused to test on many occasions. The social worker testified that petitioner’s substance abuse was the biggest obstacle to her reunifying with the child.
The report further stated that petitioner had not engaged in the Linkages program to which she had been referred. She failed to attend the MEND/WEND Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Program as requested. She was informed she was required to attend, whether or not she was in school. She did not show up for the intake and assessment sessions, did not cancel 24 hours in advance, and was terminated from the program on August 27 due to her failure to reschedule the intake and assessment meetings. Petitioner said she did not have the money to pay the $5 fee that would have enabled her to attend. However, as outlined in the report, petitioner had received cash funding from school and from her foster relatives that would have enabled her to attend. The program required the parent to pay some portion of the fee as a “buy-in so that the parents feel as though they’re actually a part of the process.” The Department had the fee reduced from $10 to $5, and had paid $45 dollars of the fee. Petitioner had not been required to pay for housing while staying at the Clean and Sober home, and did not have other expenses that would have prevented her from paying the fees.
Petitioner had unsupervised visits with the child at the Clean and Sober house until the first weekend of September, when she left the home and relapsed. The Department moved her visits to the Family Resources Center for supervision in a less restrictive environment. She visited regularly. However, during the week of October 4, 2010, she fell asleep during a visit and had to be told repeatedly to monitor her child and to watch her language around her child and others at the program. Later that day, petitioner used cuss words at the program staff when she was told not to smoke on the premises. On more than one occasion, petitioner arrived for a visit under the influence or detoxing, and on one occasion the visit was cancelled to allow her “to go home to sleep it off/detox.” She also had displayed inappropriate behavior during visits, being combative, using foul language, and talking on the phone instead of focusing on and supervising the child. For these reasons, visits were moved from the Family Resources Center back to the Department. Staff reported that petitioner and the child appeared distant at recent visitations, the child tending to play near petitioner, but keeping to herself.
Father had only three visits with the child following his release from jail in July 2010, and had made no effort to contact the Department since then.
At the contested review hearing held November 8, 2010, the court terminated reunification services to both parents and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for February 4, 2011.
DISCUSSION
I. Reasonable Services
Petitioner challenges the finding that the Department provided reasonable services. Because the child was under the age of three when she was removed from petitioner’s custody, petitioner was statutorily entitled to only six months of services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
The court at every review hearing where a child is not returned must find, and in this case did find, that the agency had provided or offered the parent reasonable services, defined as services designed to aid the parent in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) The case plan must be appropriate to the individual parent and based on the unique facts of that individual. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) “In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 547.)
The juvenile court is required to have clear and convincing evidence when it finds the reunification services offered were adequate. However, we review that finding on appeal for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) “The issue of sufficiency of the evidence in dependency cases is governed by the same rules that apply to other appeals. If there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. [Citation.] We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
Hence, we review reasonableness of services offered by viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the finding. So viewed, it is clear that substantial evidence supports the finding that reasonable services were offered by the Department.
Services provided by the Department included, but were not limited to: supervised visits, drug testing, Wal-Mart phone vouchers, bus passes and dial-a-ride passes, referrals to AOD programs, to MEND/WEND, Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Program for anger management, to the Linkages program and the Homeless Active Remediation Program (HARP), to Incredible Years parenting class, and to inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment.
In In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, upon which petitioner relies for her claim that services were not uniquely tailored to her situation, no reunification plan was prepared for the appellant father and the juvenile court stated it could not find that the father had been offered reasonable services. (Id. at pp. 1773-1774.) Here, the Department assessed the family’s needs as outlined in the April 7, 2010 disposition report, prepared a case plan based upon that assessment, and offered services designed to address petitioner’s substance abuse, housing, anger management and other issues. That petitioner did not fully participate in her case plan does not make those services unreasonable.
Petitioner challenges the reasonable services finding, not by identifying any deficiency in the services designated in the case plan, but by arguing that the social worker did not return certain phone calls at crucial periods just before the six-month review hearing, did not properly refer her to the Linkages and HARP programs to secure adequate housing for her, stayed in poor contact with her, and “thwarted her efforts” by discouraging her from taking college classes during this time. She further contends the time frame was inadequate to allow her to successfully complete her case plan and that she required an extension up to 18 months to do so.
Petitioner’s situation is not like that of the incarcerated father in Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1000, upon which she relies. In that case, the department failed to maintain contact with the father during his incarceration and never contacted the prison to determine the availability of services for him. Rather, the case plan required the father to participate in services that were not available to him. (Id. at pp. 1012, 1014.) Petitioner was not incarcerated during this case. She was offered services and a case plan to help her reunify. Although she maintains that the Department failed to keep in contact with her, the social worker testified he had trouble making contact with her, that she was still using at his last contact with her, and that he had been unable to contact her for random drug testing. The Department maintained regular contact with petitioner through the date of the six-month review status report dated October 15, 2010, at which time she was still using, but had reentered the Clean and Sober facility. However, on October 23, petitioner was asked to leave the Clean and Sober facility due to yet another refusal to test. A reasonable inference is that petitioner was not staying in contact with the Department and was avoiding contact with the Department while at Clean and Sober housing and after leaving that facility, because she was still using. Moreover, one of the counselors at the program advised the social worker that after petitioner’s termination from the program, it had been reported to the counselor that petitioner provided methamphetamines to another client in the house.
The social worker testified that petitioner had not contacted the Linkages worker after her referral to the program. Nor did she contact the HARP program representative. Petitioner testified she was not given the name of the person at Linkages to contact and the social worker never called back. The court was not required to credit petitioner’s version of events. Moreover, petitioner does not dispute and the record shows that she was furnished the contact information for the HARP program, a program similar to the Linkages program, in that it helps participants with housing. The Department provided petitioner the contact information of the person she needed to call to set up an interview for that program. A program requirement is that the individual who is requesting services actually initiate the contact. She did not follow up. The social worker readily acknowledged that he had discouraged petitioner from signing up for classes at College of Redwoods, because conflicts in her class schedule would interfere with her ability to follow her case plan. She enrolled despite his objections and later dropped out, blaming the social worker.
The finding that reasonable services were provided by the Department was amply supported by the record.
II. Case Plan Progress
Petitioner challenges the court’s findings that her progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating the child’s placement was “insufficient” and its finding by clear and convincing evidence petitioner had failed to participate regularly in the court ordered treatment plan.
She admits she did not fully comply with her case plan, but argues she made substantial progress and should be given more time to complete her program. However, she does not dispute that she failed to make substantial headway with her substance abuse issues beyond attending AOD meetings when she was not using. She does not directly challenge the court’s finding that there was no reasonable probability that she would have been ready to reunify with the child after another six months of services.
Petitioner had achieved a period of consistent visits. The Department acknowledged this, although expressing concern that she had come to some visits under the influence and had displayed inappropriate behavior during some visits. The Department also gave her credit for having completed the Incredible Years parenting program during family maintenance, before the petition was filed. Nevertheless, during the reunification period, petitioner had not dealt with the very basic issue of her substance abuse. On this record, therefore, and drawing all reasonable inferences in its support, we cannot condemn the finding that petitioner’s case plan compliance was “insufficient.” Because the usual six-month period had elapsed for this child, services could be extended only if there was a substantial probability that the child would be returned to her custody and safely maintained in her home within another six months. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) The court did not err in concluding that there was no such substantial probability. In order to make such a finding, the court would have to find, among other things, that petitioner “has made significant progress in resolving [the] problems that led to the child’s removal from the home” and that she “has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of... her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(B) and (C).) The record demonstrates petitioner had not made significant progress in resolving the problems leading to the child’s removal-most critically, her substance abuse problem.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1); Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894 [barring later challenge by appeal].) Our decision is immediately final as to this court.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.