Opinion
20170-1995.
Decided August 26, 2010.
Charles Nathan, Esq., for Plaintiff.
Paula A. Crotty, Esq., Corporation Counsel, By Gia Rose DiCola, Esq., for City Defendants.
Plaintiff Victor Mirdita moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR Rule 4404(a), seeking to set aside the jury's verdict in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff moves not only to set the verdict aside, but, additionally or in the alternative, for a new trial upon grounds that the verdict was against the weight of credible evidence. The Court considers this motion after the parties were granted leave to submit additional arguments discussing whether the verdict sheet was flawed and whether the jury charges were otherwise correct.
In the interests of justice, the Court permits filing of Defendants' "Further Affirmation in Opposition" and Plaintiff's "Reply Affirmation in Support of Motion to Set Aside Jury's Verdict" regardless of timeliness objections.
This "inmate on inmate" assault case was tried before a jury, beginning on October 15, 2008, and a verdict was returned in Defendants' favor on October 20, 2008. The case involves an assault upon Plaintiff occurring on May 13, 1994, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in the North Infirmary Command (NIC) on Rikers Island. The assault followed Plaintiff's being charged with killing the son of a high-ranking member of organized crime and took place in Plaintiff's high security cell.
Plaintiff now asks the Court to review the appropriateness of the questions on the verdict sheet, which, Plaintiff says, conflict with the Court's charge to the jury concerning responsibility for the assault. Plaintiff disputes whether asking the jury to determine whether inmate Edgardo Cintron was responsible for the assault was correct. Further, Plaintiff argues that it was improper to submit the responsibility question to the jury where the Court had determined, as a matter of law, that Cintron was responsible for the assault. Most significantly, Plaintiff stresses that the verdict sheet does not address the issue of constructive or actual notice, which he argues is the controlling factor in inmate assault cases (see, Sanchez v. State, 99 NY2d 247).
Background
Plaintiff was attacked by an inmate that Defendants moved into Mirdita's secured area only a short time before the assault. Plaintiff argues that the City is responsible for his injuries and resulting damages because corrections officials owed him a special duty for his safety as an incarcerated prisoner when the Corrections Department assumed physical custody over him. Stated another way, the corrections officials owed a duty to safeguard Plaintiff from attacks by fellow inmates (see generally, Sanchez v. State, supra.).
According to Plaintiff, liability arises where harm is reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances (see generally, Rodriguez v. City of New York , 38 AD3d 349 [1st Dept. 2007]; Craig v. City of New York, 15 Misc 3d 1124A [Civil Ct. Bronx 2007], aff'd, 24 Misc 3d 126A [1st Dept. Appellate Term 2009]). Forseeability includes both actual and constructive notice and covers situations, like the present one, where correctional authorities should have been aware of heightened danger to Plaintiff (see generally, Smith v. County of Albany , 12 AD3d 912 [3rd Dept. 2007]; Evans v. State of New York, 11 Misc 3d 1065A [Ct. Claims 2006]).
The First Department in Rodriguez v. City of New York found constructive notice existed where prison authorities housed an inmate at the Adolescent Reception and Detention Center in Bronx County and his assailant was a known dangerous inmate who had injured others at the detention center. The assailant gained access to the deceased when a correction officer inadvertently electronically released the deceased's cell door lock (see, Rodriguez v. City of New York , 38 AD3d 349 [1st Dept. 2007]).
Plaintiff further argues that the verdict is unsupportable because there was confusion in the verdict sheet because the jury was presented with questions requiring factually inconsistent answers and answers otherwise conflicting with case law.For example, the jury was asked in Question No. 1 to decide "was it foreseeablethat Edgardo Cintron would assault Plaintiff on May 13, 1994?" Then, in Question No. 2 the jury was asked "Did the City take reasonable precautions to supervise Plaintiff?" These questions, according to Plaintiff, are contrary to Sanchez, supra., and conflict with the Court's charges to the jury. Likewise, the answers to Question No. 4 and Question No. 6 conflict factually because the jury found both Plaintiff and Defendants were proximate causes of Plaintiff's injuries. Thus, according to Plaintiff, the verdict sheets caused confusion by making the jury find inconsistent conclusions that could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence.
Defendants' Position
In response, Defendants hold forth that the Court's discretionary power to set aside a jury verdict must only be exercised with considerable caution. Absent indications that substantial justice was not done, a successful litigant is entitled to the benefits of a favorable verdict (see, Nicastro v. Park, 113 AD2d 129 [2nd Dept. 1985]). Keeping that standard in mind, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed the heavy burden of showing the verdict was against the weight of credible evidence. In essence, Defendants say Plaintiff's motion must be denied because the jury's verdict was fair and based upon credible evidence.
Concerning whether the verdict sheet and charges created confusion for the jury, the City argues that Plaintiff waived any objections in this regard. For instance, the City says the parties agreed at trial to the forseeability charge and the verdict sheet. Likewise, Defendants say waiver resulted when relevant objections were not offered before verdict, which would have permitted the Court to correct any error.
Logically, according to the City, because the jury's interrogatory answers were consistent, but inconsistent with a proper damage award, the Court properly ignored the latter as without legal effect (see generally, Mayer v. Goldberg, 241 AD2d 309 [1st Dept. 1997]). Consequently, there is no error (see generally, Files v. Ken Goewey Dodge, Inc. , 33 AD3d 1109 [3rd Dept. 2006]) and no requirement for a new trial (see generally, Mateo v. 83 Post Avenue Assocs., 12 AD3d 205 [1st Dept. 2004]). Even if the interrogatory was in error because of foreseeability of inmate assault, the Court could properly enter a Defendant's judgment irrespective of any other action by the jury.
Plaintiff's Reply
In reply, Plaintiff points out that the first interrogatory is completely different from the Court's charge to the jury to consider whether Cintron assaulted Plaintiff. Further, according to Plaintiff, the Court's charges do not address the issue of actual or constructive notice. Plaintiff disputes that he failed to object, saying that counsel objected as late as summations. In summary, Plaintiff says that his motion should be granted because the jury answered four questions inconsistently with the general verdict. Plaintiff says the jury determined inconsistently that the City (Question No. 3), Cintron (Question No. 4), and Plaintiff (Questions Nos. 5 and 6) each proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries thereby creating a situation mandating a new trial.
" Was it foreseeable that Edgardo Cintron would assault Plaintiff on May 13, 1994?"
Legal Discussion
A Court's discretionary power to set aside a jury verdict must be exercised with considerable caution. Absent indications that substantial justice was not done, a successful litigant is entitled to the benefits of a favorable verdict (see, Nicastro v. Park, supra.).
Review of the record herein reveals no grounds to set aside the jury's verdict. The Court finds the verdict is based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence (see, White v. New York City Tr. Authority , 40 AD3d 297 [1st Dept. 2007], Nicastro v. Park, supra.). The jury's verdict is not against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. Rather, it was a rational decision based upon a preponderance of the evidence (see, Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 NY2d 493and Lichtenstein v. Bauer, 203 AD2d 89 [1st Dept. 1994]).
The essence of Plaintiff's case in chief is that the prison authorities were on notice that Plaintiff was subject to reprisal because he allegedly murdered the son of an organized crime figure. Therefore, Plaintiff says, the 1994 attack upon him was clearly foreseeable.
Plaintiff was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and subsequently sentenced to a term of 5 to 15 years imprisonment (see generally, People v. Mirdita, 236 AD2d 340 [1st Dept. 1997]).
In this regard, Plaintiff focuses upon the Court of Appeals' opinion in Sanchez v. State, supra., where it was determined that constructive notice is a factor in determining liability for prison assault cases. Prison authorities, as custodians, must protect inmates from harm reasonably foreseeable based upon their experience operating maximum security prisons. While there is no dispute that Defendants were obligated to keep Plaintiff safe, the record here is more in line with Vasquez v. State of New York , 68 AD3d 1275 [3rd Dept. 2009]) where the High Court found neither actual nor constructive notice existed in an assault involving a newly located inmate perpetrator. The Vasquez assailant had no prior contact to the victim or anyone else involved in the case. In the instant case, likewise, no previous encounters occurred between the two prisoners and no evidence exists that there was any indication Plaintiff would be the object of an attack from this assailant (see generally, Elnandes v. State, 11 AD3d 828 [3rd Dept. 2004]).
There is no dispute that Defendants took precautions for Plaintiff's safety. The City admits uncovering Plaintiff's numerous unidentified enemies and, consequently, moved Plaintiff from the Bronx House of Detention to the Brooklyn House of Detention for his safety. Ultimately, the City placed Plaintiff at Rikers Island in the intensely supervised NIC Unit. Here, he was centrally monitored and held in a cell 23 hours daily while showering and eating alone. Defendants gave Plaintiff a bullet proof vest and armed corrections officers escorted him whenever he moved.
Concerning the actual assailant, Edgardo Cintron, Plaintiff admits never making a complaint about him to the authorities although he says Cintron threatened him a number of times during the two weeks preceding the incident. Regardless, there is no evidence that Defendants should have known of any connection between Cintron and his victim or that Cintron was an especially dangerous individual as it involved Plaintiff. Further, there was no history of assaults at the facility.
In summary, Plaintiff fails to convince the Court to exercise its discretionary power to set aside the jury verdict and/or order a new trial. Clearly, there is no indication that substantial justice was not done and there is no reason why Defendants, as successful litigants, are not entitled to the benefits of the favorable verdict. Further, Plaintiff fails to convince the Court that there was error concerning the verdict sheet or the jury instructions that the Court did not correct at trial.
The Court determines that the jury's ultimate finding is neither inconsistent nor against the weight of the evidence (see generally, Files v. Ken Goewey Dodge, Inc., supra.). Plaintiff's motion is denied because the verdict is fair based upon the credible evidence presented. In addition, Plaintiff did not prove Cintron's attack was foreseeable and merely showing that an inmate assault occurred, without credible evidence that the assault was foreseeable, does not establish negligence (see generally, Sanchez v. State, supra.). Cintron had no previous encounters with Plaintiff and did not otherwise know him. Moreover, there is no evidence that the assault had any relation to the organized crime murder that put Plaintiff into custody in the first place, or that the unusual circumstance surrounding the assault could have been anticipated by anyone (see generally, Elnandes v. State, supra.). Nor is there evidence that any correctional employee was in any way derelict in his duties toward Plaintiff.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion, pursuant to CPLR Rule 4404(a), seeking to set the verdict aside and/or order a new trial, is DENIED.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.