Opinion
HHDCV175045447S
11-28-2018
Wendell MINNIFIELD v. Correctional Officer RICHARDS
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Matthew Dallas Gordon, J.
The present action arises under title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 and stems from a dispute between the self-represented plaintiff, Wendell Minnifield, and the defendant, Correctional Officer Richards, regarding the defendant’s alleged interference with the provision of medical treatment to the plaintiff during his term of incarceration at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield (institution). On July 19, 2017, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant alleging that in May of 2017, the defendant (1) required him to receive his scheduled, yet unspecified "medical treatment" at 5:30 p.m., as opposed to 6:15 p.m., (2) mandated that a nurse escort him to and from the institution’s medical unit for purposes of undergoing treatment, and (3) compelled the plaintiff to complete such treatment under the supervision of a nurse. Although not expressly alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff essentially asserts that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks, inter alia, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.
Section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ..."
It is important to note that "[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party ... The modern trend ... is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ... The courts adhere to this rule to ensure that pro se litigants receive a full and fair opportunity to be heard, regardless of their lack of legal education and experience ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569, 877 A.2d 761 (2005). "Nonetheless, [a]lthough [Connecticut courts] allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 497-98, 863 A.2d 680 (2005).
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
On April 24, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30. In support of the motion, the defendant claims that (1) the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment; (2) the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, bars the plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief and punitive damages; and (4) the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, bars the plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages.
DISCUSSION
The legal standard governing motions to dismiss is well settled. "[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well leaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200-01, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013).
In support of her motion to dismiss, the defendant first claims that the plaintiff has failed to state claim for relief under the eighth amendment. In so doing, the defendant overlooks the significant distinction between a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike.
"A motion to strike ... rather than a motion to dismiss, is the proper vehicle to attack the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 629-30, 941 A.2d 266 (2008). "[A] motion to dismiss is not designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint in terms of whether it states a cause of action. That should be done, instead, by a motion to strike ... the practical difference being that if a motion to strike is granted, the party whose pleading is stricken is given an opportunity to replead in order to avoid a harsh result." (Citation omitted.) Pratt v. Old Saybrook, 225 Conn. 177, 185, 621 A.2d 322 (1993). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss cannot be granted on the basis of her first claim, because a motion to dismiss is not the proper procedural vehicle to attack the legal sufficiency of a claim for relief.
The defendant next claims that she is entitled to qualified immunity. In support of this claim, the defendant argues that she reasonably believed that her actions concerning the plaintiff’s medical treatment in May of 2017 did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Specifically, the defendant argues that her actions or inactions were "not so unreasonable or in violation of clearly established rights that she should be denied immunity."
The following legal principles are relevant to the defendant’s second claim. "[T]he doctrine of federal qualified immunity ... implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and is a proper ground or the motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Doe, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-13-5037369-S (May 5, 2017, Elgo, J.). "[A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question of federal law ... and not state law. Therefore, in reviewing these claims of qualified immunity [Connecticut courts] are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 216, 9 A.3d 347 2010).
As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, "[q]ualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Lower court judges "have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first ... Deciding a case under prong two saves scarce judicial resources by avoiding unnecessary decisions whether certain conduct violates a constitutional or statutory right, when it is beyond reproach that the conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light of existing law ... Skipping prong one and going to prong two may also be preferable when the briefing is relatively poor, and [the court] deciding the case under prong one could create a risk of bad decisionmaking ... That said, there are positive attributes to deciding a case under prong one ... and very ... [lower court] judge is permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219-20 (2d Cir. 2012).
Focusing exclusively on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, "a [g]overnment official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he s doing violates that right ... There is no need for a case on point, but existing precedent must have laced the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate ... The question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching case law, but what a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position should know about the constitutionality of the conduct ... Finally, [courts] do not consider the subjective intent, motives, or beliefs of the officials ... Instead, [courts] use an objective standard for judging the actions of state and federal officials." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 220.
Applying these principles to the present case, the defendant’s actions were not, as a matter of law, objectively unreasonable in May of 2017. Construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff alleges, in essence, that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, and hereby violated his eighth amendment rights, by requiring him to wait to be summoned for medical treatment. Importantly, the plaintiff does not allege that the defendant wholly foreclosed his scheduled medical treatment. Indeed, he seemingly alleges that he was escorted to the institution’s hospital unit for medical treatment on May 4, 5, 6 and 10, 2018, and on one occasion, he voluntarily left the hospital unit before receiving such treatment. Here, the plaintiff essentially alleges that, by virtue of the defendant’s actions, he did not have medical treatment on demand and on his terms and that, instead, he had to wait or the defendant to summon him to the institution’s hospital unit in order to receive his treatment under the oversight of a nurse.
In his complaint, the plaintiff also alleges that the defendant violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). "Courts have found no private right of action under HIPAA." Mele v. Hill Health Center, 609 F.Supp.2d 248, 255 (D.Conn. 2009). Therefore, this alleged HIPAA violation is without merit.
It is important to note that the plaintiff does not allege with particularity the nature of the medical treatment sought or the severity of the condition that otherwise warranted such treatment.
The existing case law in May of 2017 supports the conclusion the defendant’s actions were not, a matter of law, objectively unreasonable. It is fundamental that "[t]he Eighth Amendment forbids deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spavone v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). "An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). At the same time, however, "mere disagreement with prison officials about what constitutes appropriate medical care does not state a claim cognizable under the Eighth Amendment." Torres v. Trombly, 421 F.Supp.2d 527, 531 (D.Conn. 2006); see also Rivera v. Rodriguez, Docket No. 3:03-CV-645 (CFD), 2007 WL 911844, *3 (D.Conn. March 27, 2007) ("A lapse in medical care or disagreement with prison officials about what constitutes appropriate care does not necessarily state a claim cognizable under the Eighth Amendment"); Sonds v. St. Barnabas Hospital Correctional Health Services, 151 F.Supp.2d 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that timing of medical intervention is inadequate basis for § 1983 claim).
In the present case, it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that it was constitutionally permissible to have the plaintiff wait for, but not be wholly precluded from, his scheduled medical treatment. Because the defendant’s actions were not, as a matter of law, objectively unreasonable in May of 2017, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and the court therefore lacks subject after jurisdiction over the eighth amendment claim alleged in the plaintiff’s amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
For all of the forgoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted.