Opinion
No. 3:19-cv-129-K-BN
02-23-2021
DAVID W. MINNIEAR, TDCJ No. 2038633, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.
FINDINGS , CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[Petitioner] David Minniear and Brenda Sotelo were involved in a relationship for many years. They separated sometime in September of 2014, and Brenda went to live with her brother and sister-in-law. On the morning of October 14, 2014, Minniear attacked Brenda at her brother's home. Brenda suffered multiple stab wounds to her chest and face, and she also was stabbed in her eyeball and through her skull. Brenda testified at trial that she is still in pain from the attack and also has loss of vision, memory loss, and speech issues.Minniear v. State, Nos. 10-15-00390-CR & 10-15-00391-CR, 2016 WL 6808946, at *1 (Tex. App. - Waco Nov. 16, 2016, pet. ref'd).
After Minniear pled guilty, a jury in Navarro County, Texas convicted him of aggravated assault of a family member and of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit another felony and assessed punishment, respectively, at life imprisonment and at 60 years of imprisonment. See State v. Minniear, Nos. C35884-CR & C35886-CR (Cnty. Ct. at Law, Navarro Cnty., Tex.).
On direct appeal, Minniear challenged the disclosure of evidence and argued that the charge allowed the jury to assess punishment by less than unanimous means and that the trial judge should have recused based on her previous representation of Minniear - all three issues were overruled, and the trial court's judgments were affirmed. See generally Minniear, 2016 WL 6808946.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the CCA) then refused Minniear's petitions for discretionary review. See Minniear v. State, PD-1400-16 & -1401-16 (Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2017). And the CCA denied his state habeas applications without written order on the trial court findings without a hearing. See Ex parte Minniear, WR-88,616-01 & -02 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018).
Minniear next filed this pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition [Dkt. No. 3] on January 10, 2019, the date on which he certifies that he placed the petition in the prison mailing system, see id. at 10; see also RULE 3(d), RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS ("A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing."); Uranga v. Davis, 893 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2018) ("We reaffirm that the operative date of the prison mailbox rule remains the date the pleading is delivered to prison authorities.").
Through his timely petition, Minniear claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that his right to due process was violated when the state courts denied his right to appeal and when he was not admonished as to the consequences of his plea.
United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade has now referred Minniear's case to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The State responded to the habeas application. See Dkt. No. 15. Minniear replied and moved for leave to amend his petition, to argue that the Court should consider claims that the State has argued are defaulted and to add a claim of actual innocence. See Dkt. Nos. 18 & 19. The Court granted leave. See Dkt. Nos. 20, 21, & 22. The State supplemented its response. See Dkt. No. 24. And Minniear filed a supplemental reply. See Dkt. No. 26.
The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny federal habeas relief.
Legal Standards
"Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and caselaw authority." Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district court, this process begins - and often ends - with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), under which "state prisoners face strict procedural requirements and a high standard of review." Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted).
This is because, "[u]nder AEDPA, state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges to state sentences based on federal law." Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 526 (2020) (per curiam). So, where a state court has already rejected a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the state court adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The statute therefore "restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus based on claims that were 'adjudicated on the merits' by a state court," Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 520 (citation omitted). And, "[w]hen a state court has applied clearly established federal law to reasonably determined facts in the process of adjudicating a claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not disturb the state court's decision unless its error lies "beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
Further, "under § 2254(d)," the reasonableness of the state court decision - not whether it is correct - is '"the only question that matters."'" Id. at 526 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) ("The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold."); Sanchez v. Davis, 936 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 2019) ("[T]his is habeas, not a direct appeal, so our focus is narrowed. We ask not whether the state court denial of relief was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable - whether its decision was 'so lacking in justification' as to remove 'any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" (citation omitted)).
A state court adjudication on direct appeal is due the same deference under Section 2254(d) as an adjudication in a state post-conviction proceeding. See, e.g., Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 756-57 (5th Cir. 2000) (a finding made by the CCA on direct appeal was an "issue ... adjudicated on the merits in state proceedings," to be "examine[d] ... with the deference demanded by AEDPA" under "28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)"). And nothing "in AEDPA or [the Supreme] Court's precedents permit[s] reduced deference to merits decisions of lower state courts." Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 524 n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Starting with Section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary" to clearly established federal law if "it relies on legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts." Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) ("We have emphasized, time and time again, that the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is 'clearly established.'" (citation omitted)).
"A state court unreasonably applies clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it improperly identifies the governing legal principle, unreasonably extends (or refuses to extend) a legal principle to a new context, or when it gets the principle right but 'applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.'" Will v. Lumpkin, 978 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000); citation omitted). "But the Supreme Court has only clearly established precedent if it has 'broken sufficient legal ground to establish an asked-for constitutional principle.'" Id. (quoting Taylor, 569 U.S. at 380-82; citations omitted).
As noted above, "[f]or purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Evans v. Davis, 875 F.3d 210, 216 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that Section 2254(d) tasks courts "with considering not only the arguments and theories the state habeas court actually relied upon to reach its ultimate decision but also all the arguments and theories it could have relied upon" (citation omitted)).
The Supreme Court has further explained that "[e]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). And "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102. The Supreme Court has explained that, "[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be," where, "[a]s amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings," but "[i]t preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents," and "[i]t goes no further." Id. Thus, "[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; accord Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) ("If this standard is difficult to meet - and it is - that is because it was meant to be. We will not lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the extreme malfunction for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
As to Section 2254(d)(2)'s requirement that a petitioner show that the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," the Supreme Court has explained that "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance" and that federal habeas relief is precluded even where the state court's factual determination is debatable. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010). Under this standard, "it is not enough to show that a state court's decision was incorrect or erroneous. Rather, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, a substantially higher threshold requiring the petitioner to show that a reasonable factfinder must conclude that the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable." Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court must presume that a state court's factual determinations are correct and can find those factual findings unreasonable only where the petitioner "rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001).
This presumption applies not only to explicit findings of fact but also "to those unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusions of mixed law and fact." Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Ford v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (Section 2254(e)(1) "'deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court.' As long as there is 'some indication of the legal basis for the state court's denial of relief,' the district court may infer the state court's factual findings even if they were not expressly made." (footnotes omitted)).
And, even if the state court errs in its factual findings, mere error is not enough - the state court's decision must be "based on an unreasonable factual determination.... In other words, even if the [state court] had gotten [the disputed] factual determination right, its conclusion wouldn't have changed." Will, 978 F.3d at 942.
Further, "determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98; see also Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003) ("a federal habeas court is authorized by Section 2254(d) to review only a state court's 'decision,' and not the written opinion explaining that decision" (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam))); Evans, 875 F.3d at 216 n.4 (even where "[t]he state habeas court's analysis [is] far from thorough," a federal court "may not review [that] decision de novo simply because [it finds the state court's] written opinion 'unsatisfactory'" (quoting Neal, 286 F.3d at 246)).
Section 2254 thus creates a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). To overcome this standard, a petitioner must show that "there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. That is, a petitioner must, in sum, "show, based on the state-court record alone, that any argument or theory the state habeas court could have relied on to deny [him] relief would have either been contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court." Evans, 875 F.3d at 217.
Analysis
I. Minniear's claim of actual innocence is not cognizable.
Insofar as Minniear brings a stand-alone, substantive claim of "actual innocence," such a claim is not recognized as an independent ground for federal habeas relief and should therefore be denied. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013) ("We have not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence." (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993))); see also, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006); Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 766 (5th Cir. 2014); cf. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995) (distinguishing "procedural" claims of innocence, which are based on a separate, underlying claim that a defendant was denied "the panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution").
II. Minniear procedurally defaulted his due process claims.
As explained above, the due process claims Minniear now brings on federal habeas review were not raised on direct appeal. See generally Minniear, 2016 WL 6808946; see also Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (The CCA "will not consider a ground for review that does not implicate a determination by the court of appeals of a point of error presented to that court in an orderly and timely fashion." (citations omitted)). Nor did Minniear include these claims in his state habeas application. See Dkt. Nos. 16-32 & 16-33.
Their factual and legal bases were therefore not "fairly presented to the" CCA, as the highest available state court, for review, which means that Minniear has failed to properly exhaust state court remedies as to them. Campbell v. Dretke, 117 F. App'x 946, 957 (5th Cir. 2004) ("'The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of the habeas claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court' so that a state court has had a 'fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on the petitioner's constitutional claim.'" (quoting Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 465 (5th Cir. 2004))); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Unexhausted claims should be found procedurally barred if "the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991).
Texas law precludes successive habeas claims except in narrow circumstances. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 4. This is a codification of the judicially created Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. See Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 759 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this state law, a habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from returning to the Texas courts to exhaust his claims unless the petitioner presents a factual or legal basis for a claim that was previously unavailable or shows that, but for a violation of the United States Constitution, no rational juror would have found for the State. See id. at 758 n.9. Therefore, unexhausted claims that could not make the showing required by this state law would be considered procedurally barred from review on the merits in this Court unless an exception is shown. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
An exception to this bar allows federal habeas review if a petitioner "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
First, insofar as Minniear asserts that the exception to procedural default articulated in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) - and expanded to Texas prisoners in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) - applies these claims, the undersigned finds that it does not.
"In Martinez, the Supreme Court held,
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel [IATC] must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.
. In 2013, the Supreme Court confirmed that Martinez applied to Texas prisoners who technically had the ability to bring their IAC claim on direct appeal of their conviction, but for all intents and purposes had to bring it in their first habeas petition.Crutsinger v. Stephens, 576 F. App'x 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Trevino, 569 U.S. at 428-29), abrogated on other grounds by Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018).
In sum, "Trevino permits a Texas prisoner to overcome the failure to raise a substantial ineffective-assistance claim in state court by showing that state habeas counsel was ineffective...." Ayestas, 138 S. Ct. at 1093-94 (citing Trevino, 569 U.S. at 429). But Trevino does not permit a Texas prisoner to overcome the failure to raise a non-IATC claim in state court, like the due process claims that Minniear has procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Murphy v. Davis, 732 F. App'x 249, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) ("Under Martinez and Trevino, the ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel may excuse a petitioner's procedural default 'of a single claim' - ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062 (2017). No court appears to have extended Martinez and Trevino to excuse procedural default of a Brady or Napue claim. We are also bound by our past pronouncements that Martinez and Trevino apply 'only' to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. See, e.g., Speer v. Stephens, 781 F.3d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 2015). And the Supreme Court in Davila was unwilling to extend Martinez and Trevino beyond ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, calling the exception 'narrow,' 'highly circumscribed,' and available only in 'limited circumstances.' 137 S. Ct. at 2065-66.").
So Minniear's due process claims are procedurally barred, as he has not shown that the claims would be allowed in a subsequent habeas proceeding in state court under Texas law. Nor has he asserted the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to procedural bar. The Court should therefore deny these grounds as procedurally barred.
III. Minniear's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be denied.
In his Section 2254 petition, Minnear raises two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). He asserts that his trial counsel violated his right to effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment by failing to investigate and advance an insanity defense and by failing to challenge the jury charge as not unanimous.
A. Investigation Claim
Because Minniear has not shown - or even argued - that his guilty pleas are invalid, he has waived his investigation-based IAC claim.
A guilty plea is valid only if entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). A plea is intelligently made when the defendant has "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a plea is "voluntary" if it does not result from force, threats, improper promises, misrepresentations, or coercion. See United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1997).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has identified three core concerns in a guilty plea proceeding: (1) the absence of coercion; (2) the defendant's full understanding of the charges; and (3) the defendant's realistic appreciation of the consequences of the plea. See United States v. Gracia, 983 F.2d 625, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1993). These core concerns are addressed by the admonishments contained in article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., Ojena v. Thaler, No. 3:10-cv-2601-P-BD, 2011 WL 4048514, at *1 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2011), rec. adopted, 2011 WL 4056162 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011). But "whether the state trial court followed the statute is nondispositive. Instead, a guilty plea will be upheld on habeas review if it is entered into knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently." Dominguez v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 6:14cv49, 2014 WL 2880492, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2014) (citing Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2000); James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Most applicable to the instant claim, "[t]he 'knowing' requirement that a defendant 'understands the consequences of a guilty plea' means only that the defendant understands the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.'" Id. (quoting Ables v. Scott, 73 F.3d 591, 592 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996)). After the reading of each indictment, Minniear pled guilty to both offenses prior to proceeding to a punishment trial before a jury. See Dkt. No. 16-14 at 16-18. Prior to this, during voir dire, with Minniear present, his counsel explained the range of punishment applicable to each offense. See Dkt. No. 16-13 at 94-95 ("MR. THOMPSON: Range of punishment, we will go through this pretty quick because -- well, we will go through it so you can understand it, but I don't want to run out of time on you. Range of punishment in this case, the aggravated assault and serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon on a family member and burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a felony offense of aggravated assault, both of these offenses are first degree felonies. A first degree felony carries up to a $10,000 fine, you can either be punished by 10 years probation or 5 years in the penitentiary, 5 to 99 years or life in the penitentiary. Does everybody understand that? (Affirmative response from venire panel)").
Minniear's knowing and voluntary guilty pleas constitute "a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings." United States v. Bendicks, 449 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1971). Non-jurisdictional defects include Minniear's claim that his trial counsel failed to investigate an insanity defense. See United States v. Palacios, 928 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2019) ("'A voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings against the defendant.' Moreover, '[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.' Therefore, '[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.' This includes all IAC claims 'except insofar as the ineffectiveness is alleged to have rendered the guilty plea involuntary.'" (citations omitted)).
B. Jury Unanimity Claim
The Court reviews the merits of properly exhausted IAC claims, whether directed at trial or appellate counsel, under the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), under which a petitioner "'must show that counsel's performance'" - "'strongly presume[d to be] good enough'" - "'was [1] objectively unreasonable and [2] prejudiced him.'" Coleman v. Vannoy, 963 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Howard v. Davis, 959 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2020)).
To count as objectively unreasonable, counsel's error must be "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (reaffirming that "[i]t is only when the lawyer's errors were 'so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment' that Strickland's first prong is satisfied" (citation omitted)). "And to establish prejudice, a defendant must show 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1875, 1881 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
"A conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness." Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 752-53 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Feldman v. Thaler, 695 F.3d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[B]ecause of the risk that hindsight bias will cloud a court's review of counsel's trial strategy, 'a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)).
And, "[j]ust as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote possibilities." Richter, 562 U.S. at 110. "The Supreme Court has admonished courts reviewing a state court's denial of habeas relief under AEDPA that they are required not simply to give [the] attorney's the benefit of the doubt, ... but to affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [petitioner's] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did." Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, on habeas review under AEDPA, "if there is any 'reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard,' the state court's denial must be upheld." Rhoades v. Davis, 852 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Sanchez, 936 F.3d at 305 ("As the State rightly puts it, we defer 'both to trial counsel's reasoned performance and then again to the state habeas court's assessment of that performance.'" (quoting Rhoades, 852 F.3d at 434)).
To demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, "the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently." Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. "Instead, Strickland asks whether it is 'reasonably likely' the result would have been different," which "does not require a showing that counsel's actions 'more likely than not altered the outcome,' but the difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters 'only in the rarest case." Id. at 111-12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 696, 697). "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.
IAC claims are considered mixed questions of law and fact and are therefore analyzed under the "unreasonable application" standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Gregory v. Thaler, 601 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2010); Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682.
Where the state court has adjudicated claims of ineffective assistance on the merits, this Court must review a habeas petitioner's claims under the "doubly deferential" standards of both Strickland and Section 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190, 202 (2011); compare Rhoades, 852 F.3d at 434 ("Our federal habeas review of a state court's denial of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is 'doubly deferential' because we take a highly deferential look at counsel's performance through the deferential lens of § 2254(d)." (citation omitted)), with Johnson v. Sec'y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 910-11 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Double deference is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome, and it will be a rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding."); cf. Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 525 ("recogniz[ing] the special importance of the AEDPA framework in cases involving Strickland claims," since "[i]neffective-assistance claims can function 'as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture,' and they can drag federal courts into resolving questions of state law" (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105)).
In such cases, the "pivotal question" for this Court is not "whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard"; it is "whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable." Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; see also id. at 105 ("Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). "And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citation omitted).
In sum, AEDPA does not permit a de novo review of state counsel's conduct in these claims under Strickland. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 101-02. Instead, on federal habeas review of a Strickland claim fully adjudicated in state court, the state court's determination is granted "a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself." Id. at 101.
The denial of this IAC claim was not unreasonable. For example, Minniear's theory as to a non-unanimous charge was rejected on direct appeal. See Minniear, 2016 WL 6808946, at *1-*2 (concluding: "After the jury returned its verdict in the aggravated assault of a family member cause, the trial court inquired whether the verdict was unanimous. The presiding juror indicated that the verdict was unanimous. The trial court then polled the jury with each juror indicating that it was his or her verdict. In the burglary of a habitation cause, the trial court inquired whether the verdict was unanimous. The presiding juror indicated that the verdict was unanimous. The parties did not wish to have the jury polled for that cause."). And Minniear may not now attack unanimity on habeas review through a collateral attack on his counsel's performance. An attack not supported by the record cannot form the basis for constitutionally deficient representation.
Recommendation
The Court should deny the application for a writ of habeas corpus.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 23, 2021
/s/_________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
See also Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (per curiam) (explaining that federal habeas review of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is "doubly deferential" "because counsel is 'strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment'"; therefore, "federal courts are to afford 'both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt'" (quoting Burt, 571 U.S. at 22, 15)); Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 683-84 ("The Supreme Court standard on prejudice is sharply defined: 'It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.' [A petitioner] must show it was 'reasonably likely' the jury would have reached a different result, not merely that it could have reached a different result. The Court reaffirmed this point in Richter: 'The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.' Now layer on top of that the habeas lens of reasonableness. [Where] the state court has already adjudicated [a petitioner's] ineffective-assistance claim on the merits, he must show that the court's no-prejudice decision is 'not only incorrect but "objectively unreasonable."' Put differently, [he] must show that every reasonable jurist would conclude that it is reasonable likely that [a petitioner] would have fared better at trial had his counsel conducted [himself differently]. 'It bears repeating,' the Supreme Court emphasized in Richter, 'that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.'" (footnotes omitted)).