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Minicucci v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Aug 3, 1994
448 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)

Summary

In Minicucci, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion for continuance where at least one of the absent witnesses had been subpoenaed. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the converse is true. A trial court does not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in granting a continuance in the absence of a subpoena.

Summary of this case from Hicks v. State

Opinion

A94A1389.

DECIDED AUGUST 3, 1994. RECONSIDERATION DENIED AUGUST 18, 1994.

D.U.I. Coweta State Court. Before Judge Thornton.

Saia, Richardson Meinken, Joseph J. Saia, for appellant.

John H. Cranford, Solicitor, for appellee.


Defendant was charged via uniform traffic citation with the offense of driving under the influence. A jury found him guilty and he appeals. Held:

1. In his first enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his oral motion to quash and dismiss the traffic citation. He argues that the traffic citation was defective under OCGA § 17-4-23 (a) because it did not list the names of Coweta County Sheriff's Deputies Jai Robertson and Errol Johnson, the off-duty law enforcement officers who had personal knowledge of the facts leading to his arrest.

OCGA § 17-4-23 (a) provides in pertinent part: "Whenever an arresting officer makes an arrest concerning the operation of a motor vehicle based on information received from another law enforcement officer who observed the offense being committed, the citation shall list the name of each officer and each must be present when the charges against the accused person are heard." The provisions of this Code section are unrelated to the substantive elements of any traffic misdemeanor charged in a uniform traffic citation. Rather, the interest protected by the requirement that certain law enforcement witnesses be identified on the traffic citation is a criminal defendant's "reasonable pretrial `access to evidence,' (see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (II) (104 SC 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413) (1984))[.]" Bentley v. State, 210 Ga. App. 862, 863 (2) (a) ( 438 S.E.2d 110) (interpreting OCGA § 17-7-110). "`Noncompliance with [the] provisions of this statute by the state does not entitle a defendant to a directed verdict of acquittal (or dismissal of the accusation). His available remedies are for a continuance or a mistrial.' Hunnicutt v. State, 135 Ga. App. 774, 775 ( 219 S.E.2d 22)." Maddox v. State, 145 Ga. App. 212 (2) ( 243 S.E.2d 636). In the case sub judice, defendant did not claim unfair surprise from the testimony of the unlisted law enforcement officers nor did he seek a continuance or a mistrial. Assuming that Deputies Robertson and Johnson should have been identified on the traffic citation, nevertheless the failure of the issuing officer to do so did not render the traffic citation void. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's oral motion to quash. Maddox v. State, 145 Ga. App. 212 (2), supra.

2. In his second enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's motion for a continuance and in denying his motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, arguing that a continuance was unwarranted because the absent prosecution witnesses had not been subpoenaed.

"All applications for continuances are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court and, if not expressly provided for, shall be granted or refused as the ends of justice may require." OCGA § 17-8-22. Where the time has expired for a defendant to demand his statutory right to a speedy trial, OCGA § 17-8-21 provides in pertinent part, "a continuance shall not be granted to the state, except upon a reasonable showing therefore." See Blevins v. State, 113 Ga. App. 702 ( 149 S.E.2d 423). "The grant of a continuance ... rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse. [Cits.]" Stephens v. State, 196 Ga. App. 29 (1) ( 395 S.E.2d 353). The absence of a material witness for the state is a reasonable showing within the meaning of OCGA § 17-8-21. Griggs v. State, 35 Ga. App. 663 (2) ( 134 S.E. 333). In the case sub judice, the record shows that at least one of the two absent law enforcement witnesses for the state had been issued a subpoena. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the state a one-hour postponement due to the absence of this material witness. The denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution is not supported by citation of authority or argument and so this portion of defendant's enumeration is deemed to be abandoned pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2). Gaston v. State, 211 Ga. App. 116, 117 (4) ( 438 S.E.2d 107).

Judgment affirmed. Pope, C. J., and Smith, J., concur.

DECIDED AUGUST 3, 1994 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED AUGUST 18, 1994 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.


Summaries of

Minicucci v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Aug 3, 1994
448 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)

In Minicucci, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion for continuance where at least one of the absent witnesses had been subpoenaed. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the converse is true. A trial court does not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in granting a continuance in the absence of a subpoena.

Summary of this case from Hicks v. State
Case details for

Minicucci v. State

Case Details

Full title:MINICUCCI v. THE STATE

Court:Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Aug 3, 1994

Citations

448 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
448 S.E.2d 34

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