Opinion
Case No. 2:20-cv-02823-RMG-MGB
06-24-2021
Gilbert Markette Mines, Jr., Plaintiff, v. All Staff Members, J. Rueben Long Detention Center, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Gilbert Markette Mines, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against "all staff members" at the J. Rueben Long Detention Center. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the pleadings and submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The allegations in Plaintiff's handwritten pleadings are mostly illegible and, in any event, incoherent. As a result, the discussion here is based on a very liberal construction of Plaintiff's allegations and employs a certain level of guesswork. Based on the undersigned's best interpretation, however, the instant case appears to involve Plaintiff's prior detention at the J. Rueben Long Detention Center in Conway, South Carolina.
Plaintiff's Initial Complaint (Dkt. No. 1)
Plaintiff initially alleged that the State deprived him of his "freedom" on or around April 4, 2019, by detaining him for failure to appear ("FTA") in a pending criminal action before the General Sessions Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Although not entirely clear, the Complaint seemed to suggest that Plaintiff missed some sort of "roll call" because he was being held at a different jail on other pending charges, and the South Carolina state court unfairly issued two FTAs against him as a result. (Id. at 12.) Beyond this general claim, Plaintiff asserted that he was "being stereotyped" (id. at 3); that inmates are "still humans" and should be considered "innocent until proven guilty" (id. at 5); that the "system" is "far from being fair" (id. at 12); and that he was "stuck in jail" (id.). Plaintiff further stated that he "would like the State to have a big briefing" and "play the game fair." (Id. at 5.) The remaining allegations were largely illegible.
While Plaintiff does not specify the underlying South Carolina state court case to which he refers, Horry County records indicate that Plaintiff was arrested for a drug charge on April 3, 2019 (Case No. 2019A2610200827), which later resulted in several FTA violations. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/horry/publicindex/ (search limited by Plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited June 23, 2021); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 F. App'x 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). Accordingly, the undersigned assumes Plaintiff was likely referencing Case No. 2019A2610200827 in his Complaint. Plaintiff apparently pled guilty to the drug charge on or around September 18, 2020, and was sentenced to time served and probation.
Thus, after reviewing the Complaint, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his case was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 5.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 9)
Although Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in compliance with the undersigned's instructions (Dkt. No. 9), the revised allegations do not remedy the deficiencies in the initial pleading. Specifically, the Amended Complaint reiterates Plaintiff's allegations of "wrongful imprisonment," asserting that he was "in North Carolina during the time of [his] roll call" and that he notified the proper authorities of his whereabouts. (Id. at 4, 6.) While the undersigned presumes Plaintiff is still referencing the FTA violations issued in Case No. 2019A2610200827, his Amended Complaint also includes an out-of-context booking report and officer narrative involving an entirely different criminal charge from December 2017 (Case No. 2017A2620701174) without any explanation or background. (See Dkt. No. 9-1.) Plaintiff appears to use this incident as an example of the general unfairness of the jail system, alleging that "all this jail know is lock em down they don't want to hear what lead to this." (Id.; Dkt. No. 9 at 6.) Plaintiff further states that "protocol is not being followed" and that "rules are being made as they go." (Dkt. No. 9 at 6.)
Plaintiff was apparently charged with arson in the third degree on or around December 14, 2017, after lighting a fire in his cell at the North Myrtle Beach detention facility where he was being held on another pending charge. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/horry/publicindex/ (search limited by Plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited June 23, 2021). The arson charge was ultimately dismissed without an indictment.
With respect to injuries, Plaintiff claims that his "heart was broke" because he should have been at home, rather than waking up in jail. (Id.) Plaintiff makes clear, however, that he "[does not] want money." (Id.) Rather, he simply wants his "voice to be heard" and asks that the Court "pull [his] file" to validate that he was in North Carolina at the time he was scheduled to appear in South Carolina state court. (Id.) Notably, Plaintiff does not contest any of the underlying criminal charges brought against him—he appears to challenge the FTAs only.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This action also falls under the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which allows a detainee like Plaintiff to seek "redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). To protect against possible abuses, these statutes charge the court with dismissing such prisoner complaints, or portions thereof, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute "is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits." Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
DISCUSSION
As noted above, many of Plaintiff's allegations in the instant case are indecipherable and, consequently, require a substantial level of guesswork and speculation by this Court. It is well-settled, however, that federal courts cannot serve as "mind readers" or "advocates" for pro se litigants. Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007); see also Kraim v. Columbia Police Dep't, No. 3:18-cv-1335-MGL-PJG, 2019 WL 2058252, at *1 (D.S.C. May 7, 2019) ("Illegible words or allegations need not be considered by the court."). Thus, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, if a complaint's lack of clarity or legibility makes it unintelligible—as is the case here—dismissal under Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., is permitted. (Dkt. No. 5 at 1-3.) See Green, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2; see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit"); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's suit as frivolous where allegations were conclusory and nonsensical on their face).
Assuming, however, that the undersigned's interpretation is correct, and Plaintiff intends to challenge his previous detention pursuant to § 1983, the Complaint is still subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim. A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a plausible claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff claims that "all staff members" at the J. Rueben Long Detention Center deprived him of his "freedom" by wrongfully imprisoning him. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 9 at 4.) As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff, however, only a "person" can be sued under § 1983. (Dkt. No. 5 at 2.) It is well-established that using the term "staff" as a name for alleged defendants, without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a "person" for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florence Cty. Det. Ctr. Personnel, No. 1:21-cv-1549-JFA-SVH, 2021 WL 2227991, at *2 (D.S.C. June 2, 2021) (finding that detention center "personnel" are "groups of persons working in a department, building, or facility, and therefore cannot qualify as a person" under § 1983); Morrow v. Pickens Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:10-cv-01199-MBS-PJG, 2010 WL 2985822, at *3 (D.S.C. June 28, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 2985823 (D.S.C. July 26, 2010) (same); Barnes v. Bakersville Corr. Ctr. Med. Staff, No. 3:07-cv-00195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983 because plaintiff named "unspecified prison personnel" as defendants). Because Plaintiff has failed to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983—despite availing himself of the opportunity to amend his Complaint—the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Moreover, it appears that the relief sought by Plaintiff is now moot, as he has been released from the detention center. "[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there." Winston v. Clarke, 799 F. App'x 215, 216 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, at the time Plaintiff filed this action, he was being detained for what he deemed to be an unfair FTA in an underlying criminal matter. (See Dkt. No. 9 at 5.) Thus, the apparent purpose of the Amended Complaint—which explicitly declined any monetary damages—was to seek release from the J. Rueben Long Detention Center based on that allegedly improper FTA. (Id. at 6.) Regardless of the underlying state court action, however, Horry County records show that Plaintiff was released from the detention center shortly after filing his Amended Complaint.
It is worth noting that Plaintiff made a point to decline any monetary damages in his Amended Complaint even after the undersigned warned him that release from detainment is generally not an available remedy in a § 1983 action. (Dkt. No. 5 at 2.)
See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/horry/publicindex/ (search limited by Case No. 2019A2610200827) (indicating that Plaintiff was sentenced to time served in September 2020).
To be sure, records from the detention center show that since the beginning of 2021, Plaintiff has been booked and released from the facility multiple times in relation to new criminal charges. These records further confirm that, as of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff is not a detainee at the J. Rueben Long Detention Center. Thus, Plaintiff has received the very relief sought in his Amended Complaint, and the instant action is therefore moot and subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., McCall v. Bodiford, No. 2:15-cv-01011-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 4498462, at *7 (D.S.C. June 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 4492802 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (dismissing claim as moot where inmate sought injunction requiring release of inmates at the Greenville County Detention Center within four hours because Plaintiff was no longer incarcerated at said facility).
See https://www.horrycounty.org/Departments/Sheriff/Detention/booking-release (searched limited by Plaintiff's last name) (last visited June 23, 2021).
In an abundance of caution, the undersigned also confirmed that Plaintiff is not currently in the custody of SCDC. See https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (search limited by Plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited June 23, 2021).
The undersigned further notes that to the extent Plaintiff intended to seek some sort of declaration that the FTAs issued against him were improper, any such relief would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes Plaintiff from "seeking what in substance would be appellate review" of a state court determination in a United States district court. Am. Reliable Insurc. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Indeed, a determination in Plaintiff's favor "would necessarily require this court to find that the state court proceedings were instituted in an improper manner, produced an improper result, or both." See Williams v. McFadden, No. 4:14-cv-00121-FL, 2015 WL 4256065, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 29, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 4256179 (E.D.N.C. July 14, 2015) (dismissing claim regarding improprieties in state court proceedings, including proceedings against plaintiff for failure to appear, based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). Thus, while Plaintiff does not expressly seek a declaratory judgment of this sort, it is worth noting that any such request would be subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can "dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order").
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE June 24, 2021
Charleston, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).