Opinion
C/A 7:21-cv-3177-DCC-JDA
01-19-2022
Frank Mills, Jr., Plaintiff, v. David H. Taylor, Sheriff, Union Co.; James Scott Coffer, Investigator, Union Co.; Eric Delaney, Public Defender, Union Co.; John M. Guest, Investigator, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge.
Frank Mills, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2, 4.] Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 4.]
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, on September 10, 2019, Union County Sheriff David H. Taylor told a news crew that the suspect who robbed the Arthur State Bank was 6 feet tall and weighed 220 pounds and was wearing a black cap or hat and tennis shoes. [Id. at 4, 7.] The description of the suspect was later changed to match Plaintiff. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff was called to the Union city jail, and Sheriff Taylor threatened to turn Plaintiff over to the FBI if he did not make a confession as to his involvement with the Arthur State Bank robbery. [Id.] When Plaintiff refused to admit any guilt or knowledge of the robbery, Sheriff Taylor tried to coerce Plaintiff into making a confession. [Id.] Sheriff Taylor told Plaintiff that, if he did not confess, he would make sure that he would go down for the crime because the crime “fits [Plaintiff's] profile” and no one would believe him because of his criminal record. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, Sheriff Taylor's actions constitute misconduct of office and the misuse of authority. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that Investigator James Scott Coffer conspired with Sheriff Taylor to threaten and coerce Plaintiff into confessing to the crime of bank robbery. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Investigator Coffer's actions constitute gross negligence, false imprisonment, perjury, slander, breach of duty and contract, torts, and violations of various constitutional rights. [Id.] Plaintiff also contends that Investigator Coffer abused his authority and engaged in misconduct of office. [Id.]
Further, Plaintiff alleges that his public defender, Attorney Eric Delaney, who was appointed to represent him in the bank robbery case, has not contacted Plaintiff or talked to him in over a year and a half. [Id. at 6.] As a result, Plaintiff contends, his due process and speedy trial rights have been violated. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Attorney Delaney's conduct constitutes negligence of counsel, a conflict of interest, and ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id.]
Plaintiff also alleges that, at the time of the Arthur State Bank robbery, he was on parole and was sent back to prison. [Id. at 7.] However, Plaintiff has not been to court on the charges pending against him. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he was incriminated by his ex-wife's false statements. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he suffered emotional stress and trauma, lost wages, punitive damages, and wrongful imprisonment. [Id. at 8.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that all charges against him be dismissed. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $46,000 for his lost wages, $50,000 for his emotional distress and trauma, and $100 for each day that he has been imprisoned as an innocent man. [Id.]
In his answers to the Court's special interrogatories, Plaintiff clarified that he is seeking to have both charges in Union County and all five charges in Spartanburg County dismissed. [Doc. 10 at 1-2.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Union County Court of General Sessions with armed robbery at case number 2019A4410100543 and with possession of a weapon during the commission of the crime of robbery at case number 2019A4410100544. See Union County Sixteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Union/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2019A4410100543 and 2019A4410100544) (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). Those charges remain pending against Plaintiff at this time.
See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Further, Plaintiff has been charged in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions with armed robbery at case number 2019A4210102837, with three counts of kidnapping at case numbers 2019A4210102838, 2019A4210102839, and 2019A4210102840, and with possession of a weapon during a violent crime at case number 2019A4210102841. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2019A4210102837, 2019A4210102838, 2019A4210102839, 2019A4210102840, 2019A4210102841) (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). Those charges also remain pending against Plaintiff at this time.
Finally, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff previously was convicted in the Darlington County Court of General Sessions and was sentenced to serve three consecutive terms of imprisonment of (1) 12 years at Indictment Number 2002-GS-16-2403 for the crime of strong arm robbery, (2) 10 years at Indictment Number 2002-GS-16-0398 for the crime of strong arm robbery, and (3) 10 years at Indictment Number 2002-GS-16-0399 for the crime of strong arm robbery. See Darlington County Fourth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Darlington/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers G728494, F816976, and F816975) (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). It appears that Plaintiff's allegations concerning his parole and revocation of that parole arise from his convictions in Darlington County.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants unlawfully arrested and detained him without probable cause, deprived him of due process, and denied him the right to a speedy trial. [Id. at 5-7.] Despite Plaintiff's contentions, this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Defendants entitled to dismissal
First, certain Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal because they are not “persons” who may be sued under § 1983 or because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing their personal involvement. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); Rutland v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:09-cv-274-SB, 2009 WL 1704331, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17, 2009) (“A defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a ‘person.'”). Further, “[i]n order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
As explained below, Defendants Delaney and Guest are both entitled to summary dismissal from this action.
Defendant Eric Delaney
Defendant Delaney is entitled to summary dismissal because he is not a state actor for purposes of this § 1983 action. As noted, in order to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). Defendant Delaney is Plaintiff's public defender in the state court and is representing him on the charges related to the Arthur State Bank robbery in Union County. [Doc. 1 at 6.] However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendant is a state actor. “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding a court-appointed attorney was entitled to dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against him for want of state action). Plaintiff has not made any allegations to plausibly show that Defendant exceeded the “traditional functions as counsel.” Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 325; see also Trexler v. Giese, No. 3:09-cv-144-CMC-PJG, 2010 WL 104599, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2010) (finding attorney was entitled to summary dismissal in § 1983 action where attorney's representation in the state criminal case fell “squarely within the parameters of his legal representation” although the plaintiff was unhappy with the manner in which the attorney represented her). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Delaney are not proper in this § 1983 action, and this Defendant is entitled to dismissal for lack of state action. See Curry v. South Carolina, 518 F.Supp.2d 661, 667 (D.S.C. 2007) (explaining public defenders are not state actors under § 1983 and thus entitled to dismissal).
To the extent Plaintiff's allegations may be construed as asserting state law claims against Defendant Delaney, such as claims for negligence or malpractice, any such claims would also subject to summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court will address Plaintiff's state law claims in detail below.
Defendant John M. Guest
Defendant Guest, who is simply identified as an investigator with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department [Doc. 1 at 3], is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff does not allege facts showing his direct involvement in any alleged unconstitutional conduct. Instead, Plaintiff merely names this Defendant in the caption. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against Defendant Guest, he is entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
Abstention under Younger
First, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's arrest in connection with the Arthur State Bank robbery and the charges of armed robbery and possession of a weapon pending against him in the Union County Court of General Sessions as well as his current detention in the Spartanburg County Detention Center on the charges pending against him in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff in both Union and Spartanburg Counties are improper and violate his constitutional rights. Plaintiff asks that the charges against him be dismissed. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief. As noted, Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments related to his pending state criminal charges. Plaintiff also appears to assert claims under state law for negligence, defamation, and other torts.
Fourth Amendment
First, Plaintiff purports to assert a claim for violations of the Fourth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] The Court reads Plaintiff's allegations as asserting claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
The Fourth Amendment provides, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Section 1983 actions premised on claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Here, although Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' actions were committed without probable cause [Doc. 1 at 4-5], he does not allege facts showing that he was searched, seized, or arrested, or that any Defendant secured a warrant without probable cause. Because Plaintiff has presented no facts concerning the specific circumstances of his arrest and detention, he has failed to plead the minimum facts necessary to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiff's sole allegations are that Defendants attempted to coerce him into confessing to the crimes he was charged with; however, he does not allege that he was searched, arrested, or detained by Defendants without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To the extent Plaintiff contends that the charges pending against him in Union County were filed without probable cause, he does not indicate who filed the charges against him or state any facts to support a claim that the filing of the charges lacked probable cause.
Further, as to the charges against him in Spartanburg County, where he is currently detained, any purported Fourth Amendment violation is without merit. This is so because, under § 1983, a public official cannot be charged with unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, or malicious prosecution when the search and arrest are based on probable cause. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.”). Moreover, “an indictment, ‘fair upon its face,' returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. S.C., No. 6:07-cv-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (explaining § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded based on the filing of an indictment). As noted, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's pending state criminal proceedings. The State has filed grand jury indictments for the charges against Plaintiff, which remain pending against him in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions at case numbers 2019A4210102837, 2019A4210102838, 2019A4210102839, 2019A4210102840, and 2019A4210102841. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2019A4210102837, 2019A4210102838, 2019A4210102839, 2019A4210102840, 2019A4210102841) (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). The indictments act as a bar to Plaintiff's claims for money damages as to those charges and his present incarceration in the Spartanburg County Detention Center, and any claims related to those charges and incarceration are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
Likewise, Plaintiff's due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments fail because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing he was subjected to any deprivation of due process to support such a claim. Indeed, Plaintiff does not explain how the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have any relation to this case.
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a procedural due process violation with regard to the charges pending against him, the investigation into the crimes he is charged with, including the alleged attempts to coerce a confession, or his purportedly unlawful incarceration, he has failed to state a claim. Additionally, such claims are subject to dismissal for the reason stated in the sections above. First, the Court should abstain from deciding such claims under Younger. Further, at this stage, the valid indictments against him act as a bar to any such claims.
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a substantive due process claim with regard to the conditions of his confinement, his allegations fail to state a claim. “To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a pretrial detainee must show unconstitutional punishment by proving that the challenged conditions were either (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted). However, “Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to state a claim of a constitutional magnitude.” Brown v. Polk, No.4:21-cv-1229-TMC-TER, 2021 WL 3080966, at *2 (D.S.C. June 28, 2021) (discussing the requirements for a pretrial detainee to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3080157 (D.S.C. July 21, 2021). In sum, Plaintiff has made no allegations concerning the conditions of his confinement and has not identified any cognizable injury as to those conditions.
Sixth Amendment
Next, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] “The Sixth Amendment provides that an ‘accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,' and this right has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Vaughn v. Greenwood Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 8:07-cv-2022-TLW-BHH, 2008 WL 5378265, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 24, 2008).
Although Plaintiff alleges he has been denied the right to a speedy trial under the Constitution, he does not allege the violation of any federal statute. Even if he had, the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3116, et seq., applies only to criminal prosecutions brought by the United States and not to those brought by state or local governments. See United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2012). Further, Plaintiff appears to assert his speedy trial claim against only Defendant Delaney, who is subject to dismissal from this action for the reasons stated above. Finally, this “federal court should abstain from considering a speedy-trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal.” Julius v. Dickers, No. 4:18-cv-105-HMH-TER, 2018 WL 1545698, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1536572 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2018). As previously discussed, this Court should abstain under Younger from hearing Plaintiff's claims because he has available state court remedies. See, e.g., Tyler v. South Carolina, No. 9:12-cv-260-RMG-BM, 2012 WL 988601, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988596 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012). As such, Plaintiff's speedy-trial claim under the Sixth Amendment should be dismissed.
Eighth Amendment
Next, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] A pretrial detainee's claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In any event, “[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These include maintaining humane conditions of confinement, such as the provision of adequate medical care and “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Complaint is completely devoid of facts to assert any colorable claim for cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff presents no facts showing Defendants engaged in any deliberate indifference, excessive use of force, failure to protect, or any other deprivation of a constitutional magnitude to deny Plaintiff “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment.
Ninth Amendment
Finally, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the Ninth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff has not provided allegations to explain the nature of his purported claim under the Ninth Amendment. Further, “the [N]inth [A]mendment creates no constitutional rights, ” Wohlford v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 842 F.2d 1293, at *1 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished), and “has not been interpreted as independently securing any constitutional rights for purposes of making out a constitutional violation.” Cooper v. Van Slambrook, No. 2:19-cv-649-DCN-BM, 2019 WL 3777153, at *2 (D.S.C. June 4, 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3778739 (D.S.C. June 25, 2019). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to assert a claim under the Ninth Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. Amend. IX.
State law tort claims
Finally, Plaintiff appears to assert claims for negligence, perjury, slander, and other torts sounding in state law. [Doc. 1 at 5 (alleging Defendant Coffer engaged in acts of “gross negligence, . . . perjury, slander, breach of duty and contract, etc. [and] torts”).] However, the law is well settled that such tort claims are not actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[N]egligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Mere negligent conduct on the part of prison officials . . . does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). Thus, to the extent that any of Plaintiff's claims arise under a theory of negligence or other state tort, such claims fail to state a claim under § 1983 as a matter of law.
Further, because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal law claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any state law claim is subject to summary dismissal because the Court would lack jurisdiction over it. Without any federal question claim, the Court could only exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's tort claims if the Complaint satisfied the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. However, this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction because the Complaint does not allege the required complete diversity of citizenship of the parties or that the requisite amount in controversy is satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court further notes that Plaintiff's state law claims could be heard by this Court through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal law claims. Federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), however, if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts look at “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has warned that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.... [I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . the state law claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Here, Plaintiff's allegations concerning his tort claims present solely state law questions. Accordingly, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims presented against Defendants.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis in addition to the other reasons state above.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiff's state criminal charges remain pending at this time, and he can raise the issues complained of herein with the state court.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).