Opinion
04207-055, 98-CV-0034E(Sc)
January 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Plaintiff commenced this action January 13, 1998, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges that defendants violated his civil rights in connection with his arrest on charges of bank robbery. Mills claims that defendants used excessive force in arresting him and that, as a result of such force, he was injured and subsequently denied medical treatment. Presently before this Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Defendants' motion is actually two-fold; it is a motion for summary judgment and/or a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP"). See Defs.' Notice of Mot., p. 7. As often occurs, defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCvP 12(b)(6) will be treated as, and in conjunction with, the motion for summary judgment inasmuch as such is supported by material outside the pleadings. FRCvP 12(b); See Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 155-156 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a FRCvP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss be converted into a motion for summary judgment when the moving party submits material outside the pleadings).
While familiarity with the facts of this case is presumed, relevant facts will be discussed as needed. On January 26, 1996 a bank in Buffalo, N.Y. was robbed. Defendants — all law enforcement officers employed by the Buffalo City Police Department — were informed of the robbery and suspected that Mills may have been involved. Sometime early that afternoon, defendants proceeded to an apartment building at 636 Grider Street in Buffalo wherein they suspected Mills might be hiding. After the three defendants had gathered in front of the building, Dill and Hassett proceeded inside while Fenger stayed outside to watch the perimeter. At some point, Dill and Hassett entered an apartment where Mills was assumed to be staying and separately searched the apartment. Dill encountered Mills in a bedroom. The circumstances of that initial encounter and Mills's subsequent arrest are disputed by the parties. Plaintiff's version of the events is as follows and is accepted for present purposes. He was sitting on a bed when Dill first encountered him. When Dill entered the bedroom, he looked at plaintiff and asked him if he was Mills. Mills Dep., p. 54. Mills said that he was and stood up from the bed. Dill rushed him and forcibly threw him down to the floor. Id. at 55-60. The other defendants entered the room and helped to handcuff Mills's arms. Mills also claims that he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray — i.e., "pepper sprayed" — several times while he was on the floor. Id. at 60-61, 71-72. After he had been handcuffed, Mills tried to stand up but he could not because his leg was injured. Mills repeatedly told defendants that his leg was injured. Id. at 63-70. Defendants then pulled Mills to his feet and, holding onto the handcuffs, dragged him down a set of stairs and outside the apartment. Id. at 66-67. Once outside the apartment building, Mills was placed inside an unmarked blue car by Dill and Fenger. Dill and Fenger then asked Mills what was in his pocket. Instead of replying, Mills reached for his pocket and he was pepper sprayed in the eyes by Fenger. Dill then entered the car, pepper sprayed Mills in the face again and reached into Mills's pocket to confiscate the item from him. At that point Dill placed a gun to Mills's head and threatened to shoot him. Id. at 70-72; Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Mills was eventually placed into a another patrol car and transported to Buffalo Police headquarters by two unidentified police officers. When they had arrived at police headquarters after midafternoon, Mills was questioned by Dill and taken to Central Booking to be processed. Dill and Fenger booked Mills and placed him in a cell. Mills alleges that he told both Dill and Fenger that his leg had been injured and that he was in pain; however Mills was held overnight without receiving any medical assistance. The next day Mills was taken to the Buffalo City Court and eventually to the Erie County Medical Center for treatment to his injured leg. Mills was diagnosed with a ruptured patellar tendon and underwent successful surgery on February 2, 1996. Mills attributes his injury to having been forcibly thrown to the floor by Dill at the time of his arrest. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-26.
A more detailed recitation of the procedural history of this case is set out in this Court's February 15, 2001 Memorandum and Order by which plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint was denied. Mills v. Fenger, 2001 WL 135824 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
Dill and Hassett were Detectives and Fenger was a Lieutenant.
Mills does not identify which specific defendant, or defendants, sprayed him while he was handcuffed on the floor. He simply states that "they kept trying to spray me * * *." Mills Dep., p. 60.
Dill confiscated $2,500 from Mills's pocket. Mills has admitted that the confiscated money came from the bank that he had robbed earlier that day. Mills Dep., p. 73.
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint January 13, 1998. He filed an Amended Complaint June 1, 1998 and a Second Amended Complaint September 18, 1998. All citations to plaintiff's Amended Complaint refer to his Second Amended Complaint.
Defendants offer a much different scenario regarding Mills's arrest. According to Dill, Mills had not been sitting on a bed when Dill initially entered the bedroom but was hiding behind a bedroom door to Dill's right. Dill claims he was "jumped" and tackled by Mills and that Mills tried to push him through a bedroom window. Dill Dep., pp. 16-17. Upon hearing the commotion, Hassett had entered the room and assisted Dill in attempting to subdue and handcuff Mills. Eventually, Fenger arrived on the scene and the efforts of all three defendants were required to handcuff Mills. See Defs.' Mem. Law, p. 3. Dill and Fenger then escorted Mills out of the apartment and placed him in a patrol car. Defendants claim that at no time during the events — either during the initial arrest or at police headquarters — did Mills inform them of his alleged injury.
Hassett was accidently pepper sprayed in the face by Dill during the struggle. Hassett was thereby incapacitated and taken outside the building by another police officer on the scene. Hassett claims that he never had any further contact with Mills after the initial arrest in the apartment building. Hassett Dep., 29-31.
Defendants argue in support of their motion for summary judgment that they are entitled to qualified immunity inasmuch as they are allowed to use a reasonable amount of force to effectuate an arrest. In addition, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to prove the necessary elements in order to sustain a section 1983 claim based on an unreasonable denial of medical treatment. Plaintiff argues that there are sufficient unresolved factual disputes in this case to defeat summary judgment. For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") provides that summary judgment shall be entered where the movant demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate this Court must draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co, 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
Nevertheless, the non-moving party must rebut the motion for summary judgment with more than conclusory allegations and general denials. FRCvP 56(e); see also Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Conclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation * * * are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact."). In addition, summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, at 322.
A two-part inquiry is necessary to determine if a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. "The threshold question is whether, '[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, * * * the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.'" Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1281 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, at 201 (2001)). If this Court determines that the particular officer's conduct did not violate a constitutional right, no further inquiry is needed and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. However, if such a violation occurred, this Court must then determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Ibid. Accordingly, whether the right was clearly established is determined by deciding "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Ibid. In other words, "if the officer's conduct violated a right, we analyze the objective reasonableness of the officer's belief in the lawfulness of his actions. If the officer reasonably believed that his actions did not violate the plaintiff's rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity even if that belief was mistaken." Ibid. (citations omitted).
Turning to the first inquiry regarding qualified immunity — viz., whether defendants have violated any of plaintiff's constitutional rights — the facts, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, show that defendants did not violate Mills's Fourth Amendment rights. An excessive force claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness standard." Saucier, at 204; Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 416-417 (2d Cir. 1998). The crux of the inquiry is the reasonableness of the officer's belief as to the appropriate level of force that is necessary in a particular situation. "Because 'police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,' the reasonableness of the officer's belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene perspective." Saucier, at 205 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, at 396-397 (1989)). The judgment of reasonable officers on the scene is owed deference and courts are cautioned against using the "20/20 vision of hindsight" from the comfortable confines of a judge's chambers. Ibid. Accordingly, evaluating the merits of an excessive force claim is fact specific to each individual case. Relevant factors include the following: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Ibid.
The facts of this case — viewed most favorably to plaintiff — show that all three defendants used objectively reasonable force in arresting Mills. Defendants were searching for a suspect who had reportedly just committed an armed robbery and none of them had any reason to believe that Mills had subsequently become unarmed. That fact, as well as the severe nature of the crime, must be considered in assessing the objective reasonableness of defendants' use of force against Mills. As noted previously, Mills has alleged that he had been sitting on a bed when Dill had first encountered him. His testimony is that, after Dill had asked him if he were Mills and Mills had answered in the affirmative, he had stood up off the bed — rather than remaining seated — and then been picked up and slammed to the floor by Dill. This Court finds that amount of force to have been reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. Dill had no way of knowing if Mills still possessed a weapon or if a weapon was within reaching distance of Mills. Thus, it was reasonable for Dill to believe that Mills posed a threat to him even as Mills initially sat on the bed. That threat became greater and more imminent as Mills stood up and it was certainly reasonable for Dill to believe that Mills posed an immediate threat to him — either through the use of a weapon or physical force — or that Mills was going to try to escape. Accordingly, Dill's actions — in throwing Mills to the floor — were necessary and commensurate with the need to quickly quell the threat posed by Mills. This Court finds nothing unreasonable about Dill's use of force in his efforts to neutralize Mills — a person who Dill reasonably perceived as an imminent threat. Moreover, the facts show that defendants Fenger and Hassett also did not use excessive force during the arrest of Mills. Mills does not dispute that Hassett and Fenger were not present upon the initial encounter between him and Dill. Mills also does not allege that either Hassett or Fenger contributed to his leg injury. In fact, Hassett had arrived on the scene only after the initial struggle between Dill and Mills had begun. Fenger arrived last on the scene and found Mills, Hassett and Dill wrestling on the floor. Arriving under such circumstances and not knowing if Mills had been the aggressor, it was reasonable for Hassett and Fenger to perceive that Mills was either trying to flee the scene, resist arrest or physically hurt a fellow police officer. Faced with that threat, they were justified in using reasonable force in trying to subdue and handcuff Mills. In that regard, plaintiff has failed to show this Court that Hassett and Fenger had used objectively unreasonable force in assisting Dill and in handcuffing plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted to defendants inasmuch as there are no genuine issues of material fact that could support plaintiff's excessive force claim against any of them.
It is undisputed that defendants were informed before Mills's arrest that it had been suspected that whoever robbed the MT Bank that day had used a weapon during the robbery. Fenger Dep., p. 15; Dill Dep., p. 12; Hassett Dep., p. 12.
Detective Dill — the first defendant to encounter Mills — had been particularly leery of the potential threat posed by Mills, as would be any other reasonable officer searching for a suspect who possibly was armed with a gun.
Moreover, the facts as alleged show that Dill would have been standing between Mills and the bedroom doorway. The doorway was the only plausible egress where Mills could safely attempt to escape. Such positioning of the parties would tend to support the need for Dill to initiate physical contact with Mills in the manner alleged by plaintiff.
Mills has also alleged that Dill pepper sprayed him in the face — during the initial arrest and several times thereafter — and that Dill threatened to shoot him while he was handcuffed and sitting in the back of the unmarked police car. Mills Dep., pp. 60-72; Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Such allegations cannot form the basis of an excessive force claim. Considering the circumstances surrounding the initial encounter between them, Dill's use of pepper spray against Mills during the initial arrest was a reasonable method to aid Dill's efforts in subduing and incapacitating Mills. Any instances thereafter in which Dill pepper sprayed Mills — as well as the allegation concerning the threat in the car — are not actionable because Mills has not alleged, or shown, any injuries from those actions. See e.g. Murphy v. Neuberger, 1996 WL 442797, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff did not allege that he was injured as a result of defendant's allegedly excessive conduct); see also McAllister v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 49 F. Supp.2d 688, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting summary judgment to defendants because plaintiff failed to show any injuries as a result of the force alleged to have been excessive).
Such force is explicitly warranted by New York's Penal Code. Section 35.30(1) thereof reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"A police officer or a peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest, or of preventing or attempting to prevent the escape from custody, of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, or to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force * * *." N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (Mckinney 1998) (emphasis added).
Indeed, plaintiff does not allege any specific instances of excessive force used by either Hassett or Fenger in arresting him. Instead, plaintiff tries to defeat summary judgment by arguing that material factual disputes exist regarding Hassett's and Fenger's involvement by pointing to discrete discrepancies among the testimonies of Hassett, Fenger and Dill with respect to the positions of the parties when each defendant arrived on the scene. See Pl.'s Mem. Law, p. 12. However, any such discrepancies are not material to Hassett's and Fenger's initial impression and contemplation of the scene which they encountered. Whatever position each party was in — viz., whether the parties were standing, wrestling or otherwise on the floor — does not change the fact that Hassett and Fenger each arrived to find an ongoing struggle.
The only other plausible instance of excessive force that Mills could allege against defendants is when they purportedly dragged Mills by his handcuffs down a set of stairs. However, assuming that to be true, defendants were justified in using a certain amount of force necessary to quickly usher Mills out of a potentially volatile situation. Two other people were present in the apartment at the time of Mills's arrest and defendants had no way of knowing whether or not those individuals posed a threat to them once Mills had been handcuffed. In addition, Mills admits to not being able to stand up after he had been handcuffed. Such an unpredictable environment and Mills's uncooperativeness justified the need for defendants to quickly remove Mills from the apartment.
This Court next turns to defendants' request for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim that defendants denied him medical care. Plaintiff claims that defendants ignored his repeated requests for medical assistance for his injured leg. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on inadequate medical treatment, plaintiff must show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996); Lagrange v. Ryan, 142 F. Supp.2d 287, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). The deliberate indifference standard is analyzed pursuant to the Due Process Clause and involves both an objective and subjective element. Weyant, at 856. First, the alleged deprivation must concern an objectively serious injury. "To satisfy the objective prong, the alleged deprivation must be of a 'sufficiently serious' condition, one that 'may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.'" Boomer v. Lanigan, 2002 WL 31413804, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Morales v. Mackalm, 278 F.3d 126, at 132 (2d Cir. 2002). Second, the defendants must have acted with culpable and deliberate indifference. Such indifference may be established by evidence that the defendants acted with reckless disregard for the substantial risk posed by the plaintiff's serious medical condition. This requires an analysis of "what the official knew or should have known." Weyant, at 856.
Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to establish either prong of his section 1983 claim based on a denial of medical care. Plaintiff counters that there are unresolved issues of fact regarding what defendants knew about the extent of Mills's injury such that summary judgment should be denied. This Court disagrees.
Plaintiff argues that it is undisputed that he suffered a ruptured patellar tendon in his left leg. He also contends that he repeatedly told defendants that his leg was "broken." See Pl.'s Mem. Law, p. 16. According to plaintiff, the fact that defendants deny Mills's assertion that he informed them of his injury creates issues of fact regarding whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mills's serious medical need. Ibid. However, assuming that Mills's factual account is true — which this Court must do on this motion for summary judgment —, the mere fact that he told defendants that his leg was injured — i.e., broken — is not enough to sustain his burden of proving that defendants deliberately disregarded an observed serious medical need. Initially, this Court notes that the nature of plaintiff's injury — viz., a ruptured patellar tendon in his left leg — is not one that "contemplates a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain." United Calvary Church v. City of N.Y., 2000 WL 1538019, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quotations omitted). Thus, Mills cannot satisfy the objective prong of his denial of medical care claim because his injury was not sufficiently serious. However, even if this Court were to find otherwise, summary judgment must be granted to defendants because plaintiff has not presented any material issues of fact showing defendants' subjective awareness of the extent to which plaintiff was injured. In other words, Mills cannot show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his claimed serious medical need. First, the facts show that Mills was wearing two layers of pants from the time of the initial arrest until well after his last contact with Dill and Fenger at Police Headquarters. The only possible visual evidence of Mills's injury was some swelling of the left knee, which would have been unnoticeable to defendants through the two layers of pants. Second, there is no mention of any injury to Mills in any of the documentation regarding his initial arrest or subsequent booking at police headquarters. See Aff. of Kevin J. Keane, Esq., Exs. G, H. Third, plaintiff has not testified or shown that he needed any kind of assistance while walking at police headquarters. In fact, plaintiff's only evidence offered in support of his denial of medical care claim are his bare allegations that he could not stand up during the initial arrest and that he subsequently complained to Dill and Fenger several times about his leg injury. Such evidence might have put defendants on notice that Mills had suffered a minor leg injury; however, without more, it falls short of creating a genuine issue of material fact of whether defendants were aware that Mills needed urgent medical assistance for a serious medical condition. Plaintiff has simply failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Dill and Fenger were "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]." Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted to Dill and Fenger because plaintiff has not shown "that the defendants acted with reckless disregard for the substantial risk posed by [his] serious medical condition," Weyant, at 856. Finally, in addition to the foregoing reasons, summary judgment shall be granted to defendant Hassett because it is undisputed that he had no contact with plaintiff after the initial arrest and therefore he was never in a position after that time to have the opportunity to obtain medical assistance for plaintiff. As such, defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's denial of medical care claim will be granted.
Mills wore a pair of sweat pants over another pair of pants. Defendants confiscated the money from the bank robbery from a pocket of the inner pair of pants that Mills had been wearing. See Mills Dep., pp. 70-72.
Plaintiff's only offer of proof tending to show that he had a visible injury is a memorandum from the Erie County Sheriff's Department noting that Mills had a "swollen [left] knee." See Aff. of Anna Marie Richmond, Esq., Ex. A. However, that document is dated January 27, 1996 — the day after Mills's arrest — and it does not establish that Mills's leg had been noticeably swollen at the time of his arrest or during processing at Police Headquarters.
Both parties have submitted Mills's Prisoner Information Form that had been completed by a Report Technician upon his processing at police headquarters. The form lists a series of questions designed, inter alia, to assess a prisoner's health status and medical history. There is nothing on such form that indicates that Mills was visibly injured or that he told anyone that he was in pain. See Keane Aff., Ex. H. Significantly, plaintiff has not offered any explanation for such absence.
Although plaintiff disputes Hassett's assertion that he had no contact with Mills after the initial arrest — see Pl.'s Statement Disputed and Undisputed Material Facts, p. 4, section (2)(g)(iv) — Mills's testimony, as well as the testimony of defendants, shows that Hassett, in fact, had no further contact with Mills after the initial arrest.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted in its entirety and that the clerk of this Court shall close this case.