Opinion
No. NNH-CV11-6021833
October 25, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
This case arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on May 12, 2010. The plaintiffs, Curtis Miller and Alyssa Natalino, filed a four-count complaint against the defendant in which they allege that they were the operator and passenger, respectively, in a car which was struck by a car being operated by the defendant. The plaintiffs each allege that they sustained personal injuries in the collision.
The first and third counts of the amended complaint sound in negligence. The second and fourth counts assert claims of statutory recklessness pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295 and allege, in pertinent part, that the defendant "deliberately or with reckless disregard violated § 14-222 of the Connecticut General Statutes by operating his motor vehicle in a reckless manner," and that the defendant's violation of § 14-222 "was a substantial factor in causing the injuries suffered by the plaintiff."
The defendant has moved to strike these statutory recklessness claims contained in the second and fourth counts on the grounds that they set forth an insufficient factual basis to support the cause of action. The plaintiffs have filed an objection to the motion to strike, contending that these causes of action are sufficiently pled.
Discussion
As counsel for both sides recognize in their respective memorandum of law, there is a split of authority in the Superior Court decisions as to the degree of pleading necessary for a claim of statutory recklessness. What has been characterized as the minority view "holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory violation as set forth in § 14-295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law." Liedke v. Paquette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10-6004043 (August 2, 2010, Swienton, J.) Under the majority view, however, "a claim for statutory recklessness is legally sufficient so long as it alleges that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the statutes enumerated in § 14-295, and further asserts that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." Talareva v. Novakowski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10-6006824 (April 5, 2011, Young, J.) Under this majority view, "as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295." Id.
Having considered both the majority and minority views and after a review of both lines of cases, this court finds the reasoning of the majority view more persuasive, and therefore adopts that view as to claims, like those here at issue, that sound in § 14-295 statutory recklessness. Consistent with that position, the court notes that the plaintiffs here have alleged in the second and fourth counts that the defendant, acting with the statutorily required mental state, violated § 14-222, and further, that this violation was a substantial factor in causing their injuries. Because these allegations satisfy the general requirements of § 14-295, counts two and four of the plaintiff's amended complaint, as pled, are sufficient to state a cause of action under § 14-295 and to survive a motion to strike. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike must fail.
In this court's opinion, the majority view better reflects the plain language of § 14-295 and, to the extent that further interpretation is appropriate, the legislative history of that statute, as well.
The defendant's motion to strike the second and fourth counts of the plaintiffs' amended complaint is hereby denied.