Opinion
No. 118423.
04-09-2013
Robert MILLER, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant.
Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP by Nicole Bellina, Esq., for claimant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York by Thomas R. Monjeau, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
Stoll, Glickman & Bellina, LLP by Nicole Bellina, Esq., for claimant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York by Thomas R. Monjeau, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
Opinion
JAMES H. FERREIRA, J.
Claimant Robert Miller filed this claim on May 18, 2010, seeking damages for, among other things, alleged wrongful confinement. A trial on the issue of liability was held on April 17, 2012 in Albany, New York. By decision dated June 28, 2012, the Court (Ferreira, J.) found defendant liable for claimant's wrongful confinement in a State correctional facility for the period of time between May 12, 2009 through June 3, 2009—23 days. A trial on the issue of damages was conducted on January 18, 2013 in Albany, New York. Claimant testified at the damages trial. No other witnesses testified, and neither party offered any documentary evidence.
As set forth in the Court's decision on liability, the following underlying facts are undisputed. On May 4, 2009, claimant, who was 64 years old at the time, was sentenced for narcotics related offenses to a determinate sentence of 1½ years confinement and 1½ years of post-release supervision (hereinafter PRS). His incarceration maximum expiration (hereinafter ME) date was the same day as his sentencing—May 4, 2009—and his PRS ME date was November 4, 2010. Claimant was thereafter confined at Rikers Island, a New York City facility, and was transferred to Downstate Correctional Facility (hereinafter Downstate), a State institution, on May 12, 2009. Claimant was released from Downstate on June 3, 2009.
At the damages trial, claimant testified that he is now 67 years old and lives in Trenton, New Jersey. He has not worked in approximately 25 to 30 years; he is a disabled veteran and supports himself through receipt of veteran benefits. He was drafted into the Army in 1967 and reenlisted when his first enlistment expired. He served on active duty in several locations, including two tours in Vietnam. He was honorably discharged on March 24, 1972. After his military service, he worked for a period of time as an auto mechanic. He has 4 children, 13 grandchildren and 2 great-grandchildren.
With respect to the instant claim, claimant testified that, at the time of his sentencing, he believed that he had already served his entire 18–month sentence. He explained that, before he pled guilty and was sentenced, he had been confined at “the Tombs” in New York City for over 18 months. Upon his guilty plea, he had been released and had returned to Trenton and rented an apartment there. It was his understanding that, since he had served his time, he would go back to Manhattan for sentencing and then would “go back home and be paroled.” Claimant testified that at his sentencing hearing, the judge told him he needed to “go up and get a [State] number” and that he would be released “the next day or that afternoon.”
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the electronic audio recording of the trial.
Claimant testified that, after he was sentenced, he was taken to Rikers Island, where he remained for two weeks. He then was taken to Downstate. When he arrived at Downstate, he informed the staff that he had already served his time. He wrote letters to the warden and to a probation officer and “spoke to every [correction officer he] came in contact with.” He did not receive any response to his letters, and no one explained to him why he was still incarcerated. Claimant explained that he did not know who to approach with respect to his release, as he had never been incarcerated before. Claimant testified that he was not in touch with any of his family members or his attorney while he was at Downstate; he explained that he did not have access to a telephone because other inmates had taken the receiver and would not let him use it unless he paid them money. He had no way of letting his family members know where he was. He also had no money in his commissary account while he was at Downstate because he had not expected to remain incarcerated and was unable to use the phone to get money sent to him.
Claimant testified that, at Downstate, he “tried to mind [his] own business” because he believed he would be leaving soon. He tried to occupy his time by reading, but “there was no peace” and “too much craziness.” He was housed in his own cell, which was “very small.” He left his cell for breakfast, lunch and dinner and one hour of television per day. He was also allowed to shower every day; he tried to shower “as quick as possible” to avoid “friction” with other inmates. He was strip searched when he first entered Downstate. Claimant testified that he has suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter PTSD) since 1967. While at Downstate, he received mental health treatment and had to go back on medication to treat his PTSD. When asked how it felt for him to spend extra days at Downstate, claimant testified that he felt forgotten and helpless because he was unable to talk to anyone who could help him. He affirmed that his time at Downstate felt different to him than the time he had spent at the Tombs because he did not owe the State time at that point.
Claimant testified that, although he had informed his parole officer that he had an apartment in New Jersey, he was paroled to a men's shelter in New York. Eventually, he was able to get his parole transferred to New Jersey, and he returned to Trenton. However, he was behind in rent and ultimately got evicted. Claimant testified that he successfully completed his parole, did not violate his parole and has not been in trouble since. He testified that he had been in “city lock up” for a traffic offense but this was the first time he had been incarcerated in a State facility for a felony offense. At the time of the trial, claimant was no longer on medication to treat his PTSD but continued to see his psychiatrist. On cross-examination, claimant acknowledged that it was possible that he had been arrested in New Jersey in 1999 for a drug offense. He also acknowledged that he did not suffer physical pain as a result of his incarceration. He testified that no one explained to him that, in order to be placed on PRS, he would have to go through parole and get the PRS set up.
“As a general rule, the measure of damages for [wrongful] confinement is such a sum as will fairly and reasonably compensate the injured person for injuries caused by the defendant's wrongful act” (Hallenbeck v. City of Albany, 99 A.D.2d 639, 640 [3d Dept 1984] ; accord Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d 988, 993 [Ct Cl 2010] ). “Such damages may include noneconomic damages for mental anguish and economic damages for loss of earnings, as well as noneconomic damages for the loss of liberty during a period of unlawful confinement” (Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d at 993 [internal citation omitted] ). “The mental anguish suffered by an inmate while he is in prison encompasses his discomfort, fear, lack of privacy and degradation” (Baba–Ali v. State of New York, 24 Misc.3d 576, 581–582 [Ct Cl 2009], affd in part, revd in part 76 AD3d 940 [2d Dept 2010] ), and “[d]amages attributable to loss of liberty include damages for the loss of the fundamental right to be free, lost opportunities to engage in everyday activities while confined, and for the mental anguish that accompanies the loss of liberty” (Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d at 993 ). “The inherently factual finding of [noneconomic damages] is generally left to a [factfinder's] common sense and judgment in light of its common knowledge and experience and with due regard to the evidence presented at trial, including the demeanor and testimony of all witnesses' “ (Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d at 995, quoting Murphy v. Lewry, 235 A.D.2d 968, 969 [3d Dept 1997] ). In assessing the amount of a damage award, “[i]t is proper for a court to look at other similar cases to determine what would be a reasonable award” (Jackson v. State of New York, UID No.2009–038–105 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Dec. 21, 2009] ).
In this case, claimant seeks damages for the loss of his liberty and the mental anguish that he suffered during the period of wrongful confinement. The Court found claimant to be a credible witness in recounting his experiences with respect to his incarceration at Downstate. Certainly, claimant has established that he is entitled to damages attributable to the loss of his liberty for 23 days. He was housed alone in a small cell and released only for short periods of time during the day. It is clear that he was deprived of the ability “to engage in many of the everyday activities that non-incarcerated individuals enjoy” (Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d at 995 ). The Court is unpersuaded by defendant's argument that, because claimant should have been-and ultimately was-released to PRS where his liberties were also significantly limited for a period of 18 months, “it cannot be said that he was deprived of all of his freedoms and liberties” during the 23 days that he was incarcerated at Downstate and, thus, damages should be reduced accordingly (Defendant's Post Trial Memorandum, at 3, February 21, 2013). The Court received no evidence as to the particular conditions of claimant's PRS. Moreover, in the Court's view, the restrictions placed upon a person on PRS do not easily compare to those placed upon a person who is incarcerated in a State facility (see Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d at 996 ). The Court also rejects defendant's argument that the Court should be guided by damage awards for inmates who are wrongfully subjected to disciplinary confinement during their confinement (see e.g. Williams v. State of New York, UID No.2012–018–334 [Ct Cl, Fitzpatrick, J., Nov. 1, 2012] ).
Claimant does not appear to be seeking any economic damages arising from the wrongful confinement. In any event, it was claimant's burden to establish any lost earnings with “reasonable certainty” (Bielich v. Winters, 95 A.D.2d 750, 751 [1st Dept 1983] ), and the Court received no specific evidence establishing that claimant incurred any economic damages with respect to the 23 days that he was held at Downstate. Thus, the Court makes no award for economic damages.
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With respect to mental anguish, it is clear from claimant's testimony that, due to a number of factors, he spent 23 days at Downstate in a state of unrest, uncertainty and helplessness. First, his confinement was unexpected. Claimant had been released from the Tombs following his guilty plea and service of his entire sentence and had returned home. He testified credibly that he believed that he would return home after his sentencing, or would only be incarcerated for a brief period of time. Instead, he spent 23 days confined at Downstate; due to the unexpectedness of the confinement, he did not have a chance to prepare for it. Claimant's time at Downstate was also fraught with uncertainty and a sense of helplessness. Claimant was aware that he was serving time that he did not owe the State yet, despite his efforts, was unable to obtain information about why he was still being held and when he would be released. The Court notes that claimant became visibly upset at times during his testimony, in particular when he was asked to describe his feelings when he was told that he was finally being released from Downstate.
Claimant also testified credibly that he experienced discomfort, fear and isolation as an inmate at Downstate. His interactions with other inmates caused him fear and anxiety, and his PTSD was aggravated by his confinement such that he had to resume taking medication for it. Moreover, he was unable to contact his family or his attorney while at Downstate and had no money in his commissary account. The Court notes that claimant's time at Downstate was not the first time he had been incarcerated. Claimant had already spent over 18 months in confinement for crimes that he committed and was not “new” to a life of incarceration. However, claimant's circumstances at Downstate were quite different from those that he had experienced at the Tombs, in that, at Downstate, he was serving time that he believed he did not owe the State and could not be sure when, if ever, he would be released.
Defendant argues that damages attributable to its wrongful confinement of claimant should be mitigated by the fact that the State did not act “willfully, intentionally or negligently” with respect to its incarceration of claimant but, rather, held claimant while it worked out the details of his PRS, as it believed that it was required to do pursuant to the order of the sentencing court (Defendant's Post Trial Memorandum, at 2). The Court's decision on liability establishes that defendant committed an intentional wrongful act in confining claimant for 23 days after the expiration of his ME date (see Miller v. State of New York, 37 Misc.3d 1202(A) [Ct Cl 2012] ). The Court finds that defendant's assertion with respect to the degree of its fault in this matter has minimal, if any, relevance to the Court's assessment of the amount of damages attributable to its wrongful act.
The Court has reviewed similar cases awarding damages for wrongful confinement (see e.g. Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.3d 988, 993 [Ct Cl 2010] ; Jackson v. State of New York, UID No.2009–038–105 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Dec. 21, 2009] ). Upon consideration of the specific circumstances of this case, including the number of days that claimant was wrongfully confined and the fact that his confinement was unanticipated by him and fraught with uncertainty, the Court awards damages to claimant in the amount of $35,000.00. This damage award represents compensation to claimant for the noneconomic damages that he incurred during the period of his wrongful incarceration.
The amount awarded herein shall carry interest at the interest rate of 9% per year from the date of the determination of liability on June 28, 2012. In addition, to the extent claimant has paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11–a (2).
Any motions on which the Court may have previously reserved or which were not previously determined are hereby denied.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.