Opinion
June 29, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.).
The IAS Court properly directed entry of a money judgment in favor of plaintiff's former counsel, respondent BA, and against the plaintiff, without necessity of a separate plenary action, for attorneys' fees owed in connection with BA's representation of the plaintiff in the underlying matrimonial action, because the plaintiff, while represented by counsel, consented to the amount of the attorneys' lien at issue in a written stipulation so ordered by the court ( see, Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230). Thus, the parties therefore waived any challenge on appeal to the court's authority to enforce the attorney compensation award specifically agreed to by the parties by so ordered stipulation as a money judgment ( Kalra v. Kalra, 170 A.D.2d 579, 580, lv dismissed 78 N.Y.2d 1070).
Nor is plaintiff's former counsel, BA, relegated solely to the commencement of a plenary action to fix and enforce the attorneys' lien consented to by written stipulation of the parties since Judiciary Law § 475, which establishes a statutory attorneys' lien, permits enforcement of the lien either by way of motion in the main action or by plenary action.
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Kupferman, Asch, Nardelli and Mazzarelli, JJ.