Opinion
HHDCV135037369
05-05-2017
Omar J. Miller v. John Doe Capt. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
In this action, the plaintiff, Omar J. Miller, has filed a two-count complaint against the defendant, Department of Corrections (DOC) Officer Joshua Medina, who is being sued in his individual capacity pursuant to allegations that he has violated the plaintiff's civil rights under the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whereby he claims that the defendant subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by failing to abide by reasonable safety standards during transportation of the plaintiff and maliciously and recklessly crashed into several motor vehicles, causing physical injuries.
The plaintiff, who is representing himself, has also sued " John Doe" for whom service appears to have been accepted by the Office of the Attorney General. No appearance has been filed on behalf of " Doe" who remains an unidentified entity before the court.
Before this court is the defendant's motion to dismiss based on his claim that this court lacks jurisdiction based on the state's sovereign immunity. The defendant argues that because the plaintiff has sued the defendant, who is a corrections officer employed by the state of the DOC, the plaintiff has essentially brought an action against the state of Connecticut, in violation of its sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
This court disagrees. Based on the following reasoning, this court concludes that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded an action in which the defendant is being sued in his individual capacity. Thus, pursuant to the court's analysis in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975) and in Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003), the court finds that it has jurisdiction.
" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).
" When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003). " [I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008). As such, this court is obligated to " take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 132, 913 A.2d 415 (2007).
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was transported by the defendant to MacDougall Walker Correctional Institute from the University of Connecticut John Dempsey Hospital, while being fully restrained with handcuffs, tether chain, and shackles, but not secured with safety seatbelts during the transport. During the transport, the plaintiff heard a crash and was violently jerked off the back seat, hit steel structures in the vehicle, blacked out, and suffered injuries as a result. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, by his deliberate acts or omission, " posed danger to [the] plaintiff by forcing him to be transported in an unsafe vehicle, " and that the actions amounted to " cruel and unusual punishment" by violating safety standards and recklessly exceeding speed limits. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant forced the plaintiff into a dangerous vehicle, even though he was aware of the hazards and that the vehicle was dangerous, then drove recklessly, crashing into several cars and then denied the plaintiff appropriate medical care.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is well established in Connecticut jurisprudence. " [W]e have long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . ." Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). " We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 550-51, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984). " While the principle of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in our common law, it has, nevertheless, been modified and adapted to the American concept of constitutional government where the source of governmental power and authority is not vested by divine right in a ruler but rests in the people themselves who have adopted constitutions creating governments with defined and limited powers and courts to interpret these basic laws. The source of the sovereign power of the state is now the constitution which created it, and it is now recognized that, as Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: 'A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 313-14.
In Spring v. Constantino, supra, 168 Conn. 568, our Supreme Court observed that " [t]he fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent . . . The vital test is to be found in the essential nature and effect of the proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court then set forth the following criteria for determining " whether the suit is, in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." Id.
Since the complaint makes clear that the defendant is an employee of the DOC and that his actions, which are the subject of the suit, clearly took place in the course of his employment, specifically providing transport of the plaintiff to and from his medical appointment, the defendant has clearly satisfied criteria one and two. The defendant, however, has offered this court only a superficial analysis of criteria three and four in the context of an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Unlike the plaintiff in Miller v. Egan, the plaintiff in this case has made clear that he is suing the defendant in his individual capacity. Moreover, as our Supreme Court clarified in Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 140, " § 1983 does authorize actions against state officers for damages arising from official acts, if they are sued in their individual capacities ." (Emphasis in original.) See also Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 307 (" [i]f the plaintiff's complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims").
Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part: " Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ."
" [S]tate officials sued for money damages in their official capacities are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983 because the action against them is one against the office and, thus, no different from an action against the state itself . . . State officials are, however, 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983 and may be held personally liable when sued as individuals for actions taken in their official capacities and, thus, under color of law." (Citation omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 141. " Thus, the phrase 'acting in their official capacities' . . is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 140-41.
In Sullins v. Rodriguez, our Supreme Court observed that the plaintiff unambiguously asserted that the defendant " is sued in his individual capacity" and concluded that " [s]uch an articulation of the defendant's capacity is sufficient to commence a § 1983 claim against a state officer in his individual capacity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 141.
In this case, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint which states quite clearly that he is suing Medina in his individual capacity. Moreover, the plaintiff sought to serve the defendant individually and strenuously objected to the defendant's motion to dismiss (#102) the original complaint based on ineffective service to the extent that he sought to sue the defendant in his individual capacity. That motion was withdrawn (#109) after the plaintiff requested a waiver of personal service (#104), citing the constraints inherent with respect to his incarcerated status.
In the alternative, the defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity. " [T]he doctrine of federal qualified immunity also implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and is a proper ground for the motion to dismiss." Kaminski v. Milling, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-5016058-S, (December 23, 2015, Young, J.). " [A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 raises a question of federal law . . . and not state law. Therefore, in reviewing these claims of qualified immunity we are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials . . . Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn.App. 603, 625, 975 A.2d 59 (2009). Qualified immunity reflects the " concern that for the public benefit, public officials be able to perform their duties unflinchingly and without constant dread of retaliation." Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 2010). The standard " is forgiving and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
" Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). " [I]f it was objectively reasonable for him at the time of the challenged action to believe his acts were lawful . . . then qualified immunity applies." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 612, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 444, 190 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014).
In this case, the plaintiff alleges a violation of his eighth amendment right to protection from cruel and unusual punishment. " The [e]ighth [a]mendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments . . . This includes punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . The standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious . . . Second, the [government official] must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind . . . An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference . . . Thus, an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not [does not violate the eighth amendment]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 302-03, 124 A.3d 977 (2015).
Although the court emphasizes that the plaintiff is self-represented, the plaintiff has nevertheless meticulously and carefully alleged that the defendant was not only aware of the risk of harm to the plaintiff but then disregarded that risk by acting with deliberate indifference to his physical safety, specifically in his failure to abide by DOC administrative directives requiring appropriate seat belt restraints. Moreover, the plaintiff has further alleged that the defendant engaged in reckless and wanton conduct of driving at an excessive speed. Given the allegations that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would be at serious risk of injury in the event of a collision, given that the defendant was alleged to be aware of the requirement that inmates must be secured by seat belts, and given the allegations that the defendant drove erratically and unsafely while the plaintiff was not safely secured, this court concludes that the plaintiff's action is not barred by qualified immunity. As our U.S. Supreme Court has held in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), a prison official may be held liable " only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."
The court is mindful of the fact that it must consider the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 651. Because the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support the claim that it was not objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe his acts were lawful, the court denies the motion to dismiss.