Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2924 SECTION "K"(1).
November 28, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for New Trial (Rec. Doc. 72) filed by plaintiff Coty Miller that was submitted on the papers. The Court has reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and relevant law and finds the motion to be without merit.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). As the plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its decision to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, the Court will consider the Rule 59 standard as it applies to decisions in non-jury trials. A motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) should be based upon a manifest error of law or mistake of fact. Perez v. Brown Mfg., 1999 WL 777757 (E.D. La. 1999). Under that standard, a judgment should not be set aside except for substantial reasons. See 11 Charles Wright, Arthur Miller Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2804; In re TT Boat Corp., 2000 WL 222848 (E.D. La. 2000). Moreover, "[c]ourts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests on the party seeking new trial." Sibley v. Lemarie, 184 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff argues that this Court committed manifest error of law in excluding the plaintiffs testimony, on hearsay and relevance grounds, as to alleged statements of two of her coworkers in a Title VII case. Plaintiff's sole argument is that under Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998), this Court should have allowed the testimony into evidence. Contrary to plaintiffs assertions the Williams court held that "[b]ecause the out of court statements [of plaintiffs co-workers] concerned matters outside the declarants' scope of employment, we conclude that the district court erred in allowing this testimony into evidence." Id. at 949. However, in that case the Court of Appeals considered the testimony to be harmless error because it did not have a substantial effect on the jury verdict. Id. Thus, Williams does not stand for the proposition that the co-worker statements should have been allowed.
This Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs argument, no new evidence or legal arguments were presented in this motion. In this case, plaintiff was unable to establish that the alleged harasser was a supervisor or that she suffered a tangible employment action, as she quit after two days without reporting the alleged discriminatory treatment. Nor does plaintiffs citation to Williams convince the Court that its decision to exclude the testimony was in error. Certainly, no "substantial reasons" have been presented to the Court to grant this motion. The Court stands firm in its assessment of the evidence adduced at trial and remains overwhelmingly convinced that its factual findings and legal conclusions are accurate and correct. Plaintiffs motion does not raise any new factual or legal issues which the court did not consider at trial. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is DENIED.