Milkowski v. Island County

Full title: FRANK MILKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. ISLAND COUNTY, et al, Defendants

Court: United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle

Date published: Feb 10, 2003

CASE NO. C02-2272C (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2003)

Opinion

CASE NO. C02-2272C.

February 10, 2003

ORDER

JOHN COUGHENOUR, Chief United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 6) and defendants' motion to strike materials submitted by plaintiff (Dkt. No. 13). The Court has considered the papers submitted by the parties and determined that oral argument is not necessary. For the following reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED, and defendants' motion to strike materials submitted by plaintiff is hereby DENIED as moot.

I. FACTS

On April 5, 2002, defendant Ricky Lee Norrie, an Island County Sheriff's Office sergeant, was directed to serve a summons and complaint on plaintiff Frank Milkowski. The service order cautioned that Frank Milkowski, a/k/a Peter Milkowski, had a "HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTING" law enforcement and directed the serving officer to "SEE WARRANT ALL ATTACHED." Accordingly, prior to approaching Frank Milkowski's residence, defendant Norrie telephoned Sheriff's Office dispatch to ascertain the existence of any outstanding arrest warrants. Dispatch informed defendant Norrie that two outstanding bench warrants existed for Peter Milkowski, a/k/a Frank Milkowski. Dispatch provided a physical description of this individual.

Plaintiff answered the door and identified himself as Frank Milkowski. Defendant Norrie served the summons and complaint, which plaintiff accepted. He noticed that plaintiff's eye color differed from the physical description provided by dispatch, but not in other respects. Citing the outstanding warrants, he then arrested and handcuffed plaintiff. Plaintiff immediately informed defendant Norrie that he believed the arrest warrants were actually for his brother, Peter Milkowski. He told defendant Norrie that his brother had fraudulently adopted his identity in the past, leading to this confusion. Plaintiff insisted that he and Peter Milkowski were, in fact, distinct individuals and that the subject of the arrest warrants was, in fact, Peter Milkowski. Plaintiff urged defendant Norrie and another officer¹ to verify his story by examining plaintiff's personal documents. The officers examined plaintiff's driver's license, passport, and other identity-related documents. There was no evidence that the documents, bearing the name Frank Milkowski, were altered or otherwise invalid.² Defendant Norrie contacted dispatch with the personal data provided by plaintiff. Dispatch confirmed the validity of the data provided.³ Plaintiff also informed defendant Norrie that he had a note from Sheriff's Office detective Lindner "for the express purpose of preventing repetition of identity mistakes." However, this note was not located at that time.

1 Defendant Norrie called for back-up soon after arriving at Frank Milkowski's residence because he saw another man depart quickly through a back door. The parties have not identified this individual by name.

2 The arrest warrants for Peter Milkowski, a/k/a Frank Milkowski, stemmed from charges of driving with a suspended license.

3 As discussed in detail below, the mere fact that plaintiff held apparently valid identification for Frank Milkowski did not remove all confusion surrounding his identity and connection to the outstanding warrants. The warrants and service order warned that Peter Milkowski and Frank Milkowski both used each other's names as aliases.

Despite plaintiff's persistent protestations, defendant Norrie proceeded to transport plaintiff to the Island County Jail. There, after reviewing previous booking photos of Peter Milkowski, defendant Norrie and other jail officers confirmed that Peter Milkowski and Frank Milkowski were, in fact, distinct individuals. They also confirmed what plaintiff had represented: Peter Milkowski, not Frank Milkowski, was the subject of the arrest warrants. Moreover, other jail officers had prior knowledge of the identity confusion between the brothers Milkowski. Defendant Norrie apologized to plaintiff and drove him home. In total, plaintiff was under arrest approximately two hours.

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move to strike the following assertions made by plaintiff: 1) "many persons within the Sheriff's Office knew that Frank Milkowski had been mistaken for his brother Peter Milkowski in the past;" 2) "[the arresting] Officers noticed that several of the files that the officers searched in order to find the passport were labeled with reference to myself and not Peter;" 3) "Sgt. Norrie had access to the fact that Frank's driver's license was in good standing while Peter's was `suspended';" and 4) "[defendant Norrie] lacked any information that Peter lives, or physically was, anywhere near Frank's residence" at the time of the arrest. Because these assertions do not alter the Court's conclusions below, the Court DENIES as moot defendants' motion to strike materials submitted by plaintiff.

III. DEFENDANT NORRIE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Norrie moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims in their entirety. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986).

Defendant Norrie argues he is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's claims. With respect to qualified immunity, the Court must determine: 1) whether plaintiff's factual allegations establish the violation of a constitutional right; and 2) whether the right violated was so clearly established that any reasonable officer would have known what conduct the law requires in the given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-05 (2001). Even if the officer is mistaken as to what the law requires, he is entitled to qualified immunity if his mistake is reasonable. Id. at 205-08. Thus, the parties agree that defendant Norrie's defense of qualified immunity "boils down to whether the officer's continuing identification mistake was reasonably made."

To demonstrate the reasonableness of his mistake, defendant Norrie relies on Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). In Hill, police officers arrested a man matching the general physical description of a robbery suspect when he answered the door at the suspect's residence, where weapons were in plain view. 401 U.S. at 799. The man informed the officers that he was not Hill and produced identification showing he was, in fact, Miller. Id. at 803-04. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found:

[T]he arresting officers had a reasonable, good faith belief that the arrestee Miller was in fact Hill . . . The mailbox at the indicated address listed Hill as the occupant of the apartment. Upon gaining entry to the apartment, they were confronted with one who fit the description of Hill . . . That person claimed he was Miller, not Hill [and produced identification to that effect]. But aliases and false identification are not uncommon. . . . The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out. . . . But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation. . . .

Hill, 407 U.S. at 803-04. However, it is essential to note that Hill was a criminal case; the issue of mistaken identity did not arise in the context of a civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Plaintiff distinguishes Hill and directs the Court to Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002), which plaintiff asserts is "remarkably close" to the instant case. In Fairley, plaintiff filed § 1983 claims against the arresting officers and booking sergeant after he was arrested and detained in jail for twelve days on outstanding arrest warrants for his twin brother. 281 F.3d at 915. The Ninth Circuit described the circumstances of the arrest:

John Fairley ("John") was taken into custody . . . for allegedly violating a temporary restraining order after a confrontation with his next door neighbor. . . . After John was in custody, Officers Romero and Javellana ran a warrant check and found two 1995 infractions warrants for Joe B. Fairley, John's identical twin brother. The physical descriptions of the two men were similar in ceratin respects: both were black, between 5'6" and 5'8", and, of course, were the same age. However, their weights differed by approximately 66 pounds and the driver's license number on one of the warrants was similar, but not identical to the number on John's license. John had not had contact with the police for almost ten years and both he and his wife told the officers the warrants had to be for Joe. The officers knew John had a twin: the temporary restraining order application said so and his next door neighbor pointed that fact out to the officers.

Id. at 915 (emphasis in original). Yet, the reasonableness of the arresting officers was not at issue on appeal; the jury had fully exonerated the individual arresting officers. Id. at 916. In fact, the Ninth Circuit declined entirely to address John's Fourth Amendment claim against the city. Id. at 917. Instead, it concluded there was sufficient evidence, in light of the twelve-day detention, for a reasonable jury to conclude that John suffered a constitutional deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

Although the cases cited by the parties are not on point, they provide a welcome context with respect to the reasonableness of defendant Norrie's mistaken identification and arrest of plaintiff Defendant Norrie set off to serve papers on Frank Milkowski, a/k/a Peter Milkowski. The service order cautioned: "HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTING [law enforcement]" . . . "SEE WARRANT ALL ATTACHED." Defendant Norrie ascertained the existence of two outstanding arrest warrants for Peter Milkowski, a/k/a Frank Milkowski. Plaintiff identified himself as Frank Milkowski and matched the general physical description of the subject of the arrest warrants, except eye color. This provided a reasonable basis for his arrest. When plaintiff protested, defendant Norrie acted reasonably by allowing plaintiff to produce documents to distinguish his identity from Peter Milkowski. Defendant Norrie then confirmed the data provided by plaintiff with dispatch. Because defendant Norrie knew the subject of the arrest warrants was known to identify himself as Frank Milkowski, the mere fact that plaintiff possessed valid documents identifying him as Frank Milkowski could not alleviate the confusion.

The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the undisputed underlying facts of this case demonstrate that defendant Norrie's mistaken identification and arrest of plaintiff were reasonable. Accordingly, defendant Norrie is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accepting plaintiff's challenged assertions as true does not change the undisputed underlying facts. Peter Milkowski had fraudulently adopted plaintiff's identity in the past, which led law enforcement records to indicate that Peter and Frank Milkowski were different names for the same individual, or that each used the other's name as an alias. Defendant Norrie reasonably believed, based on the service order warning, that plaintiff had a history of obstructing law enforcement and using an alias.⁴ With this information, it was not unreasonable for defendant Norrie to question plaintiff's protestations and transport him to the jail where the mistake was quickly identified. Plaintiff correctly notes that defendant Norrie could have done more to ascertain the precise subject of the arrest warrants. However, plaintiff misstates the test for qualified immunity. Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the reasonableness of his arrest. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant Norrie's motion for summary judgment.

4 The fact that plaintiff possessed apparently valid identification for Frank Milkowski did not make defendant Norrie's actions unreasonable because the subject of the arrest warrants was known to use the alias Frank Milkowski.

IV. DEFENDANT ISLAND COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Island County also moves for summary judgment on all claims. Although a municipality is not subject to vicarious liability for its employees' unconstitutional or tortious acts, a municipality may be liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a plaintiff demonstrates 1) a violation of his constitutional rights; 2) the existence of a policy, practice, or custom that led to the constitutional violation; and 3) a causal relationship between the municipal policy and the violation.Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). Such a policy, practice, or custom may be one of action or inaction. See Fairley, 281 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff's claims against defendant Island County fail as a matter of law. First, plaintiff fails to demonstrate any violation of his constitutional rights. As discussed in detail above, defendant Norrie's mistaken identification and arrest of plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances. Although plaintiff compares this case to Fairley, the Ninth Circuit affirmed civil liability there on the basis that the plaintiff was jailed for twelve days. Here, plaintiff was under arrest for two hours. Second, defendant Island County's policies and practices for serving arrest warrants were appropriate and did not cause any such constitutional violation.⁵ Plaintiff argues that defendant Island County had a policy of inaction⁶ analogous to that in Fairley. Yet there, the plaintiff was detained for twelve days without any fingerprint identification or a Department of Motor Vehicles check, either of which would have verified plaintiff's protestations of mistaken identity. 281 F.3d at 915. The Ninth Circuit found:

5 Contrary to plaintiff's conclusory assertion, defendant Island County did not have a policy of inaction. Per the plain terms of its Sheriff's Office policies, before approaching plaintiff's residence, defendant Norrie telephoned dispatch to verify the existence of outstanding arrest warrants and the physical description of the subject of those warrants. He informed Frank Milkowski that he had warrants for his arrest. When plaintiff protested, defendant Norrie permitted plaintiff to produce documents in an effort to clarify confusion surrounding the warrants and fraudulently adopted identity. Defendant Norrie again contacted dispatch to confirm the information provided by plaintiff.

6 Accepting plaintiff's challenged assertions as true, the fact that persons within the Sheriff's Office knew of the brothers Milkowski mistaken-identity problems fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether defendant Island County had a policy, practice, or custom that caused any constitutional violation.

John had a liberty interest in being free from a twelve-day incarceration without any procedural safeguards in place to verify if the warrant he was detained on was his and in the face of his repeated protests of innocence. In light of the importance of John's liberty interest, the significant risk of deprivation of that interest through the City's warrant procedures, and the minimum burden to the City of instituting readily available procedures for decreasing the risk of erroneous detention, the procedures afforded by the City to John fail to provide him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 918. In sharp contrast to Fairley, the fact that defendant Island County corrected the mistaken arrest soon after plaintiff's arrival at the jail, where booking photos of Peter Milkowski could be compared to plaintiff, conclusively demonstrates that it did have "readily available procedures" in place to decrease the risk of erroneous arrest and detention.

Plaintiff argues that because the Sheriff's Office informed defendant Norrie that Peter Milkowski was also known as Frank Milkowski and that Frank Milkowski was also known as Peter Milkowski, defendant Island County is liable for "shoddy warrant serving procedures." Plaintiff's argument is without merit. As plaintiff's testimony confirms, his brother had, in fact, fraudulently adopted his identity in the past, which led to confusion within law enforcement agencies. There is nothing shoddy about informing law enforcement officers as to aliases. Plaintiff further argues that "[i]t would have been simple, and made good sense, to attach photos which the department had of each person to the Service Order and/or warrant; Frank and Peter Milkowski do not closely resemble each other facially." While plaintiff's assertion may be true, this Court's function is not to legislate law enforcement procedures. The simple fact that a "better" procedure might exist does not satisfy plaintiff's burden with respect to a policy, practice, or custom. Moreover, the procedure suggested by plaintiff here is not similar to the "readily available procedures" discussed in Fairley. The Court GRANTS defendant Island County's motion for summary judgment.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, plaintiff's two-hour arrest was unfortunate, but it was not a violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment and DENIES as moot defendants' motion to strike materials submitted by plaintiff. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED.