Opinion
No. CV 96 0053832
February 11, 1997
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Milford Crane Machine Co., appeals the Milford Board of Assessment's decision which effectively affirmed the 1995 tax assessment of two pieces of the plaintiff's real property. The tax assessor determined that on October 1, 1991, the appraised fair market value of the first property, commonly known as 143 Buckingham Avenue, was $1,158,700 ($475,800 for the land, $678,900 for the buildings, and $4,000 for additional improvements). The assessed value for tax purposes was therefore determined to be $811,090 ($333,060 for the land, $475,230 for the buildings, and $2,800 for additional improvements). The tax assessor determined that on October 1, 1991, the appraised fair market value of the second property, a vacant lot located across the street from the first property, was $71,100. The assessed value for tax purposes was therefore determined to be $49,770. The plaintiff claims that the Milford tax assessor overvalued his properties for the 1995 assessment year, and thus, overassessed it for tax purposes.
General Statutes § 12-62a(b) provides: "Each such municipality shall, no later than the close of its next revaluation required under the provisions of section 12-62, assess all property for purposes of the local property tax at a uniform rate of seventy per cent of present true and actual value, as determined under section 12-63." In relevant part, § 12-63 provides that "[t]he present true and actual value of all other property shall be deemed by all assessors and boards of tax review to be the fair market value thereof and not its value at a forced or auction sale."
I.
The plaintiff appeals the Board of Assessment's decision pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a. "In an appeal from a board of tax review pursuant to § 12-117a, the function of the trial court is to determine the true and actual value of the plaintiff's property." (Bracketts omitted; internal quotation mark omitted.) Beacon Hill Condominium Assoc. v. Beacon Falls, 41 Conn. App. 249, 253, 675 A.2d 909 (1996). The court's function is consistent with the goal of property valuation, which "is to determine the `present, true and actual value' of the subject property." First Bethel Associates v. Bethel, 231 Conn. 731, 738, 651 A.2d 1279 (1995) quoting General Statutes § 12-62.
As amended by Public Acts 1996, No. 96-261, § 1, General Statutes § 12-117a provides, in relevant part: "Any person, including any lessee of real-property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, October 1, 1991, October 1, 1992, October 1, 1993, October 1, 1994 or October 1, 1995, and with respect to the assessment list for assessment years thereafter, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated. . . The court shall have power to grant such relief as to justice and equity appertains, upon such terms and in such manner and form as appear equitable, and, if the application appears to have been made without probable cause, may tax double or triple costs, as the case appears to demand; and, upon all such applications, costs may be taxed at the discretion of the court. If the assessment made by the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, is reduced by said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court, or, at the applicant's option, shall be granted a tax credit for such overpayment, interest and any costs awarded by the court. Upon motion, said court shall, in event of such overpayment, enter judgment in favor of such applicant and against such city or town for the whole amount of such overpayment, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court. The amount to which the assessment is so reduced shall be the assessed value of such property on the grand lists for succeeding years until the tax assessor finds that the value of the applicant's property has increased or decreased.
See supra, footnote 1.
"A trial court hears a § 12-117a tax appeal case de novo; Carol Management Corp. v. Board of Tax Review, 228 Conn. 23, 25 n. 1, 633 A.2d 1368 (1993); with the burden of proof on the taxpayer who claims aggrievement to prove that the assessor's valuation is not the true and actual value of the property." Ireland v. Town of Wethersfield, 41 Conn. App. 421, 426, 676 A.2d 422 (1996). In an appeal under § 12-117a, the valuation of property for assessment purposes is thus a question of fact for the court as the trier. Reynaud v. Winchester, 35 Conn. App. 269, 274, 644 A.2d 976 (1994). While the court recognizes that "[t]he process of valuation at best is a matter of approximation"; First Bethel Associates v. Bethel, supra, 231 Conn. 739; the court must nevertheless fulfill its charge and "arrive at [its] own conclusions as to the value of [property] by weighing the opinion of the appraisers, the claims of the parties in light of all the circumstances in evidence bearing on value, and [the court's] own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value including [its] own view of the property." O'Brien v. Bd. of Tax Review, 169 Conn. 129, 136, 362 A.2d 914 (1975); Reynaud v. Winchester, supra, 35 Conn. App. 274.
II.
The plaintiff's properties are within the territorial limits of Milford, Connecticut. The first property consists of 3.17 acres; the second property approximately one third of an acre. As far as the second property is concerned, only the plaintiff submitted an appraisal. The defendant submitted the tax assessor's card for the second property; see Defendant Exh. B; however, independently, it has no evidentiary value in assisting this court determine the present, true and actual value of the second property. While the assessor's card informs the court that the assessor determined the value of the second property by multiplying the second property's square footage by $4.41 per square foot, the assessor's card fails to provide the court with market conditions and appraisal assumptions that support the application of $4.41 per square foot to the second property. Therefore, in light of the plaintiff's unrebutted appraisal report of the second property, which contained market conditions and appraisal assumptions, the court finds that the present, true and actual value of the second property as of October 1, 1991, was $48,500.
As concerns the first property, both appraisers concluded that the property was overvalued. The plaintiff's appraiser determined that on October 1, 1991, the present, true and actual value of the first property was $515,000. The defendant's appraiser concluded that the value as of October 1, 1991, was $800,000. In reaching their respective conclusion, both appraisers used the sales comparison approach and the income approach. Both appraisers agree that the cost approach is not a reliable indicator of value in this case. The court has no reason to disagree.
In reaching its own conclusion, however, the court relies upon the sales comparison approach. There are several reasons why the court relies upon the sales comparison approach: First, the income approach produces different valuations depending upon the holding period utilized. The vast difference among the valuations causes the court concern over its reliability. Second, the plaintiff's appraiser testified that more weight should be placed "upon the sales comparison approach because of the nature of the property, thinking that it would most likely be purchased by a single user rather than rented as an income producing property." The court agrees with this opinion. Finally, there is considerable harmony in the price per square foot generated by the two appraisers in their sales comparison approach. Therefore, the court will rely upon the sales approach analysis provided by the two appraisals.
The plaintiff's appraiser determined that the price per square foot was $19. The defendant's appraiser concluded that the price per square foot was $23. The court finds the defendant's price per square foot is more reliable as an accurate price per square foot of the subject property because the defendant's appraiser used the comparable properties that were closer in vicinity to the subject property and the date of the comparable sales were closer in time to the valuation date of October 1, 1991. These factors eliminate as much appraiser subjectivity as possible, and lead the court to conclude that the true price per square foot of the subject property is $23.
The final question is what is the square footage of the subject property. At issue is whether to include the 8,000 square feet of what is described in the plaintiff's appraisal as Building 2. Testimonial evidence suggests that Building 2 has no utility. The building is rundown and the plaintiff's appraiser reported that the best course of action would be to demolish the building. The court's inspection of the property confirms the testimony that Building 2 is in a rundown state. Building 2, however, remains on the property, and thus, offers the possibility of use as storage space to the owner or person occupying the land. The appropriate method to adjust the valuation of the property in light of the condition of Building 2 is with a downward adjustment to the price per square foot generated by the comparable sales. Implicitly, the Legislature agrees. General Statutes § 12-64s. Indeed, in this case, the defendant's appraiser testified that the condition of Building 2 was taken into consideration in arriving at his price per square foot for the subject property. The court credits this testimony. Thus, the court finds that the value of the first property is $800,000.
III.
In conclusion, the court finds that the value of the first property is $800,000. The court finds that the value of the second property is $48,500. The defendant is therefore ordered to change the assessment list in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED
Philip E. Mancini, Jr. Judge Referee