Opinion
1:21 CV 431
04-21-2021
DAJUAN MIDGETT, Plaintiff, v. NICOLE GEARHART, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
DAN AARON POLSTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Background
Pro se Plaintiff Dajuan Midgett, an Ohio prisoner, filed this in forma pauperis action on February 24, 2021. (Doc. No. 1.) His Complaint does not set forth clear allegations or legal claims, but it appears the Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the indictment and the legality his conviction in a criminal case in Richland County which has resulted in his incarceration. He was found guilty in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on charges of trafficking in fentanyl and trafficking in fentanyl and heroin within the vicinity of a school. Ohio v. Midgett, 2019 CR 0520 (Richland Cty. Ct. of Comm. Pls.) The caption of his Complaint names Nicole Gearhart, Wayne Liggett, Edward Corely, Shawn Boone, Steve Billing, and Richland County Common Pleas Judge Brent N. Robinson as Defendants, who all appear to have been involved in some way in his criminal case, but the Complaint does not not specifically identify any of the Defendants or set forth any specific allegations of misconduct or legal claims against them.
Rather, the Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth only general legal assertions and complaints relating to his state criminal proceeding. For example, he generally asserts that he is “crime victim” whose rights have been violated under the Crime Victim Rights Act, and he contends the Defendants have otherwise committed “multiple federal crimes, ” fraud, and “multiple constitutional violations” in connection with the state indictment and criminal proceedings against him. (Doc. No. 1 at 13-14.)
The only discernible specific relief the Plaintiff seeks is release from his imprisonment. He states that he insists the federal court save him from the “unlawful restraint of [his] liberty which the State of Ohio, Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Richland County, and Belmont Correctional Institution, all are benefitting from . . . . ” (Id. at 12.)
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), federal district courts are expressly required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis actions filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such action that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).
Discussion
Upon review, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Complaint must be summarily dismissed in accordance with § 1915(e)(2)(B).
First, where a person in state custody challenges the validity of a criminal conviction and the relief he seeks is his immediate release or a speedier release from imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-500 (1973). A federal civil rights action is not a valid way for a prisoner to challenge the legality of his confinement following a state criminal conviction, as the Plaintiff appears to do here. Accordingly, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks release from custody or to be exonerated from his state criminal convictions, the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cognizable federal claim. Only by petitioning a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus may the Plaintiff seek relief from his state convictions. See id.
Further, even to the extent the Plaintiff may be seeking relief other than release from his imprisonment, his Complaint fails to allege a plausible federal claim upon which he may be granted relief. In order to survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under §1915(e)(2)(B)). The “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And they must be sufficient to give the defendants “fair notice of what [the plaintiff's] claims are and the grounds upon which they rest.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Although courts are generally required to construe pro se complaints liberally, “[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf, ” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6 Cir. 2004), or to “guess at the nature” of the claims asserted. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Cir. 1996) (court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief). Where, as here, defendants are merely named in the caption of a complaint without specific allegations of wrongful conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 Fed.Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir.2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights).
The allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint are so general, unclear, and conclusory that they fail to meet the basic pleading requirements necessary state any plausible federal claim - whether for fraud, constitutional violations, or under Crime Victim Rights Act - against any Defendant in the case. See Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6
Furthermore, in Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner is precluded from raising claims in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment on the merits of those claims would affect the validity of his conviction or sentence, unless and until the prisoner shows that his “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”).
The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants in this case - whatever they are - necessarily affect the validity of his Richland County convictions. Therefore, to the extent he purports to assert claims under § 1983, they are barred by Heck because he has made no showing or allegation that his convictions have been called into question or invalidated in any of the ways articulated in Heck.
Finally, most of the Defendants are immune from suit or cannot be sued for federal rights violations under § 1983. In particular, judges and defense lawyers are immune from suit or cannot be sued for rights violations allegedly occurring during the performance of their official duties in criminal cases. See Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1440 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing judicial immunity); Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (a lawyer does not act under color of law when performing traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding).
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state any plausible claim upon which he may be granted relief and is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.