Summary
finding that defendant was parole-ineligible and remanding for resentencing
Summary of this case from Yarbrough v. CommonwealthOpinion
50045 Record Nos. 931646 and 931647
Decided April 21, 1995
Present: All the Justices
Since "future dangerousness" was an issue in the sentencing phase of a capital murder prosecution, the jury was entitled to be informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole, and this proceeding is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
Criminal Law — Capital Murder — Sentencing Phase — Future Dangerousness Predicate — Parole Ineligibility
This appeal from a conviction for capital murder in which the death sentence was imposed was remanded by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of that Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994).
1. The United States Supreme Court has held that when "future dangerousness" is at issue in the sentencing phase of a capital murder case, the jury is entitled to be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility.
2. Since "future dangerousness" was an issue in the sentencing phase of the defendant's capital murder trial, the jury was entitled to be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility, and the case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
Remanded for sentencing hearing.
Bryan L. Saunders (Warren F. Keeling, on briefs), for appellant.
John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Walter Mickens, Jr., was convicted of the capital murder of Timothy Jason Hall, i.e., the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Hall in the commission of, or subsequent to, attempted forcible sodomy, in violation of Code Sec. 18.2-31(5). In the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury fixed Mickens' punishment at death, based upon findings beyond a reasonable doubt of both the "vileness" and the "future dangerousness" predicates. Code Sec. 19.2-264.2. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Mickens in accordance with the jury's verdict. We affirmed the trial court's judgment and the death sentence. Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 442 S.E.2d 678 (1994).
Mickens petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and, on October 11, 1994, in a summary disposition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to this Court "for further consideration in light of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994)." Mickens v. Virginia, 513 U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 307 (1994). By order entered December 1, 1994, we placed this case on our March 1995 docket with directions for briefing and argument.
In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that, when "future dangerousness" is at issue in the sentencing phase of a capital murder case, the jury is entitled to be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2189. Code Sec. 53.1-151(B1) prescribes the test for determining whether a defendant is ineligible for parole:
Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or (iii) robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon, or any combination of the offenses specified in subdivisions (i), (ii) or (iii) when such offenses were not part of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.
In a pretrial motion, Mickens contended that Virginia's rule barring evidence about a defendant's parole eligibility "prevents the jury from giving full consideration to all mitigating factors." Mickens represented to the trial court that he would not have been eligible for parole if he were convicted of capital murder, and he claimed that the rule violated his federal and state constitutional rights. The trial court rejected this contention, and we affirmed that ruling. Mickens, 247 Va. at 404-05, 442 S.E.2d at 685. At the time of Mickens' pretrial motion, Simmons had not been decided.
Mickens claims that he is ineligible for parole because, in addition to his capital murder convictin, he was convicted on June 3, 1974, of robbery by the presenting of a deadly weapon (a knife) and on February 4, 1980, of another robbery by the presenting of a deadly weapon (a knife).
Mickens asserts that the trial court's ruling prevented him from presenting his parole ineligibility to the jury, thereby depriving the jury from considering "a truly mitigating factor." He contends that the holding in Simmons invalidates his death sentence and requires that we either impose a life sentence or remand the case for resentencing.
We conclude that the holding in Simmons requires a remand of the case for resentencing. "Future dangerousness" was an issue in the sentencing phase of the capital murder trial; therefore, the jury was entitled to be informed of Mickens' parole ineligibility.
Accordingly, we will remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
Remanded for sentencing hearing.