Opinion
Case Number: 01-1930-CIV-MARTINEZ-KLEIN
December 4, 2003
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. No. 82-1), filed on July 7, 2003 . For the reasons set forth more fully below, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. No. 82-1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Procedural History
Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. No. 82-1) on July 7, 2003. In its motion, the United States moves for judgment on Counts VIII, IX, and X of the Complaint (D.E. No. 1-1) filed on May 1, 2001, which allege claims pursuant to state and local law. The United States argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear these counts because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to suit under the state and local laws at issue The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication. The Court heard Oral Argument on this and other pending motions on October 28, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. See Order Granting Hearing on Various Pending Motions, (D.E. No. 149-1) dated October 17, 2003. The Court, having carefully considered the case file and being otherwise duly advised, finds judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the reasons stated more fully herein.
II. Legal Standard
Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper when there are no material facts in dispute, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Onega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). In rendering judgment on the pleadings, the Court should consider the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts. Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d at 1370. In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept the facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Id.; Onega v. Christian, 85 F.3d at 1524. The Court may not enter judgment on the pleadings "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d at 1370 (citations omitted).
In its motion, the United States argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Counts VIII, IX and X because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to suit under the state and local laws at issue Federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (holding that "[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal government and its agencies from suit"); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (holding that "[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . ., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit) Waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992). Waivers of sovereign immunity must be narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1893, 1897(1993).
III. Analysis
A. Relevant Facts
This is a civil environmental action brought by Miami-Dade County against the United States for monetary recovery, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief arising from environmental contamination at and around Miami International Airport (MIA). The County seeks relief pursuant to two federal statutes, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992; certain Florida statutes, and Chapter 24 of the Miami-Dade County Code. See Joint Scheduling Report (D.E. No. 18-1) filed on November 15, 2001, at 1-2. For a more detailed statement of the case, see the parties' Joint Pretrial Stipulation (D.E. No. 155-1) filed on November 14, 2003, at 2-4, incorporated herein by reference.
In its motion, the United States moves for judgment on Counts VIII, IX, and X of the Complaint Count VIII of the Complaint seeks cost recovery, contribution and declaratory relief pursuant to Section 376.313, Florida Statutes, which permits an individual to bring a cause of action for damages and contribution that result from discharge or other condition of pollution. See DE. No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 241-250. Count IX seeks cost recovery, contribution and declaratory relief under Section 406.727, Florida Statutes. Id. at ¶¶ 251-257. Section 406.727, Florida Statutes, is a state law modeled after CERCLA. See Florida Power Light Co. Vs. Allis Chalmers. Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317, n. 3. Count X seeks cost recovery, declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and civil penalties under Chapter 24 of the Miami-Dade County Code. See D. E. No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 258-274. The United States argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear these counts because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to suit under the state and local laws at issue.
B. CERCLA Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 42 U.S.C § 9620(a)(4)
The United States moves to dismiss Counts VIII and IX, brought pursuant to Sections 376.313 and 406.727, Florida Statutes, on the basis that CERCLA's limited waiver of sovereign immunity does not encompass state law claims for sites formerly owned by the United States The provision of CERCLA waiving the United States's sovereign immunity states:
State laws concerning removal and remedial action, including State law regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and remedial action at facilities owed or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States or facilities that are subject to deferral under subsection (H)(3)(C) of this section when such facilities are not included on the National Priorities list. The preceding sentence shall not apply to the extent a State law would apply any standard or requirement to such facilities which is more stringent that the standards and requirements applicable to facilities which are not owned or operated by an such department, agency, or instrumentality.42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (emphasis added).
As a matter of law, the Court agrees that this waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to facilities currently owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States. See Robinson v. United States Cold Storage. Inc., 2002 WL 187511, at *3 (D. Del. 2002); Wilson v. Squirrel, 2000 WL 33154288, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Crowley Marine Serv., Inc. v. Fednav Ltd., 915 F. Supp. 218, 221-22 (E.D. Wash. 1995); Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224, 228-29 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of Army, 801 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Charter Int'l Oil Co. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 104, 107 (D.R. 1. 1996) (dicta). If the facilities in question here, namely M1A, are not presently owned or operated by the United States, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to Counts VIII and IX. Therefore, to the extent that the United States's Motion raises this question of law, which the Court now decides in its favor, the Motion is GRANTED.
Other complaints about CERCLA's poor drafting aside, this much does seem clear from the statutory text See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 Wm. Mary L. Rev 1405 (1997).
However, the Court declines to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII and IX because this is procedurally inappropriate. In support of their respective positions on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, both parties have submitted evidence outside the pleadings, the most significant of which are three 1948 quitclaim deeds that convey title for MIA from the United States to Miami-Dade County. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (D.E. No. 97-1) filed on August 5, 2003, at Ex. G; and Defendant's Reply to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (D.E. No. 99-1) filed on August 11, 2003, at Ex. C and D.
The additional evidence presented by the parties raises the question of what effect the 1948 quitclaim deeds had on the United States's relationship to MIA In light of this, it is inappropriate to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII and IX. The more appropriate procedure is to consider the issue of the 1948 quitclaim deeds as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Fed. R Civ P. 12(c). If after such consideration the Court were to find that the United States does have a current ownership interest in MIA, the County should be permitted to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b); Hams v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 996 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that where issues not raised in the pleadings are tried by the parties, either explicitly or implicitly, these issues should be treated as raised in the pleadings and amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence is permissible).
In this case, the question of the 1948 quitclaim deeds has been fully briefed in Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D. E. No. 127-1) filed on September 12, 2003; Defendant's Response (D.E. No. 127-1) filed on September 12, 2003; and Plaintiff's Reply (D.E. No. 127-1) filed on September 12, 2003. Thus, to the extent that the inquiry turns upon the provisions of the 1948 quitclaim deeds, the issue is best decided in considering the Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which has been fully briefed and will be adjudicated by separate written Order. Therefore, to the extent that the United States moves the Court to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII and IX, the motion is DENIED.
CERCLA imposes liability upon parties based entirely upon their relationship, prior or current, to the contaminated property. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Nationsbank N.A., 183 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999). The question of whether a defendant may be an "owner" under CERCLA depends upon (he application of state law. Id. The Court believes that the issue of whether the 1948 quitclaim deeds create an ownership interest, either current or former, in the United States is a question of law. Thus, although the Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment focuses on the issue of former ownership, the issue of current ownership is necessarily implicated in the Court's decision on former ownership.
C. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, RCRA § 6001(a)
The United States moves to dismiss Counts VIII, IX and X, brought pursuant to Florida law and the Miami-Dade County Code, on the basis that RCRA's limited waiver of sovereign immunity waives sovereign immunity only for sites currently owned or operated by the United States or for activities presently engaged in by the federal government. In relevant part, the RCRA waiver states:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any solid waste management facility or disposal site, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the disposal or management of solid waste or hazardous waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief), respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal and management in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is subject to such requirements, including the payment of reasonable service charges.42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a) (emphasis added).
The Court agrees that the italicized language is in the present and future tense, such that the waiver does not apply to past government activities. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987) (discussing congressional drafting which includes future and present activities as opposed to past activities). Furthermore, to the extent that there is any doubt that the waiver applies to past government activities, the Court must construe the language of the waiver strictly in the favor of the United States. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1987) (citations omitted), Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 201. Therefore, to the extent that the United States's Motion raises this question of law, which the Court now decides in its favor, the Motion is GRANTED.
Thus, the Court does not reach the issue of whether RCRA waives sovereign immunity for state claims for cost recovery or contribution, as set forth in Counts VIII and IX; nor does the Court reach the issues of whether RCRA waives sovereign immunity for private party claims for clean up costs, as set forth in Counts VIII, IX and X.
However, the Court declines to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII, IX and X. First, in its response, the County argues that the United States has jurisdiction over contamination at and emanating from MIA See DR No 97-1, at 4 Ml A has been designated a Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), which is administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 2701. DERP empowers the Corps to remediate FUDS properties, which are statutorily defined as a site that "was under the jurisdiction of the Secretary and owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by the United States at the time of actions leading to contamination by hazardous substances," 10 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)(B) The Court agrees that by statutory definition a FUDS site is no longer owned by the United States. Thus, the United States does not own or operate MIA by virtue of its designation as a FUDS site. However, the Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the designation of MIA as a FUDS site confers control over MIA to the United States that is sufficient to trigger RCRA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Court finds this, in part, because of the dearth of information and argument presented by the parties on this point. At the same time, the Court notes that to the extent the parties have introduced evidence for the Court's consideration the matter goes outside the pleadings Thus, the Court would prefer to have a full and fair hearing on the merits of this issue. Because the parties have not discussed the RCRA waiver and DERP in either of their motions for summary judgment, this issue is reserved for trial and the summary procedures available therein, such as a Rule 52(c) motion for directed verdict
Second, it is procedurally inappropriate to grant judgment on the pleadings in light of the evidence outside the pleadings that both parties have submitted, namely the three 1948 quitclaim deeds that convey title for MIA from the United States to Miami-Dade County. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (D.E. No. 97-1) filed on August 5, 2003, at Ex. G, and Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (D.E. No. 99-1) filed on August 11, 2003.
This additional evidence raises the question of what effect the 1948 quitclaim deeds had on the United States's relationship to MIA. The question of the 1948 quitclaim deeds has been fully briefed in the Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D. E. No. 127-1) filed on September 12, 2003; Defendant's Response (D.E. No. 127-1) filed on September 12, 2003; and Plaintiff's Reply (D.E. No. 127-1) filed on September 12, 2003. Thus, to the extent that the inquiry turns upon the provisions of the 1948 quitclaim deeds, the issue is best decided in considering Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which has been fully briefed and will be adjudicated by separate written Order. Therefore, to the extent that the United States moves the Court to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII, IX and X, the motion is DENIED.
IV. Conclusion
As a matter of law, the Court agrees that the CERCLA waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to facilities currently owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, and that the RCRA waiver does not apply to past government activities. To the extent that the motion raises these questions of law, which the Court decides in the movant's favor, the motion is GRANTED. However, the Court declines to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII, IX and X Both parties have submitted evidence outside the pleadings. This evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the designation of MIA as a FUDS site confers control over MIA to the United States which is sufficient to trigger RCRA's waiver of sovereign immunity. This evidence further raises the question of what effect the 1948 quitclaim deeds had on the United States's relationship to Miami International Airport. Therefore, to the extent that the United States moves the Court to enter judgment on the pleadings as to Counts VIII, IX and X, the motion is DENIED. It is therefore:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. No. 82-1) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as more fully stated herein.
DONE AND ORDERED.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMYAR JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. No. 127-1), filed on September 12, 2003 . For the reasons set forth more fully below, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (D.E. No. 127-1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.I. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 124-1) on August 29, 2003. Plaintiff then filed a Corrected Motion of Partial Summary Judgement (D.E. No. 127-1) on September 12, 2003. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgement (D.E. 124-1)is DENIED as MOOT. The Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgement has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudiction, matter jurisdiction to hear these counts because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to suit under the state and local laws at issue The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication. The Court heard Oral Argument on this and other pending motions on October 28, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. See Order Granting Hearing on Various Pending Motions, (D.E. No. 149-1) dated October 17, 2003. The Court, having carefully considered the case file and being otherwise duly advised, finds partial summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent that the US has conceded it is a "former owner" and bears liability as such under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended 42 U.S.C. $ § 9601-9675. However, partial summary judgment is DENIED as to the remainder of Plaintiff's' Correct Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II. Legal Standard
Under Rule 5b(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" The Supreme Court stated that
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Everett v. Nappcr, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has further stated that "Rule 56(c) therefore requires a nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248; Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). It is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248.
III. Analysis
A. Relevant Facts
This is a civil environmental action brought by Miami-Dade County against the United States for monetary recovery, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief arising from environmental contamination at and around Miami International Airport (MIA). The County seeks relief pursuant to two federal statutes, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992; certain Florida statutes; and Chapter 24 of the Miami-Dade County Code. See Joint Scheduling Report (D. E. No. 18-1) filed on November 15, 2001, at 1-2. For a more detailed statement of the case, see the parties' Joint Pretrial Stipulation (D. E. No. 155-1) filed on November 14, 2003, at 2-4, incorporated herein by reference.
The County has not denied its liability under CERCLA. Thus, under CERCLA the County is not an innocent plaintiff and its CERCLA claim is, as a matter of law, a claim for contribution pursuant to CERCLA § 9613(f) and not a claim for cost recovery based solely upon § 9607(a). See Redwing v. Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir 1996) (holding that CERCLA provides two different mechanisms, contribution and cost recovery, for two different types of Plaintiff's, innocent parties and potentially responsible parties, respectively). The County has moved for partial summary judgment that the United States is a former owner of a facility for purposes of CERCLA liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). Specifically, the County seeks to establish that the United States is a former owner of: U.S. Air Force aircraft; a "wash rack" at the U.S. Air Force Landing Apron No. 7; and the Miami International Air Depot (MIAD). The County does not move for summary judgment as to the amount of US liability.
See Plaintiff's Reply to Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D. E. No. 142-1) filed on October 6, 2003, at 11.
CERCLA imposes liability upon parties based entirely upon their relationship, prior or current, to the contaminated property. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Nationsbank N.A., 183 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir 1999). There is no causation requirement. Id. See Reichold Chemicals, Inc. vs. Textron. Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that a CERCLA "plaintiff is not required to link [a] defendant's conduct or defendant's waste firmly to release or threat of release"); Redwing v. Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d at 1513 (holding that a CERCLA plaintiff does not have to establish that a defendant acted with specific intent to dispose hazardous substances); Blasland, Bouck Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1303-1305 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that there are no equitable defenses under CERCLA § 9607(a)). Although § 9607(b) enumerates affirmative defenses to CERCLA strict liability status, none of these defenses is applicable here.
To establish a prima facie case under CERCLA, a plaintiff must show:
1. The site was a CERCLA facility;
2. There was a release or threatened release of hazardous substance,
3. As a result of this release or threatened release, the Plaintiff incurred response costs; and
4. The defendant is a "covered person" under $9607(a) of CERCLA.Redwing v. Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d at 1496-97; Blasland. Bouck Lee. Inc. v. City of North Miami, 283 F.3d at 1302; Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Nationsbank N. A., 183 F.3da t 1273.
There is no dispute that this case concerns CERCLA facilities. There is no dispute that there was a release or threatened release of hazardous substances There is no dispute that Plaintiff has incurred response costs. However, there is dispute regarding whether the United States is a "covered person" under § 9607(a) of CERCLA.
The parties do not dispute that MIA, or portions thereof, are CERCLA facilities. However, the County, as part of it theory of recovery, also seeks to hold the United States liable under CERCLA for its ownership of aircraft and engines as CERCLA "facilities." See Complaint, D.E. No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 208-213. It has not been determined whether aircraft and engines are relevant CERCLA facilities.
However, several key factors, such as the type and amount of hazardous substances that may have been released, are in dispute. Because the County's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks judgment as to the United States's liability, but not as to the amount of such liability, the Court will not address any allocation factors. These are triable issues of fact.
There is, however, dispute as to the applicable legal standard for contribution claims pursuant to CERCLA § 9613(f)(1). See Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 127-1), at 6-7; and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment, DE. No. 130-1, at n. 2. Regardless of the applicable legal standard, there are also triable issues of fact, including but not limited to, disputed questions of science and the necessity of past remedial actions. Because the Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks judgment as to the United States's liability for contribution, but not the amount of contribution, the Court will not address the applicable legal standard for contribution claims.
To establish liability under CERCLA, for either a cost recovery action or a contribution action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant falls under one of four classes of covered persons as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). One such category of covered person is a former owner. The issue for which the County seeks summary judgment is whether the United States is a former owner of facilities at and around MIA. If the United States is a former owner, then it bears CERCLA liability and may be forced to contribute to the costs for clean up of hazardous waste contamination. U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1998).
Section 9607(a)(2) states that "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of" is a covered person and, thus, liable
B. The United States's Concession of Former Ownership
In its Response to Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 130-1), the United States concedes that
it was a `former owner' for CERCLA purposes with respect to portions of Miami International Airport ("MIA") that it owned from 1943 to 1948 and with respect to approximately 144 acres of MIA that the United States leased for Air Force use from 1948 to 1966.
To the extent that the United States has conceded that it is a former owner, or "covered person" under CERCLA § 9607(a), it bears strict CERCLA liability and may be forced to contribute to the costs for clean up of hazardous waste contamination. With respect to the portions of MIA that the United States admits it was a former owner, the inquiry at trial will be Plaintiff's demand for equitable allocation of clean up costs pursuant to § 9613(f)(1). Therefore, to the extent that the United States concedes it is a former owner of portions of MIA, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
C. The County's Argument Regarding the Wash Rack and Aircraft
In its Response, the United States concedes that it was a `former owner' for CERCLA purposes with respect to portions of MIA that it owned from 1943 to 1948 and with respect to portions that the United States leased for Air Force use from 1948 to 1966. The United States does not concede ownership of the wash rack and aircraft for purposes of CERCLA liability. Nevertheless, the County interprets the United State's concession to include ownership of the wash rack and aircraft for purposes of CERCLA liability. See D. E. No. 142-1, at 3, However, the Court does not find that the concession made by the United States in its Response encompasses ownership of aircraft and the wash rack as CERCLA facilities under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A). Therefore, to the extent that the County's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks to establish that the United States is a former owner of aircraft and the wash rack for purposes of CERCLA liability, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
The concession made by the United States is not detailed. Thus, by separate written Order, entered on November 26, 2003, the Court has requested a brief statement of clarification from the United States.
The Court makes this distinction because the County, as part of it theory of recovery, seeks to hold the United States liable under CERCLA for its ownership of aircraft and engines as CERCLA "facilities." See Complaint, D. E. No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 208-213. Moving forward, the Court wants to be clear that the issue of whether aircraft and engines are relevant CERCLA facilities for purposes of imposing CERCLA liability, other than the time periods for which the United States is conceding ownership of MIA, remains a genuine issue of material fact.
D. Ownership Based Upon the 1948 Deeds
The County argues that the United States is a former owner of Ml AD because the 1948 deeds which conveyed title to Ml A from the United States to the County also conveyed beneficial ownership to the United States, At issue are the three following deed provisions:
1. A "national emergency provision" which gave the United States the right to the nonexclusive or exclusive use and possession of the airport during times of national emergency, as declared by the President or Congress. See Exhibits to the United States Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D. E. No. 114-1) filed on August 29, 2003, at Ex. 12, Book, 2970, pp. 301-02; Book 2987, pp. 275-76; Book 2997, pp. 485-86.
2. A "nonexclusive landing provision" which gave employees or agents of the United States the right to "nonexclusive use of the landing area of the airport" under certain circumstances. Id.
3. An "airport use provision" which restricted the use, lease, sale or disposal fo the land to airport purposes unless consent to do otherwise was obtained from the Civil Aeronautics Administrator. Id.
The question of whether a defendant may be an "owner" under CERCLA depends upon the application of state law. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Nationsbank N.A., 183 F.3d at 1275; Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland apartments, Ltd., 94 F.3d at 1498. Thus, the Court must consider these three provisions of the 1948 deeds in the context of Florida law.
As for the national emergency provision, the Court finds that this constitutes an easement or license to the United States, which does not convey title to the United States or rise to the level of ownership under Florida law. See Dean v. Mod Properties, Ltd., 528 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (explaining that "Ownership of land, or an ownership interest in land, constitutes an `estate' as distinguished from an easement, which is the right in one other than the owner of the land to use land for some particular purpose or purposes. An easement, or right to use land not owned, is more in the nature of a claim or encumbrance against the title to the land than it is in the nature of title to, or an estate in, the land"). See also, 20 Fla. Jur. Easements and Licenses in Real Property, § 1 (2d. Ed. 2003) (stating that an easement is an interest in land and does not convey title to land or an estate in the land); 20 Fla. Jur Easements and Licenses in Real Property, § 2 (2d Ed 2003) (stating that a license is a "mere permit" and does not involve an interest in land).
As for the nonexclusive landing provision, the Court finds that this also constitutes an easement or license, which does not convey title to the United States or rise to the level of ownership under Florida law. Id
As for the airport use provision, the Court finds that this provision is a restrictive covenant, which does not convey title to the United States or rise to the level of ownership under Florida law. See City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439, 446 (Fla. 1978) (holding that a grant of land from the State to the city for "municipal purposes only" was not a reservation or exception, but rather a restriction on the use of the property). See also, l Fla. Jur Building, Zoning and Land Controls § 66 (2d. Ed. 2003) (stating that a restriction resulting from a restrictive covenant is a "creature of equity arising out of contract") (citations omitted).
Therefore, under Florida law, the United States is not a former owner of Ml AD by virtue of the 1948 deeds that conveyed title for MIA from the United States to the County. Accordingly, to the extent that the County argues that the United States is a former owner of MIAD because of the 1948 deeds, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, to the extent that the United States concedes it is a former owner of portions of Miami International Airport, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary judgment is GRANTED. However, the United States had not conceded ownership of the wash rack and aircraft for purposes of CERCLA liability, and to the extent that the County's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks to establish CERCLA liability based on ownership of the aircraft and wash rack, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. In addition, to the extent that the County argues that the United States is a former owner of MIAD because of the 1948 deeds, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DHNIHD It is therefore: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
1. Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 127-1) is GRANTCD in part and DENIED in part as stated more fully herein.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 124-1) is DENIED as MOOT
DONE AND ORDERED
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 109-1) filed on August 29. 2003 . For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary judgment is DENIED.I. Procedural History
Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 109-1) on August 29, 2003. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for adjudication. The Court heard Oral Argument (D.E. No. 149-1) on this and other pending motions on October 28, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. See Order Granting Hearing on Various Pending Motions, (D.E. No. 149-1) dated October 17, 2003. The Court, having carefully considered the case file and being otherwise duly advised finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude entering the partial summary judgment requested by Defendant. For the reasons more fully described herein, Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary judgment (D.E. No. 109-1) is DENIED.
II. Legal Standard
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Supreme Court stated that
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), Everett v. Nappcr, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987) The Supreme Court has further stated that "Rule 56(c) therefore requires a nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248; Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). It is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. at 248.
III. Analysis
A. Relevant Facts
This is a civil environmental action brought by Miami-Dade County against the United States for monetary recovery, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief arising from environmental contamination at and around Miami International Airport (MIA). The County seeks relief pursuant to two federal statutes, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992; certain Florida statutes; and Chapter 24 of the Miami-Dade County Code. See Joint Scheduling Report (D. E. No. 18-1) filed on November 15, 2001, at 1-2. For a more detailed statement of the case, see the parties1 Joint Pretrial Stipulation (D.E. No. 155-1) filed on November 14, 2003, at 2-4, incorporated herein by reference.
B. The United States's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The United States moves for summary judgment on most of the liability claims made by the County pursuant to CERCLA and RCRA. First, the United States moves for summary judgment on Count I (CERCLA) to the extent that the count alleges that the United States released chlorinated solvent hazardous substances during the 1948 to 1961 period that the Air Force leased portions of MIA from the County. Second, the United States moves for summary judgment of Counts ll, HI and IV to the extent they allege arrangements for disposal of chlorinated solvent hazardous substances during and after World War II; federal operation of certain companies during and shortly after World War ll; and federal operation of Aerodex and other companies in the 1950s through 1970s. Third, the United States moves for summary judgment in its entirety on Count V, which alleges a joint venture contract between Aerodex and the Air Force. Fourth, the United States moves for summary judgment in its entirety on Count VI, which alleges a RCRA citizen's suit. Last, the United States seeks summary judgment that the County's past response actions within the westside of MIA and the County's proposed future response actions within the west side of MIA are not "necessary" within the meaning of CERCLA because of the Lower Miami Springs Well Field groundwater treatment remedy implemented by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1993.
The Court has reviewed the pleadings submitted by the parties, including Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D. E. No. 109-1), Plaintiff's Response (D.E. No. 139-1) filed on October 1, 2003, and Defendant's Reply (D.E. No. 147-1) filed on October 16, 2003. In considering Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court has paid particular attention to the United States's Statement of Material Facts (D.E. No. 110-1) filed on August 29, 2003; Deposition Excerpts (D.E. No. 112-1) filed on August 29, 2003; and Exhibits (D.E. No. 113-120) filed on August 29, 2003. The Court has also paid particular attention to the County's Objections to the Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (D.E. No 140-1) filed on October 1, 2003, and the exhibits included therein. After reviewing the documents and the voluminous evidence submitted by the parties for the Court's consideration, it is apparent that several genuine issues of material fact preclude granting the partial summary judgment requested by the United States.
The County has introduced evidence which indicates that the activities and operations of the United States at M1A on the area it leased back from the County included disposal of hazardous substances. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (D.E. No. 140-1) filed on October 1, 2003, at No. 63-64, including the exhibits cited therein. As a result of this evidence, there arc genuine issues of material fact which preclude granting the partial summary judgment sought by the United States with respect to Count 1.
The County has also introduced evidence which supports the claims made in Counts H, III, IV and V. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (D. E. No. 140-1) filed on October 1, 2003, at No. 7-10, 12, 13, 15-23, 26, 29, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40-43, 45-47, 50-62, including the exhibits cited therein. As a result of this evidence, there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude granting the partial summary judgment sought by the United States with respect to Counts H, III, IV and V.
In addition, the County has introduced evidence which supports the claims made in Count VI. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (D. E. No. 140-1) filed on October 1, 2003, at No. 66-82, including the exhibits cited therein. As a result of this evidence, there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude granting the partial summary judgment sought by the United States with respect to Counts VI.
The County has introduced evidence which indicates that its past response actions within the westside of MIA and proposed future response actions within the west side of MIA are "necessary" within the meaning of CERCLA. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (D. E. No. 140-1) filed on October 1, 2003, at No. 66-82, and the exhibits cited therein As a result of this evidence, there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude granting the partial summary judgment sought by the United States.
Furthermore, to the extent that parties agree on issues of material fact, there are divergent inferences and conclusions which may be drawn in light of the disputed issues of material fact Accordingly, summary adjudication is not appropriate at this time, and this action should proceed to a full hearing on the merits of the claims and defenses.
IV. Conclusion
The Defendant has not met the standard for granting summary judgment. Several genuine issues of material fact, not necessarily limited to those discussed herein, preclude granting the partial summary judgment requested by the United States. For the reason stated more fully herein, it is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED thatDefendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 109-1) filed on August 29, 2003 , is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED