Summary
converting motions for summary judgment to trial on the briefs with consent of parties
Summary of this case from Barnett v. D'AmicoOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-2653 SECTION' "C" (4)
January 8, 2002
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court are cross-motions to amend the Court's November 7, 2001, judgment in the above-captioned case. After reviewing the arguments of counsel, the record, and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment is hereby DENIED and Defendants' Motion to Amend Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
Back Ground
Sometime on the evening of September 4, 1999, or morning of September 5, 1999, the HM-120, a standard hopper barge chartered to Plaintiff M/G-T Services, Inc. ("M/G-T"), sank while in Defendant Turn Services, Inc.'s fleet. See M/G-T Servs, Inc. v. Turn Servs., Inc., Civ. Act. No. 00-2653, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18579, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2001). Plaintiffs assert, and Defendants do not dispute, that the barge was a total loss. See id. On August 9, 2001, the parties stipulated that after due proceedings, judgment would be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants in the amount of 575,834 (75 percent of $99,779.75), plus 75 percent of the value of the barge, as determined by the Court. See Rec. Doc. 29. Also on August 9, 2001, the Court noted in a Minute Entry, "the parties have represented to the Court that the only outstanding issue in this litigation concerns [the] value of the barge." Rec. Doc. 30. Accordingly, the Court ordered the parties to submit cross-motions for summary judgment with supporting affidavits and relevant deposition excerpts. See Rec. Doc. 30. Although the order referred to cross-motion for summary judgment, the parties requested that the Court conduct a trial on the briefs to determine the barge's value. See 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18579, at *2. The parties submitted the required information. See Rec. Docs. 33, 34. In addition, Plaintiffs requested prejudgment interest. Rec. Doc. 33, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 13-14. On September 12, 2001, Defendants wrote to the Court to request an informal conference on the prejudgment interest issue with Plaintiffs and the Court. See Letter from Gary A. Hemphill, Terriberry, Carroll Yancey, L.L.P., to Honorable Ginger Berrigan, United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (on file in Chief Judge Berrigan's chambers). Defendants, however, did not formally contest the prejudgment interest request.
On November 6, 2001, the Court determined the value of the barge to be $46,320.76. See 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18579, at *21. Accordingly, on November 7, 2001, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for $74,834.00, as stipulated, without prejudgment interest. See Rec. Doc. 37. The Court also entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for an additional $34,740.57 (75 percent of $46,320.76) with prejudgment interest. See id.
On November 14, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend, contending that the Court should amend its judgment to provide prejudgment interest on the stipulated amount of $74,834. See Rec. Doc. 38. On November 21, 2001, Defendants also filed a Motion to Amend, arguing that the Court should amend its judgment to delete the award of prejudgment interest on the portion of the judgment reflecting the loss of the barge. See Rec. Doc. 39.
Analysis
Plaintiffs have filed their motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), which provides that "[o]n a party's motion filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings — or make additional findings — and may amend the judgment accordingly. The purpose of Rule 52(b) is, generally, to correct manifest errors of law or fact. See Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiffs' motion is based on an asserted error of law. As explained below in its consideration of Defendants' motion, however, the Court was correct not to grant Plaintiff prejudgment interest on the initial stipulated amount of $74,834. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion is denied.
Taking up the other motion at issue, the Court initially notes that Defendants do not specify under which rule they seek relief Nevertheless, as the motion was served ten (10) days after the court's ruling and seeks to amend the judgment, it is apparent that Rule 59(e) governs Defendants' motion. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
Alteration or amendment of a decision under Rule 59(e) is proper upon the movant's showing of: "(1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and/or (3) the need to correct a clear and manifest error of fact or law." Washington v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 309, 311 (E.D. La. 1998), rev'd and vacated on other grounds, 199 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2000). "The district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case" pursuant to a Rule 59(e) motion." See Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 174.
As an initial matter, the Court notes again that Defendants' trial memorandum did not include an objection to Plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest. Nevertheless, as stated above, Defendants did request an informal conference with Plaintiffs and the Court to discuss Plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest. Although the better course may have been for Defendants to formally contest the prejudgment interest request, the Court finds that Defendants constructively raised the issue before the Court and thus are not barred from seeking relief under Rule 59(e) here.
The Court begins its substantive analysis of the prejudgment interest question by noting that the source of the confusion — the Joint Stipulation — was entered pursuant to an agreement by the parties settling all issues except for the value of the barge. As the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties derive from federal law, in this case maritime law, federal law determines the interpretation and construction of the stipulation. Cf. Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying federal law to enforceability of settlement agreement where substantive rights and liabilities of parties derive from federal law); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge, 424 F.2d 684, 691 (5th Cir. 1970) (construction of maritime contracts governed by federal law).
Under federal law, the standard rules of contract interpretation require the Court to employ the plain meaning of the words stated in the instrument. See Roberts it Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc., 648 F.2d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, the parties agreed, in pertinent part, that Defendants would pay Plaintiffs "75% of Plaintiffs' total recoverable damages . . . plus 75% of the value of the barge, as determined by the Court." Rec. Doc. 29 at I. Nowhere is prejudgment interest mentioned.
But even if the Court were persuaded that the plain language of the stipulation was ambiguous as to prejudgment interest and that an examination of extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine the parties' intent as to this issue, the Court would still find that the stipulation did not provide for the potential award of prejudgment interest. In particular, Plaintiffs represented to the Court that the only outstanding issue in the case concerned the value of the barge. See Rec. Doc. 30. This representation necessarily excludes consideration of an award of prejudgment interest.
As a matter of federal law, when the contract as a whole is ambiguous as to the parties intent, the Court must look to extrinsic or parol evidence to determine that intent. See Godchaux v. Conveying Techniques, Inc., 846 F.2d 306, 314 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs, however, point to extrinsic evidence for the proposition that the stipulation did not preclude an award of prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs assert that M/G-T did not waive its right to prejudgment interest in the stipulation; that the stipulation was entered into only to avoid a full trial; and that Defendants' counsel was notified of M/G-T's position on the interest issue both by phone and in its trial brief.
Based on Plaintiffs' representation that the only outstanding issue concerned the value of the barge, the Court rejects the assertion that the above-stated grounds support a reading of the stipulation to include a potential award of prejudgment interest. Moreover, even if Defendants were notified of M/G-T's position on the interest issue, Plaintiffs at no time requested a correction or clarification of the August 9, 2001, Minute Entry. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the agreement prevented it from awarding prejudgment interest.
Plaintiffs cite Consol. Grain Barge Co. v. Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Mo. 1981), for the proposition that even when parties stipulate to damages, the Court may nevertheless award prejudgment interest. In that case, however, although the parties "stipulated the amount of damages" except for the loss of use of the vessels at issue, the court did not specifically address the effect of the stipulation on prejudgment interest. Id. at 848. In the instant case, on the other hand, the plain meaning of the settlement agreement excludes the potential award of prejudgment interest. See Rec. Doc. 29. In addition, as stated above, even if the Court were not persuaded that the plain language of the stipulation precluded an award of prejudgment interest, the parties represented to the Court that the only outstanding issue in the case concerned the value of the barge. See id. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the agreement prevented it from awarding prejudgment interest.
Plaintiffs also cite decisions by this Court for the proposition that because it routinely awards prejudgment interest based on its calculation of total recoverable damages, it should uphold the award here. See Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. ADM Leasco, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-0111, 1992 WL 373544, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 4 1992); In re Diamond B Marine Servs., Inc., No. 99-951, 99-984, 99-1346, 2001 WL 1164914, at *23 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2001). Plaintiffs argue that the mere agreement of the parties as to the amount of damages does not prevent M/GT from recovering prejudgment interest thereon, particularly when a case has proceeded to trial (on the briefs, in this case) and judgment. Although, as in Rhone-Poulenc and Diamond B, a trial was held in the instant case, in the prior cases, the Court was operating under no agreement limiting its scope-of decision. In the instant case, as stated above, the parties curtailed the Court's role to that of determining the value of the barge. Under the stipulation, prejudgment interest was not an issue before the Court. Thus, upon this reexamination, the Court concludes that it erroneously awarded prejudgment interest.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is hereby DENIED, and Defendants' Motion to Amend is hereby GRANTED. As such, the November 7, 2001, Judgment is amended to delete the Court's award of prejudgment interest.