Opinion
No. EP-04-CA-0231-PRM.
August 11, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this day, the Court considered (1) Defendant CSK Auto Inc.'s ("CSK Auto") "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed on March 4, 2005; (2) Plaintiff Salvador Meza's ("Meza") "Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," filed on March 24, 2005; (3) CSK Auto's "Reply Brief," filed on April 5, 2005; (4) CSK Auto's "Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence," filed on April 5, 2005; and (5) Meza's "Response to Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence," filed on April 14, 2005, in the above-captioned cause. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that CSK Auto's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted for the reasons set forth below.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CSK Auto owns and operates retail auto parts stores in nineteen states under the brand names Checker Auto Parts, Schuck's Auto Supply, and Kragen Auto Parts. Saar Aff., at 2, ¶ 4. The stores are divided into nine regions, each headed by a Regional Vice President. Langdon Aff., at 2, ¶ 5. Each region has approximately ten districts, and each district has approximately fifteen stores. Id. Each district is headed by a District Manager who reports to the Regional Vice-President. Id. CSK Auto operates fourteen Checkers Auto Parts stores in the El Paso, Texas and Southern New Mexico area. Saar Aff., at 2, ¶ 4. Those stores are part of District 105 of CSK Auto's Southwest Region. Id.
Salvador Meza was born on December 27, 1951. Meza Dep., at 7-8. He began working for Valley Distributing, predecessor-in-interest to CSK Auto, in 1973. Id. at 8. Meza was initially hired as an assistant-manager trainee and became an assistant manager after two months of employment. Id. at 9. In 1975, he was promoted to Store Manager. Id. In approximately 1980, he was promoted to District Manager. Id. at 10. As District Manager, he supervised multiple stores within the district. Meza Dep., at 42. Meza was responsible for ensuring that company policy was implemented at the local stores. Id. at 43. In El Paso, a District Manager is the highest-ranking local position. Id. at 42-43.
From about 1981 until 1990, Meza managed a district consisting of El Paso and Southern New Mexico. Id. at 11. He was periodically reassigned to assist in turning around underperforming markets. Id. at 11-15. In early 1996 or 1997, Meza was transferred from the position of District Manager to a new position — Special Projects Manager. Id. at 18-19, 21. He was placed in a central Phoenix, Arizona store and was instructed to train a store manager trainee. Meza Dep., at 18-19. Because of the shift in position, Meza believed that he was being pushed aside and set up for termination. Id. at 19. Meza was replaced as District Manager by a younger Caucasian manager, and Meza felt that discrimination motivated CSK Auto's actions. Id. 20-22. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at 19-20. To resolve the complaint, CSK Auto offered Meza a position as Regional Recruiter, which he accepted. Id. at 23-24, 26. About a year later, Meza returned to the position of District Manager. Meza Dep., at 27-29.
Meza returned to El Paso in 1998. Id. at 17. Meza was transferred to El Paso so that he could assume responsibility for an underperforming market in Lubbock, Texas. Id. at 35-36. Thus, Meza assumed responsibility for stores in El Paso and Lubbock, Texas, as well as Carlsbad, Alamogordo, Hobbs, and Ruidoso, New Mexico. Id. at 37.
There is no dispute that Meza generally did a good job for the company. Saar Dep., at 54. He was able to accept coaching and improve his performance. Id. at 59. Meza was only disciplined once during the thirty years he worked for CSK Auto. Meza Dep., at 135, 172; Saar Dep., at 60.
On June 19, 2003, Meza, along with four store managers, traveled to Carlsbad, New Mexico by car to clean the Carlsbad CSK Auto store and prepare it for inventory. Meza Dep., at 46. The store managers in the car with Meza were Eduardo Jayme ("Jayme"), Danny Macias, Rodolfo Garcia, and Roger Martinez. Id. at 47.
On their return from Carlsbad, Meza was driving a company car on United States Highway 62/180, a highway which passes through the Guadalupe Mountains. Meza Dep., at 47. The portion of Highway 62/180 that cuts through the highest point of the Guadalupe Mountains is known as "Guadalupe Pass." Meza Dep., Exs. 6, 7; Plueger Aff., at 2, ¶ 3. Driving westbound over Guadalupe Pass involves traveling on a steep decline with "a lot of dangerous curves." Meza Dep., Ex. 7; Plueger Aff., at 2, ¶ 8.
As Meza began his descent down Guadalupe Pass, he placed the car that he was driving in neutral and left the car in neutral the entire length of the decline. Meza Dep., at 53. Meza did not place the car in gear until he reached the bottom of Guadalupe Pass. Id. at 65. According to Meza, the car reached speeds exceeding 90 miles per hour while descending down Guadalupe Pass. Meza Dep., Ex. 5. Meza took curves at approximately 75 miles per hour. Id. Meza heard one of his passengers comment about the speed in which he was driving, but he responded, "the car can handle it." Id. In short, Meza voluntarily and intentionally drove over 90 miles per hour in neutral down Guadalupe Pass. Meza Dep., at 66. Meza acknowledged that he could have slowed down if he chose to heed the requests of his subordinates, but he did not. Id. There was no accident or injury as a result of the incident. Id.
On June 20, 2003, Jayme told Juan Bustillos, CSK Auto's Asset Protection Manager, ("Bustillos") that Meza was driving at unsafe speeds in neutral down Guadalupe Pass. Factual App. in Supp. of Def. CSK's Mot. for Summ. J., Bustillos Aff. ("Bustillos Aff. A"), at 1, ¶ 4. Jayme also informed Bustillos that he was very concerned for his safety and that he told Meza to slow down, but that Meza thought it was funny and was joking around. Id., at 1, ¶ 5. Bustillos reported the incident to David Schroeder, Regional Manager for Loss Prevention, ("Schroeder") and his immediate supervisors, Ed Plueger, Director of Loss Prevention, ("Plueger") and Greg Ryan, Director of Internal Audits. Id. at 2, ¶ 7. Typically, it would have been Bustillos' responsibility to investigate the incident. Pl.'s Factual App. to his Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B, Bustillos Aff. ("Bustillos Aff. B"), at 1. However, responsibility for this investigation was given to Schroeder. Id.
Bustillos has also filed a charge against CSK Auto alleging race/national origin and age discrimination. Bustillos Aff. B, at 6.
Jayme's comments to Bustillos triggered an investigation into the June 19, 2003 incident. Plueger Aff., at 2, ¶ 7. The investigation involved (1) interviewing and taking statements from the four store managers involved in the incident and (2) interviewing and taking a statement from Meza. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 12-14.
Schroeder interviewed and collected statements from the four store managers in the car with Meza. Schroeder Aff., Ex. 1. The statements generally indicated that the store managers were afraid that they would be involved in a motor vehicle accident and that they had asked Meza to slow down. Id.
On June 24, 2003, Plueger met with Meza to "get his side of the story." Plueger Aff., at 3, ¶ 13. Meza did not deny the core of the allegations made against him. Id. at 3, ¶ 15. He admitted to driving over 90 miles per hour in neutral down Guadalupe Pass. Id. He also admitted that he heard at least one passenger ask him to slow down and admitted that his response was something to the effect of, "the car can handle it." Id. at 3-4, ¶ 15.
It is customary, in situations where allegations are made against a District Manager or other high level employee which may involve discipline, that high level officials with CSK Auto convene to discuss the situation and decide upon disciplinary action. Saar Aff., at 3, ¶ 7. Typically, the severity of the punishment imposed varies depending on the circumstances surrounding the incident. Saar Dep., at 15, 65 (action "depends on how severe the incident or the allegation is and what the findings are").
The allegations against Meza were reviewed by upper management, including Meza's two direct supervisors. Saar Aff., at 2-3, ¶¶ 5-7. The following members of upper management reviewed the allegations against Meza and collectively made the ultimate decision to terminate his employment: John Saar, Divisional Vice-President ("Saar"); Greg Langdon, Regional Vice-President of the Southwest Region ("Langdon"); Lon Novatt, Senior Vice-President; Jim Wigle, General Counsel; Plueger; Sonya Cathey, Senior Human Resources Manager; and Martin Fraser, President and COO. Saar Aff., at 2-3, ¶¶ 6-9; Plueger Aff., at 3, ¶ 10.
The group discussed the severity of Meza's alleged infraction and the very real potential that if his car had lost control, none of the passengers likely would have survived a crash. Saar Aff., at 3, ¶ 9. They also discussed the criminal aspect underlying Meza's conduct, Saar Dep., at 46, and the fact that driving in neutral is dangerous, especially on a steep mountain road, because the braking distance of a car in neutral increases and the driver does not have as much control. Saar Aff., at 3, ¶ 9. The group was also concerned that the store managers in the car had reported that they asked Meza to slow down, but that he instead laughed off their concerns and continued to drive at a high rate of speed while the vehicle was in neutral. Id. at 3, ¶ 10. The group also considered Meza's tenure with CSK Auto. Saar Dep., at 48.
The group ultimately and unanimously concluded that Meza's employment should be terminated. Saar Aff., at 4, ¶ 18; Plueger Aff., at 4, ¶ 20. The group concluded that Meza intentionally drove in the manner alleged on June 19, 2003 and intentionally disregarded the concerns of his passengers, who were also his subordinates. Saar Aff., at 4, ¶ 14. The group also noted that Meza had admitted to driving down Guadalupe Pass at over 90 miles per hour. Saar Dep., at 69. In sum, the group concluded that Meza's conduct violated CSK Auto's Conduct of Associates Policy (1) by disregarding the safety of fellow CSK Auto employees and (2) by failing to operate the car in a safe and lawful manner. Saar Aff., at 4, ¶ 16; Meza Dep., Ex. 2. Meza was terminated on June 24, 2003.
Meza did not believe he had done anything wrong to warrant termination. Meza Dep., at 135. He pointed out that other employees had not been terminated for their respective unsafe driving incidents. Id. at 85. However, Meza does admit that he violated CSK Auto's Conduct of Associates Policy. Id. at 86. Meza also admits to the events that transpired on June 19, 2003. Id. at 66.
At the time of Meza's termination, there were eight District Managers in the Southwestern Region. Id. at 170. Meza had the most seniority of all eight District Managers. Id. at 171-72.
As a result of Meza's termination, CSK Auto promoted Jose "Joe" Leon as a new District Manager. Langdon Aff., at 4, ¶ 15-16. Jose Leon is Hispanic. Id. at 16. He was born on August 8, 1948. Morefield Aff., at 3, ¶ 7. John Amador ("Amador") is the current District Manager for all stores in El Paso. Def.'s Reply Br., at 4. He is a Hispanic Male born on April 25, 1956. Amador Aff., at 3, ¶ 14.
On August 29, 2003, Meza filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Meza Dep., Ex. 9. On June 14, 2004, Meza filed suit against CSK Auto pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ("§ 1981"). In his complaint, Meza alleges that CSK Auto discriminated against him on the basis of race, age, and in retaliation for Meza's prior EEOC activity. In particular, Meza asserts that he was unfairly disciplined in comparison to other CSK Auto employees because he is a Hispanic of advanced age.
In his response to CSK Auto's Motion for Summary Judgment, Meza informed the Court that he would no longer pursue his claim of retaliation. Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at 11.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Although the movant must "`demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' [it] need not negate the elements of the non-movant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence indicates that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
Because the moving party has the burden of proof, evidence is construed in favor of the non-movant, and the non-movant is given the benefit of all favorable inferences. Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). When the moving party has properly supported its summary judgment motion, the non-moving party must come forward with "significant probative evidence" showing that there is an issue regarding material facts. Ferguson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978). If the movant satisfies his initial burden, the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). In other words, "the non-movant must adduce evidence which creates a material fact issue concerning each of the essential elements of its case for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial." Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The court must resolve factual controversies or disputes in the non-movant's favor, but "only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis added). The court should not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
The non-movant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'" identify those facts establishing a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "This burden is not satisfied with `some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by `conclusory allegations,' by `unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a `scintilla' of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal citations omitted). Likewise, "some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis omitted). The non-movant "is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim." Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
B. Title VII, ADEA, TCHRA, and § 1981
Meza alleges violations of rights governed by: (1) Title VII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.; (3) the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.306 (Vernon 1996 Supp. 2004-05); and (4) the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in federal and private employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Similarly, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court analyzes Meza's Title VII and ADEA claims together because "[t]he same evidentiary procedure for allocating burdens of proof applies to discrimination claims under both statutes." Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995); Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 896 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2002) ("This circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas rubric to both Title VII and ADEA claims.").
"Section 633a was designed to provide . . . employees protection from age discrimination in the same way that the portion of Title VII covering federal employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, protects federal employees from other forms of discrimination." Smith v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 778 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1985). Hence, courts use the case law interpreting Title VII as precedent when construing § 633a. See id. (citing Oscar Mayer Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)); see also Bechtel v. OPM, 549 F. Supp. 111, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1982) ("Title VII's explicit pronouncement on the identity of the proper defendant" should apply in actions brought under the ADEA).
The Court need not separately address Meza's TCHRA claim because such claims generally are analyzed under Title VII precedent (for race-discrimination claims) and ADEA precedent (for age-discrimination claims). See Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 n. 10 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Shackelford v. Deloitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1999)) ("The law governing claims under the TCHRA and Title VII is identical."); McClaren v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, Inc., No. 04-505632, 2005 WL 1864272, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2005) (noting that the Court need not analyze the plaintiff's ADEA and TCHRA claims separately because "the TCHRA parallels federal discrimination laws").
The Court need not separately analyze Meza's § 1981 claim because such claims are generally analyzed under Title VII precedent. See Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 669 F.2d 776, 779 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that a plaintiff's claim of "disparate treatment under § 1981 is subject to the same analysis accorded Title VII disparate treatment cases").
Allegations of discrimination generally fall into two categories, disparate impact claims and disparate treatment claims. See Coleman v. School Bd. of Richmond Parish, No. 04-30445, 2005 WL 1714369, at *4 (5th Cir. July 25, 2005) (stating that "in the context of Title VII litigation, we recognize two types of discrimination claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). "Disparate treatment refers to deliberate discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment, whereas disparate impact claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate." Id.
In this case, Meza contends that CSK Auto discriminated against him by treating him differently from other similarly situated employees. Because the practices complained of effectively turn on discretionary decisions, they do not fall within the category of facially neutral procedures to which the disparate impact model is traditionally applied. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We examine discrimination claims using the disparate impact model when employment practices are `facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but . . . in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.'") (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)). Decisions which rely on subjective judgments provide the opportunity for the intentional discrimination cognizable in a disparate treatment action. See Carroll v. Sears Roebuck Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The use of subjective criteria to evaluate employees in hiring and job placement decisions is not within the category of facially neutral procedures to which the disparate impact model is applied."); see also Walls v. Miss. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The use of subjective criteria to evaluate employees in hiring is analyzed, not under the disparate impact model, but instead under the disparate treatment model."). Therefore, the Court's analysis of Meza's claims will be done solely under a disparate treatment framework.
Title VII and ADEA disparate treatment discrimination claims can be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3 (1983) ("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff [in a discrimination case] may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence."); Ceasar v. North Star Steel Tex., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865-66 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination need not come forward with direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to avoid summary judgment). In the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory intent, as is typically the case, proof via circumstantial evidence is assembled using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (noting that "there will seldom be eyewitness testimony as to the employer's mental processes" and that the Fifth Circuit has "employed some variant of the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas to analyze ADEA claims that are based principally on circumstantial evidence") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Accordingly, because Meza has not presented any direct evidence of race or age discrimination, the Court must apply the burden shifting analytical framework established in McDonnell Douglas. Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 896-97. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court employs a three-part test designed to ascertain a defendant's motivation in taking the challenged action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). If a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises. Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993). In order to rebut the presumption, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a "legitimate, non discriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory action." Russell, 235 F.3d at 222. The defendant need not prove that there was no intentional discrimination; the defendant need only produce evidence on that point. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993). Finally, if the defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption of discrimination established by the plaintiff's prima facie case is defeated. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10 (1981). The plaintiff may still meet his ultimate burden by producing evidence that demonstrates the defendant's offered reason was a mere "pretext" for discrimination. Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 897. "That is, the plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because CSK Auto moved for summary judgment, Meza does not need to actually prove that CSK Auto's proffered reason is a pretext. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 958. Rather, the Court must determine if Meza "tendered factual evidence that would lead a jury to reasonably conclude that" CSK Auto's reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Ultimately, in a discrimination case, "whether summary judgment is appropriate depends on numerous factors, including `the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered.'" Price v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49). Additionally, "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false," is sufficient to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149 (noting that the Court of Appeals erred by "proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination").
III. ANALYSIS
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, CSK Auto asserts (1) that Meza fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and (2) that Meza cannot establish pretext. Meza argues that he establishes both a prima facie case of discrimination and pretext because (1) comparably situated CSK Auto employees have not been terminated for committing the offense of unsafe driving, (2) CSK Auto deviated from its own employment policies, and (3) CSK Auto has offered inconsistent reasons for Meza's termination.
A. Meza's Prima Facie Case
In the context of Title VII and ADEA litigation, a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination exists if a plaintiff is able to show four elements. "The first three elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA are identical to the first three elements of a Title VII prima facie case." Meinecke, 66 F.3d at 83; see also Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating in the context of a Title VII case that "the McDonnell Douglas test requires the plaintiff to show: (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she lost, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that others similarly situated were more favorably treated"); Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957 n. 4 (stating that "[i]n age discrimination cases, the plaintiff is required to make a prima facie case, wherein he must demonstrate that: (1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was either (i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, (ii) replaced by someone younger, or (iii) otherwise discharged because of his age."). Therefore, for both Title VII and ADEA claims, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for the position that he sought; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206; Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957 n. 4.
There are two ways for a plaintiff to establish the fourth element. First, in the context of a work-rule violation case, a plaintiff can complete a prima facie case by establishing that the conduct for which the plaintiff "was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by an employee [not within his protected class] whom [the company] retained." Wallace, 271 F.3d at 221 (emphasis added) (stating this standard in a gender discrimination case) (citing Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores (No. 471), 891 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)); Little, 924 F.2d at 97 (stating, in an age discrimination case, that the plaintiff "must show that [the employer] gave preferential treatment to a younger employee under `nearly identical' circumstances") (citing Smith, 891 F.2d at 1180).
In a work-rule violation case, a plaintiff is alleging that an employee outside the plaintiff's protected class was given more favorable treatment in the application of a company disciplinary policy based on discriminatory reasons. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995) (considering an African-American plaintiff's claim that he was disciplined for poor work performance but White employees were not).
Second, a plaintiff can complete his prima facie case by establishing that he was replaced by someone outside of his protected class. Meinecke, 66 F.3d at 83 (listing the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII as "after being discharged, [the plaintiff's] employer replaced her with a person who is not a member of the protected class"). Additionally, if a plaintiff is alleging age discrimination, he can attempt to establish a prima facie case by showing that he was replaced by someone younger, even if that person falls within his protected class. See Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957 n. 4. (noting that an ADEA plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that "he was either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of age"). Meza has not alleged that he was replaced by someone outside of the classes described in Title VII and the ADEA, respectively. Therefore, the only relevant inquiry under this method is whether Meza was replaced by someone younger, a showing which could establish a prima facie case under the ADEA.
Meza alleges that he was replaced by Amador. Meza Dep., at 100, 102. Amador is a Hispanic male born on April 25, 1956. Amador Aff., at 3, ¶ 14. "Under the ADEA, the protected class is limited to persons at least 40 years of age or older." Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 362 (5th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Amador is not outside of Meza's protected class.
Meza does not proffer any additional evidence that requires an inquiry into whether he was "otherwise discharged because of his age," such as evidence of age-related comments. See Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding a prima facie case of age discrimination based in part on age-related comments).
The parties do not dispute that Meza satisfies the first three elements needed to establish a prima facie case of age and race discrimination in that: (1) he is a Hispanic male of advanced age; (2) he was qualified for the position he held as District Manager; and (3) he was terminated from his position. Therefore, the only dispute is whether Meza has established the fourth element required for a prima facie case under each statutory claim.
First, the Court will analyze whether Meza has established the presence of preferential treatment to employees outside his protected class under nearly identical circumstances, which could complete his prima facie case under either the ADEA or Title VII. Second, the court will analyze whether Meza has established that he was replaced by someone younger, which could complete his prima facie case under the ADEA.
1. Prima Facie Case Based on Preferential Treatment of Other Employees Outside of Meza's Protected Class under Nearly Identical Circumstances
To complete a prima facie case by showing that Meza's conduct was nearly identical to the conduct of an employee outside his protected class whom CSK retained, Meza must demonstrate that the difference between Meza's conduct "and that of those alleged to be similarly situated [does not account] for the difference in treatment received from the employer." Barnes v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 778 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
To illustrate the stringency of the nearly identical standard, in Dodge v. Hertz Corp., 124 Fed. Appx. 242, 243 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion), the plaintiff, Dodge, was a Hispanic male who was dismissed from his managerial position for altering "numerous rental contracts to increase fraudulently his incentive-based compensation while avoiding detection." As evidence that similarly situated Caucasian females were not as severely disciplined for similar violations, Dodge alleged that a Caucasian female manager was disciplined but not terminated "when money from her branch went missing." Id. at 244. However, the Fifth Circuit held that although both Dodge's alleged misconduct and the conduct the Caucasian female manager purportedly engaged in could be loosely classified as dishonest, "the mere fact that two situations can be classified in the same broad category is a far cry from their being nearly identical." Id. The Court determined that "these two hypothetical incidents of misbehavior would likely warrant radically different responses from the employer and could not be said to be `nearly identical.'" Id. Consequently, the Dodge court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment for the employer, agreeing that Dodge had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 244-45.
Though Dodge is an unpublished opinion, the Court finds that its reasoning and logic persuasively apply to the instant case. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (stating "[a]n unpublished opinion may . . . be persuasive").
a. Alleged Instances of Unsafe Driving
The Court finds that the record discloses three instances of alleged "unsafe driving" involving District Managers, whom Meza claims were employees outside of his protected class that received preferential treatment. The Court will examine each alleged incident to determine if it constitutes nearly identical circumstances.
The other alleged incidents of unsafe driving do not involve District Managers. Rather, they involve employees such as delivery drivers and store managers who had substantially different positions, duties, and supervisors. Pl.'s Factual App. to His Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at 10-11. Therefore, these incidents do not constitute nearly identical conduct because the differences in CSK Auto's treatment can be explained by the differences in the employee's positions. See Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2000) (refusing to consider more favorable treatment toward employees who "held different jobs than [the plaintiff], executed different duties, and were accountable to different supervisors").
i. Glen Malloy
Glen Malloy ("Malloy"), a Caucasian District Manager in his 30's, accidentally wrecked a rental car while on a business trip in Arizona. Meza Dep., at 93. He was not terminated. Bustillos Aff. B, at 4. Meza was present when Malloy wrecked the car, as were two other District Managers, Amador and Bill Morrison. Meza Dep., at 93. The four were attending a CSK Auto sponsored District Managers' meeting. Id. at 95. They were returning to their hotel after having dinner and drinks. Meza Dep., at 93; Bustillos Aff. B, at 3. The incident occurred late at night after Malloy, Meza, and other employees had been out drinking. Saar Dep., at 77. CSK Auto did not pay for the drinks. Meza Dep., at 93. The accident occurred during personal time. Saar Dep., at 76; Amador Aff., at 2, ¶ 11. Bustillos reported the incident to Plueger. Bustillos Aff. B, at 4. There is no competent summary judgment evidence indicating that there were any complaints about Malloy's driving prior to the accident.
The record is not clear as to whether Malloy or CSK Auto was responsible for renting the vehicle.
ii. Brad Fisher
Brad Fisher ("Fisher"), a Caucasian District Manager, would allegedly "slam on the brakes" of company vehicles in order to scare sleeping passengers. In another incident, when Bustillos was driving with Fisher as his passenger, Fisher allegedly pulled on the emergency brake and screamed, causing the vehicle to skid and Bustillos to lose control of the vehicle. Bustillos Aff. B, at 2. Bustillos reported this incident to Schroeder, Plueger, and Langdon, but Fisher was not disciplined. Id. at 2-3.
Fisher denies ever slamming on the brakes of a moving car. Fisher Aff., at 2, ¶ 3. However, he does admit that he would sometimes yell at sleeping passengers. Id. at 2, ¶ 4.
iii. Ernie Whitmore
Ernie Whitmore ("Whitmore"), a Caucasian District Manager in his late 30's, would regularly meet with store managers in Albuquerque bars. Bustillos Aff. B, at 4. Whitmore would allegedly become inebriated at these meetings and then drive to his home in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Id. Bustillos became aware of these allegations from store managers and reported them to Plueger. Id. Plueger did not commence an investigation into these allegations, and Whitmore was later promoted. Id.
b. Applying the "Nearly Identical" Standard
After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Court finds that Meza does not provide evidence that employees outside his protected class were given preferential treatment under nearly identical circumstances.Specifically, the Court notes that Meza's conduct involves (1) intentional reckless driving (speeding and placing a moving vehicle in neutral) (2) by one of CSK's highest ranking employees, (3) during the course of a business trip, (4) which endangered the lives of four CSK Auto employees, (5) who complained about the conduct as it occurred, (6) whose complaints were disregarded by Meza, all of which (7) jeopardized CSK Auto's property, (8) exposed CSK Auto to serious potential liability, (9) occurred in violation of CSK Auto policy, and (10) was a violation of state law.
Each of the alleged incidents of unsafe driving involving a District Manager includes significant differences from Meza's conduct. First, Malloy's alleged conduct (1) occurred on personal time after drinks paid for by the employees, (2) did not occur in spite of complaints by the passengers, (3) did not involve passengers who were Malloy's subordinates, and (4) did not occur in a company owned vehicle. Second, the alleged incidents of Fisher slamming on the brakes to scare sleeping passengers (1) did not involve illegal activity, (2) did not occur in spite of the complaints of subordinates, and (3) is not alleged to have endangered anyone's life. On the contrary, the other employees viewed these incidents as "a big joke." Bustillos Aff. B, at 2. Furthermore, with respect to the incident involving Bustillos, (1) Fisher was a passenger, (2) the conduct did not occur in spite of the complaint of Bustillos, and (3) Bustillos was not Fisher's subordinate. Third, Whitmore's alleged conduct (1) did not occur on a business trip, (2) did not involve company property, (3) did not endanger other employees, and (4) did not occur in spite of the complaints of subordinates.
While Meza would ask the Court to group all the incidents together into the abstract category of "unsafe driving," the Court finds that doing so would ignore substantial and significant differences that necessarily impede a finding that they are nearly identical. Indeed, the troubling aspect about Meza's conduct was his careless disregard, not only of the safety of his occupants, but of the complaints of his subordinates who were accompanying him. Like in Dodge, the alleged incidents "would likely warrant radically different responses from the employer." Dodge, 124 Fed. Appx. at 244. Even construing the evidence in favor of Meza, CSK Auto would be justified in treating these incidents differently.
In sum, all the alleged incidents of unsafe driving have significant differences that prevent them from being characterized as nearly identical. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Meza fails to complete his prima facie case of race discrimination based on preferential treatment of employees outside of Meza's protected class. Thus, the Court is of the opinion that CSK Auto's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Meza's claims of race discrimination. 2. Prima Facie Case Based on Hiring a Younger Replacement
Meza's claims under Title VII, § 1981, and the TCHRA, to the extent his TCHRA claim is based on race discrimination, all fail because the Court's analysis is identical for all three claims. See supra note 4 (explaining that TCHRA claims generally are analyzed under Title VII and ADEA precedent); note 5 (explaining that § 1981 claims are generally analyzed under Title VII precedent).
Although Meza's Title VII claim has failed, he can still complete a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA if Meza establishes that he was replaced by someone younger. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957 n. 4. However, to establish a claim under the ADEA, the age difference must be "significant." O'Connor v. Consol. Coin, 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (holding that merely being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case; rather, an employee demonstrates an inference of age discrimination when he is replaced by an employee "significantly" younger).
Meza alleges that store managers informed him that he was replaced by Amador. Meza Dep., at 100, 102. CSK Auto admits that John Amador is the current District Manager of all stores in El Paso. Def.'s Reply Brief., at 4. However, CSK Auto alleges that Meza was actually replaced by Jose Leon, a Hispanic male older than Meza, and that Amador only assumed Meza's position as a result of a company reorganization. Id. at 4. Amador is a Hispanic man who is approximately five years younger than Meza. Amador Aff., at 3, ¶ 14. Assuming Amador can be considered the replacement for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, five years is likely insufficient as a matter of law to be considered a "significant" age difference. See Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that "the overwhelming body of cases in most circuits has held that age differences of less than ten years are not significant enough to make out the fourth part of the age discrimination prima facie case"). However, the Fifth Circuit has not established a bright-line rule stating what age difference is too small to be considered significant as a matter of law. See Rachid, 376 F.3d at 313 (noting that whether an age difference of five years is significant is a "close question"). Therefore, the Court will assume, without deciding, that five years could constitute a significant age difference for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case.
Meza was born on December 27, 1951. Meza Dep., at 8. Amador was born on April 25, 1956. Amador Aff., at 3, ¶ 14.
The other three elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA are undisputed. Therefore, the Court will assume, without deciding, that Meza has established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, and the Court will determine if CSK Auto has provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Meza's termination.
B. CSK's Legitimate Reason for Firing Meza
Assuming, arguendo, that Meza has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to CSK Auto to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03; Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1505 (5th Cir. 1988); Montgomery v. Brookshire, 880 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D. Tex. 1995). The defendant's burden is satisfied by producing evidence, which, "taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 509. CSK Auto's burden to produce a nondiscriminatory reason for Meza's termination is "one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment." Sandstad, 309 F.3d at 898.
As previously discussed, CSK Auto argues that Meza violated its Employment Policies when he recklessly disregarded the safety of four CSK Auto store managers when he drove down Guadalupe Pass at over 90 miles per hour in neutral. Specifically, it is undisputed that Meza violated CSK Auto's policy (1) prohibiting CSK Auto associates from performing work-related activities that disregard the safety of themselves, their fellow workers, or any other person, and (2) prohibiting unsafe and unlawful operation of a company vehicle.
Thus, the Court finds that CSK Auto has met its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Meza's termination. Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997).
C. Pretext
If the employer satisfies its burden of providing a legitimate reason for its employment action, the plaintiff must then present sufficient evidence showing that the reason proffered by the employer is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 805; Price, 283 F.3d at 720 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507-08) ("[T]he plaintiff is given a `full and fair opportunity to demonstrate' that the defendant's proffered reason is not true, but instead is a pretext for intentional discrimination."). "[T]he plaintiff must substantiate his claim of pretext through evidence demonstrating that discrimination lay at the heart of the employer's decision." Price, 283 F.3d at 720 (citing Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 937 (2001)); Valdez v. San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, 974 F.2d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1992) ("To show pretext, a plaintiff may prove that the reason proffered by the employer for termination is unworthy of credence, or that the employer's decision was more likely motivated by discriminatory reasons."). At trial, the plaintiff still bears the ultimate burden of showing discriminatory intent on the employer's part. See Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1505 (citing Tex. Dep't of Comty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253-56) ("[T]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant's reasons are pretexts for unlawful discrimination either by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant or by showing that the defendant's reason is unworthy of credence."). However, for purposes of deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only determine if Meza has "tendered factual evidence that would lead a jury to reasonably conclude that" CSK Auto's reasons are a pretext for age discrimination. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 958.
1. Meza's Arguments for Pretext
In Meza's effort to meet his burden of establishing that CSK Auto's proffered reason for discharging him is pretextual, Meza argues (1) that other district managers who also committed the offense of unsafe driving were not terminated, (2) that CSK Auto deviated from its policy concerning unsafe-driving incidents and its progressive discipline policy, and (3) that CSK Auto has offered an inconsistent reason to explain why Meza was terminated. The Court will examine each of Meza's arguments of pretext in turn.
a. Comparably Situated Employees were not Fired
First, Meza argues that employees comparably situated to Meza were not fired. However, as detailed above, the Court has concluded that Meza's proffered examples of similar conduct by other employees do not satisfy the nearly identical standard.
See supra Part III(A)(1) (discussing Meza's failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a showing of unequal application of discipline because Meza's conduct differed significantly from the alleged incidents of unsafe driving involving other employees). The nearly identical standard applies with equal force to the pretext prong of the burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Wyvill, 212 F.3d at 304-05 (requiring a plaintiff attempting to demonstrate pretext to show that his employer treated others differently in "nearly identical circumstances"). Additionally, Bustillos' bare assertion that employees were treated more leniently than Meza under nearly identical circumstances is a legal conclusion that adds nothing to Meza's case. Bustillos Aff. B, at 5.
b. CSK Auto Violated its Own Progressive Discipline Policy
Second, Meza argues that CSK Auto violated its own progressive discipline policy. However, the record reflects that the Driver Policy referred to in Bustillos' Affidavit actually applies solely to company delivery drivers who are involved in an accident. Therefore, the policy is inapplicable to the instant case where Meza is admittedly a District Manager and where his actions giving rise to his termination involved conduct that was intentional, and not accidental.c. CSK Auto Offered an Inconsistent Reason for Meza's Termination
Third, Meza argues that "an inconsistent reason offered to explain an employee's termination may support a finding that the reason is mere pretext." Read v. BT Alex Brown, Inc., 72 Fed. Appx. 112, 120 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion). As grounds for this conclusion, Meza alleges an inconsistency between (1) Defendant's interrogatory answers, in which it said that Langdon and Saar were the two individuals who made the decision to terminate Meza, Interrog. Ans. no. 7; (2) the deposition testimony of Saar that the decision was made by a consensus of six individuals, including Langdon and Saar, Saar Dep., at 36-37, 41, 45-46; and (3) Langdon's testimony that he did not have much input into the decision to terminate Meza, Langdon Dep., at 23. However, CSK Auto has not given inconsistent rationales for its decision, merely arguably inconsistent descriptions of its decision-making process. See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[A]n employer's changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.") (emphasis added).
Though Read is an unpublished opinion, the Court finds that its reasoning and logic persuasively apply to the instant case. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 (stating "[a]n unpublished opinion may . . . be persuasive").
Although the level of involvement of certain decision-makers could be relevant in certain discrimination cases, this is not such a case. For example, in Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825 (3d Cir. 1994), as evidence that Casio's stated reason for discharging the plaintiff was pretextual, Torre presented evidence that a particular supervisor, Hand, was involved in the decision to terminate him. Torre, 42 F.3d at 833-34. Hand's involvement was relevant to the issue of pretext because Torre presented evidence that Hand "harbored age-related animus towards Torre." Id. Consequently, the court determined that Hand's involvement in the decision to terminate Torre could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Casio's proffered reason for terminating Torre — his poor job performance — was not worthy of credence. Id. In contrast, in this case, Meza has presented no evidence explaining why the level of involvement of certain decision-makers is relevant to whether CSK Auto's proffered reason for Meza's termination — his violation of company driving policy — is unworthy of credence, such as evidence that a particular supervisor harbored age or race-related animus toward him. As a result, there is no evidence allowing the Court to conclude that the level of involvement of certain decision-makers is relevant to the issue of pretext in this case.
In this case, CSK Auto has offered a consistent reason for Meza's discharge, his admitted violation of the company driving policy. The level of involvement of certain decision-makers is irrelevant to the consistency of CSK Auto's rationale for Meza's termination. 2. Meza's Failure to Establish Pretext
Meza admitted that he was never told that he was discharged because of his age or race. Meza Dep., at 95-96. Further, Meza conceded that he knowingly and intentionally drove at speeds over 90 miles per hour while the vehicle was in neutral down Guadalupe Pass, a steep and dangerous mountain road, despite hearing a passenger in the car complain about the speed in which he was driving. Meza Dep., at Exs. 5, 7. He also acknowledged that his actions violated CSK Auto's company policy and that some form of discipline was in order. Meza Dep., at 86, 89. Simply put, Meza does not dispute CSK Auto's allegations concerning the June 2003 driving incident; rather, he merely objects to the severity of the punishment imposed.
"The Fifth Circuit is clear that when a plaintiff has violated a company policy, the company may, within broad limits, deal with the employee free of judicial second guessing." Porter v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 615, 621 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Elliot v. Group Med. Surgical Serv., 714 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 1983)) ("When questioned directly concerning the company's stated reasons for [plaintiff's] dismissal, [plaintiff did not] seriously dispute either his awareness of the objective truth of the company's stated ground of dissatisfaction with him, maintaining only that it was inadequate to warrant his termination. However, within certain limits not exceeded here, such judgments as that are for the employer, not for the court."). Based on the evidence before the Court, CSK Auto has not overstepped its discretion in its treatment of Meza.
After complete review of the evidence presented, the parties' arguments as set forth in their respective pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Meza has failed to establish pretext with respect to his claims of age discrimination. Therefore, Meza has failed to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Thus, CSK Auto's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Meza's claims of age discrimination.
Meza's claim under the ADEA and his remaining claim under the TCHRA, based on age discrimination, both fail because the Court's analysis is identical for both claims. See supra note 4 (explaining that TCHRA claims generally are analyzed under Title VII and ADEA precedent).
IV. CONCLUSION
"Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors. Those include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other [appropriate] evidence that supports the employer's case." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49. In the instant case, Meza has failed to demonstrate that employees outside of his protected class were given more favorable treatment under nearly identical circumstances. As a result, Meza has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Additionally, the Court assumes that Meza established a prima facie case of age discrimination by providing evidence that he was replaced by a younger employee. However, there is abundant uncontroverted evidence to support CSK Auto's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Meza's termination and insufficient evidence to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that CSK Auto's explanation for discharging Meza was a pretext for age discrimination.
Therefore, a reasonable trier of fact could only find (1) that CSK Auto articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to terminate Meza and (2) that Meza does not establish pretext. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of fact, and the Court concludes that CSK Auto's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant CSK Auto's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. IT IF FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned cause is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all remaining pending motions are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall close this matter.