Opinion
No. C99-3087-MWB
August 15, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joseph Meyer filed his complaint in this lawsuit on November 17, 1999, against his former employer, defendant Iowa Mold Tooling Co., Inc. ("IMT") and his supervisors at IMT, defendants Charlie Conroy, Rick Horn, Rhonda Pinneke and John Salmon. Meyer, who suffers from profoundly impaired hearing, alleges in his complaint that he was discriminated against by defendants because of his disability, subjected to retaliatory treatment when he complained, and ultimately terminated because of his disability.
Meyer asserts claims for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code Ch. 216, and two pendent state law claims. Specifically, in Count I, Meyer alleges that he is a qualified individual with a disability — profound deafness — and that defendants discriminated against him because of that disability, in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The complaint further asserts, in Count II, that defendants retaliated against him because he complained of their failure to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability, in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12103(A). In Count III, the complaint alleges that defendants violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.6, by discriminating against Meyer because of his disability. Meyer alleges in Count IV that defendants retaliated against him because he complained of their failure to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability, in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.6. In Count V, Meyer alleges that defendants' behavior toward him constitutes tortious infliction of emotional distress. Finally, in Count VI, Meyer asserts that IMT is liable for the conduct of its employees under the legal principle respondeat superior.
On February 14, 2000, defendants IMT, Rhonda Krause f/k/a Rhonda Pinneke, and Charlie Conroy filed their Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's ADA And ICRA Termination and Retaliation Claims, ICRA Accommodation Claim And State Tort Claim (#12). In their motion, defendants contend that Meyer's allegations related to his claims of discriminatory termination and retaliation are untimely and should be dismissed. Defendants also contend that Meyer's claim under ICRA that defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability is untimely and must be dismissed. Finally, defendants argue that the court should dismiss Meyer's claim that defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the grounds that it is untimely and preempted by ICRA. Meyer filed a timely resistance to defendants' motion.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT A. Facts Drawn From The Complaint
According to the complaint, Meyer is profoundly deaf. He was born profoundly hearing impaired and has progressively lost most of his hearing. Meyer learned American Sign Language ("ASL") as his first language and English as his second. Because of differences between English and ASL, it is sometimes difficult for Meyer to comprehend written or spoken English.
On May 29, 1984, Meyer was hired by IMT. He was first assigned to the welding department. Because Meyer's disability made it difficult for him to communicate with his
supervisor, Meyer was transferred to an assembly position in the parts room two weeks after he started. While working in the parts room, Meyer was almost hit by a forklift as it came up behind him because he had been unable to hear it approaching. Meyer's supervisor threatened to discipline Meyer for the forklift incident.
In 1990, Meyer bid on and obtained a position as a crane mechanic. Meyer later bid on and a obtained a position in the compressor room. However, he was only allowed to work in the compressor room for two days before being removed and transferred back to the crane department. He was transferred because defendants thought it was too dangerous to have Meyer working in the compressor room because he was unable to hear the pressure.
After being transferred back to the crane department, Meyer continued to work as a crane mechanic until his termination from IMT. While working in the crane department, Meyer was prohibited from driving a forklift because defendant Conroy thought that Meyer's disability rendered him unsafe to drive a forklift.
Throughout his employment with IMT, Meyer requested that IMT provide him with accommodations such as a Telecommunication Device for the Deaf ("TDD"), interpreters for meetings, and a beeper or flashing lights to warn about emergencies. Defendants were resistant to providing Meyer with such accommodations.
In March 1994, Meyer filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"), regarding disability discrimination. After Meyer filed the complaint, defendants provided several accommodations to him, including a TDD and a beeper. Although defendants provided some accommodation, they often failed to provide such devices and failed to provide Meyer with interpreters for company and personnel meetings.
Defendants usually failed to provide an interpreter for mandatory quarterly plant-wide informational meetings even though Meyer made requests for an interpreter at these meetings. On one occasion when Meyer requested an interpreter, defendant Pinneke refused his request and told Meyer to sit in the front row and lip read. Prior to this incident, Pinneke had been informed that Meyer was not skilled at lip reading and was only able to understand a small percentage of what was said when lip reading.
Throughout his employment, Meyer was repeatedly ridiculed and threatened by IMT employees and management personnel about his inability to hear and his use of ASL.
On one occasion, Meyer requested an interpreter for a meeting with Pinneke in which Pinneke disciplined Meyer for actions which he believed did not warrant reprimand. Pinneke refused Meyer's request for an interpreter. As a result, Meyer was unable to understand or effectively communicate with Pinneke regarding the discipline she meted out to him. Pinneke subsequently told Meyer's wife that she believed that Meyer possessed less than normal intelligence because Meyer did not understand what she was trying to communicate to him.
On March 7, 1994, Meyer requested and was denied an interpreter for an upcoming four hour meeting. Although told that IMT was unable to obtain an interpreter for the date of the meeting, Meyer subsequently learned that no interpreter had ever been requested. On December 22, 1994, Meyer informed his supervisor defendant Salmon that he would need an interpreter for an upcoming meeting. Salom refused Meyer's request for an interpreter and yelled at Meyer, "Read my lips."
Defendants retaliated against Meyer because he complained about their failure to provide him accommodation and as a result of his filing a complaint with the ICRC. Specifically, defendants "over-supervised" Meyer in relation to non-disabled workers and labeled him a troublemaker for his requests for accommodation. Meyer was disciplined for conduct which was condoned by defendants when committed by non-disabled workers. Meyer was also disciplined more severely than non-disabled workers who had committed the same or similar violations. Meyer's employment with IMT was terminated on January 24, 1996.
B. Facts Related To Question Of Jurisdiction
On March 18, 1994, Meyer filed a complaint with the ICRC (Complaint No. 03-94-25932) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") (Complaint No. 261940744) alleging that IMT discriminated against him in violation of the ADA and the ICRA by failing to accommodate his disability (the "accommodation complaint"). On February 22, 1996, Meyer filed a second complaint with the ICRC (Complaint No. 02-96-30154) and the EEOC (Complaint No. 261920259) alleging that IMT discriminated and retaliated in violation of the ADA and the ICRA when it terminated him (the "termination complaint").
Reversing the order in which they had been filed, the ICRC and the EEOC concluded their investigation of Meyer's termination complaint before they concluded their investigation of his accommodation complaint. On September 4, 1996, the ICRC issued a finding of "no probable cause" on Meyer's termination complaint. The ICRC's notice further informed Meyer that:
Please be advised that the complainant has the right to file a request for reopening by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter, or to file an appeal in district court within thirty (30) days.
ICRC Letter (Sept. 4, 1996) at 1.
A court may properly consider undisputedly authentic documents attached to the motion papers of either party in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Lit., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994).
On October 24, 1996, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on Meyer's termination claim. The EEOC right-to-sue letter also informed Meyer that he had 90 days in which to bring suit:
The fact that the EEOC will take no further action does not affect your rights to take legal action on your own behalf under the ADA. If you filed your charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination (300 days in states with a state disability discrimination law), you may file a lawsuit within ninety (90) days of the date you receive this letter . You may sue for recovery of backpay, appropriate make-whole relief or injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and court costs. Once ninety (90) days have passed from your receipt of this letter, your right-to-sue is lost .
EEOC Letter (Oct. 24, 1996) at 1 (emphasis original).
On June 5, 1997, the ICRC issued a notice of administrative closure on Meyer's accommodation claim. The notice informed Meyer that he had two years in which to request a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC which would allow him to file suit on the accommodation claim. On August 19, 1999, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on Meyer's accommodation claim. The letter informed Meyer that he had 90 days in which to file suit on his accommodation claim:
You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS from your receipt of this Notice; otherwise, your right to sue based on this charge will be lost.
EEOC Letter (Aug. 19, 1999) at 1 (emphasis original). Meyer filed his complaint in this lawsuit on November 17, 1999.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Defendants have moved to dismiss Meyer's supplemental state law claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants assert that Meyer's state common law claim for tortious infliction of emotional distress is preempted by the ICRA, Iowa Code Chapter 216. Defendants further contend that Meyer's claims under the ICRA are barred because his lawsuit was not filed in a timely manner. Finally, defendants contend that Meyer's ADA claims of discriminatory termination and retaliation are untimely and should be dismissed. The court will address each of these arguments seriatim.
A. Standards For Motions To Dismiss
This court has considered in some detail the standards applicable to motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in a number of published decisions. See, e.g., Adler v. I M Rail Link, L.L.C., 13 F. Supp.2d 912, 917 (N.D.Iowa 1998); Terra Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 679, 682 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Leiberkneckt v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 300, 302 (N.D.Iowa 1997); North Cent. F.S., Inc. v. Brown, 951 F. Supp. 1383, 1404 (N.D.Iowa 1996); Powell v. Tordoff, 911 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 (N.D.Iowa 1995); Quality Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. City of Spencer, 908 F. Supp. 1471, 1489 (N.D.Iowa 1995); Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F. Supp. 1494, 1502 (N.D.Iowa 1995); Dahl v. Kanawha Inv. Holding Co., 161 F.R.D. 673, 681 (N.D.Iowa 1995). Because the court does not find that intervening decisions have altered these standards in any way, it will not repeat the discussions of those standards here.
B. Preemption Of State Common Law Claims
Defendants contend that Meyer's state common law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted by the ICRA. The ICRA, Iowa Code Chapter 216, established the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and provides statutory remedies for enforcement of basic civil rights. Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa 1993). The Iowa Supreme Court has held that section 216.16(1) renders the chapter's remedies exclusive and preemptive. Greenland, 500 N.W.2d at 37; Grahek v. Voluntary Hosp. Co-op. Ass'n of Iowa, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 1991); Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1985). Preemption occurs unless the claims are separate and independent, and therefore incidental, causes of action. Greenland, 500 N.W.2d at 38; Grahek, 473 N.W.2d at 34; Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 639 (Iowa 1990). The claims are not separate and independent when, under the facts of the case, success on the claim not brought under chapter 216 requires proof of discrimination. Greenland, 500 N.W.2d at 38.
The Iowa Supreme Court has addressed the preemption issue in a number of cases. In Northrup, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the ICRA provided the exclusive remedy for alleged wrongful discharge for alcoholism and the plaintiff's independent common-law action for wrongful discharge could not be recognized. Northrup, 372 N.W.2d at 197. However, the court went on to entertain the plaintiff's claim that his discharge for alcoholism constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 197-99. The court concluded that discharge of a plant superintendent for alcoholism, when the superintendent has extensive responsibilities for plant operations, buying, production scheduling, maintenance, and plant safety, was not outrageous conduct, nor was general criticism of the superintendent's performance outrageous. Id. at 198.
The Iowa Supreme Court subsequently clarified its holding in Northrup in Hamilton, 436 N.W.2d 336. In Hamilton, the plaintiff alleged discharge of an at-will employee in violation of public policy, but the court found that her argument "basically boil[ed] down to an assertion of sex discrimination." Id. at 341. The court concluded that Northrup held that the civil rights statute preempts independent common law actions also premised on discrimination. Id. The court stated that "[plaintiff] failed in her bid to prove sex discrimination. Northrup forbids her a second bite of the apple in the form of an independent common law action also premised on sex discrimination." Id. at 341-42.
In Vaughn, 459 N.W.2d 627, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the trial court properly dismissed, as preempted by the ICRA, claims of wrongful discharge, unfair employment practices, and termination in bad faith and actual malice because all were based on religious discrimination. Vaughn, 459 N.W.2d at 639. However, the court held that a claim of breach of contract was not preempted, because it was a separate and independent cause of action triable to a jury. Id. at 639.
The Iowa Supreme Court next addressed the question of preemption in Grahek, 473 N.W.2d 31. The court held that a breach of contract claim was not preempted by the civil rights statute even when the plaintiff believed that he was fired because of his age because:
[plaintiff] need not prove [discrimination] to be successful in his contract claim. In this count he is claiming that the employment contract was breached by his premature termination in violation of the terms of the alleged contract. The claim of age discrimination is only incidental to the separate and independent cause of action for breach of contract.Grahek, 473 N.W.2d at 34. However, the court distinguished wrongful discharge claims based on at-will employment from the one encountered by the plaintiff alleging breach of an employment contract, noting that "in an at-will situation, either party may terminate the employment at any time for any reason except discrimination under chapter 601A or violation of public policy." Id. The court concluded that:
[s]ince in at-will employment situations involving allegations of discrimination the claim of wrongful discharge and the claim of discrimination are one and the same, Iowa Code section 601A.16 requires that the employee follow the procedures provided in that chapter.Id. The court did find that the plaintiff's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims were preempted because:
the only act of bad faith which [plaintiff] alleges is age discrimination. Thus, as in at-will employment arrangements, the bad faith claim and the chapter 601A civil rights claim are the same. Therefore, chapter 601A preempts the tort claim.Id. The court found that claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, which were not based on unfair or discriminatory practices, but on earlier acts, were not preempted. Id. at 35.
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by the ICRA because the plaintiff had to prove sexual discrimination to be successful on the emotional distress claim. Greenland, 500 N.W.2d at 38. The court held that the test is whether, in light of the pleadings, discrimination is made an element of the alternative claims. Id. The court concluded that:
We think the answer with regard to the emotional distress claim is yes, resulting in preemption. Discrimination through sexual harassment is the "outrageous conduct" [plaintiff] specifically alleges in her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. So under the facts she alleges, if she were to fail in her claim of discrimination, [plaintiff] would necessarily fail in her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stated otherwise, it is impossible for [plaintiff] to establish the emotional distress she alleges without first proving discrimination.Id. The court also addressed the apparent inconsistency between this holding and the Northrup decision in which the court had entertained an emotional distress claim based on termination for alcoholism after concluding that the plaintiff had a viable claim under 601A for discrimination on the basis of alcoholism. Northrup, 372 N.W.2d at 197-99. In Greenland, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the decisions in Vaughn and Northrup did not implicitly allow separate claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in conjunction with the ICRA discrimination claims, because preemption of the emotional distress claims was never raised or considered in either appeal. Greenland, 500 N.W.2d at 38.
In the present case, Meyer has brought claims of disability discrimination under the ICRA. He has also asserted a common-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Meyer's common-law claim appears from the complaint to be based entirely on the same conduct Meyer has alleged was discriminatory. In Count V, Meyer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, he cites no additional facts to support his claim.
In light of the authorities cited above, Iowa Code § 216.6 provides the exclusive remedy for this claim since it is based entirely on the claimed discriminatory actions of defendants. Therefore, this portion of defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Count Count V (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
C. Timeliness Of Meyer's ICRA Claims 1. Meyer's accommodation charge
Iowa Code § 216.16 provides in pertinent part:
1. A person claiming to be aggrieved by an unfair or discriminatory practice must initially seek an administrative relief by filing a complaint with the commission in accordance with section 216.15. This provision also applies to persons claiming to be aggrieved by an unfair or discriminatory practice committed by the state or an agency or political subdivision of the state, notwithstanding the terms of the Iowa administrative procedure Act. A complainant after the proper filing of a complaint with the commission, may subsequently commence an action for relief in the district court if all of the following conditions have been satisfied:
a. The complainant has timely filed the complaint with the commission as provided in section 216.15, subsection 12; and
b. The complaint has been on file with the commission for at least sixty days and the commission has issued a release to the complainant pursuant to subsection 2 of this section.
2. Upon a request by the complainant, and after the expiration of sixty days from the timely filing of a complaint with the commission, the commission shall issue to the complainant a release stating that the complainant has a right to commence an action in the district court. A release under this subsection shall not be issued if a finding of no probable cause has been made on the complaint by the administrative law judge charged with that duty under section 216.15, subsection 3, a conciliation agreement has been executed under section 216.15, the commission has served notice of hearing upon the respondent pursuant to section 216.15, subsection 5, or the complaint is closed as an administrative closure and two years have elapsed since the issuance date of the closure.
Notwithstanding section 216.15, subsection 4, a party may obtain a copy of all documents contained in a case file where the commission has issued a release to the complainant pursuant to this subsection.
3. An action authorized under this section is barred unless commenced within ninety days after issuance by the commission of a release under subsection 2 of this section.
Here, the ICRC issued a notice of administrative closure on Meyer's accommodation claim on June 5, 1997. The notice informed Meyer that he had two years in which to request a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC which would allow him to file suit on the accommodation charge. Meyer concedes that he never obtained a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC with respect to his accommodation charge. Therefore, because Meyer did not obtain a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC with respect to his accommodation claim, absent application of some equitable doctrine, Meyer's accommodation claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act must be dismissed. See Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 58 F.3d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1995) ("If a plaintiff fails to file a timely charge, the lawsuit is barred unless he or she can demonstrate that the limitations period is subject to equitable modification such as waiver, estoppel, or tolling.").
Here, Meyer argues that his failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter should be excused because: 1) he was not represented by counsel when he received the ICRC's letter; 2) he has a diminished reading capacity; and 3) the determination of the termination charge before the accommodation charge led him to assume that his accommodation and termination claims were being combined into one complaint.
The court notes that Meyer has directed the court's attention to no Iowa legal authority that would permit the court to excuse Meyer's failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to commencing his lawsuit for the reasons set out above. The court's own search has yielded no such legal authorities. Courts have recognized that the statutory prerequisites for bringing a Title VII suit in federal court may be waived in cases where a "plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights," Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978), or when the administrative agency has incorrectly refused to issue a right-to-sue letter. Hladki v. Jeffrey's Consol., Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 388, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
In the case at hand, construing all facts in Meyer's favor, the court finds that Meyer has failed to demonstrate that he could not obtain the required right-to-sue letter. Initially, Meyer points to the fact that he was not represented by counsel. Courts have generally rejected the assertion that a litgant's pro se status renders one immune from timely filing requirements. See Brooks v. Ferguson-Florissant, 113 F.3d 903 905 (8th Cir. 1997) ("While we recognize that Brooks represented himself and may have had difficulty with procedural rules, the motion to dismiss provided him notice that the receipt date was critical and that he would lose his right to sue under Title VII if he had not filed within 90 days of receiving the letter."); Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen, 886 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding "[t]hat Plaintiff is a pro se litigant does not render him immune from the ninety-day requirement."); Brown v. Consolidated Freightway, 152 F.R.D. 656, 658 (N.D.Ga. 1993) (while taking note of plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant, the court found that "this status does not excuse plaintiff's failure to comply with the established statute of limitations for the filing of his action."). Therefore, the court concludes that the fact that Meyer was not represented by counsel does not excuse his failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter. Moreover, with respect to Meyer's claim that he has difficulty understanding the written English language, the record is absolutely devoid of any facts which would support such a conclusion. The court similarly concludes that the record is bereft of any facts which would support Meyer's claim that he assumed that the ICRC would combine his accommodation claim with his termination claim. The court notes that Meyer's own action in correctly filing a second complaint against defendants following his termination from IMT demonstrates that he did not assume that the ICRC would investigate his termination at the time it investigated his accommodation charges. Rather, this action demonstrates that Meyer knew that his termination complaint was distinct from his accommodation claim. Meyer has not pointed to anything in the record which would lead a reasonable individual to assume that his termination claim and accommodation claim had been combined. Therefore, the court concludes that Meyer's failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC with respect to his accommodation claim is fatal with respect to that claim, and grants this portion of defendants' motion.
2. Meyer's termination charge
Meyer's termination claim under the ICRA suffers from a similar malady. The ICRC issued a finding of no probable cause on his termination complaint on September 4, 1996, and notified Meyer that he had thirty days in which to appeal the ICRC's conclusion. Meyer did not file a timely appeal of the ICRC's determination with respect to his termination complaint. Under Iowa law, judicial review of an agency no-probable-cause determination must be sought within thirty days of the issuance of the final agency action. Iowa Code § 216.17(1). The court concludes that Meyer's failure to pursue timely appeal of an administrative decision mandates dismissal as a matter of law. See Atwood v. City of Des Moines, 485 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Iowa 1992) (holding that failure to seek judicial review of ICRC's determination precluded consideration of claims). Therefore, the court grants this portion of defendants' motion with respect to Meyer's termination claim.
D. Timeliness Of Meyer's ADA Termination Claim
Finally, defendants seek the dismissal of Meyer's discriminatory termination claim under the ADA. On October 24, 1996, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on Meyer's termination claim. The EEOC right-to-sue letter also informed Meyer that he had 90 days in which to bring suit. Meyer, however, did not commence his suit until November 17, 1999.
It is settled law that, under the ADA, plaintiffs must comply with the same procedural requirements to sue as exist under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Under Title VII, in cases where the EEOC does not file suit or obtain a conciliation agreement, the EEOC "shall so notify the person aggrieved and within 90 days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Because Meyer's termination claim under the ADA was not filed within ninety days, the court finds that Meyer's termination claim is time-barred unless equitable tolling is applicable. The court notes that procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of sympathy for litigants. As the United States stated in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980), "[i]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law."
Meyer accurately points out that ADA time limitations may be tolled when equity so requires. The ninety-day time period for filing a civil action following receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice is a requirement in the nature of a statute of limitations, subject to equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). In addition to the three reasons rejected above in the court's discussion of Meyer's ICRA claims, Meyer additionally contends that his termination claim should be construed as a "continuing violation." A "continuing violation" claim generally involves an attempt to obtain recovery for incidents of discrimination falling outside of the limitations period, rather than discrimination after the filing of the administrative charge or the lawsuit. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1399, 1413-16 (N.D.Iowa 1995). Moreover, discriminatory or retaliatory conduct after the filing of an administrative charge or judicial complaint is also actionable if it "`grows out of or is like or reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in the administrative charge.'" Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Nichols v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 887 (8th Cir. 1998)); see Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998); Philipp v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 676 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that "`the sweep of any subsequent judicial complaint may be as broad as the scope of the EEOC's investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.'"" Kells, 210 F.3d at 836 (quoting Cobb v. Stringer, 850 F.2d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted)). Here, however, Meyer's termination was the basis of an independent complaint before the EEOC. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[a]llegations outside the scope of the EEOC charge, however, circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, and for that reason are not allowed." Kells, 210 F.3d at 836; see Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 223 (8th Cir. 1994). Because Meyer had an independent complaint before the EEOC related to his termination, the court concludes that his claim that he was not provided with reasonable accommodation is not reasonably related to his claim of discriminatory termination. Thus, the court concludes that Meyer's ADA discriminatory termination claim is time-barred and equitable tolling based upon a continuing violation theory does not apply. Therefore, the court grants this portion of defendants' motion with respect to Meyer's termination claim under the ADA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court initially concludes that Iowa Code § 216.6 provides the exclusive remedy for Meyer's claim for tortious infliction of emotional distress since it is based in its entirety on the claimed discriminatory actions of defendants. Therefore, defendants' motion is granted as to Count V (intentional infliction of emotional distress). The court further concludes that Meyer's accommodation claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act was not filed in a timely fashion. Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motion as to Meyer's ICRA accommodation claim and dismisses Count III. The court next concludes that
Meyer's failure to pursue the necessary appeal of the administrative agency decision with respect to his termination claim under the ICRA mandates dismissal of that claim. Therefore, the court grants defendants' motion as to Meyer's ICRA termination claim and dismisses Count IV. Finally, the court concludes that because Meyer's termination claim under the ADA was not filed within ninety days, his ADA termination claim is time-barred. Therefore, the court grants defendants' motion with respect to that claim and dismisses Count II.
IT IS SO ORDERED.