Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-244.
February 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("Met Life") brings this interpleader action to determine the appropriate payee of benefits under a group life insurance policy owned by Bert Alan Kissick ("Kissick"), now deceased. Defendant Robert Joseph Raibley ("Raibley"), as personal representative of the deceased's estate, and defendant Kathy Kalisek ("Kalisek") each assert rights to the insurance proceeds. Presently before the Court is Kalisek's motion for summary judgment. (Court File No. 7). Defendant Raibley has not filed a response to this motion, and the Court deems him to have waived opposition. E.D.T.N. LR 7.2. However, the Court must still examine defendant Kalisek's motion to determine if summary judgment is appropriate. For the following reasons, Kalisek's motion for summary judgment (Court File No. 7) shall be GRANTED.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
II. Background
The relevant facts are undisputed. Bert Alan Kissick died on June 15, 2000, in Maryville, Tennessee. At the time of his death, Kissick was enrolled for coverage under Met Life group universal insurance policy number 34891. On November 8, 1992, Kissick designated Kalisek as the beneficiary under the policy. On June 9, 2000, Kissick executed a durable power of attorney designating Raibley as his attorney-in-fact. On June 13, 2000, two days prior to his death, Raibley executed a designation of beneficiary form purporting to change the beneficiary of Kissick's life insurance policy to "the Estate of Bert Alan Kissick." The parties dispute whether the latter designation was effective under Tennessee law.
III. Analysis
Tennessee law prohibits an attorney-in-fact from changing the beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy absent a durable power of attorney expressly granting that power. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-108(c)(5) provides that "[n]othing contained in this section . . . shall be construed to vest an attorney in fact with . . . [the power to] . . . [c]hange beneficiary designations on any death benefits payable on account of the death of the principal from any life insurance policy." The Tennessee Court of Appeals, under similar circumstances, has found an attorney-in-fact's beneficiary designation to be ineffectual. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 1995 WL 152536, *7 (Tenn.Ct.App. Apr. 7, 1995). Absent an express grant of the power, an attorney-in-fact cannot change the designated beneficiary under a life insurance policy. Id. at *7.
It is undisputed that the power of attorney executed by Kissick did not contain express language permitting Raibley to change the designated beneficiary under the Met Life group life insurance policy. As such, Raibley's designation of "the Estate of Bert Alan Kissick" as the policy's beneficiary is ineffectual. Kissick's November 8, 1992 designation of defendant Kalisek as the beneficiary remains in effect, and Kissick is entitled to the proceeds under the Met Life policy.
An order shall enter.