Opinion
No. 109297
11-12-2020
CLEVELAND METROPARKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAPHAEL Y. CAUTHEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Appearances: Anne Eisenhower, Cleveland Metroparks Chief Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. John F. Corrigan, for appellant.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 19CRB013103
Appearances:
Anne Eisenhower, Cleveland Metroparks Chief Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. John F. Corrigan, for appellant. MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:
{¶ 1} Raphael Y. Cauthen appeals from a judgment of the Cleveland Municipal Court that convicted him of obstructing official business after a jury trial. Cauthen was found inside his vehicle with a bottle of wine in the Cleveland Metroparks Lakefront Reservation after closing hours. His conviction of obstructing official business stemmed from his conduct during the encounter with the patrolling officers. On appeal, he raises the following two assignments of error for our review:
Appellant's obstruction of official business conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence as required by state and federal due process.
Appellant's obstruction of official business conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 2} After a review of the record and applicable law, we find no merit to the appeal and affirm his conviction.
Substantive and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} On August 4, 2019, two police officers with the Cleveland Metroparks ("Metroparks") were patrolling the Lakefront Reservation in the area of East 55th Street. After the park was closed at 11:00 p.m., the officers came upon Cauthen's parked vehicle. When they approached his vehicle to inquire about his presence in the park after closing hours, they observed a bottle of wine inside the vehicle. Cauthen was uncooperative when the officers investigated his violations of the Metroparks Code. He was subsequently cited for possessing alcohol within the park, in violation of Cleveland Metroparks Ordinances 529.01, a minor misdemeanor, and being at the park after closing hours, in violation of Cleveland Metroparks Ordinances 509.06, also a minor misdemeanor. In addition to these citations, Cauthen was also charged with obstructing official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), a second-degree misdemeanor. This appeal pertains to the charge of obstructing official business only.
{¶ 4} After a jury trial, the jury found Cauthen guilty of obstructing official business. The trial court placed him on community control for three years. On appeal, Cauthen claims his conviction of obstructing official business is unsupported by sufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The Officers' Testimony
{¶ 5} At trial, the Metroparks presented the testimony of Cleveland police officers Bobby Meadows, Race Gordon, and Kevin Huff. A DVD of the dashcam video from Officer Meadows's patrol vehicle accompanied the officers' testimony and was played repeatedly for the jury. On August 4, 2019, Officer Meadows, who was training Officer Gordon that day, was patrolling the Metroparks along the lakefront. Under the park rules, the park closes at 11 p.m., except for those who are fishing along the lakefront. At 11:21 p.m., the officers came across a white Audi, which appeared to be occupied. Officer Meadows pulled his patrol vehicle behind the Audi and turned on the vehicle's dashcam. Officers Meadows and Gordon approached the vehicle to see if the occupant of the vehicle was there for fishing activities.
We note that the dashcam video is missing from the appellate record. This court had ordered the Cleveland Municipal Court Clerk of Courts to supplement the record with the missing DVD, but the clerk's office was unable to locate the missing DVD. The trial judge presiding over this case also sent correspondence to this court indicating her chambers were not in possession of the DVD. While the appellate record does not include the DVD, the pertinent portion of the contents of the DVD is reflected in the officers' testimony.
{¶ 6} Officer Meadows approached the passenger side while Officer Gordon approached the driver's side. Officer Gordon spoke to the driver, Cauthen, and asked for his identification. Gordon repeated his request two or three times before Cauthen reluctantly complied. The dashcam video showed that it took 30 to 40 seconds before Cauthen handed his identification to Gordon, who acknowledged that, although he had to repeatedly ask for Cauthen's identification, Cauthen was not obstructing with official business at that point.
{¶ 7} When Cauthen handed his identification to Officer Gordon, Officer Meadows noticed there was a wine bottle under Cauthen's right arm. Because the presence of alcohol in the park was illegal, the officers asked Cauthen to step outside the vehicle so that they could retrieve the bottle of wine and look for the presence of additional alcohol. Instead of stepping outside, Cauthen appeared to be reaching around in the vehicle in an effort to conceal the wine bottle, while the officers asked Cauthen three or four times to step outside. Officer Gordon finally advised Cauthen that he was being detained and proceeded to open the driver's door. Cauthen exited his vehicle at that point. Although Officer Meadows estimated that it took about five minutes for Cauthen to exit his vehicle, Officer Meadows acknowledged that, based on the dashcam video's timer, only 45 seconds elapsed between the first request for Cauthen to exit the vehicle and when Officer Gordon opened the door. Officer Gordon acknowledged Cauthen exited his vehicle within a minute of his initial request.
{¶ 8} After Cauthen exited the vehicle, while walking toward the officers' patrol vehicle as requested, he locked the vehicle with the remote keys in his hand. The officers explained to Cauthen that alcohol was prohibited in the park and they needed to retrieve the alcohol and to ensure there was no more alcohol inside the vehicle. They asked Cauthen repeatedly to unlock the vehicle door with the keys. Cauthen said "no" and told the officers to obtain a warrant. At one point Cauthen — by this time standing near the officers' patrol vehicle — placed the keys on the hood of the patrol vehicle. The officers asked him if he was now allowing them to use the keys to open his vehicle, Cauthen said "no" and held the keys high above his head, preventing the officers from taking the keys.
{¶ 9} Officer Meadows testified that he advised Cauthen that the officers just wanted to retrieve the bottle and to make sure there was no additional alcohol inside the vehicle and that his refusal to give them his keys fell within the realm of obstructing because they were unable to perform their job. He advised Cauthen that he would be placed in handcuffs if he did not provide them with the keys. Officer Meadows testified he was faced with two choices: either to forcefully enter Cauthen's vehicle or fight Cauthen for the keys. The officers eventually advised Cauthen that he was obstructing official business and placed him in handcuffs. Cauthen finally "let go of the keys in his hand" when he was placed in handcuffs. Officer Huff, who arrived at the scene later, estimated that it took about a minute for the officers to obtain the keys.
Obstructing Official Business
{¶ 10} Obstructing official business is defined in R.C. 2921.31, which states in relevant part:
No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties.
{¶ 11} Obstructing official business as defined in R.C. 2921.31(A) has five essential elements: "(1) an act by the defendant, (2) done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official, (3) that actually hampers or impedes a public official, (4) while the official is acting in the performance of a lawful duty, and (5) the defendant so acts without privilege." State v. Kates, 169 Ohio App.3d 766, 2006-Ohio-6779, 865 N.E.2d 66, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 12} It has been long settled that an affirmative act is required support a conviction of obstructing official business. N. Ridgeville v. Reichbaum, 112 Ohio App.3d 79, 84, 677 N.E.2d 1245 (9th Dist.1996). Therefore, in this case, the state must produce evidence to prove Cauthen committed an affirmative act that hampered or impeded the performance of the lawful duties of the Metroparks police officers.
Issue on Appeal
{¶ 13} On appeal, Cauthen focuses on the short duration of his delay in providing his identification, exiting his vehicle, and giving the officers access to his vehicle to remove the prohibited alcohol. He argues at great length that his delay in compliance was not conduct punishable pursuant to R.C. 2921.31 because the delay was minimal.
{¶ 14} The Metroparks appears to have conceded on appeal that the evidence does not reflect that Cauthen obstructed official business in failing to provide his identification or in failing to exit his vehicle as requested in a timely fashion. Rather, the Metroparks only argues that Cauthen committed the affirmative act required for a charge of obstructing official business in locking his vehicle and holding the keys out of the reach of the officers, which prevented the officers from retrieving the prohibited alcohol as part of their lawful duties.
Case Law Authority
{¶ 15} "Mere failure to obey a law enforcement officer's request does not bring a defendant within the ambit of" the offense of obstructing official business. Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 187 Ohio App.3d 786, 2010-Ohio-2208, 933 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). To support a conviction of obstructing official business, "there must be proof of an affirmative or overt act that hampered or impeded the performance of the lawful duties of a public official." Brooklyn v. Kaczor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98816, 2013-Ohio-2901, ¶ 8. "'One cannot be guilty of obstructing official business by doing nothing because the text of R.C. 2921.31 specifically requires an offender to act.'" Id., quoting State v. Brickner-Latham, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-05-26, 2006-Ohio-609, ¶ 26.
{¶ 16} The courts have found insufficient evidence to support a conviction of obstructing official business where a defendant refused to be fingerprinted, State v. Ellis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108302, 2020-Ohio-111, ¶ 26; where a defendant refused to state his name and age, Kaczor, supra; where a defendant refused to provide his driver's license to the police officer, State v. McCrone, 63 Ohio App.3d 831, 580 N.E.2d 468 (9th Dist.1989); where a defendant refused to get into a police cruiser, State v. Simpson, 82 Ohio App.3d 286, 292, 611 N.E.2d 892 (8th Dist.1992); and where a defendant refused to exit the police vehicle on his own, State v. Morris, 2016-Ohio-8325, 68 N.E.3d 822, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 17} In contrast, sufficient evidence supports the charge where a defendant refused an officer's command to exit a vehicle by clutching the steering wheel and making obscene gestures and shouting expletives, State v. Gannon, 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0053-M, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 15; where a defendant pulled away from the officers as they attempted to remove him from a vehicle, State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23176, 2007-Ohio-622, ¶ 28; where a defendant attempted to put his car in gear and drive away after an investigatory stop, State v. Combs, 66 Ohio App.3d 292, 584 N.E.2d 9 (12th Dist.1990); and where a defendant decided to flee into the house in the midst of a police investigation and attempted to close the door on the officers, State v. Pierce, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-36, 2017-Ohio-4223, ¶ 13.
Sufficiency of Evidence and Manifest Weight
{¶ 18} When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. A reviewing court is not to assess "whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction." State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
{¶ 19} While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met its burden of persuasion. Id. Unlike a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, which raises a question of law, manifest-weight challenges raise factual issues. When a defendant argues his or her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court,
"reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction."Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it. Iler v. Wright, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80555, 2002-Ohio-4279, ¶ 25.
Analysis
{¶ 20} Cauthen characterizes his conduct of locking his vehicle and withholding the keys from the officers as a mere refusal to cooperate with law enforcement officers and argues that a refusal to cooperate was not an affirmative act required by R.C. 2921.31. We disagree. We find Cauthen's conduct went beyond a mere refusal to cooperate. His locking the vehicle's doors and then holding the keys out of the reach of the officers was an affirmative act that hampered and impeded the officers' duties of enforcing the Metroparks ordinances, which included removing the prohibited alcohol from his vehicle.
{¶ 21} Cauthen also claims he did not obstruct official business because he eventually assisted the officers in gaining access to his vehicle after a one-minute delay; he argues the delay in complying with the officers' request was minimal and does not amount to obstruction of official business.
{¶ 22} First, Cauthen's claim that he eventually assisted the officers in gaining access to his vehicle is not borne out by the officers' testimony. The officers testified that, after Cauthen locked his vehicle, he initially placed the keys on the hood of the police vehicle. When the officers asked him if he was allowing the officers to use the keys to unlock his vehicle, he held the keys high above his head, preventing the officers from obtaining the keys. He let go of the keys only when the officers placed him in handcuffs and arrested him for obstructing official business.
{¶ 23} Second, while we are aware there must be some "substantial stoppage" of the officer's progress before an officer is considered to have been hampered or impeded, State v. Buttram, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190034, 2020-Ohio-2709, ¶ 20, citing State v. Stephens, 57 Ohio App.2d 229, 230, 387 N.E.2d 252 (1st Dist.1978), "no finite period of time constitutes a substantial stoppage, 'be the delay * * * thirty seconds or two minutes.'" Id., quoting State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). "If the defendant's act had 'more effect on the performance of the police than silence or a refusal to answer would have had,' then the evidence supports the conviction." Id., quoting State v. Gordon, 9 Ohio App.3d 184, 187, 458 N.E.2d 1277 (1st Dist.1983). Here, although the duration of the delay was no more than one minute, the officers' testimony reflects a substantial stoppage of the performance of their duties: the officers were only able to gain access to Cauthen's vehicle to remove the prohibited alcohol, as they were required to do, after they placed Cauthen under arrest.
Cauthen cites Columbus v. Michel, 55 Ohio App.2d 46, 378 N.E.2d 1077 (10th Dist.1978), to support his claim that a delay in cooperating with the police by momentarily refusing to assist the police with access to one's property for a search does not amount to obstruction of official business. In Michel, the court determined that the defendant's failure to open his apartment door for ten minutes while the police repeatedly knocked on his door was an omission to act, rather than an act, and held that "the mere failure of a person to respond to an officer's request" does not constitute obstructing official business. Michel is not applicable here. Cauthen affirmatively prevented the officers from carrying out their duties. Although the delay was relatively short, the duration of the delay is not the deciding factor of whether obstructing official business occurred. --------
{¶ 24} Finally, without challenging the legality of the officers' conduct in the incident, Cauthen argues he could not be convicted of obstructing official business because the officers did not have the authority to demand that a citizen assist them in a warrantless search of their property. Our review of the transcript does not reflect the officers unlawfully searched the vehicle: the officers' testimony only shows that they demanded the keys to enter Cauthen's vehicle in order to retrieve the wine bottle from the vehicle and to ensure there was no other alcohol inside the vehicle; while Officer Huff did search the vehicle, he testified that the search was a lawful inventory search after the defendant's arrest.
{¶ 25} Viewing the evidence in this case in a light most favorable to the prosecution, therefore, there was sufficient evidence that Cauthen's conduct hampered or impeded the officers' performance of a lawful duty. Moreover, we are mindful that in evaluating a manifest-weight claim, "the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts." State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Having reviewed the entire record, we are not persuaded that the evidence weighs heavily against Cauthen's conviction and the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that his conviction of obstructing official business must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The first and the second assignments lack merit.
{¶ 26} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. /s/_________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE EILEEN T. GALLAGHER., A.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR