Summary
In Metcalf v. City of Tallahassee Police Dep't, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21695, *18 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2001), the suspect who was shoved to the ground and had knee put in his back was suspected of being in a domestic disturbance and had been carrying a firearm at the time police arrived.
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4:00cv152-WS
April 20, 2001
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Harrison Metcalf ("Plaintiff"), seeks damages from Crystopher Knight ("Knight") and Zealey Jones ("Jones") (collectively "Defendants"), both sworn police officers working for Tallahassee Police Department ("TPD"), based on the officers' alleged violations of Plaintiff's civil rights.
Before the court at this time is Defendants' motion (doc. 34) for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded (doc. 42) in opposition to the motion, and the parties have been advised (doc. 44) that the motion would be taken under advisement as of a date certain.
I.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff makes the following allegations:
On or about August 28, 1999, Defendants, Knight and Jones. arrested Plaintiff without probable cause.
While affecting [sic] the above referenced arrest, Defendants, Knight and Jones, without provocation, kicked and struck Plaintiff several times about the head, face and body causing great bodily injury to Plaintiff. Further, Defendants, Knight and Jones, threatened deadly force upon Plaintiff without just cause or provocation.
. . . .
. . . . Plaintiff was beaten about his head, face, neck and other parts of his body by Defendants, Knight and Jones, and the conduct of Defendants, Knight and Jones, was intentional, severe, excessive, willful, vicious, malicious, and without regard for the health, safety or welfare of Plaintiff.
Pl.'s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 13-14, 16.
II.
In support of and in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the parties have submitted affidavits, deposition excerpts, and other evidence that reveals the following:
At approximately 10:30 p.m., August 28, 1999, a 911 operator received a call from a woman who reported a "couple fighting next door." Spellman Aff., Ex. A. The caller said that she could hear "a lot of bumping and a lady hollering" in her neighbor's mobile home located on Lot 17 in Briarwood Manor, 1655 Capital Circle Southeast, Tallahassee, Florida. In response to questions from the 911 operator, the caller repeated several times that she could hear a disturbance in progress on Lot 17.
TPD responded to the 911 call by immediately dispatching all units in Charlie District to Lot 17 in the Briarwood Trailer Park. The dispatcher advised that a domestic disturbance was in progress at that location. Officer Knight was the first to arrive at the scene of the purported disturbance — a disturbance that Knight was trained to treat as a crime in progress. After parking his police vehicle approximately thirty (30) feet up the road from Lot 17, and while waiting for his back-up to arrive, Knight observed the trailer located on Lot 17. All lights were out and he could see no indicia of a disturbance in progress. Consistent with TPD procedures, Knight radioed dispatch to confirm that the 911 caller had indeed identified Lot 17 as the place of the disturbance. The dispatcher assured Knight that he was at the correct lot.
Officer Jones entered the trailer park soon after Knight, disengaging his lights and siren before he parked his vehicle in front of Lot 17. Approaching the trailer, the officers positioned themselves to the west and east of the front door before Knight knocked on the front door, first with his hand, then with his flashlight. After several minutes, a male asked, "Who is it?" Knight responded: "It's the Police Department." Doc. 39, Knight Aff. at ¶ 7. The officers then heard the man — later identified as Plaintiff, Harrison Metcalf — say: "F___ the Police Department." The officers soon after heard the man walk away from the front door toward the interior of the trailer.
Based on Plaintiff's response to their presence, Jones immediately took a position, with his gun drawn, behind a pickup truck that was parked on Lot 17. Knight stayed at the front door, again identifying himself as a police officer and advising Plaintiff that he needed to open the door. After approximately a minute, when Plaintiff cautiously opened the front door (the storm door remained shut), Knight stepped into the light so Plaintiff could observe Knight's TPD uniform.
Seeing a .38 caliber revolver in Plaintiff's hand, Knight immediately drew his weapon and verbally ordered Plaintiff to put his gun down. After repeated and forceful commands from Knight, Plaintiff put his gun on a table approximately four feet from the door, then stepped outside with his hands above his head. Once outside, Plaintiff — a large man weighing over two hundred (200) pounds — was "proned out on the ground and handcuffed." McNeil Aff., Ex. A. at 4.
According to Plaintiff, Knight shoved Plaintiff down to the ground, putting his knees in Plaintiff's back while Jones assisted in putting handcuffs on Plaintiff. Plaintiff says that when he was stretched out on the ground, Knight told him that he was under arrest. The officers deny that any such statement was made.
Once handcuffed, the officers lifted Plaintiff from the ground, escorted him to Jones's patrol car, and secured him in the back seat. In Plaintiff's words, he was "jerked" up from the ground and "slung" into the back seat of the police vehicle. He says that, in the process, he hit his head and/or eye on the corner of the door. Both officers deny that Plaintiff was struck, hit, kneed, or slung by either officer, or that Plaintiff hit his head or any other part of his body on the patrol car.
While Plaintiff was detained in the patrol car, Jones spoke with Plaintiff's wife, who was standing outside the trailer. When Jones explained that he and Knight had been dispatched to her trailer on a 911 call reporting a domestic disturbance, Mrs. Metcalf denied that there had been a disturbance at their trailer. With Mrs. Metcalf's consent, the officers conducted a quick sweep of the premises but found no signs of a disturbance.
With Plaintiff still in the patrol car, Knight advised TPD dispatch of the situation. He then contacted the 911 caller, a woman living in a trailer on Lot 16, who advised Knight that she had intended to identify Lot 15, not Lot 17, as the place of the disturbance. After Knight advised Jones that the 911 caller had confused Lot 15 with Lot 17, the officers released Plaintiff before they went to investigate the situation at Lot 15.
According to Knight, Plaintiff was released after being detained in the patrol car for approximately five (5) minutes. In contrast, Plaintiff maintains that he was confined to the patrol car for approximately forty (40) minutes. He says that he is confident of his estimate of the time not because he saw a clock or watch but vehicle. He says that, in the process, he hit his head and/or eye on the corner of the door. Both officers deny that Plaintiff was struck, hit, kneed, or slung by either officer, or that Plaintiff hit his head or any other part of his body on the patrol car.
While Plaintiff was detained in the patrol car, Jones spoke with Plaintiff's wife, who was standing outside the trailer. When Jones explained that he and Knight had been dispatched to her trailer on a 911 call reporting a domestic disturbance, Mrs. Metcalf denied that there had been a disturbance at their trailer. With Mrs. Metcalf's consent, the officers conducted a quick sweep of the premises but found no signs of a disturbance.
With Plaintiff still in the patrol car, Knight advised TPD dispatch of the situation. He then contacted the 911 caller, a woman living in a trailer on Lot 16, who advised Knight that she had intended to identify Lot 15, not Lot 17, as the place of the disturbance. After Knight advised Jones that the 911 caller had confused Lot 15 with Lot 17, the officers released Plaintiff before they went to investigate the situation at Lot 15.
According to Knight, Plaintiff was released after being detained in the patrol car for approximately five (5) minutes. In contrast, Plaintiff maintains that he was confined to the patrol car for approximately forty (40) minutes. He says that he is confident of his estimate of the time not because he saw a clock or watch but because he is a "pretty good judge of time." Pl.'s Dep. at 34.
During his deposition, Plaintiff actually gave two different estimates of the time he was detained. After initially stating that he was detained for forty minutes, he later estimated that he was in the patrol car "close to an hour." Pl.'s Dep. at 34.
When they finished their investigation at Lot 15, the officers returned to Plaintiff's home and attempted to apologize for their mistake. Angry and upset, Plaintiff complained about his heart condition and a sore wrist. While the officers could see Plaintiff's scars from open heart surgery, they could see no bruising, redness, or obvious injury to Plaintiff's wrist. Plaintiff advised the officers that he was on the phone with his lawyer.
III.
The Fourth Amendment protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV (emphasis added). A "seizure" occurs when a police "officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In this case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when he was handcuffed and placed in the rear of Jones's patrol car. Whether the seizure was reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene without regard to the officer's underlying intent or motivation.
While not all seizures are unlawful, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that "any curtailment of a person's liberty by the police must be supported at least by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity." Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court held that the Fourth Amendment allows a police officer to stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. "Reasonable suspicion" has been defined as "some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
In this case, the facts known to Defendants when they "seized" Plaintiff included: (1) TPD issued an "all units" dispatch based upon a 911 call reporting a domestic disturbance in progress at Lot 17 in Briarwood Trailer Park; (2) dispatch confirmed that Lot 17 was the reported location of the crime in progress after Defendants arrived at the scene; (3) Plaintiff responded to Defendants' announced presence at his front door with an obscenity and a reluctance to open the door; and (4) Plaintiff was holding a .38 caliber revolver in his hand when he ultimately opened the door. Under the totality of these circumstances, the court is confident that Defendants had reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was involved in the reported disturbance.
The court's reasonableness inquiry does not end, however, with a finding that Defendants had a reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff. Under Terry and its progeny, the court's inquiry is a dual one. If the court first determines that an officer's action was justified at its inception, then the court must decide whether the officer's action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. In other words, this court must determine whether the scope of Plaintiff's detention exceeded permissible bounds. Such a determination is governed by common sense and ordinary human experience, not rigid criteria. United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1989). Factors relevant to the decision include "the law enforcement purposes served by the detention, the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation, the scope and intrusiveness of the detention, and the duration of the detention." United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 1988),cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1137, 103 L.Ed.2d 198 (1989).
Here, the uncontroverted evidence reveals that Defendants were dispatched to investigate a reported "crime in progress" soon after TPD received a 911 call from a woman who reported hearing a domestic disturbance — banging, bumping, and yelling — inside her neighbor's trailer. When Defendants initially announced their presence at the alleged scene of the disturbance, they were met by a man, Plaintiff, who was reluctant to cooperate. Plaintiff shouted an obscenity ("F___ the police!"), responded slowly to the officers' commands, and ultimately greeted the officers with a loaded weapon in his hand. To protect their safety and to prevent Plaintiff from jeopardizing their investigation, Defendants took the reasonable precaution of handcuffing Plaintiff and placing him in the back of a patrol car while they proceeded to assess the situation. Defendants then diligently talked with Plaintiff's wife, swept the residence, reported their findings to dispatch, and contacted the 911 caller for additional information. As soon as Defendants learned that the 911 caller had mistakenly identified Lot 17 as the scene of the domestic disturbance, Plaintiff was released. Given the totality of these circumstances, and assuming that Plaintiff was detained not for five minutes, as asserted by Defendants, but for as long as forty minutes or so, as claimed by Plaintiff, the court finds that Defendants' detention or "seizure" of Plaintiff was reasonable. See United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.) (finding an officer's investigatory stop, during which the suspect was placed in handcuffs, secured in the back of a patrol car, and detained for approximately seventy-five minutes, to be reasonable), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 357, 148 L.Ed.2d 287 (2000).
The court is not persuaded, moreover, that Defendants' "seizure" of Plaintiff amounted to an "arrest" requiring probable cause. To be sure, if a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion continues too long or becomes unreasonably intrusive, it ripens into a de facto arrest that must be based on probable cause. No bright-line rule exists, however, to assist either an officer or a court in determining when an investigative stop ripens into an arrest. Instead, "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
The Supreme Court has long held that, in effecting an investigatory stop under Terry, police officers are justified in taking reasonable steps to ensure their personal safety so long as they possess "an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). It follows that an investigatory stop does not necessarily ripen into an arrest because an officer draws his weapon, United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1983); or handcuffs a suspect, United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1989); or orders a suspect to lie face down on the ground, Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1493 (11th Cir. 1991); or secures a suspect in the back of a patrol car, United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, an investigatory stop does not automatically become an arrest simply because an officer mirandizes the suspect or utters the words: "You are under arrest." See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2256-57, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (explaining that whether a seizure is characterized as an investigatory stop or arrest depends on the nature and degree of the intrusion and not on whether the officer pronounces the detainee "under arrest"); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that mirandizing a detainee does not convert a Terry stop into an arrest);United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining that a Terry stop did not ripen into an arrest even though the officers approached the suspects with weapons drawn, searched the suspects' vehicle, took the car keys to prevent movement, gave one suspect Miranda warnings, and took the suspects to a police van to sign a consent to search form), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 872, 112 S.Ct. 209, 116 L.Ed.2d 167 (1991).
There are also no rigid time limitations or bright line rules regarding the duration of a permissible Terry stop. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (declining to adopt an "outside time limitation" for a permissible Terry stop); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 2, 2001). Again, the test is one of "common sense and ordinary human experience." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685. In Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, the Supreme Court explained: "In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." See United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d at 1350 (rejecting defendant's contention that because she was detained for approximately seventy-five minutes in handcuffs in the back of a patrol car, her detention exceeded the duration of an allowable Terry stop and ripened into a full scale arrest); Hardy, 855 F.2d at 761 (approving a Terry stop of fifty minutes duration). Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (suggesting that 90 minutes is "probably" too long for a Terry stop).
Here, having already determined that it was reasonable for Defendants to secure Plaintiff while they investigated a possible crime in progress, that Defendants pursued their investigation diligently, and that Defendants released Plaintiff as soon as their suspicions were dispelled, this court rejects Plaintiff's argument that his detention amounted to an unlawful "arrest."
IV.
Turning to Plaintiff's claim that Defendants used excessive force against him, the court notes that Plaintiff has produced no evidence that "Defendants, Knight and Jones, without provocation, kicked and struck Plaintiff several times about the head, face and body causing great bodily injury to Plaintiff" or that "Plaintiff was beaten about his head, face, neck and other parts of his body by Defendants." Pl.'s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 14 16. At most, there is evidence that Plaintiff was "shoved" to the ground, "kneed" in the back, "jerked" up from the ground, and "slung" into the car.
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 claim based upon the use of excessive force in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen arises from the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Court held, any such claim must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard — a standard that does not take into account an officer's underlying intent or motivation. As the Graham court explained:
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. . . .
As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, . . . the "reasonableness" inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. . . . An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397.
Since Graham was decided, the Eleventh Circuit has reaffirmed the principle "that the application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding de minimis force where an officer "grabbed [the suspect] from behind by the shoulder and wrist, threw him against a van three or four feet away, kneed him in the back and pushed his head into the side of the van, searched his groin area in an uncomfortable manner, and handcuffed him"). Under the circumstances in this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that the force used by Defendants was no more than de minimis was not clearly excessive to the need for force, and was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances known to Defendants at the time.
V.
Even if Plaintiff were able to demonstrate that Defendants used excessive force, the court finds that Plaintiff has not established that Defendants' acts violated clearly established law. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that for the law to be "clearly established," "case law must ordinarily have been earlier developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that what he is doing violates federal law." Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000). In the context of Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, the Eleventh Circuit has said: "We have noted that generally no bright line exists for identifying when force is excessive; we have therefore concluded that unless a controlling and materially similar case declares the official's conduct unconstitutional, a defendant is usually entitled to qualified immunity." Priester, 208 F.3d at 926. For qualified immunity to be unavailable to a defendant, "preexisting law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances."Priester, 208 F.3d at 927 (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149-1150 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1994) ( en banc)).
Plaintiff has not cited, nor has this court found, any controlling, materially similar and/or particularized caselaw that compels the conclusion that what Defendants did in this case violates federal law. Furthermore, this is not a case where Defendants' conduct "was so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force that [Defendants] had to know [they] w[ere] violating the Constitution even without caselaw on point." Priester 208 F.3d at 926 (quoting Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997)). Defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity.
VI.
The court having found that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue for trial, it is ORDERED:
Defendants' motion (doc. 34) for summary judgment is GRANTED.
DONE AND ORDERED.