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Merritt v. Hooshang Construction, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jun 26, 1995
216 A.D.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)

Opinion

June 26, 1995

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Becker, J.).


Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with costs payable by the defendant Hooshang Construction, Inc., to the plaintiff and with one bill of costs payable by the plaintiff to defendants the Town of Hempstead, James Thomas Martino, James Thomas Martino Associates, and Hooshang Ahdoot.

It is well settled that a claim against a municipality for negligently issuing a certificate of occupancy accrues when the certificate was issued and not when the injury occurs or the defective condition is discovered (see, Klein v. City of Yonkers, 53 N.Y.2d 1011, affg 73 A.D.2d 931; Pleasant Ridge Townhouses Homeowners' Assn. v. T D Constr. Corp., 181 A.D.2d 871; Matter of Stelman v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 146 A.D.2d 632). It is undisputed that the complaint in this case was filed more than one year and 90 days from the date that the defendant Town of Hempstead (hereinafter the Town) issued a certificate of occupancy for the plaintiff's house, which is the subject of this appeal. Therefore, the complaint, insofar as it is asserted against the Town, is barred by the one-year-and-90-day Statute of Limitations (see, General Municipal Law § 50-i [c]).

It is undisputed that the architectural plans created by the defendant James Thomas Martino (hereinafter Martino) of the defendant James Thomas Martino Associates (hereinafter Martino Associates) were used by the builder-vendor, the defendant Hooshang Construction, Inc. (hereinafter Hooshang Construction), when constructing the plaintiff's house. It is also undisputed that Hooshang Construction deviated from Martino's plans, and the plaintiff alleges that the deviation was the proximate cause of the house's defects. Therefore, Martino and Martino Associates are not liable to the plaintiff for negligently designing the house.

The defendant Hooshang Ahdoot (hereinafter Ahdoot), an officer of Hooshang Construction, allegedly made fraudulent misrepresentations to the plaintiff which induced the plaintiff to purchase the house. A review of the record reveals, however, that the statements allegedly made by Adhoot are not actionable under a fraud theory of liability because they are based on the same allegations that give rise to a breach of contract cause of action (see, Brenner v. De Bruin, 186 A.D.2d 701, 703; McKernin v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, 176 A.D.2d 233, 234; Zaug v. Dwyer/Berry Constr. Corp., 152 A.D.2d 565, 566; Tuck Indus. v. Reichhold Chems., 151 A.D.2d 565, 566).

The plaintiff alleges that Ahdoot participated in the negligent construction of the house. However, allegations against a corporation and its officer for negligent construction of a house state a breach of contract cause of action and not a tort cause of action (see, 431 Conklin Corp. v. Rice, 181 A.D.2d 716, 717-718; Westminster Constr. Co. v. Sherman, 160 A.D.2d 867, 868). Ahdoot is not personally bound by the contract of sale. Thus, he may not be held personally liable merely because, while acting for Hooshang Construction, he made decisions and took steps that resulted in Hooshang Construction breaching its contract with the plaintiff (see, 431 Conklin Corp. v. Rice, supra, at 717-718; Westminster Constr. Co. v. Sherman, supra, at 868).

In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court properly granted the respective motions of the Town, Martino and Martino Associates, and Ahdoot for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against them (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557).

However, Hooshang Construction, as the builder-vendor of the house, impliedly warranted that the house was constructed in a skillful manner, free of material, latent defects (see, General Business Law § 777-a; Caceci v. Di Canio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52). The record reveals that there is a factual dispute regarding whether the alleged defects in the house were visible when the plaintiff took title. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied Hooshang Construction's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it. Miller, J. P, Thompson, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Merritt v. Hooshang Construction, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jun 26, 1995
216 A.D.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
Case details for

Merritt v. Hooshang Construction, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:RICHARD MERRITT, Appellant-Respondent, v. HOOSHANG CONSTRUCTION, INC.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Jun 26, 1995

Citations

216 A.D.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
628 N.Y.S.2d 792

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