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awarding solo practitioner with 22 years experience $250 per hour
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06 CV 5912 (RJD) (KAM).
August 16, 2007
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
By order dated February 28, 2007, the Honorable Chief Judge Dearie referred this matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), to the undersigned for an inquest on damages following a motion by plaintiff for the entry of default against defendants Chalta V.R. Reddy ("Reddy") and Deepak Vadhan ("Vadhan") for allegedly defaulting on a loan guaranty, The Clerk of the Court noted the default of Reddy and Vadhan on January 9, 2007. In support of its damages claim and motion for entry of a default judgment, plaintiff submitted the declaration of Edmond J. Blough, dated May 29, 2007 (doc. no. 22 ("Blough Decl.")), a supplementary declaration of Edmond J. Blough, dated June 27, 2007 (doc. no. 32 ("Suppl. Blough Decl.")), the declaration of Spencer L. Schneider, Esq., dated May 2007 (doc. no. 23 ("Schneider Decl.")), and a memorandum of law (doc. no. 21). In its motion for default judgment, plaintiff seeks: (1) the unpaid principal of all "WCMA Loans," i.e., all advances made by plaintiff; (2) interest at the "Default Rate," as defined in the loan agreement; (3) a "Late Fee" and "Line Fee," and (4) attorney fees and legal expenses as per the loan agreement. By letters dated June 5, 2007 (doc. no. 26) and June 27, 2007 (doc. no. 32), plaintiff clarified that, pursuant to the guaranty executed by defendant Reddy, plaintiff was seeking $100,000 in principal, plus interest and attorneys' fees, against Reddy, as set forth in the supplemental declaration of Edmond Blough. (See also Blough Decl., Exh. C.)
Having considered plaintiff's submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court respectfully recommends that a judgment be entered against Vadhan in the sum of $539,582.37, inclusive of $495,354.10 in principal, $10,031.14 in interest as of August 16, 2007, $24,413.80 in late fees, $7,500 in line fees, and $2,283.33 in attorney's fees. The court also respectfully recommends that the court award interest against Vadhan at the rate of $133.75 per day from August 16, 2007 until the date judgment is entered, after which interest shall accrue at the rate provided by law. As to Reddy, the court respectfully recommends that judgment be entered against him in the sum of $102,283.33, inclusive of $100,000 in principal and $2,283.33 in attorney fees.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Merrill Lynch Banking Financial Services ("Merrill Lynch" or "MLBFS") is a financial services firm with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois (Docket no. 1, Complaint, dated Nov. 1, 2006 ("Compl."), ¶ 1.) Defendants Reddy and Vadhan are principals of defendant Brook-Island Medical Associates, P.C. (Compl., ¶ 11). On November 1, 2004, defendant Brook-Island entered into a Working Capital Management Account ("WCMA") Loan and Security Agreement ("Loan Agreement") with Merrill Lynch, under which Merrill Lynch extended Brook-Island a $500,000 commercial line of credit. In return, Reddy and Vadhan gave plaintiff "their absolute and unconditional personal guaranties of Brook-Island's indebtedness." (Id.) Defendant Reddy guaranteed $100,000 of the debt, plus interest, and cost and fees to enforce the Guaranty. (Blough Decl., Exh. C.) The line of credit expired on October 31, 2005, and plaintiff temporarily extended it to June 15, 2006 to allow defendants additional time to provide necessary financial documents. (See id., ¶ 13.) Upon maturity, the debt became due and a notice of default was sent on June 19, 2006. (See Blough Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants failed to pay and thus triggered an event of default. (Compl., ¶ 13.) This event entitled plaintiff to accelerate and recover the entire indebtedness. (See id.) Further, this same event caused the indebtedness guaranteed under the Guaranties to become "immediately due and payable," and defendants Reddy and Vadhan to become liable as guarantors. (Id., ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on November 1, 2006, and sought to recover indebtedness under the Guaranties in the amount of $467,895.84, including interest as of that date, plus further accrued interest and attorneys' fees. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Defendants Reddy and Vadhan failed to appear, respond or otherwise defend, despite receiving notice and opportunity to do so. (See doc. nos. 3 and 7, Certificates of Service.)
DISCUSSION
A. Default Judgment Standard
Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a party moves for judgment against an adverse party who has failed to answer or otherwise appear in the action, the court may enter judgment against the defaulting party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). When a default judgment is entered, the defendant's failure to respond constitutes an admission of the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except as to the claims relating to damages. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981). Moreover, an inquest by affidavit, without an in-person hearing, may be conducted as long as the court can ensure "a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment." Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiff has made a motion for entry of a default judgment and defendants have failed to respond to the complaint or oppose plaintiff's motion. Given defendants' opportunity to respond and apparent lack of interest in the proceeding, there is no reason to delay the proceeding any further. Judgment by default is therefore appropriate, and accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that default judgment be entered against defendants in the amounts specified below.
B. Liability
Under New York Law, in order to establish a prima facie case for entitlement to recover on a guaranty, a plaintiff must show: (1) an absolute and unconditional guaranty; (2) the underlying debt; and (3) failure of the guarantor to perform under the guaranty. See Fundex Capital Corp. v. Rochelle, No. CV-05-2972, 2006 WL 547794, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006) (Report and Recommendation) (citing Buffalo and Erie Regional Development Corp. v. World Auto Parts, Inc., 306 A.D.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)),adopted, 2006 WL 1586557 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2006); Kensington House Co. v. Oram, 293 A.D.2d 304, 304-05 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
In this case, plaintiff has satisfied each element. First, by signing the Guaranty Agreements, defendant Vadhan gave his absolute and unconditional guaranty of Brook-Island's indebtedness to plaintiff and promised to pay the debt in its entirety upon default. Reddy also provided an absolute and unconditional guaranty of Brook-Island's indebtedness to plaintiff and promised to pay the debt, up to $100,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees, upon default. (See Blough Decl., Exhs. B and C, Unconditional Guaranty Agreements, dated November 1, 2004.) Vadhan's Guaranty Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he undersigned ("Guarantor") hereby unconditionally guarantees to MLBFS: (I) the prompt and full payment when due, by acceleration or otherwise, of all sums now or any time hereafter due from Customer to MLBFS under the Guaranteed Documents. . . . Upon the occurrence and during the continuance of any Event of Default under the Guaranteed Documents, any or all of the indebtedness hereby guaranteed then existing shall, at the option of MLBFS, become immediately due and payable from Guarantor. . . .
Reddy's Guaranty Agreement contains the same language, but limits his liability to $100,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees. (See Blough Decl., Exh. C.)
Second, as of April 30, 2006, the underlying principal owed by Brook-Island was $487,296.40, plus interest thereafter at the daily rate of $132.64 from May 31, 2007. (See id., ¶¶ 12, 18.) Third, "prompt and full payment" became due after a notice of default was sent on June 19, 2006. (Id., Exhs. E and F.) Because plaintiff has thus made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to recover on defendants' guaranties, the court respectfully recommends that the plaintiff recover on the guaranties from defendants Vadhan and Reddy.
C. Damages
After establishing liability, the court must conduct an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. DCH Auto Group (USA) Inc. v. Fit You Best Auto Inc., No. CV-05-2973, 2006 WL 279055, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006) (citingTransatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997)). Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when granting a default judgment, if "it is necessary to take an account or determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence . . . the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. . . ." As noted above, the Second Circuit has approved the holding of a damages inquest by affidavit without an in-person court hearing following a default, "as long as [the court has] ensured that there was a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment."Transatlantic, 109 F.3d at 111 (quoting Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40). Thus, the movant need only show adequate support for the relief it seeks. See Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 158-59. Where, as here, default has been noted, a party's recovery is limited to the amount requested in its demand for judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c); see also Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 985 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1993).
In its motion for default judgment, plaintiff seeks: (1) the unpaid principal of all "WCMA Loans," i.e., all advances made by MLBFS; (2) interest at the "Default Rate," as defined in the loan agreement; (3) a "Late Fee" and "Line Fee," and (4) attorney fees and legal expenses as per the loan agreement. (Blough Decl., ¶ 18.)
1. Defendants Vadhan and Reddy's Obligations as Guarantors
The complaint alleges claims against Vadhan and Reddy, who, on November 1, 2004, collectively gave their absolute and unconditional guaranties of Brook-Island's indebtedness to plaintiff upon a default of the Working Capital Management Account note, and failed to repay that indebtedness when it became due on June 15, 2006. (Compl., ¶ 13.) However, unlike defendant Vadhan, the liability of defaulting defendant Reddy is limited under his guaranty to the principal amount of $100,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees. (Blough Decl., Exhs. B and C at 3; doc. nos. 26 and 32.) Reddy's guaranty further provides that:
[S]aid maximum liability [of $100,000] shall be increased by: (I) interest, from the date which is five business days after the date of receipt by guarantor of a payment demand to the date of payment, at the highest "interest rate" under the guaranteed documents, (ii) any additional advances by MLBFS to customer after the date of such payment demand not repaid by customer, and (iii) all out of pocket expenses of MLBFS in enforcing this guaranty, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.
(Blough Decl., Exh. C at 3.) As a result, defendant Reddy is only liable for $100,000 of the principal, plus outstanding interest, and attorney's fees, while defendant Vadhan is liable for the entire principal, plus interest, late fees, line fees and attorney fees.
2. The Unpaid Principal and Interest
As of June 27, 2007, the outstanding principal of the loan was $495,354.10. (Suppl. Blough Decl., ¶ 1, Exh. A.) According to the May 31, 2007 account statement submitted as Exhibit A to the supplemental Blough declaration, the balance in May 2007 was $487,296.40, upon which May interest charges were added in the amount of $4,111.70. (Id.) Pursuant to the explicit terms of the Loan Agreement, interest charges are capitalized every month when those interest charges are not repaid. (Blough Decl., Exh. A, ¶ 2.2(e)(I).)
As the May 2007 statement also shows (see Suppl. Blough Aff., Exh. A), interest was calculated at the "Default Rate," as explicitly provided for in the Loan Agreement, because defendant Brook-Island defaulted under the Loan Agreement. (Blough Decl., ¶¶ 1.1 and 2.2(e)(I).) The Default Rate is defined as "an annual interest rate equal to the lesser of: (I) two percentage points over the Interest Rate; or (ii) the highest interest rate allowed by applicable law." (Id., ¶ 1.1; Exh. G at 3.) While the non-default interest rate on the loan is defined as
a variable per annum rate of interest equal to the sum of 2.40% plus the One-Month LIBOR. "One-Month LIBOR" shall mean, as of the date of any determination, the interest rate then most recently published in the "Money Rates" section of the Wall Street Journal as the one-month London Interbank Offered Rate.
(Id., Exh. A, ¶ 1.1.) The interest charged for the month of April 2007 was $3,946.00 (id., ¶ 13 and Exh. G at 3), and $4,111.70 for the period May 1 — June 1, 2007. (Suppl. Blough Decl., Exh. A at 3.)
Because the defendants have defaulted on the loan, interest will continue to accrue on the debt at the Default Rate. (Blough Decl., ¶ 14.) As a result, plaintiff calculated that the per diem interest on the debt is $133.75 per day, from June 28, 2007 until the date judgment is entered. (Suppl. Blough Decl., ¶ 1.) Although not elucidated in its submissions, plaintiff presumably calculated the per diem interest rate by applying 9.72% to the principal, $495,354.10, and dividing that number by twelve (as the rate is yearly) and then by twenty-six (the number of days between June 1 — 27, 2007). As of June 27, 2007, the accrued interest for the month of June totaled $3,477.39. (Id.; see also Blough Decl., Exh. A, ¶ 2.1.) Thus, the court respectfully recommends that an additional $6553.75 ($133.75 x number of days between 6/28 and 8/16/07) be granted to the plaintiff for interest accrued through the date this order is entered, plus $133.75 per day thereafter until the entry of judgment as to defendant Vadhan.
Plaintiff's June 5, 2007 and June 27, 2007 letters regarding interest sought from defendant Reddy are inconsistent as to the amounts sought. Moreover, because plaintiff failed to provide interest calculations for the $100,000 principal owed by defendant Reddy, the court respectfully recommends that interest be denied as to Reddy.
3. Late and Line Fees
Defendant Brook-Island is also obligated to pay Merrill Lynch a late fee as per the Loan Agreement. (Blough Decl., Exh. A ¶ 2.2) According to the agreement, the debtor is responsible for five percent of the outstanding indebtedness as of the notice of default, which in this case was provided on June 19, 2006. (Blough Decl., Exh. E.) As stated in the letter of default, the debt as of June 19, 2006 amounted to $488,276.10. (Id.) Five percent of $488,276.10 is $24,413.80, and thus the court respectfully recommends plaintiff be granted an additional $24,413.80 in late fees from defendant Vadhan.
Plaintiff is similarly entitled to a Line Fee, which is $5000 per year under the Loan Agreement. (Blough Decl., Exh. A, ¶ 1.1) This fee is given in consideration of the extension of the WCMA Line of Credit by Merrill Lynch to the defendant during the period from the Activation date, November 1, 2004, to the Initial Maturity Date, October 31, 2005. (Id., ¶ 2.2(1)(I).) Because the Maturity Date was extended to June 15, 2006, the account was open for a year and a half. (Id., Exh. D, ¶ 5.) Thus, plaintiff is entitled to a pro-rated fee of $7,500 against defendant Vadhan, calculated as follows: $5000 for October 31, 2005 through October 31, 2006, and $2500 for November 1, 2006 through May 31, 2006. (Blough Decl., ¶ 16.)
4. Attorneys' Fees and Legal Expenses
According to the Loan Agreement, defendant Brook-Island is further liable for "all fees and out-of-pocket expenses (including attorney's fees and legal expenses) incurred by Merrill Lynch in connection with the . . . collection [and] enforcement . . . of this Loan Agreement." (Blough Decl., Exh. A, ¶ 3.7(d)(iii).) As a result, plaintiff requests $2,283.33 in attorney fees for 9.133 attorney hours spent prosecuting this claim. (Schneider Decl., ¶ 3.)
A determination of the appropriate award for attorneys' fees rests soundly within the discretion of the district court. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). "The party seeking reimbursement bears the burden of proving the reasonableness and necessity of hours spent and rates charged."Morin v. Nu-Way Plastering Inc., No. 03-CV-405, 2005 WL 3470371, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005) (citing New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983)). "In determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees . . . courts have generally used the lodestar method, in combination with the twelve factors articulated in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1971)." Emerald Investments, LLC v. Porter Bridge Loan Co., No. 05-CV-1598, 2007 WL 1834507, at *1, 5 (D. Conn. 2007). However, in a recent decision, Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 484 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2007), amended, 2007 WL 2004106 (2d Cir. July 12, 2007), the Second Circuit explained that the better course is:
The twelve factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.Emerald Investments, 2007 WL 1834507, at *5 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19).
for the district court, in exercising its considerable discretion, to bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that [the Second Circuit] and other courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney's fees in setting a reasonable hourly rate. The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay. In determining what rate a paying client would be willing to pay, the district court should consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in mind that a reasonable paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively. The district court should also consider that such an individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from being associated with the case. The district court should then use that hourly rate to calculate what can properly be termed the "presumptively reasonable fee."Arbor Hill, 2007 WL 2004106, at *7. "After determining the amount of the presumptively reasonable fee, the court may use its discretion to increase or reduce the amount based on the particular circumstances of the case." Emerald Investments, 2007 WL 1834507 at *5 (quoting Chan v. Sung Yue Tung Corp., No. 03-CV-6048, 2007 WL 1373118, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2007)).
The Second Circuit directs that the district court,
in determining what a reasonable paying client would be willing to pay, [to] consider factors including, but not limited to, the complexity and difficulty of the case, the availab[ility] and capacity of the client's other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether the attorney had an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or initiated the representation himself, whether the attorney was initially acting pro bono (such that a client might be aware that the attorney expected low or nonexistent remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) the attorney expected from the representation.Arbor Hill, 2007 WL 2004106, at *1; see also Emerald Investments, 2007 WL 1834507, at *5 n. 12.
In addition, "the Supreme Court directed that district courts should use the prevailing market rates in the community, in calculating the lodestar, or what the Second Circuit is now calling the `presumptively reasonable fee.'" Lynch v. Town of Southampton, No. CV 05-4499, 2007 WL 1876501, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2007) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). The community is defined as the district in which the court sits. See Arbor Hill, 2007 WL 2004106, at *7; Lynch, 2007 WL 1876501, at *12; Polk v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 772 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983).
Finally, a party seeking attorney fees "must support that request with contemporaneous time records, that show `for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.'" Cablevision Systems New York City Corp. v. Diaz, No. CV-07-4340, 2002 WL 31045855, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2002) (quoting Carey, 711 F.2d at 1154); see also Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. The Body Shop, No. 00 Civ. 1089, 2002 WL 393091 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2002) (denying award of attorneys' fees where information regarding how the fees were accumulated was not provided even though the requested amount of $1,000 was reasonable).
In this case, plaintiff's counsel has been in practice for twenty-two years, the last eighteen of which have been as a solo practitioner, and charges a rate of $250 per hour. (Schneider Decl., ¶ 2). Courts in this district have found that a reasonable rate for an attorney with experience comparable to that of plaintiff's counsel is $250 per hour. See Lynch, 2007 WL 1876501, at *13 (finding an hourly rate of $250 to be reasonable for an attorney with more than twenty years of experience);Morin, 2005 WL 3470371 at *2 (finding an hourly rate of $200-250 for senior associates to be reasonable); Martas v. Zaro's Bake Shop, Inc., No. CV-02-5895, 2002 WL 1267999, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. March 29, 2002) (finding an hourly rate of $250 for a partner to be reasonable); Fink v. City of New York, 154 F. Supp. 2d 403, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (awarding partners the rate of $200 — $250). The court finds that a "reasonable paying client" would be willing to pay the rate of $250 an hour for an attorney with over twenty years of experience in order to recover on a debt of more than $600,000, even in a case where the defendants defaulted, thus obviating the need for litigation. Accordingly, after considering the recent Arbor Hill standards, the court fixes the hourly compensation of plaintiff's counsel at $250. Cf. Warner Bros. Ent. v. Carsagno, No. 06 CV 2676, 2007 WL 1655666, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (declining to award attorneys' fees for the work of individuals the court could not identify).
With respect to the number of hours counsel worked, plaintiff's counsel states that he expended 9.133 hours in this case, but failed to submit contemporaneous records. (Schneider Decl., ¶ 3.) Nevertheless, plaintiff's counsel did submit a detailed summary of the legal services performed and the corresponding time requirements. Cf. Kingvision, 2002 WL 393091, at *5 ("Plaintiff does not support its request by any documentation showing how the fees were accumulated . . . [and] plaintiff's failure to submit detailed information regarding attorney's fees and costs precludes such an award."). The court finds that these hours do not appear "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary."Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Thus, it is respectfully recommended that plaintiff's request for $2,283.33 in attorney fees, for 9.133 hours of work, at a rate of $250 per hour, be granted against defendants Vadhan and Reddy.
Therefore, as set forth the in Supplemental Blough Declaration, with respect to the unpaid principal, interest, late and line fees and attorneys' fees under the Loan Agreement, the plaintiff is entitled to $539,582.37 against defendant Vadhan, as of the date this order is entered, as follows: Principal Interest Late Fees Line Fee Per diem interest as of 8/16/07 Attorneys' Fees TOTAL:
................................. $495,354.10 (through June 1, 2007) .................................. $3,477.39 (through June 27, 2007) ................................. $24,413.80 .................................. $7500 ........... $6553.75 (133.75/day between June 28, 2007 and the date of this order, and continuing at that rate until judgment is entered) ........................... $2,283.33 $539,582.37 (plus interest until judgment is entered) As against defendant Reddy, the plaintiff is entitled to $102,283.33, calculated as follows: Principal Attorneys' Fees TOTAL: ................................. $100,000 (through June 1, 2007) ........................... $2,283.33 $102,283.33CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully recommended that a judgment be entered against Vadhan in the sum of $539,582.37, inclusive of $495,354.10 in principal, $10,031.14 in interest as of August 16, 2007, $24,413.80 in late fees, $7,500 in line fees, and $2,283.33 in attorney's fees. The court also respectfully recommends that the court award interest against Vadhan at the rate of $133.75 per day from August 16, 2007 until the date judgment is entered, after which interest shall accrue at the rate provided by law. As to Reddy, the court respectfully recommends that judgment be entered against him in the sum of $102,283.33, inclusive of $100,000 in principal and $2,283.33 in attorney fees.Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with United States Chief District Judge Raymond J. Dearie within ten days of the date of its entry. Failure to object within ten days of the date of entry of this Report and Recommendation will preclude appellate review by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); E.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 6.3; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989). Any requests for extension of time to file objections should be made to Chief Judge Dearie.
Plaintiff shall serve, by hand or overnight delivery, a copy of this Report and Recommendation on defendants Vadhan and Reddy, and file affidavits of service, no later than August 17, 2007.