Opinion
No. 3426.
Decided December 7, 1943.
Where a liability insurance policy contains an exclusionary clause as to bodily injuries received by an employee of the insured while engaged in the business of the insured, the relationship of employer and employee within the meaning of the policy was not established by the fact that A had been employed the previous summer by the insured but on the occasion of the accident, after both had spent the winter in Florida, and were returning home together with an understanding that A might resume her work for the insured if a more remunerative employment were not found, notwithstanding the fact that the insured defrayed a portion of A's expenses on such trip. A clause in a policy of insurance is to be interpreted in the light of what a reasonable person in the position of the named insured would have understood it to mean and not what the insurance company intended the clause to mean.
PETITION for declaratory judgment. September 12, 1940, the plaintiff issued to defendant Manzer an automobile liability insurance policy with the following clause: "This policy does not apply: . . . (e) under coverage A, to bodily injury to or death of any employee of the insured while engaged in the business, other than domestic employment, of the insured . . . ." March 25, 1941, while the defendant Manzer was returning in her automobile from Florida with a Mrs. Howland, her sister-in-law, who had spent the winter in Florida with Mrs. Manzer, after working for Mrs. Manzer in the summer of 1940 at the Farm Kitchen in Hooksett, operated by Mrs. Manzer, an accident happened in Florida, as the result of which Mrs. Howland suffered personal injuries. Mrs. Howland brought an action at law against Mrs. Manzer to recover damages for these personal injuries. The plaintiff brought this petition for declaratory judgment, claiming it was not obligated to defend the action or pay any verdict that might be recovered therein, on the ground that Mrs. Howland was, at the time of the accident, in the employ of Mrs. Manzer and engaged in the latter's business.
The case was submitted on deposition. The Presiding Justice found Mrs. Howland was not employed by Mrs. Manzer, and ruled that the plaintiff is bound to defend, and is liable on the policy in the event of judgment in favor of Mrs. Howland. To this finding and ruling the plaintiff excepted. The case is transferred on plaintiff's bill of exceptions allowed by Lorimer, J.
Further facts appear in the opinion.
Murchie Murchie (Mr. Alexander Murchie orally), for the plaintiff.
McLane, Davis Carleton (Mr. Robert P. Bingham orally), for defendant Howland.
Thorp Branch (Mr. Branch orally), for defendant Manzer.
In addition to the foregoing facts, it might be stated that Mrs. Howland after working for Mrs. Manzer in 1940, went south with Mrs. Manzer, in the latter's automobile, to spend the winter with Mrs. Manzer where the latter had a winter home. Mrs. Howland paid a small portion of the expenses both on the trip south and at the home during the winter. There was no arrangement as to the defrayal of expense on the way back. Mrs. Manzer was taking Mrs. Howland back with her with the understanding on the part of both that Mrs. Howland would work for Mrs. Manzer during the season of 1941, which was due to open May 1, provided Mrs. Howland did not find some more remunerative employment. Mrs. Howland was to stop in New Jersey on her way back, to visit for a couple of weeks, after which she would proceed by train or otherwise to Hooksett.
These facts are not disputed. To say that under such an arrangement the relationship of employer and employee existed is to put an interpretation on same beyond all reasonable and justifiable stretch of imagination. Conceding, as claimed by the petitioner, that the trip north and transportation afforded Mrs. Howland was in furtherance of Mrs. Manzer's business to be resumed May 1, it cannot be said that in the absence of actual employment and remuneration for services rendered, any reasonable and fair-minded person would reach the conclusion that the relationship of employer and employee existed. The clause in the policy is to the effect that the policy did not cover "bodily injury to or death of any employee of the insured while engaged in the business, other than domestic employment, of the insured." The words "engaged in the business" are significant. Except for the fact that these two people were on their way back home, with an understanding that Mrs. Howland might work for Mrs. Manzer, as she had done the previous summer, and that Mrs. Manzer was to share at least the greater part, if not all of the expense of the trip, there is nothing from which employment may be found. No services were being rendered, no wages were being paid, the business had not been resumed and was not to be resumed for another month. There was no agreement that the payment of expense by Mrs. Manzer was to constitute pay. Add to this the fact that these two people were related by marriage, that the bulk of the expense on the trip south and the cost of living in Florida were shouldered by Mrs. Manzer, and that Mrs. Howland was to stop in New Jersey to visit for two weeks, and proceed to Hooksett at her own expense, we have a situation where everything tends to refute and disprove rather than to establish and prove the existence of the relationship of employer and employee with the latter engaged in the business of the employer.
"Clause f [e], on which the plaintiff relies, is a contractual limit of liability (Laws 1937, c. 161, s. 16 [R. L., c. 122, s. 15]; Shelby c. Co. v. Lynch, 89 N.H. 510) and, as such, is subject to the rules governing the interpretation of contracts. It is part of a printed policy drawn presumably by specialists in the law of insurance and addressed in the specific instance to laymen who the plaintiff must have known could not have been conversant with the technical meaning of many of its terms. The test to be applied is not what the insurance company intended the clause to mean but what a reasonable person in the position of the named insured would have understood it to mean. Hoyt v. Insurance Co., [ 92 N.H. 242], and cases cited." Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Swift, 92 N.H. 364, 367.
It is impossible for us to conceive for one moment that the petitioner can seriously contend and expect to be successful in its contention that in the instant case any layman could and should have construed the exclusion in the policy to mean that on the present state of facts the relationship of employer and employee, with the latter engaged in the business of the employer, existed. We certainly cannot subscribe to such a contention.
Exception overruled.
BRANCH, J., did not sit: the others concurred.