Opinion
No. 07-5548-cv.
March 4, 2009.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Gerard E. Lynch,Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court, entered on December 19, 2007, is AFFIRMED.
APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS: CECELIA C. CHANG (Barbara D. Underwood and Benjamin N. Gutman, on the brief, for Andrew M. Cuomo, New York, N.Y.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: SADIE ZEA ISHEE (Dennis B. Feld, on the brief), for Mental Hygiene Legal Services, New York, N.Y.
PRESENT: HONORABLE REENA RAGGI, HONORABLE RALPH K. WINTER, HONORABLE PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Defendants-appellants David A. Paterson, Andrew Cuomo, Diane Jones Ritter, and Brian Fischer appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lynch, J.), granting in part and denying in part plaintiff-appellee Mental Hygiene Legal Services's motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff had filed a declaratory judgment action attacking the constitutionality of six procedural provisions of Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law (MHL), which establishes a regulatory regime for "Sex Offenders Requiring Civil Commitment or Supervision," and subsequently moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The district court granted the motion with respect to sections 10.06(k) and 10.07(d). It determined that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success in challenging § 10.06(k), concluding that the provision permitted the pre-trial detention of a "sex offender requiring civil management" without an individualized finding that the person is sufficiently dangerous to warrant confinement and that lesser conditions of supervision will not suffice to protect the public. The court also enjoined defendants from committing, pursuant to section 10.07(d), any person charged with, but never convicted of, a sex offense because of his or her mental incapacity to stand trial, unless a court or jury has found that the person did commit the conduct constituting the sex offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied plaintiff's motion with respect to the four other challenged portions of Article 10.
District courts may grant preliminary injunctions when the moving party demonstrates (1) irreparable injury absent injunctive relief, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships decidedly tipped in the movant's favor.Lusk v. Village of Cold Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 2007). However, when "the moving party seeks to stay governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, the injunction should be granted only if the moving party meets the more rigorous likelihood-of-success standard." Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, and this Court reviews the district court's determination only for abuse of that discretion. Green Party of N.Y. State v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 389 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2004). Such abuse occurs when the court applies an incorrect legal standard or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. See Prayze FM v. F.C.C., 214 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 2000). We identify neither error in this case.
We agree with the district court that plaintiff has shown irreparable injury and, at least, a likelihood of prevailing on its constitutional claims with respect to sections 10.06(k) and 10.07(d). Our conclusion, like any ruling on a preliminary injunction, does not preclude a different resolution of plaintiff's facial challenge on a more fully developed record. See id. at 253 (declining to decide facial challenge on appeal of grant of preliminary injunction).
The district court's order is accordingly AFFIRMED.