Opinion
Civ. File No. 97-1589 (PAM/JGL)
February 20, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. After a review of the record and consideration of Plaintiffs' arguments, the Court denies the Motion.
Although Plaintiffs have not filed a Motion but only a Memorandum in support of the Motion for a New Trial, the Court will consider the merits of Plaintiffs' arguments.
DISCUSSION
The Court may grant a new trial if, because of an unsupported verdict, an excessive damage award, or significant legal errors at trial, a "miscarriage of justice" has occurred. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1480 (8th Cir. 1996); Hannah v. Haskins, 612 F.2d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that a new trial is appropriate if "prejudicial error has been committed in the trial of the action").
Plaintiffs argue that a new trial is warranted because of six alleged errors of law made by the Court during the trial. These errors include the exclusion of Plaintiffs' expert witness testimony, the exclusion of certain evidence, the exclusion of Plaintiffs' claims of failure to promote and early retirement, the Court's limitation of damages to the statute of limitations period, and alleged errors in the jury instructions. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. None of the grounds cited by Plaintiffs, either individually or taken together, rises to the level of prejudicial error that would mandate a new trial. Because the jury in this case deliberated with care and the verdicts were supported by the evidence in the case, the Court will not set the jury's verdicts aside.
A. Exclusion of Expert Testimony
Plaintiffs complain that the Court "unfairly denied . . . their substantial rights to ultimately prove their case" (Pls.' Mem. at 4) by excluding the expert testimony of Dr. John Taborn. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred by concluding that they submitted untimely information that amounted to a supplementation of Dr. Taborn's expert report, that, in any event, excluding Dr. Taborn's testimony was an inappropriate and extreme remedy, and that the Court erred in reconsidering and reversing its earlier Daubert ruling.
It is worth noting at the outset that the exclusion of Dr. Taborn, a damages witness, could have had an adverse effect only on Plaintiff Phillip Webb because the jury did not reach the damages question for any of the other Plaintiffs. Having made that note, the Court will not revisit at length its determination that Plaintiffs supplemented their expert's report in an untimely manner. Suffice it to say that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it absolutely clear that a testifying expert's report "shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore [and] the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). There is no question that Dr. Taborn re-interviewed each Plaintiff and took new notes of those interviews after the initial disclosure required by the Rules. These notes were not provided to Defense counsel until after business hours on the night before Dr. Taborn was to testify. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1), this additional or changed information was due prior to the trial, at the very latest.
Despite Plaintiffs' petulance at the remedy imposed by the Court, as Defendant correctly points out, district courts need not impose the least onerous sanction available. Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 186 F.3d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir. 1999). Under the circumstances of this case, the Court determined that granting a continuance or rescheduling the testimony of Dr. Taborn was insufficient to remedy Plaintiffs' egregious abuse of the judicial process.
Finally, it was not an error for the Court to reconsider and reverse its earlier Daubert ruling in this case. Plaintiffs had represented during the Daubert hearing that Dr. Taborn's testimony was necessary because the Plaintiffs themselves could not express their complaints of emotional distress due to their denial and repression. During the course of the trial, however, each Plaintiff took the stand and testified at length about his emotional complaints. In light of Plaintiffs' misrepresentation during the Daubert hearing, the Court was moved to reconsider and reverse its earlier decision.
B. Exclusion of Evidence
Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred by excluding no less than six categories of evidence that they claim was necessary to prove their prima facie case. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendant that not all of these rulings have the same potential effect on all of the Plaintiffs. These rulings have no effect on Plaintiff Webb because the jury determined that he had proven his prima facie case. Additionally, to the extent that the rulings relate to the B-shift, these rulings have no bearing on Plaintiff Smith's case.
Because Plaintiffs have raised no new considerations, the Court will not review each of its rulings in detail. Most of Plaintiffs' complaints about the evidentiary rulings of the Court distill to the claim that "the court's crabbed notions . . . unfairly prevented the Plaintiffs from proving their case." (Pls.' Mem. at 13.) Plaintiffs, however, must do more than merely claim that the Court erred in its rulings. Beyond establishing that the Court erred, Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that these alleged errors were "so prejudicial that a new trial would likely produce a different result." Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 1997). Not only have Plaintiffs failed to show that the Court's rulings were erroneous, but they have failed to show that any alleged errors were so prejudicial as to alter the outcome of the case.
C. Exclusion of Failure to Promote and Early Retirement Claims
Plaintiffs contend that they should have been allowed to present evidence that the allegedly hostile work environment "took away their ability to take the promotional exams." (Pls. Mem. at 18.) Plaintiffs, however, were not prevented from taking promotional exams. Plaintiffs chose not to take such exams allegedly because of the hostile work environment. As the Court determined when ruling on the motions in limine, such a choice was only relevant to show that Plaintiffs subjectively felt that the work environment was hostile. Because Plaintiffs were able to, and ultimately did, adduce other evidence of the subjectively hostile nature of the work environment, evidence relating to their choice not to take promotional exams was cumulative and its probative value was outweighed by its potential to confuse or mislead the jury.
In a rather perplexing argument, Plaintiffs also contend that a new trial is justified because the Court should have allowed them to amend their Complaint to include a claim of constructive discharge. Plaintiffs, however, never made such a request. Accordingly, a new trial is not warranted to allow Plaintiffs such an opportunity.
D. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs' next argument is that the Court incorrectly narrowed the period of recovery for illegal acts of discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363.01 et seq., to the one-year statute of limitations period. Once again, it is important to note that because the jury only reached the question of damages for Plaintiff Webb, this alleged error could have affected only him.
Plaintiffs claim that the law in Minnesota does not limit the damages for employment discrimination plaintiffs to only the acts that occurred within the statute of limitations period. Plaintiffs cite no Minnesota case law that supports their position, however. Instead, Plaintiffs merely argue that the Court's ruling "abrogates the continuing violation doctrine with nonsensical results." (Pls.' Mem. at 20.)
Significantly, Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court's ruling with regard to their claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiffs' contention that limiting recovery for illegal acts of discrimination to the statute of limitations period is "nonsensical" would seem to apply equally to claims under Title VII. Such a contention, however, would flout the firmly ensconced law of this Circuit. The Court of Appeals has continually justified the rule that "plaintiffs may only recover damages on their [Title VII] discrimination claims for acts committed during [the] statute of limitations period, even if there was a continuing violation." Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d 780, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Kline v. Kansas City Fire Dep't, 175 F.3d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Damages, however, may be recovered only with respect to events that occurred within the limitations period.")). This rule "strikes a reasonable balance between permitting redress of an ongoing wrong and imposing liability for conduct long past." IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d at 797 (quoting Ashley, 66 F.3d at 167-68). It is therefore disingenuous to say that applying this rule to the MHRA, when there is no controlling Minnesota case law to the contrary, is "nonsensical." Accordingly, the Court did not err in limiting the extent of Plaintiffs' recovery to the MHRA statute of limitations period.
E. Jury Instructions
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred in instructing the jury. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Instruction 12 was misleading and confusing because it provided that "Defendant City of St. Paul . . . claims that Plaintiffs unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities." According to Plaintiffs, Defendant offered no evidence that Plaintiffs failed to take advantage of any corrective opportunities.
As Defendant notes, however, proof that an employer promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedures and proof that an employee failed to use the complaint procedures may constitute a defense. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). In this case, Defendant did provide such proof. Accordingly, Instruction 12 was a fair and accurate statement of the law.
Plaintiffs also argue that the language in Instructions 16, 18, and 22 was erroneous. Plaintiffs argument overlooks the fact that the language used in these instructions is based on the law of this Circuit. The definition of the term "unwelcome" in instruction 16 is taken from Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986). The factors to be considered in determining whether a reasonable person in each Plaintiff's circumstances would find his or her work environment hostile or abusive and the descriptions of what constitutes a hostile work environment are likewise grounded in the case law of this Circuit. See Cater v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999); Hathaway v. Renyen, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997). Finally, as Defendant notes, Instruction 22 was a correct statement of the law. See Madison, 257 F.3d at 797. Taken as a whole, these instructions concisely and accurately set forth the essential elements of Plaintiffs' claims.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that a new trial is warranted. Accordingly, based on the files, record, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (Clerk Doc. No. 155) is DENIED.