Opinion
Civil Action No: 00-0471 SECTION: "J" (4)
October 31, 2000
MINUTE ENTRY
On October 20, 2000, the Court granted the defendant's Motion to Compel and for Attorney's Fees and Costs (doc. #6), and awarded the defendant its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in filing the motion, under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (doc. #7). The Court further ordered counsel for the defendant to submit his contemporaneous time sheets in compliance with Local Rule 54.2.
On October 30, 2000, counsel for the defendant submitted his billing sheets. The defendant seeks to recover fees for one attorney, Mr. Jonathan H. Sandoz. According to the billing sheets, Mr. Sandoz billed 2.40 hours of work at $ 125.00 per hour, totaling $300.00. The defendant also seeks to recover costs incurred in filing and securing the Motion to Compel, totaling $38.80. Thus, the defendant seeks an award of $338.80.
See Rec. doc. #8.
I. Analysis
In the Fifth Circuit, the adequacy of a claim for attorney's fees is determined by computing the "lodestar" figure. The court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended in the matter and the reasonable hourly rate for the participating attorneys. See Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 862(1995). The lodestar is then computed by multiplying the number of hours by the reasonable hourly rate. Id.
The court must then consider the applicability and weight of the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The court can make upward or downward adjustments to the lodestar figure if the Johnson factors warrant such modifications. See Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1993).
The twelve Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to this case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations; (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of counsel; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See Johnson v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing the award of attorney's fees, where the lower court did not specify the factors on which it based its award of attorney's fees).
The party seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of submitting adequately documented time records. See Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457. The court should use the submitted time as a benchmark and exclude any time that is "excessive, duplicative or inadequately documented." Id.
II. Lodestar A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96(1984); Gaines v. Doughtery County Board of Education, 775 F.2d 1565, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985). The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. See NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987).
Satisfactory evidence of the reasonableness of the rate is more than the affidavit of the attorney performing the work. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n. 11. For example, satisfactory evidence must speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits. Testimony that a given fee is reasonable is therefore unsatisfactory evidence of market rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 439 n. 15(1983). Evidence of rates may be adduced through evidence of what local attorneys charge under similar circumstances.
Mr. Sandoz has not met his burden of proving that $125 per hour is reasonable given the Johnson factors. He has not provided the Court with any evidence to establish that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. The Court, however, drawing on its knowledge of local attorney's fees, the lack of complexity of the motion to compel, and the rates charges in similar cases, concludes that $110.00 is a reasonable hourly rate.
B. Hours Reasonably Expended
In determining which hours reported were reasonably expended, the total number of hours reported by each attorney is examined. When examining the hours reported for tasks that are properly billable the actual hours for the tasks are evaluated to determine if the time spent was reasonable. In determining if the time spent was reasonable, the court must examine whether the attorney exercised billing judgment; that is whether the attorney excluded excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours. See Hensley, supra.
After reviewing counsel's time entries, the Court finds that 2.4 hours were reasonably expended. Thus, the Court finds that reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the lodestar for Mr. Sandoz is $ 264.00. The Court further finds that the defendant reasonably expended $ 38.80 in costs associated with the filing and securing of the order to compel.
The lodestar for Mr. Sandoz is computed by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended (2.4) by the reasonable hourly rate ($110). See Kellstrom, supra.
Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant is hereby awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs of $ 302.80, incurred in filing and securing the order compelling the plaintiff to respond to the defendant's discovery (doc. #6). The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant $ 302.80, within twenty (20) days of this order.