Opinion
No. 05-03-01737-CV
Opinion issued December 16, 2004.
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 199-1609-02.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, RICHTER, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this tax dispute, Rosser B. Melton, Jr. appeals the trial court's directed verdict in favor of Collin County Central Appraisal District (CCAD). In two issues, Melton complains (1) the trial court erroneously excluded testimony about actual rental income and (2) the directed verdict was error or should have resulted in a different outcome in valuation. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Melton sued CCAD, contending he was entitled to have a jury determine the valuation of his property located in McKinney, Texas. During his case in chief, Melton presented photos of his property to the jury. In a hearing outside of the jury's presence, Melton requested to testify about the current rent he collected for the property. CCAD objected, contending a proper predicate for such evidence had not been laid and Melton was not qualified to render an expert opinion with regard to lease rates. CCAD further argued that it would be problematic to allow the evidence before the jury without someone testifying who was able to "give a proper analysis as to what market rent is and how that applies" to Melton's property.
The trial court denied Melton's request to present the information to the jury. The court stated that Melton had not established his ability to testify as to a fair rate for the property and "if [he could not] do that, then the actual rate's really not relevant." Melton presented no other evidence, and after being cross-examined, he rested his case. CCAD moved for a directed verdict based on the lack of evidence presented as to the market value of the property. The court granted CCAD's motion for directed verdict.
Evidence to Establish Market Value
In his first issue, Melton complains the trial court erred by excluding his testimony concerning the rental income for the property in question. Melton argues that under Hunt County Tax Appraisal District v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 719 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.App. 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), his testimony involving rental income was admissible. Melton contends that like the objections in Rubbermaid, the objections in the present case went to the weight of the evidence instead of its admissibility. Melton appears to contend that if the present testimony was excluded because of its weight, it was improperly excluded. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Rubbermaid, and Melton's argument is without merit as applied to the present case.
Rubbermaid is the only authority Melton cites. Accordingly, we address his argument only as it applies Rubbermaid. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h); Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 54 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex.App. 2001, pet. denied) ("It is not our function to independently review the record and research the applicable law to determine whether this complaint presents reversible error.").
In Rubbermaid, our Court concluded the complained-of matters concerned the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Id. at 222. However, we reached that conclusion because the parties stipulated to Rubbermaid's expert's qualification as an appraiser. Id. Further, Rubbermaid's expert detailed comparable investments, testified about his familiarity with other rental properties in towns with similar uses, and explained his adjustments in using those comparable properties. Id. Although comparable sales data was not used, both sides' experts testified that comparable sales data was unavailable. Id.
In the present case, however, Melton was not an expert, and neither party presented testimony from an expert. The parties stipulated to the admission of CCAD's exhibit showing sales of other properties in downtown McKinney, but neither party presented any evidence regarding comparable rent or comparable investments. The objections were made based on Melton's failure to lay the proper predicate and because Melton was not qualified to render an expert opinion. In sustaining CCAD's objection, the court stated that Melton had not established his ability to testify as to a fair rate for the property so as to make the actual rent relevant. Thus we conclude the court based its exclusion of Melton's testimony on his lack of qualifications to testify about the income method for determining appraisal, and accordingly, it was a question of relevancy and of admissibility. See Tex. R. Evid. 402, 702.
Under the tax code, the income method for appraisal of market value includes the analysis of comparable rental data or the potential earning capacity of the property, or both; comparable operating expense data; and comparable data to estimate rates of capitalization or rates of discount. It further requires projections of future rent or income potential and expenses to be based on reasonably clear and appropriate evidence. The tax code states,
(a) If the income method of appraisal is the most appropriate method to use to determine the market value of real property, the chief appraiser shall:
(1) analyze comparable rental data available to the chief appraiser or the potential earnings capacity of the property, or both, to estimate the gross income potential of the property;
(2) analyze comparable operating expense data available to the chief appraiser to estimate the operating expenses of the property;
(3) analyze comparable data available to the chief appraiser to estimate rates of capitalization or rates of discount; and
(4) base projections of future rent or income potential and expenses on reasonably clear and appropriate evidence.
(b) In developing income and expense statements and cash-flow projections, the chief appraiser shall consider:
(1) historical information and trends;
(2) current supply and demand factors affecting those trends; and
(3) anticipated events such as competition from other similar properties under construction.
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 23.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
We conclude that in the present case, the evidence was excluded because of its admissibility in that Melton did not establish his ability to testify. We need not address whether this was an abuse of discretion by the court, however, because Melton has failed to adequately brief that issue. Melton raises no argument and cites no authority that the court erred in excluding his testimony based on admissibility. He asserts no argument and cites to no authority saying he did establish his ability to testify. And Melton provides no authority to argue expert testimony was not required. These issues not being adequately briefed, we do not address them. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h); Wilkinson, 54 S.W.3d at 18. We resolve Melton's first issue against him.
Directed Verdict
In his second issue, Melton argues the court erred in not allowing all of the information to go to the jury and in using "a number for its valuation that it is prohibited by law from using." However, Melton offers no authority to support his argument. In introducing his second issue, Melton states, "What follows is probably correct law, or mixed fact and law, but the case law is not available to support it." He has waived his second issue.
Rule 38 of the rules of appellate procedure provides that a brief to the court of appeals shall contain, among other things, "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (appellate court has discretion to waive point of error due to inadequate briefing); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 934 (Tex. 1983). The failure to adequately brief an issue by failing to provide authorities and record citations waives any error on appeal. See Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 283-84; Wilkinson, 54 S.W.3d at 18.; Raitano v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 860 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.App. 1993, writ denied) ("The Court does not represent the appellant and has no duty to search for pertinent authority."). Because Melton provided no authorities for his argument in his second issue, we consider this issue waived and resolve his second issue against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.