Opinion
A163560
03-07-2024
GEORGE MELENDEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. CGC15549146
TUCHER, P. J.
George Melendez filed the underlying putative class action, seeking damages and statutory penalties from San Francisco Baseball Associates, LLC (the Giants) for violating California labor law by failing timely to pay final wages to discharged employees. (Lab. Code, §§ 201-203; statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Melendez's claims are premised on allegations that employees who perform event-specific job assignments at a professional baseball venue are entitled to immediate payment of final wages upon completion of each assignment pursuant to section 201, which provides that when an employer "discharges" an employee, "wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately." An "employer's willful failure to pay wages to a 'discharged' employee in accordance with section 201 subjects the employer to penalties." (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 80 (Smith).)
During the pendency of this litigation, the Legislature enacted section 201.8, which addresses payment of wages to an "events employee" of a professional baseball team and provides, among other things, that completion of a specific job assignment does not by itself constitute a discharge or termination of employment. (§ 201.8, subd. (d).) Following the enactment of section 201.8, the Giants filed a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings is "equivalent to a demurrer." (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) On appeal, we review the complaint de novo to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a "legally cognizable claim." (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Melendez contends he has alleged a valid claim against the Giants for violating section 201 during the period before section 201.8 went into effect, arguing that section 201.8 constitutes a change in the law that does not apply retroactively. Disagreeing, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Melendez's Lawsuit
Melendez filed this action against the Giants in November 2015. In an amended complaint filed the following year, Melendez alleged he had been employed intermittently by the Giants "for periods of limited and specific duration," and that he was not paid his final wages upon "discharge from such periods of intermittent employment," but instead was paid his wages several days after each alleged "discharge." Melendez further alleged that the Giants maintain a policy or practice of failing timely to pay final wages to persons it employs intermittently, and he sought to represent similarly situated current and former employees in seeking redress against the Giants for violating section 201.
According to Melendez's pleaded theory, the Giants are liable for violating section 201 because they (1) "discharged" him and other intermittently employed persons at the end of a homestand, at the end of a baseball season, and at the end of any other inter-season event, and (2) failed to pay these employees final wages at the time of each discharge. When Melendez filed his action, there was another putative class action pending against the Giants, which alleged section 201 wage violations on behalf of employees who were discharged or laid off at the end of the 2010, 2011 and 2012 baseball seasons. (Rivas v. San Francisco Giants Enterprises LLC (Super. Ct. S.F. City &County, 2021, No. CGC-13-530672) (Rivas).) In early August 2016, the parties agreed that Melendez would serve as the named plaintiff and class representative in both his case and Rivas, and they stipulated to consolidating these cases for purposes of trial.
The Giants' Unsuccessful Arbitration Motion
Meanwhile, in May 2016, the Giants filed a motion to compel arbitration of Melendez's complaint, arguing that his wage violation claim rested on factual disputes that required consideration of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (the CBA), which contained an arbitration clause. In July 2016, the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Melendez had been employed as a security guard for the Giants and was a party to the CBA through his union, but it concluded that Melendez's claims were based on "a violation of state statutes, not a violation of the CBA." The Giants appealed the order denying their arbitration motion, which stayed proceedings in the trial court for more than two years.
In April 2019, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly denied the Giants' motion to compel arbitration because the parties' dispute turns on an interpretation of state law rather than the CBA. (Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1, 5, 13 (Melendez I).) In reaching this conclusion, the Court declined to evaluate the merits of Melendez's claims, positing that the parties' "credible arguments" about whether employees were being discharged within the meaning of section 201 each time they completed a specific job assignment would "have to be considered when the trial court resolves the merits of this lawsuit on remand." (Melendez I, at pp. 5, 11.)
Senate Bill 286 of 2019
In September 2019, less than six months after Melendez I was decided, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 286 (Sen. Bill 286), which added section 201.8 to the Labor Code, effective January 1, 2020. (Stats. 2019, ch. 700, § 1.)
Section 201.8 addresses the payment of wages to an "events employee," which is defined as "an employee of an owner, operator, affiliate, licensee, vendor, concessions operator, lessee, tenant, or subtenant of a professional baseball venue or professional baseball team, or one of their respective contractors or subcontractors, who works in any capacity during any event held at a professional baseball venue, unless the employee is hired for a specified, limited, period of time, and the employee has no expectation of an ongoing employment relationship." (§ 201.8, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 201.8 codifies a general rule that an events employee is not entitled to immediate payment of his or her wages. (§ 201.8, subd. (b).) Instead, the "employee is entitled to receive payment of the wages earned and unpaid by the next regular payday, unless an events employee is discharged by the employer or the events employee quits the employment, in which case payment of final wages is governed by Sections 201 and 202, respectively." (Ibid.)
Section 201.8 also provides that, contrary to Melendez's pleaded theory, an events employee is not discharged each time he or she completes a given job assignment. (§ 201.8, subd. (d).) Instead, "[e]vents employees shall be deemed to be employed continuously and without interruption until their employment is terminated either by the employer or the events employee. The conclusion of an event or series of events (whether it is a single game, concert, or event, or a series of games in a homestand, or the end of the season for a professional baseball team), by itself, does not constitute a discharge, termination, layoff, or any other type of break in service." (Ibid.)
Melendez's Consolidated Complaint
In September 2020, Melendez filed a consolidated complaint for damages and restitution on behalf of himself, Wifredo Rivas, and other similarly situated individuals, which is the operative pleading for purposes of this appeal. The complaint divides Melendez's section 201 wage violation claim against the Giants into three causes of action that correspond to distinct putative classes of intermittently employed workers who were allegedly discharged upon completion of their job assignments and not timely paid final wages. The first cause of action alleges violations of section 201 on behalf of employees who were allegedly discharged at the end of the 2010, 2011 and 2012 baseball seasons, and the third cause of action covers persons intermittently employed between April 16, 2010, and November 29, 2012. In January 2021, the trial court sustained demurrers to these causes of action without leave to amend, and that ruling is not at issue in this appeal. The second cause of action alleges violations of section 201 on behalf of persons who were intermittently employed between November 30, 2012 and the date class notice was distributed, and on March 5, 2021, the Giants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to this remaining claim. The Giants argued that section 201.8 clarifies that Melendez's theory of liability "is not viable under Section 201," and that this clarification of the law should apply to "claims predating its enactment, such as Plaintiff's claims." Opposing this motion, Melendez argued that the Giants could be held liable for violating section 201 during the period before section 201.8 went into effect because (1) section 201.8 changed existing law by defining a layoff of a baseball industry employee to mean something other than a discharge; and (2) section 201.8 does not apply retroactively.
The consolidated complaint also contains a fourth cause of action, a non-representative claim for additional penalties under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which is derivative of the first three causes of action. The PAGA cause of action is not separately analyzed by the parties or independently relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
The trial court held a hearing on April 29, 2021, after obtaining supplemental briefing to address whether retroactive application of section 201.8 would violate due process. At the April 29 hearing, the court granted the Giants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to a tentative ruling, advised the parties that it would issue a written order, and instructed the Giants to prepare a proposed judgment. Later that day, the court issued a 13-page order explaining its decision.
The trial court characterized the dispositive issue as whether section 201.8 may be "applied to claims predating its enactment." To resolve this issue, the court undertook a two-part inquiry. Addressing first whether section 201.8 has a retrospective effect, the court was unconvinced by the Giants' characterization of section 201.8 as merely clarifying rather than effecting a change in the law. However, the court went on to find that the Legislature intended section 201.8 to apply retroactively to all existing causes of action from the date of its enactment. Based on this second finding, the court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed Melendez's remaining causes of action, and ordered the Giants to "draft and submit a proposed judgment."
On June 25, 2021, a judgment against Melendez as to all causes of action in the consolidated complaint was filed in the trial court. The judgment dismisses Melendez's claims on the merits with prejudice, provides that Melendez "shall take nothing by way of this action," and awards costs to the Giants as the prevailing party. On August 26, Melendez filed his notice of appeal, which states that he is appealing the judgment that was entered on June 25, 2021, and served on June 30, 2021.
DISCUSSION
I. The Appeal Is Timely
Along with their respondent's brief, the Giants filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that it was not timely filed. We deferred ruling on the motion, which we now deny. Under the applicable rule of court, a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the appellant has been served with notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).) Here, the Giants concede in their motion that Melendez filed his notice of appeal within 60 days of the date he was served with notice of entry of the June 2021 judgment.
The Giants argue this appeal is nevertheless untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after Melendez was served with notice of entry of the April 29, 2021, order, which granted the Giants judgment on the pleadings. This argument is inconsistent with settled authority, which establishes that an" 'order granting or denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not an appealable order because it is not final, but only a preliminary or interlocutory order. The proper appeal is from an actual judgment.' " (Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212-1213; see Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 217.)
The Giants contend that, regardless of its label, the April 29 order must be construed as the judgment because it terminated this litigation. Tellingly, the Giants fail to cite any case that construes an order granting judgment on the pleadings as an actual judgment that terminates the action. Instead, they rely on inapposite authority involving statutorily appealable orders. (Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750, 755 [probate court order whose appeal was authorized by statute]; Russell v. Foglio (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 659 [anti-SLAPP order that "was specifically, statutorily appealable"].)
Finally, the Giants contend the April 29 order constitutes a judgment because it left nothing more to be done. They cite Laraway v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, which involves an order on a petition for an extraordinary writ that "resolved all issues between the parties, did not direct or contemplate the preparation of any further order or judgment, and was thus an appealable, final order." (Id. at p. 581.) Here, by contrast, the April 29 order specifically directed the Giants to confer with opposing counsel and submit a proposed judgment, thus leaving something more to be done. Moreover, the judgment contains a cost award, which was made after the court issued its April 29 order.
II. Judgment on the Pleadings was Properly Granted
A. Issues on Appeal
Melendez contends that he stated a valid claim against the Giants for violating section 201 because section 201.8 does not apply to transactions that predate its enactment. This retroactivity issue is dispositive, for Melendez does not dispute that, to the extent section 201.8 applies, he and the putative class are events employees whose completion of a job assignment at the Giants' ballpark does not constitute a discharge within the meaning of section 201.
"A basic canon of statutory interpretation is that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the Legislature plainly intended them to do so." (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western Security Bank).) The parties' respective arguments on appeal implicate two prongs of this rule, requiring consideration of whether section 201.8 has a retrospective effect, and if so, whether the Legislature nonetheless intended the statute to apply retroactively.
The determination whether a statute has retrospective effect is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a judicial function. (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244.) "A statute has retrospective effect when it substantially changes the legal consequences of past events," whereas "a statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively even if applied to transactions predating its enactment." (Id. at p. 243, italics omitted.) Courts assume that "the Legislature amends a statute for a purpose, but that purpose need not necessarily be to change the law. [Citation.] Our consideration of the surrounding circumstances can indicate that the Legislature made material changes in statutory language in an effort only to clarify a statute's true meaning." (Ibid.)
The general rule is that statutes operate prospectively only, and there is a presumption against retroactive legislation. (McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475 (McClung).) Thus, absent "an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature or the voters must have intended a retroactive application." (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209.) When "the Legislature clearly intends a statute to operate retrospectively, we are obliged to carry out that intent unless due process considerations prevent us." (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243.)
B. Did Section 201.8 Clarify or Change Existing Law?
"A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment." (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 (Carter).) "Such a legislative act has no retrospective effect because the true meaning of the statute remains the same." (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243.) Even when the Legislature makes material changes to statutory language, courts will consider the surrounding circumstances when determining whether those changes were "an effort only to clarify a statute's true meaning." (Ibid.; see also Carter, at pp. 922-923.)
Circumstances surrounding the enactment of section 201.8 lead us to conclude that this statute clarifies existing law. The term "discharge" in section 201 is not defined, which led to the controversy in the present case about whether workers employed in the baseball industry are discharged each time they complete a specific assignment. In Melendez I, the Supreme Court recognized that this case presents credible arguments supporting both sides of the controversy. (See Melendez I, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 11.) Within months of that decision, the Legislature added section 201.8 to the Labor Code, which resolves the matter conclusively by expressly adopting the Giants' view that their employees are not discharged each time a specific job assignment is completed. When the Legislature "promptly reacts to the emergence of a novel question of statutory interpretation" by amending the statute to address the question,"' "it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act." '" (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243.)
Circumstances surrounding the passage of Sen. Bill 286 are also relevant here. Legislative history admitted into the record by the trial courtreflects that Sen. Bill 286 was introduced to and adopted by the Legislature for the purpose of clarifying that employees who work at a professional baseball stadium are not terminated from their employment at the conclusion of an event, series of events, or baseball season. Committee reports analyzing the bill prior to its passage repeatedly stated that Sen. Bill 286 "clarifies" that events employees of a professional baseball team are continuously employed, until they or their employer terminates their employment. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Labor, Public Employment &Retirement, Analysis of Sen. Bill 286 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 12, 2019, pp. 2-3; Sen. Rules Com., Off of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill 286 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 6, 2019, pp. 1-3.) For example, the Office of Senate Floor Analyses reported that Sen. Bill 286 "clarifies that the conclusion of an event or series of events (whether it is a single game[,] concert, or event, or a series of games in a homestand, or the end of the season for a professional baseball team), by itself does not constitute a discharge, termination, layoff, or any other type of break in service." Some reports also articulated a need for clarifying legislation due to recent litigation and even spelled out the competing arguments as to whether events employees remained continuously employed at the conclusion of a single game, homestand, or season of work. This legislative history reinforces our conclusion that section 201.8 clarified existing law. (See e.g., Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corp. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926, 959 [legislative history "instructive" when it showed the clarifying statute was a response to" 'contradictory and inconsistent interpretations'" of the injury element of the alleged Labor Code violation].)
The Giants request judicial notice of legislative material pertaining to the enactment of section 201.8 that was judicially noticed by the trial court. (Citing Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) We deny the request because published legislative history may be cited without a request for judicial notice. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9.) The Giants also request judicial notice of nine "facts and propositions" pertaining to the operation of their business, which they characterize as matters of common knowledge and not reasonably subject to dispute. We deny this request because, even if we assume these alleged facts are matters of common knowledge, the Giants fail to show that they are relevant to our disposition of the present appeal. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 ["any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue"].)
Melendez argues that section 201.8 must be deemed a change in the law because before section 201.8 was enacted, the plain language of section 201 compelled a finding that layoffs in the baseball industry constituted discharges. Melendez bases this argument on a provision in section 201, subdivision (a) (section 201(a)), which states that "[a]n employer who lays off a group of employees by reason of the termination of seasonal employment in the curing, canning, or drying of any variety of perishable fruit, fish, or vegetables, shall be deemed to have made immediate payment when the wages of said employees are paid within a reasonable time as necessary for computation and payment thereof . . ." Melendez construes this provision as equating layoffs with discharges unless they fall within the statutory exception carved out for specific types of seasonal work. Building on this theory, he posits that layoffs in the baseball industry constituted discharges under section 201 until the enactment of section 201.8, when the Legislature carved out a new exception to the rule of immediate wage payment for employers in the baseball industry.
Melendez's argument rests on the false assumption that his interpretation of section 201(a) is incontrovertible. To be sure, section 201(a) establishes a special rule that applies when certain agricultural and fishing industry employers "lay[] off" seasonal workers. But Melendez points to no language in section 201 that addresses whether employees who work in industries not listed in section 201(a), such as employees in the professional baseball industry, are discharged within the meaning of the statute each time they complete a specific assignment. Throughout this litigation, the Giants advocated for a different construction of section 201 from the construction upon which Melendez based his claims, and the Melendez I court opined that both arguments were credible. (Melendez I, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 11.) The fact that our high court recognized Melendez's interpretation of section 201 as plausible but not incontrovertible reinforces our conclusion that a clarification was in order and was provided when the Legislature enacted section 201.8.
In a related argument, Melendez contends that legislative history characterizing section 201.8 as a clarification of the law should be disregarded as absurd. It is true that courts should not accept uncritically a" '[l]egislative statement that an unmistakable change in the statute is nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its original terms,'" and a legislative declaration "that a statutory amendment merely clarified the law 'cannot be given an obviously absurd effect.'" (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 473.) But, although statutory interpretation is ultimately a judicial function, legislative declarations regarding an existing statute's meaning "are entitled to due consideration, and we cannot disregard them." (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244.)
Here, as we have explained, section 201.8 does not constitute an unmistakable change in the statute, and it was in no way absurd for the Legislature to have characterized it as clarifying existing law. True, when the Legislature enacted section 201(a) in 1947, it carved out an express exception to the immediate wage payment requirement for specific groups of seasonal employees and did not include employees in the baseball industry. But section 201(a) does not address the baseball industry one way or the other. Nothing about that provision was unmistakably changed by enacting section 201.8. Nor does the fact that section 201(a) was enacted decades before section 201.8 carry much weight here. The pertinent fact is that once a controversy about how properly to apply section 201(a) to the baseball industry arose in the underlying litigation, the Legislature responded promptly to clarify the law by enacting section 201.8. (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 243-244.)
Melendez's remaining substantive argument is that controlling Supreme Court precedent precludes construing section 201.8 as a clarification of existing law, citing Smith, supra, 39 Cal.4th 77. When the courts have definitively interpreted a statute, the Legislature may-of course-amend the statute to overrule the judicial decision, but in doing so, the Legislature necessarily changes the law regardless of any expressed intent to clarify the law. (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 473-474.) But we reject Melendez's contention that Smith definitively resolved the statutory interpretation issue that generated the present litigation.
In Smith, the plaintiff was hired for a one-day modeling job with the understanding she would be paid $500 for her work, but the employer waited more than two months to pay her. (Smith, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 81.) In her subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged the defendant violated section 201 by failing to pay her and other models their wages immediately upon discharge from employment, and sought penalties pursuant to section 203. (Ibid.) The issue before our Supreme Court was "whether the discharge element of these two statutes requires an involuntary termination from an ongoing employment relationship . . . or whether this element also may be met when an employer releases an employee after completion of a specific job assignment or time duration for which the employee was hired." (Ibid.) The Court concluded that "the statutory discharge element contemplates both types of employment terminations." (Ibid.)
Importantly, there was no dispute in Smith that the employeremployee relationship was terminated upon completion of the one-day job; the only issue was whether termination must be involuntary to qualify as a statutory discharge. (See Smith, supra, 39 Cal.4th pp. 82-83.) And the Smith Court did not expressly or implicitly consider whether employees in the professional baseball industry experience a discharge upon completion of each specific work assignment. Throughout the present litigation, the parties have debated how Smith "applies here," and as our Supreme Court observed in Melendez I, both parties made "credible arguments" in favor of their contrary positions. (Melendez I, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 11.) But the Melendez I court declined to resolve this debate, leaving the matter for the trial court to decide (ibid.), and, in the meantime, the Legislature announced its intent to clarify section 201 by enacting section 201.8. Because section 201.8 was enacted soon after the Melendez I court acknowledged the need to clarify the meaning of the term "discharge" in section 201 as it applies to employment in the baseball industry, it is appropriate to give particular weight to legislative declarations that section 201.8 was intended to clarify existing law. (See Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243.)
A similar situation arose in Sullivan v. Kelly Servs., Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2008, Nov. 12, 2008, No. C 07-2784 CW) 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 91608, which reinforces our conclusion. In that case, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint against a temporary employment agency for violating section 201 and 202, on the theory that the defendant discharged her when she completed her temporary assignment, entitling her to immediate payment of wages. (Id. at *3, *7.) In granting the defendant summary judgment, the Sullivan court distinguished Smith on the ground that the Smith plaintiff was not employed to complete temporary work assignments but was directly employed to work for a single day, and released after one day of work. (Sullivan, at *8-*9; compare Smith, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 90.) The Sullivan court also pointed out that although the Smith case did not address temporary services employees, after Smith was decided, a controversy arose about whether temporary services employees would be considered discharged after every temporary work assignment, and a bill was successfully introduced to add section 201.3 to the Labor Code clarifying that temporary services employees were not discharged after every temporary assignment. (Sullivan, at *9-*10.) Under those circumstances, the Sullivan court concluded, section 201.3 applied to transactions preceding its enactment because it clarified rather than changed existing law.
"While not binding on us, a nonpublished federal district court case can be citable as persuasive authority." (Balsam v. Trancos, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1100.)
As in Sullivan, the present case is distinguishable from Smith because Melendez's ongoing employment with the Giants consisted of temporally- limited work assignments, as opposed to a voluntary termination after a single, short-term job. Smith did not address employees in the professional baseball industry, just as it did not address temporary services workers. And once the Melendez I court acknowledged the genuine dispute about how properly to interpret section 201, the Legislature acted promptly to clarify the law, as it did with respect to the controversy that gave rise to the Sullivan case.
In a supplemental brief, the Giants rely on Young v. RemX Specialty Staffing (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 427, which also involved a claim that a temporary staffing company failed to timely pay final wages, although the alleged violation occurred after section 201.3 was enacted. There, the plaintiff's employer assigned her to fill a temporary position at a bank, which she did not complete because the bank terminated the assignment due to the plaintiff's misconduct. (Id. at pp. 430-431.) The plaintiff was not discharged by her employer, but she nevertheless alleged that her termination by the bank constituted a discharge within the meaning of section 201.3. (Id. at p. 432.) The appellate court disagreed, relying on Smith for the proposition that "a 'discharge' requires the end of an employment relationship." (Young, at p. 433, italics omitted.) The Young court also emphasized that, although section 201.3 was enacted in response to concern about the implications of Smith, this statute did not change the Smith Court's definition of a discharge. (Young, at p. 433.) Instead, as legislative history material showed, the Legislature addressed this concern by clarifying the law to explicitly state that temporary services employees are not owed final wages when a temporary assignment ends unless the employee is discharged. (Young, at p. 434.) On this issue, Young's analysis parallels our own, further reinforcing that in the context of events employees, section 201.8 clarified existing law by stating explicitly that completion of a temporary job assignment does not constitute a discharge, unless the employment relationship is also terminated by the employer or the events employee. (§ 201.8, subd. (d).)
In his supplemental brief, Melendez acknowledges that" 'clarification'" language in the legislative history of section 201.8 shows "the Legislature clearly intended to provide an interpretation of existing law," but he argues that this expression of legislative intent does not control a court's exercise of its obligation to interpret the law. We agree with this concession; expressions of legislative intent to clarify the law are relevant, which is why we consider them here, along with other circumstances surrounding the enactment of section 201.8.
For all these reasons, we conclude that section 201.8 clarified existing law and applies to transactions predating its enactment because it has no retrospective effect. In our view, the trial court reached a contrary conclusion because it misunderstood the significance of the fact that, prior to the enactment of section 201.8, both parties proffered plausible interpretations of section 201. When a statute has been definitively interpreted, an amendment inconsistent with that interpretation would be a change in the law, regardless of any legislative declaration suggesting otherwise. (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 473-474.) But when there is a genuine dispute about how properly to interpret a statutory term, the fact that the Legislature promptly acts for the express purpose of clarifying the statute is a strong indication that the resulting statute is indeed a clarification of existing law, applicable to pending cases on that basis. (Ibid.; see e.g., Carter, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 930.)
C. Does Section 201.8 Apply Retroactively?
After concluding (erroneously in our view) that section 201.8 changed the law, the trial court found that this statute applies retroactively to bar Melendez's remaining causes of action against the Giants. Melendez disagrees strongly with this aspect of the trial court's ruling, arguing that the absence of an express retroactivity provision is dispositive, as the legislative history contains no evidence that the Legislature considered the issue of retroactivity. (Citing e.g., McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th 456.) In presenting his arguments, Melendez fails to consider that expressions of intent to clarify the law can be evidence of the Legislature's intent for a statute to apply to all existing causes of action, whether or not the statute does in fact change (rather than clarify) the law. (Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization (2001) 25 Cal.4th 197, 222; Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 244-245; Plotkin v. Sajahtera, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 953, 961.)
In any event, we do not reach the merits of the second prong of the appealed order in light of our conclusion that section 201.8 applies to transactions predating its enactment because its clarified existing law. On this ground alone, we affirm the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to Melendez's remaining claim against the Giants.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party is to bear its own costs.
WE CONCUR: FUJISAKI, J., PETROU, J.