Opinion
No. 03 Civ. 3026 (SAS).
December 15, 2004
Edwin Melendez, Camp Gabriels, Gabriels, New York, Plaintiff (Pro Se).
Michael S. Chestnov, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York, New York, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Edwin Melendez, an incarcerated and pro se plaintiff, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New York City Department of Correction ("NYCDOC") Officers Simmonds and Cruse. Construing the complaint liberally, Melendez alleges that during a February 27, 2003 incident at Bronx Supreme Court, defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Simmonds was sued incorrectly as "Simmon." See Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ III.B. Melendez also incorrectly referred to Simmonds and Cruse as "Bronx Supreme Court Corrections Officers" in the caption of the complaint. Id. Simmonds and Cruse are employees of the New York City Department of Correction. See 9/24/04 Defendants' Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment ("SJ Notice") at 1.
See id. ¶ IV.
See SJ Notice at 1.
Because Melendez failed to oppose defendants' motion, I have decided the motion solely on the papers submitted by defendants.
II. BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2003, Melendez was escorted by court officers to a holding pen in the basement of the Bronx Supreme Court. Once he reached the basement, Melendez claims that he was transferred into the custody of NYCDOC. Melendez submits that at this point he "became dizzy as a result of [his] low blood pressure," and that Simmonds "forced [him] to keep moving, holding [him] by [his] arm." Melendez subsequently collapsed, sustaining injuries to his left eye and neck. The incident occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m., and EMS technicians began attending to Melendez no later than 3:15 p.m. A Bronx Supreme Court officer escorted Melendez to Lincoln Hospital in the Bronx, where his injuries were treated. After his medical treatment, Melendez was taken to the Bronx Criminal Court and turned over to the custody of NYCDOC.
See Compl. ¶ IV.
See 7/28/04 Melendez Deposition ("Melendez Dep."), Ex. C to 9/24/04 Declaration of Michael Chestnov ("Chestnov Dec."), counsel to defendants, at 28:4-10.
Compl. ¶ IV.
See id.
See Melendez Dep. at 51:23-24.
See FDNY Ambulance Call Report, Ex. D to Chestnov Dec. (noting that the EMS technicians took Melendez's blood pressure at 3:15 p.m.).
See Melendez Dep. at 41:12-42:17.
See Compl. ¶ IV; Lincoln Hospital Emergency Services Form, Ex. E to Chestnov Dec. (stating that Melendez was admitted to Lincoln Hospital at 4:48 p.m. on February 27, 2003).
See Melendez Dep. at 44:4-23; see also Melendez's Inmate Movement Activity Form ("Movement Form"), Ex. G to Chestnov Dec. (stating that Melendez was first received into NYCDOC's custody at location "CXE2" on February 27, 2003 at 10:26 p.m.); NYCDOC Master Location List, Ex. H to Chestnov Dec. (identifying location "CXE2" as the Bronx Criminal Court New Admit Area).
Although Melendez names Cruse as a defendant, he does not plead any specific claim against Cruse in his complaint. However, at his deposition, Melendez stated that Cruse (1) was the highest ranking officer on the scene at the time of Melendez's injury, (2) argued with a Bronx Supreme Court officer about who was responsible for Melendez after he fell, and (3) was negligent because this argument delayed Melendez's medical treatment.
See Compl. ¶ III.C.
See id. ¶ IV.
See Melendez Dep. at 52:11-13.
See id. at 50:1-4.
See id. at 49:22-24, 51:19-52:1.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." "An issue of fact is `genuine' if `the evidence is such that a jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" "A fact is `material' for these purposes if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'"
Overton v. New York State Div. of Military and Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The movant has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party must then "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" "`Mere conclusory allegations, speculation or conjecture will not avail a party resisting summary judgment.'" In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
See Powell v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. (quoting Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Conroy v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996)).
See Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
When the non-moving party "`chooses the perilous path of failing to submit a response to a summary judgment motion, the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial.'" If the movant does not meet its burden of production, then the court must deny summary judgment even if the non-movant does not oppose the motion. Moreover, the court may not rely solely on the movant's statement of undisputed facts contained in its Rule 56.1 statement. The court must be satisfied that the movant's assertions are supported by the evidence in the record.
Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001)).
See id. (citing Amaker, 274 F.3d at 681).
See id.
See id. (citing Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003)).
B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
The Supreme Court has held that under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an "obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Therefore, "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" is both proscribed by the Eighth Amendment and creates a cognizable claim under section 1983. "The standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components." First, the government action must be "`sufficiently serious'" to an objective observer. Second, the government official "`must act with a subjectively culpable state of mind.'" Central to an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is that the prisoner must be in the custody of the government actor who committed the alleged violation.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
Id. at 104-05.
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Id. (quoting Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66).
See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (noting that the Eighth Amendment requires the government to attend to the medical needs of prisoners who have been deprived of their liberty and thus cannot care for themselves); Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing a deliberate indifference claim against prosecutors because the Eighth Amendment only requires that prison officials "protect the health and safety of inmates in their custody").
IV. DISCUSSION
The relevant issue in this case concerns the identity of the officers who had custody of Melendez at the time of his injuries. Melendez claims that NYCDOC Officers, namely Simmonds and Cruse, are responsible for his injuries and the delay in his medical treatment. However, defendants have submitted evidence demonstrating that Melendez was not in the custody of NYCDOC at the time of the incident. Specifically, defendants have proffered Melendez's Movement Form, which shows that Melendez was first admitted into NYCDOC custody at 10:26 p.m. on the day of the incident, over seven hours after his injuries occurred. Additionally, Melendez himself admits that a Bronx Supreme Court officer accompanied him to the hospital, and that upon returning from the hospital, he was transferred into NYCDOC custody at the Bronx Criminal Court. This evidence supports the conclusion that although Melendez was on his way to the NYCDOC admission area when his injuries occurred, he was still in the custody of the Bronx Supreme Court at the time of the incident. Accordingly, at the time Melendez sustained his injuries, Bronx Supreme Court officers were responsible for his care. Because defendants have demonstrated that Simmonds and Cruse were not responsible for Melendez's injuries, defendants have met their burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See Compl. ¶¶ III-IV; Melendez Dep. at 49:22-50:7, 51:19-52:1.
See Movement Form; see also Arraignment and Classification of Risk Screening Form, Ex. F to Chestnov Dec., at 1 (noting that NYCDOC received Melendez into custody after 10:00 p.m. on February 27, 2003).
See Melendez Dep. at 41:12-42:17.
See id. at 44:4-45:10.
In contrast, Melendez has provided no evidence to support his contention that he was in the custody of NYCDOC officers at the time of his injuries. Although his complaint refers to Simmonds as the officer who forced him to stand up and walk when he felt dizzy, this conclusory statement is the extent of his evidence against Simmonds. Similarly, Melendez initially fails to state Cruse's role in the incident, and later simply alleges that Cruse had a brief argument with a Bronx Supreme Court officer about who should take responsibility for Melendez. Melendez's statements about Simmonds and Cruse, devoid of any additional evidence, do not demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
See Compl. ¶ IV.
See id.
See Melendez Dep. at 49:22-50:4.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [docket # 19] and this case.
SO ORDERED.