Mejia v. State

Full title: JUANA MELISSA MEJIA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Feb 5, 2009

No. 05-08-00352-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 5, 2009)

Opinion

No. 05-08-00352-CR

Opinion Filed February 5, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 001-82280-07.

Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and LANG.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice LANG.

Following the trial court's denial of her pretrial motion to suppress evidence, appellant Juana Melissa Mejia pleaded guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of that offense and assessed punishment at ninety days' confinement, suspended for twelve months, and a fine of $600. In a single issue on appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because a police officer acting outside his geographical jurisdiction cannot lawfully detain a citizen based on reasonable suspicion. We conclude the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's sole issue is decided against her. Because all dispositive issues are well settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are based on the testimony of Officer Jeffrey A. Rose at the January 31, 2008 hearing on appellant's motion to suppress. At the time of the underlying events in this case, Rose was employed as a motorcycle officer with the Addison Police Department. According to Rose, the City of Addison is located entirely within Dallas County. While traveling home from an off-duty job at approximately 2:30 a.m. on January 11, 2007, Rose was driving his personal vehicle in the center lane of a three-lane portion of the Dallas North Tollway located in Collin County. Looking in his rearview mirror, Rose "noticed a set of headlights rapidly approaching" his vehicle. As the vehicle behind Rose drew closer, it began "flashing its headlights as if it wanted [him] to move out of the way." The vehicle "got right up to" Rose, causing Rose to become "very concerned" the vehicle was going to run into him. The vehicle then "swerved" to the right and passed Rose on the right-hand side. Shortly after passing Rose, the vehicle exited the tollway. Rose observed that as the vehicle exited, "the [vehicles's] two right side tires, passenger side tires left the pavement" and "started riding up on" a concrete barrier on the side of the exit ramp. In addition, the front end of the vehicle "struck the concrete barrier" and "bounced off." Rose "became concerned" and followed the vehicle as it pulled into a nearby gas station and stopped near some gas pumps. According to Rose, the gas station was located in Collin County. Rose contacted his police dispatcher and "told them to call Dallas, that there was a driver that was possibly intoxicated." At the gas station, Rose approached the vehicle, which was being driven by appellant, and identified himself as a police officer. Rose opened the door of appellant's vehicle and detected "a heavy scent of alcohol inside of the vehicle." Rose ordered appellant out of her vehicle and detained her until Dallas police officers arrived. Steven Jankowski was one of two Dallas police officers who arrived at the scene while Rose was detaining appellant. Jankowski testified at the suppression hearing that appellant admitted to him she had consumed two glasses of wine. According to Jankowski, appellant failed field sobriety tests and was arrested, without a warrant, for driving while intoxicated. On August 8, 2007, appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress "the use, at the trial of this case, of all evidence, physical or testimonial, seized or obtained by the State of Texas in violation of the laws or constitutions of the State of Texas or of the United States." At the hearing on that motion, appellant sought, specifically, suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of "the approach by Officer Rose" and his detention of appellant, including "anything after that detention." Appellant asserted Rose was acting beyond his geographical jurisdiction when he detained her at the gas station. Appellant contended such investigatory detention was not permissible under the law because Rose did not have probable cause to believe she was committing the offense of driving while intoxicated. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress and stated as follows:

The court finds that Officer Rose did not conduct a traffic stop in this case. The defendant stopped her vehicle of her own accord.

Officer Rose contacted dispatch of [sic] a possible intoxicated driver and stopped behind the defendant when she pulled into the gas station.

Officer Rose had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant on suspicion of driving while intoxicated based on her unsafe driving, including her rate of speed, almost hitting Officer Rose, striking the barrier with her car and riding up on the barrier with the tires of her car as well as the smell of alcohol Officer Rose detected coming from her or the vehicle and her admission to drinking two glasses of wine.¹ There is a recent case out of the Court of Appeals in Dallas which I am bound by, State versus Purdy, and that's the court's ruling.

Following appellant's guilty plea and the trial court's adjudication of guilt and assessment of punishment, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In her sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts as follows:

The trial court erred by denying the Motion to Suppress Evidence upon evidence and findings that Ms. Mejia was detained by a police officer who was acting outside his geographical jurisdiction based on reasonable suspicion that Ms. Mejia was driving while intoxicated, in violation of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(g) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

Appellant contends the trial court's ruling conflicts with the "fundamental rule" that "police officers acting outside their geographical jurisdiction may not detain citizens upon reasonable suspicion." According to appellant, "[a] peace officer who is acting outside his geographical jurisdiction does not have the right to seize a citizen except upon probable cause to believe that the citizen has committed an offense in the officer's presence." Appellant contends suppression of the evidence at issue "would have likely prevented the State from obtaining a conviction in this case-an error that affects substantial rights." Thus, appellant argues, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence was reversible error. The State asserts "only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is required to conduct an investigative detention, regardless of whether it is within the officer's jurisdiction." According to the State, Rose "had reasonable suspicion that [a]ppellant was driving while intoxicated based on her speeding, nearly striking his vehicle, and hitting a road barrier as she exited the highway." Therefore, the State argues, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, and we review de novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact not turning on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493; State v. Purdy, 244 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. ref'd). If the trial court's decision is correct based on any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained. See St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725; Randolph, 152 S.W.3d at 769.

B. Applicable Law

Subsection two of article 14.03(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part that a police officer outside his jurisdiction "may arrest without a warrant a person who commits any offense within the officer's presence or view," with the exception of certain violations of the Texas Transportation Code not relevant here. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(g)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008). "An `arrest' under article 14.03 is not limited to a formal, custodial arrest." Purdy, 244 S.W.3d at 594 (citing Mitchell v. State, 187 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. ref'd)). "Thus, the provisions of article 14.03 also apply when an officer temporarily detains a person based on reasonable suspicion." Id.; see also Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 260 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).

C. Application of Law to Facts

Appellant asserts subsection two of article 14.03(g) applies in this case. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(g)(2). Appellant does not dispute that in Purdy, this Court concluded article 14.03(g) authorizes a municipal police officer to stop a driver outside his jurisdiction if the officer has reasonable suspicion the driver is driving while intoxicated. Purdy, 244 S.W.3d at 594-95. Rather, appellant argues Purdy was wrongly decided by this Court. We disagree. In support of her argument, appellant cites Brother, which was a primary basis for this Court's decision in Purdy. See id.; Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 260-61. Appellant asserts Brother required probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, for a stop outside the detaining officer's jurisdiction of a driver suspected of driving while intoxicated. Therefore, appellant contends, under Brother, Rose "was required to have probable cause to justify his detention of [appellant] at the gas station in Collin County." However, although the court in Brother used the term "probable cause" in determining article 14.03(g) did not prohibit the stop, the court's analysis focused on whether the officer had specific articulable facts from which to form a reasonable suspicion the driver was driving while intoxicated. See id. at 256-60; see also Purdy, 244 S.W.3d at 595-96. Additionally, appellant contends State v. Kurtz, 152 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), "said that police officers acting outside their geographical jurisdiction must have probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, to seize a citizen." However, that case involved an extra-jurisdictional stop (1) based only on traffic offenses, and (2) made by an officer specifically prohibited by article 14.03(g) from making an arrest based on such offenses. See id. at 79-80. Kurtz did not address the issue before us, and the proposition asserted by appellant is not stated in that case. Id. Therefore, Kurtz is not instructive. The only other cases cited by appellant in support of her contention Rose was required to have probable cause to detain her are two Waco Court of Appeals cases, one vacated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the other reversed. See Gerron v. State, 57 S.W.3d 568 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001), vacated, 97 S.W.3d 597 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Yeager v. State, 23 S.W.3d 566 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000), rev'd, 104 S.W.3d 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). More recently, the Waco Court of Appeals specifically held article 14.03 permits a police officer to conduct an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion of a non-traffic offense. See Mitchell, 187 S.W.3d at 116. In addition, other Texas courts of appeals have similarly interpreted article 14.03. See Leonard v. State, 135 S.W.3d 98, 102-03 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. ref'd); Escamilla v. State, No. 01-06-00299-CR, 2007 WL 1440228, at *3 n. 3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 17, 2007, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication); Stevenson v. State, No. 03-05-00217-CR, 2006 WL 1649015, at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin June 15, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication); State v. McMorris, No. 02-05-00363-CR, 2006 WL 1452097, at *3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 25, 2006, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument that this Court's decision in Purdy should be overruled. Based on Purdy, we conclude Rose, a police officer acting outside his jurisdiction, was required to have only reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, to detain a driver suspected of driving while intoxicated. Appellant's sole issue is decided against her.

III. CONCLUSION

Because a police officer acting outside his geographical jurisdiction can lawfully detain a citizen based on reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. We decide against appellant on her sole issue. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.